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SUMMA THEOLOGICA
by ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
PART I ("Prima Pars")
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province
BENZIGER BROTHERS
NEW YORK
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DEDICATION
To the Blessed Virgin
Mary Immaculate
Seat of Wisdom
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NOTE TO THIS ELECTRONIC EDITION
The text of this electronic edition was originally produced by Sandra
K. Perry, Perrysburg, Ohio, and made available through the Christian
Classics Ethereal Library <http://www.ccel.org>;. I have eliminated
unnecessary formatting in the text, corrected some errors in
transcription, and added the dedication, tables of contents,
Prologue, and the numbers of the questions and articles, as they
appeared in the printed translation published by Benziger Brothers.
Each article is now designated by part, question number, and article
number in brackets, like this:
> SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 49, Art. 2]
> Whether the Supreme Good, God, Is the Cause of Evil?
In a few places, where obvious errors appeared in the Benziger
Brothers edition, I have corrected them by reference to a Latin text
of the _Summa._ These corrections are indicated by English text in
brackets. For example, in Part I, Question 45, Article 2, the first
sentence in the Benziger Brothers edition begins: "Not only is it
impossible that anything should be created by God...." By reference
to the Latin, "non solum _non_ est impossibile a Deo aliquid creari"
(emphasis added), this has been corrected to "Not only is it [not]
impossible that anything should be created by God...."
This electronic edition also differs from the Benziger Brothers
edition in the following details (as well as the obvious lack of the
original page numbers and headers):
* The repetitive expression "We proceed thus to the [next] Article"
does not appear directly below the title of each article.
* Italics are represented by underscores at the beginning and end,
_like this._ Quotations and other "quotable" matter, however, are
ordinarily set off by quotation marks with no underscores in this
edition, in accordance with common English usage, even where they
were set in italics with no quotation marks in the Benziger Brothers
edition. Titles of books are set off by underscores when they appear
in the text with no parentheses, but not when the books are cited in
parentheses.
* Bible chapters and verses are cited with arabic numerals separated
by colons, like this: "Dan. 7:10"--not like this: "Dan. vii. 10."
Small roman numerals have been retained where they appear in
citations to books other than the Bible.
* Any matter that appeared in a footnote in the Benziger Brothers
edition is presented in brackets at the point in the text where the
footnote mark appeared.
* Greek words are presented in Roman transliteration.
* Paragraphs are not indented and are separated by blank lines.
* Numbered topics, set forth at the beginning of each question and
at certain other places, are ordinarily presented on a separate line
for each topic.
* Titles of questions are in all caps.
Anything else in this electronic edition that does not correspond to
the content of the Benziger Brothers edition may be regarded as a
defect in this edition and attributed to me (David McClamrock).
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CONTENTS
PROLOGUE
FIRST PART (QQ. 1-119)
Question
1. The Nature and Extent of Sacred Doctrine
2. The Existence of God
3. On the Simplicity of God
4. The Perfection of God
5. Of Goodness in General
6. The Goodness of God
7. The Infinity of God
8. The Existence of God in Things
9. The Immutability of God
10. The Eternity of God
11. The Unity of God
12. How God Is Known by Us
13. The Names of God
14. Of God's Knowledge
15. Of Ideas
16. Of Truth
17. Concerning Falsity
18. The Life of God
19. The Will of God
20. God's Love
21. The Justice and Mercy of God
22. The Providence of God
23. Of Predestination
24. The Book of Life
25. The Power of God
26. Of the Divine Beatitude
27. The Procession of the Divine Persons
28. The Divine Relations
29. The Divine Persons
30. The Plurality of Persons in God
31. Of What Belongs to the Unity or Plurality in God
32. The Knowledge of the Divine Persons
33. Of the Person of the Father
34. Of the Person of the Son
35. Of the Image
36. Of the Person of the Holy Ghost
37. Of the Name of the Holy Ghost--Love
38. Of the Name of the Holy Ghost, as Gift
39. Of the Persons in Relation to the Essence
40. Of the Persons as Compared to the Relations or Properties
41. Of the Persons in Reference to the Notional Acts
42. Of Equality and Likeness Among the Divine Persons
43. The Mission of the Divine Persons
TREATISE ON THE CREATION
44. The Procession of Creatures from God, and of the First Cause
of All Things
45. The Mode of Emanation of Things from the First Principle
46. Of the Beginning of the Duration of Creatures
47. Of the Distinction of Things in General
48. The Distinction of Things in Particular
49. The Cause of Evil
TREATISE ON THE ANGELS
50. Of the Substance of the Angels Absolutely Considered
51. Of the Angels in Comparison with Bodies
52. Of the Angels in Relation to Place
53. Of the Local Movement of the Angels
54. Of the Knowledge of the Angels
55. Of the Medium of the Angelic Knowledge
56. Of the Angels' Knowledge of Immaterial Things
57. Of the Angels' Knowledge of Material Things
58. Of the Mode of the Angelic Knowledge
59. The Will of the Angels
60. Of the Love or Dilection of the Angels
61. Of the Production of the Angels in the Order of Natural Being
62. Of the Perfection of the Angels in the Order of Grace and of
Glory
63. The Malice of the Angels with Regard to Sin
64. The Punishment of the Demons
TREATISE ON THE WORK OF THE SIX DAYS
65. The Work of Creation of Corporeal Creatures
66. On the Order of Creation Towards Distinction
67. On the Work of Distinction in Itself
68. On the Work of the Second Day
69. On the Work of the Third Day
70. On the Work of Adornment, as Regards the Fourth Day
71. On the Work of the Fifth Day
72. On the Work of the Sixth Day
73. On the Things That Belong to the Seventh Day
74. On All the Seven Days in Common
TREATISE ON MAN
75. Of Man Who Is Composed of a Spiritual and a Corporeal Substance:
and in the First Place, Concerning What Belongs to the Essence
of the Soul
76. Of the Union of Body and Soul
77. Of Those Things Which Belong to the Powers of the Soul in General
78. Of the Specific Powers of the Soul
79. Of the Intellectual Powers
80. Of the Appetitive Powers in General
81. Of the Power of Sensuality
82. Of the Will
83. Of Free-Will
84. How the Soul While United to the Body Understands Corporeal
Things Beneath It
85. Of the Mode and Order of Understanding
86. What Our Intellect Knows in Material Things
87. How the Intellectual Soul Knows Itself and All Within Itself
88. How the Human Soul Knows What Is Above Itself
89. Of the Knowledge of the Separated Soul
90. Of the First Production of Man's Soul
91. The Production of the First Man's Body
92. The Production of the Woman
93. The End or Term of the Production of Man
94. Of the State and Condition of the First Man as Regards His
Intellect
95. Of Things Pertaining to the First Man's Will--Namely, Grace
and Righteousness
96. Of the Mastership Belonging to Man in the State of Innocence
97. Of the Preservation of the Individual in the Primitive State
98. Of the Preservation of the Species
99. Of the Condition of the Offspring As to the Body
100. Of the Condition of the Offspring As Regards Righteousness
101. Of the Condition of the Offspring As Regards Knowledge
102. Of Man's Abode, Which Is Paradise
TREATISE ON THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT
103. Of the Government of Things in General
104. The Special Effects of the Divine Government
105. Of the Change of Creatures by God
106. How One Creature Moves Another
107. The Speech of the Angels
108. Of the Angelic Degrees of Hierarchies and Orders
109. The Ordering of the Bad Angels
110. How Angels Act on Bodies
111. The Action of the Angels on Man
112. The Mission of the Angels
113. Of the Guardianship of the Good Angels
114. Of the Assaults of the Demons
115. Of the Action of the Corporeal Creature
116. On Fate
117. Of Things Pertaining to the Action of Man
118. Of the Production of Man from Man As to the Soul
119. Of the Propagation of Man As to the Body
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PROLOGUE
Because the Master of Catholic Truth ought not only to teach the
proficient, but also to instruct beginners (according to the Apostle:
As Unto Little Ones in Christ, I Gave You Milk to Drink, Not Meat--
1 Cor. iii. 1, 2)--we purpose in this book to treat of whatever
belongs to the Christian Religion, in such a way as may tend to the
instruction of beginners. We have considered that students in this
Science have not seldom been hampered by what they have found written
by other authors, partly on account of the multiplication of useless
questions, articles, and arguments; partly also because those things
that are needful for them to know are not taught according to the
order of the subject-matter, but according as the plan of the book
might require, or the occasion of the argument offer; partly, too,
because frequent repetition brought weariness and confusion to the
minds of the readers.
Endeavoring to avoid these and other like faults, we shall try, by
God's help, to set forth whatever is included in this Sacred Science
as briefly and clearly as the matter itself may allow.
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SUMMA THEOLOGICA
FIRST PART
["I," "Prima Pars"]
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QUESTION 1
THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SACRED DOCTRINE
(in Ten Articles)
To place our purpose within proper limits, we first endeavor to
investigate the nature and extent of this sacred doctrine. Concerning
this there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is necessary?
(2) Whether it is a science?
(3) Whether it is one or many?
(4) Whether it is speculative or practical?
(5) How it is compared with other sciences?
(6) Whether it is the same as wisdom?
(7) Whether God is its subject-matter?
(8) Whether it is a matter of argument?
(9) Whether it rightly employs metaphors and similes?
(10) Whether the Sacred Scripture of this doctrine may be expounded
in different senses?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 1]
Whether, besides Philosophy, any Further Doctrine Is Required?
Objection 1: It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no
need of any further knowledge. For man should not seek to know what is
above reason: "Seek not the things that are too high for thee"
(Ecclus. 3:22). But whatever is not above reason is fully treated of
in philosophical science. Therefore any other knowledge besides
philosophical science is superfluous.
Obj. 2: Further, knowledge can be concerned only with being, for
nothing can be known, save what is true; and all that is, is true. But
everything that is, is treated of in philosophical science--even God
Himself; so that there is a part of philosophy called theology, or the
divine science, as Aristotle has proved (Metaph. vi). Therefore,
besides philosophical science, there is no need of any further
knowledge.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Tim. 3:16): "All Scripture inspired
of God is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in
justice." Now Scripture, inspired of God, is no part of philosophical
science, which has been built up by human reason. Therefore it is
useful that besides philosophical science, there should be other
knowledge, i.e. inspired of God.
_I answer that,_ It was necessary for man's salvation that there should
be a knowledge revealed by God besides philosophical science built up
by human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is directed to God, as
to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason: "The eye hath not
seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them
that wait for Thee" (Isa. 66:4). But the end must first be known by men
who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was
necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed
human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as
regards those truths about God which human reason could have
discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine
revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover,
would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the
admixture of many errors. Whereas man's whole salvation, which is in
God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order
that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more
surely, it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by
divine revelation. It was therefore necessary that besides
philosophical science built up by reason, there should be a sacred
science learned through revelation.
Reply Obj. 1: Although those things which are beyond man's
knowledge may not be sought for by man through his reason,
nevertheless, once they are revealed by God, they must be accepted by
faith. Hence the sacred text continues, "For many things are shown to
thee above the understanding of man" (Ecclus. 3:25). And in this, the
sacred science consists.
Reply Obj. 2: Sciences are differentiated according to the
various means through which knowledge is obtained. For the astronomer
and the physicist both may prove the same conclusion: that the earth,
for instance, is round: the astronomer by means of mathematics (i.e.
abstracting from matter), but the physicist by means of matter itself.
Hence there is no reason why those things which may be learned from
philosophical science, so far as they can be known by natural reason,
may not also be taught us by another science so far as they fall
within revelation. Hence theology included in sacred doctrine differs
in kind from that theology which is part of philosophy.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 2]
Whether Sacred Doctrine Is a Science?
Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not a science. For every
science proceeds from self-evident principles. But sacred doctrine
proceeds from articles of faith which are not self-evident, since
their truth is not admitted by all: "For all men have not faith" (2
Thess. 3:2). Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science.
Obj. 2: Further, no science deals with individual facts. But this
sacred science treats of individual facts, such as the deeds of
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and such like. Therefore sacred doctrine is
not a science.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) "to this science
alone belongs that whereby saving faith is begotten, nourished,
protected and strengthened." But this can be said of no science except
sacred doctrine. Therefore sacred doctrine is a science.
_I answer that,_ Sacred doctrine is a science. We must bear in mind that
there are two kinds of sciences. There are some which proceed from a
principle known by the natural light of intelligence, such as
arithmetic and geometry and the like. There are some which proceed
from principles known by the light of a higher science: thus the
science of perspective proceeds from principles established by
geometry, and music from principles established by arithmetic. So it
is that sacred doctrine is a science because it proceeds from
principles established by the light of a higher science, namely, the
science of God and the blessed. Hence, just as the musician accepts on
authority the principles taught him by the mathematician, so sacred
science is established on principles revealed by God.
Reply Obj. 1: The principles of any science are either in
themselves self-evident, or reducible to the conclusions of a higher
science; and such, as we have said, are the principles of sacred
doctrine.
Reply Obj. 2: Individual facts are treated of in sacred
doctrine, not because it is concerned with them principally, but they
are introduced rather both as examples to be followed in our lives (as
in moral sciences) and in order to establish the authority of those
men through whom the divine revelation, on which this sacred scripture
or doctrine is based, has come down to us.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 3]
Whether Sacred Doctrine Is One Science?
Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not one science; for
according to the Philosopher (Poster. i) "that science is one which
treats only of one class of subjects." But the creator and the
creature, both of whom are treated of in sacred doctrine, cannot be
grouped together under one class of subjects. Therefore sacred
doctrine is not one science.
Obj. 2: Further, in sacred doctrine we treat of angels, corporeal
creatures and human morality. But these belong to separate
philosophical sciences. Therefore sacred doctrine cannot be one
science.
_On the contrary,_ Holy Scripture speaks of it as one science: "Wisdom
gave him the knowledge [scientiam] of holy things" (Wis. 10:10).
_I answer that,_ Sacred doctrine is one science. The unity of a faculty
or habit is to be gauged by its object, not indeed, in its material
aspect, but as regards the precise formality under which it is an
object. For example, man, ass, stone agree in the one precise
formality of being colored; and color is the formal object of sight.
Therefore, because Sacred Scripture considers things precisely under
the formality of being divinely revealed, whatever has been divinely
revealed possesses the one precise formality of the object of this
science; and therefore is included under sacred doctrine as under one
science.
Reply Obj. 1: Sacred doctrine does not treat of God and
creatures equally, but of God primarily, and of creatures only so far
as they are referable to God as their beginning or end. Hence the
unity of this science is not impaired.
Reply Obj. 2: Nothing prevents inferior faculties or habits
from being differentiated by something which falls under a higher
faculty or habit as well; because the higher faculty or habit regards
the object in its more universal formality, as the object of the
_common sense_ is whatever affects the senses, including, therefore,
whatever is visible or audible. Hence the _common sense,_ although one
faculty, extends to all the objects of the five senses. Similarly,
objects which are the subject-matter of different philosophical
sciences can yet be treated of by this one single sacred science under
one aspect precisely so far as they can be included in revelation. So
that in this way, sacred doctrine bears, as it were, the stamp of the
divine science which is one and simple, yet extends to everything.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 4]
Whether Sacred Doctrine Is a Practical Science?
Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is a practical science; for
a practical science is that which ends in action according to the
Philosopher (Metaph. ii). But sacred doctrine is ordained to action:
"Be ye doers of the word, and not hearers only" (James 1:22).
Therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science.
Obj. 2: Further, sacred doctrine is divided into the Old and the
New Law. But law implies a moral science which is a practical science.
Therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science.
_On the contrary,_ Every practical science is concerned with human
operations; as moral science is concerned with human acts, and
architecture with buildings. But sacred doctrine is chiefly concerned
with God, whose handiwork is especially man. Therefore it is not a
practical but a speculative science.
_I answer that,_ Sacred doctrine, being one, extends to things which
belong to different philosophical sciences because it considers in
each the same formal aspect, namely, so far as they can be known
through divine revelation. Hence, although among the philosophical
sciences one is speculative and another practical, nevertheless sacred
doctrine includes both; as God, by one and the same science, knows
both Himself and His works. Still, it is speculative rather than
practical because it is more concerned with divine things than with
human acts; though it does treat even of these latter, inasmuch as man
is ordained by them to the perfect knowledge of God in which consists
eternal bliss. This is a sufficient answer to the Objections.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 5]
Whether Sacred Doctrine Is Nobler than Other Sciences?
Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not nobler than other
sciences; for the nobility of a science depends on the certitude it
establishes. But other sciences, the principles of which cannot be
doubted, seem to be more certain than sacred doctrine; for its
principles--namely, articles of faith--can be doubted. Therefore
other sciences seem to be nobler.
Obj. 2: Further, it is the sign of a lower science to depend upon
a higher; as music depends on arithmetic. But sacred doctrine does in
a sense depend upon philosophical sciences; for Jerome observes, in
his Epistle to Magnus, that "the ancient doctors so enriched their
books with the ideas and phrases of the philosophers, that thou
knowest not what more to admire in them, their profane erudition or
their scriptural learning." Therefore sacred doctrine is inferior to
other sciences.
_On the contrary,_ Other sciences are called the handmaidens of this
one: "Wisdom sent her maids to invite to the tower" (Prov. 9:3).
_I answer that,_ Since this science is partly speculative and partly
practical, it transcends all others speculative and practical. Now one
speculative science is said to be nobler than another, either by
reason of its greater certitude, or by reason of the higher worth of
its subject-matter. In both these respects this science surpasses
other speculative sciences; in point of greater certitude, because
other sciences derive their certitude from the natural light of human
reason, which can err; whereas this derives its certitude from the
light of divine knowledge, which cannot be misled: in point of the
higher worth of its subject-matter because this science treats chiefly
of those things which by their sublimity transcend human reason; while
other sciences consider only those things which are within reason's
grasp. Of the practical sciences, that one is nobler which is ordained
to a further purpose, as political science is nobler than military
science; for the good of the army is directed to the good of the
State. But the purpose of this science, in so far as it is practical,
is eternal bliss; to which as to an ultimate end the purposes of every
practical science are directed. Hence it is clear that from every
standpoint, it is nobler than other sciences.
Reply Obj. 1: It may well happen that what is in itself the
more certain may seem to us the less certain on account of the
weakness of our intelligence, "which is dazzled by the clearest
objects of nature; as the owl is dazzled by the light of the sun"
(Metaph. ii, lect. i). Hence the fact that some happen to doubt about
articles of faith is not due to the uncertain nature of the truths,
but to the weakness of human intelligence; yet the slenderest
knowledge that may be obtained of the highest things is more desirable
than the most certain knowledge obtained of lesser things, as is said
in _de Animalibus_ xi.
Reply Obj. 2: This science can in a sense depend upon the
philosophical sciences, not as though it stood in need of them, but
only in order to make its teaching clearer. For it accepts its
principles not from other sciences, but immediately from God, by
revelation. Therefore it does not depend upon other sciences as upon
the higher, but makes use of them as of the lesser, and as
handmaidens: even so the master sciences make use of the sciences that
supply their materials, as political of military science. That it thus
uses them is not due to its own defect or insufficiency, but to the
defect of our intelligence, which is more easily led by what is known
through natural reason (from which proceed the other sciences) to that
which is above reason, such as are the teachings of this science.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 6]
Whether This Doctrine Is the Same as Wisdom?
Objection 1: It seems that this doctrine is not the same as wisdom.
For no doctrine which borrows its principles is worthy of the name of
wisdom; seeing that the wise man directs, and is not directed (Metaph.
i). But this doctrine borrows its principles. Therefore this science
is not wisdom.
Obj. 2: Further, it is a part of wisdom to prove the principles
of other sciences. Hence it is called the chief of sciences, as is
clear in Ethic. vi. But this doctrine does not prove the principles of
other sciences. Therefore it is not the same as wisdom.
Obj. 3: Further, this doctrine is acquired by study, whereas
wisdom is acquired by God's inspiration; so that it is numbered among
the gifts of the Holy Spirit (Isa. 11:2). Therefore this doctrine is
not the same as wisdom.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 4:6): "This is your wisdom and
understanding in the sight of nations."
_I answer that,_ This doctrine is wisdom above all human wisdom; not
merely in any one order, but absolutely. For since it is the part of a
wise man to arrange and to judge, and since lesser matters should be
judged in the light of some higher principle, he is said to be wise in
any one order who considers the highest principle in that order: thus
in the order of building, he who plans the form of the house is called
wise and architect, in opposition to the inferior laborers who trim
the wood and make ready the stones: "As a wise architect, I have laid
the foundation" (1 Cor. 3:10). Again, in the order of all human life,
the prudent man is called wise, inasmuch as he directs his acts to a
fitting end: "Wisdom is prudence to a man" (Prov. 10: 23). Therefore
he who considers absolutely the highest cause of the whole universe,
namely God, is most of all called wise. Hence wisdom is said to be the
knowledge of divine things, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14). But
sacred doctrine essentially treats of God viewed as the highest
cause--not only so far as He can be known through creatures just as
philosophers knew Him--"That which is known of God is manifest in
them" (Rom. 1:19)--but also as far as He is known to Himself alone
and revealed to others. Hence sacred doctrine is especially called
wisdom.
Reply Obj. 1: Sacred doctrine derives its principles not from
any human knowledge, but from the divine knowledge, through which, as
through the highest wisdom, all our knowledge is set in order.
Reply Obj. 2: The principles of other sciences either are
evident and cannot be proved, or are proved by natural reason through
some other science. But the knowledge proper to this science comes
through revelation and not through natural reason. Therefore it has no
concern to prove the principles of other sciences, but only to judge
of them. Whatsoever is found in other sciences contrary to any truth
of this science must be condemned as false: "Destroying counsels and
every height that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God" (2
Cor. 10:4, 5).
Reply Obj. 3: Since judgment appertains to wisdom, the twofold
manner of judging produces a twofold wisdom. A man may judge in one
way by inclination, as whoever has the habit of a virtue judges
rightly of what concerns that virtue by his very inclination towards
it. Hence it is the virtuous man, as we read, who is the measure and
rule of human acts. In another way, by knowledge, just as a man
learned in moral science might be able to judge rightly about virtuous
acts, though he had not the virtue. The first manner of judging divine
things belongs to that wisdom which is set down among the gifts of the
Holy Ghost: "The spiritual man judgeth all things" (1 Cor. 2:15). And
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "Hierotheus is taught not by mere
learning, but by experience of divine things." The second manner of
judging belongs to this doctrine which is acquired by study, though
its principles are obtained by revelation.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 7]
Whether God Is the Object of This Science?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not the object of this science. For
in every science, the nature of its object is presupposed. But this
science cannot presuppose the essence of God, for Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. i, iv): "It is impossible to define the essence of God."
Therefore God is not the object of this science.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever conclusions are reached in any science
must be comprehended under the object of the science. But in Holy Writ
we reach conclusions not only concerning God, but concerning many
other things, such as creatures and human morality. Therefore God is
not the object of this science.
_On the contrary,_ The object of the science is that of which it
principally treats. But in this science, the treatment is mainly about
God; for it is called theology, as treating of God. Therefore God is
the object of this science.
_I answer that,_ God is the object of this science. The relation between
a science and its object is the same as that between a habit or
faculty and its object. Now properly speaking, the object of a faculty
or habit is the thing under the aspect of which all things are
referred to that faculty or habit, as man and stone are referred to
the faculty of sight in that they are colored. Hence colored things
are the proper objects of sight. But in sacred science, all things are
treated of under the aspect of God: either because they are God
Himself or because they refer to God as their beginning and end. Hence
it follows that God is in very truth the object of this science. This
is clear also from the principles of this science, namely, the
articles of faith, for faith is about God. The object of the
principles and of the whole science must be the same, since the whole
science is contained virtually in its principles. Some, however,
looking to what is treated of in this science, and not to the aspect
under which it is treated, have asserted the object of this science to
be something other than God--that is, either things and signs; or the
works of salvation; or the whole Christ, as the head and members. Of
all these things, in truth, we treat in this science, but so far as
they have reference to God.
Reply Obj. 1: Although we cannot know in what consists the
essence of God, nevertheless in this science we make use of His
effects, either of nature or of grace, in place of a definition, in
regard to whatever is treated of in this science concerning God; even
as in some philosophical sciences we demonstrate something about a
cause from its effect, by taking the effect in place of a definition
of the cause.
Reply Obj. 2: Whatever other conclusions are reached in this
sacred science are comprehended under God, not as parts or species or
accidents but as in some way related to Him.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 8]
Whether Sacred Doctrine is a Matter of Argument?
Objection 1: It seems this doctrine is not a matter of argument. For
Ambrose says (De Fide 1): "Put arguments aside where faith is sought."
But in this doctrine, faith especially is sought: "But these things
are written that you may believe" (John 20:31). Therefore sacred
doctrine is not a matter of argument.
Obj. 2: Further, if it is a matter of argument, the argument is
either from authority or from reason. If it is from authority, it
seems unbefitting its dignity, for the proof from authority is the
weakest form of proof. But if it is from reason, this is unbefitting
its end, because, according to Gregory (Hom. 26), "faith has no merit
in those things of which human reason brings its own experience."
Therefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument.
_On the contrary,_ The Scripture says that a bishop should "embrace that
faithful word which is according to doctrine, that he may be able to
exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers" (Titus 1:9).
_I answer that,_ As other sciences do not argue in proof of their
principles, but argue from their principles to demonstrate other
truths in these sciences: so this doctrine does not argue in proof of
its principles, which are the articles of faith, but from them it goes
on to prove something else; as the Apostle from the resurrection of
Christ argues in proof of the general resurrection (1 Cor. 15).
However, it is to be borne in mind, in regard to the philosophical
sciences, that the inferior sciences neither prove their principles
nor dispute with those who deny them, but leave this to a higher
science; whereas the highest of them, viz. metaphysics, can dispute
with one who denies its principles, if only the opponent will make
some concession; but if he concede nothing, it can have no dispute
with him, though it can answer his objections. Hence Sacred Scripture,
since it has no science above itself, can dispute with one who denies
its principles only if the opponent admits some at least of the truths
obtained through divine revelation; thus we can argue with heretics
from texts in Holy Writ, and against those who deny one article of
faith, we can argue from another. If our opponent believes nothing of
divine revelation, there is no longer any means of proving the
articles of faith by reasoning, but only of answering his
objections--if he has any--against faith. Since faith rests upon
infallible truth, and since the contrary of a truth can never be
demonstrated, it is clear that the arguments brought against faith
cannot be demonstrations, but are difficulties that can be answered.
Reply Obj. 1: Although arguments from human reason cannot
avail to prove what must be received on faith, nevertheless, this
doctrine argues from articles of faith to other truths.
Reply Obj. 2: This doctrine is especially based upon arguments
from authority, inasmuch as its principles are obtained by revelation:
thus we ought to believe on the authority of those to whom the
revelation has been made. Nor does this take away from the dignity of
this doctrine, for although the argument from authority based on human
reason is the weakest, yet the argument from authority based on divine
revelation is the strongest. But sacred doctrine makes use even of
human reason, not, indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merit of
faith would come to an end), but to make clear other things that are
put forward in this doctrine. Since therefore grace does not destroy
nature but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the
natural bent of the will ministers to charity. Hence the Apostle says:
"Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of
Christ" (2 Cor. 10:5). Hence sacred doctrine makes use also of the
authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were able
to know the truth by natural reason, as Paul quotes a saying of
Aratus: "As some also of your own poets said: For we are also His
offspring" (Acts 17:28). Nevertheless, sacred doctrine makes use of
these authorities as extrinsic and probable arguments; but properly
uses the authority of the canonical Scriptures as an incontrovertible
proof, and the authority of the doctors of the Church as one that may
properly be used, yet merely as probable. For our faith rests upon the
revelation made to the apostles and prophets who wrote the canonical
books, and not on the revelations (if any such there are) made to
other doctors. Hence Augustine says (Epis. ad Hieron. xix, 1): "Only
those books of Scripture which are called canonical have I learned to
hold in such honor as to believe their authors have not erred in any
way in writing them. But other authors I so read as not to deem
everything in their works to be true, merely on account of their
having so thought and written, whatever may have been their holiness
and learning."
_______________________
NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 9]
Whether Holy Scripture Should Use Metaphors?
Objection 1: It seems that Holy Scripture should not use metaphors.
For that which is proper to the lowest science seems not to befit this
science, which holds the highest place of all. But to proceed by the
aid of various similitudes and figures is proper to poetry, the least
of all the sciences. Therefore it is not fitting that this science
should make use of such similitudes.
Obj. 2: Further, this doctrine seems to be intended to make truth
clear. Hence a reward is held out to those who manifest it: "They that
explain me shall have life everlasting" (Ecclus. 24:31). But by such
similitudes truth is obscured. Therefore, to put forward divine truths
by likening them to corporeal things does not befit this science.
Obj. 3: Further, the higher creatures are, the nearer they
approach to the divine likeness. If therefore any creature be taken to
represent God, this representation ought chiefly to be taken from the
higher creatures, and not from the lower; yet this is often found in
Scriptures.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Osee 12:10): "I have multiplied
visions, and I have used similitudes by the ministry of the prophets."
But to put forward anything by means of similitudes is to use
metaphors. Therefore this sacred science may use metaphors.
_I answer that,_ It is befitting Holy Writ to put forward divine and
spiritual truths by means of comparisons with material things. For God
provides for everything according to the capacity of its nature. Now
it is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through sensible
objects, because all our knowledge originates from sense. Hence in
Holy Writ, spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of
material things. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i): "We
cannot be enlightened by the divine rays except they be hidden within
the covering of many sacred veils." It is also befitting Holy Writ,
which is proposed to all without distinction of persons--"To the wise
and to the unwise I am a debtor" (Rom. 1:14)--that spiritual truths
be expounded by means of figures taken from corporeal things, in order
that thereby even the simple who are unable by themselves to grasp
intellectual things may be able to understand it.
Reply Obj. 1: Poetry makes use of metaphors to produce a
representation, for it is natural to man to be pleased with
representations. But sacred doctrine makes use of metaphors as both
necessary and useful.
Reply Obj. 2: The ray of divine revelation is not extinguished
by the sensible imagery wherewith it is veiled, as Dionysius says
(Coel. Hier. i); and its truth so far remains that it does not allow
the minds of those to whom the revelation has been made, to rest in
the metaphors, but raises them to the knowledge of truths; and through
those to whom the revelation has been made others also may receive
instruction in these matters. Hence those things that are taught
metaphorically in one part of Scripture, in other parts are taught
more openly. The very hiding of truth in figures is useful for the
exercise of thoughtful minds and as a defense against the ridicule of
the impious, according to the words "Give not that which is holy to
dogs" (Matt. 7:6).
Reply Obj. 3: As Dionysius says, (Coel. Hier. i) it is more
fitting that divine truths should be expounded under the figure of
less noble than of nobler bodies, and this for three reasons. Firstly,
because thereby men's minds are the better preserved from error. For
then it is clear that these things are not literal descriptions of
divine truths, which might have been open to doubt had they been
expressed under the figure of nobler bodies, especially for those who
could think of nothing nobler than bodies. Secondly, because this is
more befitting the knowledge of God that we have in this life. For
what He is not is clearer to us than what He is. Therefore similitudes
drawn from things farthest away from God form within us a truer
estimate that God is above whatsoever we may say or think of Him.
Thirdly, because thereby divine truths are the better hidden from the
unworthy.
_______________________
TENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 10]
Whether in Holy Scripture a Word may have Several Senses?
Objection 1: It seems that in Holy Writ a word cannot have several
senses, historical or literal, allegorical, tropological or moral, and
anagogical. For many different senses in one text produce confusion
and deception and destroy all force of argument. Hence no argument,
but only fallacies, can be deduced from a multiplicity of
propositions. But Holy Writ ought to be able to state the truth
without any fallacy. Therefore in it there cannot be several senses to
a word.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De util. cred. iii) that "the
Old Testament has a fourfold division as to history, etiology, analogy
and allegory." Now these four seem altogether different from the four
divisions mentioned in the first objection. Therefore it does not seem
fitting to explain the same word of Holy Writ according to the four
different senses mentioned above.
Obj. 3: Further, besides these senses, there is the parabolical,
which is not one of these four.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xx, 1): "Holy Writ by the manner
of its speech transcends every science, because in one and the same
sentence, while it describes a fact, it reveals a mystery."
_I answer that,_ The author of Holy Writ is God, in whose power it is to
signify His meaning, not by words only (as man also can do), but also
by things themselves. So, whereas in every other science things are
signified by words, this science has the property, that the things
signified by the words have themselves also a signification. Therefore
that first signification whereby words signify things belongs to the
first sense, the historical or literal. That signification whereby
things signified by words have themselves also a signification is
called the spiritual sense, which is based on the literal, and
presupposes it. Now this spiritual sense has a threefold division. For
as the Apostle says (Heb. 10:1) the Old Law is a figure of the New
Law, and Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) "the New Law itself is a
figure of future glory." Again, in the New Law, whatever our Head has
done is a type of what we ought to do. Therefore, so far as the things
of the Old Law signify the things of the New Law, there is the
allegorical sense; so far as the things done in Christ, or so far as
the things which signify Christ, are types of what we ought to do,
there is the moral sense. But so far as they signify what relates to
eternal glory, there is the anagogical sense. Since the literal sense
is that which the author intends, and since the author of Holy Writ is
God, Who by one act comprehends all things by His intellect, it is not
unfitting, as Augustine says (Confess. xii), if, even according to the
literal sense, one word in Holy Writ should have several senses.
Reply Obj. 1: The multiplicity of these senses does not
produce equivocation or any other kind of multiplicity, seeing that
these senses are not multiplied because one word signifies several
things, but because the things signified by the words can be
themselves types of other things. Thus in Holy Writ no confusion
results, for all the senses are founded on one--the literal--from
which alone can any argument be drawn, and not from those intended in
allegory, as Augustine says (Epis. 48). Nevertheless, nothing of Holy
Scripture perishes on account of this, since nothing necessary to
faith is contained under the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere
put forward by the Scripture in its literal sense.
Reply Obj. 2: These three--history, etiology, analogy--are
grouped under the literal sense. For it is called history, as
Augustine expounds (Epis. 48), whenever anything is simply related; it
is called etiology when its cause is assigned, as when Our Lord gave
the reason why Moses allowed the putting away of wives--namely, on
account of the hardness of men's hearts; it is called analogy whenever
the truth of one text of Scripture is shown not to contradict the
truth of another. Of these four, allegory alone stands for the three
spiritual senses. Thus Hugh of St. Victor (Sacram. iv, 4 Prolog.)
includes the anagogical under the allegorical sense, laying down three
senses only--the historical, the allegorical, and the tropological.
Reply Obj. 3: The parabolical sense is contained in the
literal, for by words things are signified properly and figuratively.
Nor is the figure itself, but that which is figured, the literal
sense. When Scripture speaks of God's arm, the literal sense is not
that God has such a member, but only what is signified by this member,
namely operative power. Hence it is plain that nothing false can ever
underlie the literal sense of Holy Writ.
_______________________
QUESTION 2
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
(In Three Articles)
Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of
God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is the beginning of
things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is
clear from what has been already said, therefore, in our endeavor to
expound this science, we shall treat:
(1) Of God;
(2) Of the rational creature's advance towards God;
(3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to God.
In treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we shall
consider:
(1) Whatever concerns the Divine Essence;
(2) Whatever concerns the distinctions of Persons;
(3) Whatever concerns the procession of creatures from Him.
Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider:
(1) Whether God exists?
(2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what is _not_ the
manner of His existence;
(3) Whatever concerns His operations--namely, His knowledge, will,
power.
Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the proposition "God exists" is self-evident?
(2) Whether it is demonstrable?
(3) Whether God exists?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 2, Art. 1]
Whether the Existence of God Is Self-Evident?
Objection 1: It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. Now
those things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which
is naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first
principles. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), "the
knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all." Therefore the
existence of God is self-evident.
Obj. 2: Further, those things are said to be self-evident which
are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1
Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration.
Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once
recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as
the signification of the word "God" is understood, it is at once seen
that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which
nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and
mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore,
since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists mentally, it
also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition "God
exists" is self-evident.
Obj. 3: Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For
whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not
exist: and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition "Truth does
not exist" is true: and if there is anything true, there must be
truth. But God is truth itself: "I am the way, the truth, and the
life" (John 14:6) Therefore "God exists" is self-evident.
_On the contrary,_ No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is
self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states
concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of
the proposition "God is" can be mentally admitted: "The fool said in
his heart, There is no God" (Ps. 52:1). Therefore, that God exists is
not self-evident.
_I answer that,_ A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on
the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other,
self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident
because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as
"Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If,
therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all,
the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard
to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are
common things that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being,
whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the
essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will
be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the
meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it
happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: "Whether
all that is, is good"), "that there are some mental concepts
self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are
not in space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of
itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject,
because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (Q. 3,
Art. 4). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition
is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that
are more known to us, though less known in their nature--namely, by
effects.
Reply Obj. 1: To know that God exists in a general and
confused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's
beatitude. For man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally
desired by man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not
to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is
approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even
though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who imagine
that man's perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and
others in pleasures, and others in something else.
Reply Obj. 2: Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God"
understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be
thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted
that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified
something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it
does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word
signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can
it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there
actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought;
and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not
exist.
Reply Obj. 3: The existence of truth in general is
self-evident but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident
to us.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 2, Art. 2]
Whether It Can Be Demonstrated That God Exists?
Objection 1: It seems that the existence of God cannot be
demonstrated. For it is an article of faith that God exists. But what
is of faith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces
scientific knowledge; whereas faith is of the unseen (Heb. 11:1).
Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that God exists.
Obj. 2: Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration.
But we cannot know in what God's essence consists, but solely in what
it does not consist; as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore
we cannot demonstrate that God exists.
Obj. 3: Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this
could only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate
to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between
the finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a
cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it
seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says: "The invisible things of Him are
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom.
1:20). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be
demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first thing we
must know of anything is whether it exists.
_I answer that,_ Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through
the cause, and is called _a priori,_ and this is to argue from what is
prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a
demonstration _a posteriori_; this is to argue from what is prior
relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its
cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And
from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be
demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because
since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the
cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is
not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects
which are known to us.
Reply Obj. 1: The existence of God and other like truths about
God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith,
but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural
knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes
something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to
prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of
faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically
known and demonstrated.
Reply Obj. 2: When the existence of a cause is demonstrated
from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the
cause in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case
in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence of
anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of
the word, and not its essence, for the question of its essence follows
on the question of its existence. Now the names given to God are
derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence
of God from His effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning
of the word "God".
Reply Obj. 3: From effects not proportionate to the cause no
perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect
the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can
demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we
cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 2, Art. 3]
Whether God Exists?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two
contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But
the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God
existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the
world. Therefore God does not exist.
Obj. 2: Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be
accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it
seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by
other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things
can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary
things can be reduced to one principle which is human reason, or will.
Therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence.
_On the contrary,_ It is said in the person of God: "I am Who am." (Ex.
3:14)
_I answer that,_ The existence of God can be proved in five ways.
The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is
certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are
in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for
nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards
which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act.
For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from
potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from
potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of
actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which
is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes
it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in
actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different
respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be
potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is
therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a
thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself.
Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If
that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this
also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another
again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be
no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that
subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the
first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by
the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in
motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.
The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world
of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no
case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found
to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to
itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not
possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes
following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause,
and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the
intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause
is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause
among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any
intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on
to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will
there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes;
all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a
first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.
The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus.
We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since
they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they
are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these
always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is
not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time
there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true,
even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does
not exist only begins to exist by something already existing.
Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been
impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now
nothing would be in existence--which is absurd. Therefore, not all
beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the
existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has
its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on
to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by
another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes.
Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having
of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but
rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as
God.
The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things.
Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and
the like. But _more_ and _less_ are predicated of different things,
according as they resemble in their different ways something which is
the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more
nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something
which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently,
something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest
in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in _Metaph._ ii. Now
the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire,
which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore
there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their
being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.
The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that
things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an
end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always,
in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain
that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now
whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be
directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the
arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent
being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and
this being we call God.
Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God
is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His
works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good
even out of evil." This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that
He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.
Reply Obj. 2: Since nature works for a determinate end under
the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs
be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done
voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than
human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things
that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an
immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body
of the Article.
_______________________
QUESTION 3
OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD
(In Eight Articles)
When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the
further question of the manner of its existence, in order that we may
know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather
what He is not, we have no means for considering how God is, but
rather how He is not.
Therefore, we must consider:
(1) How He is not;
(2) How He is known by us;
(3) How He is named.
Now it can be shown how God is not, by denying Him whatever is opposed
to the idea of Him, viz. composition, motion, and the like. Therefore
(1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in
Him; and because whatever is simple in material things is imperfect
and a part of something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection;
(3) His infinity; (4) His immutability; (5) His unity.
Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is a body?
(2) Whether He is composed of matter and form?
(3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence
or nature, and subject?
(4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence?
(5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference?
(6) Whether He is composed of subject and accident?
(7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple?
(8) Whether He enters into composition with other things?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 1]
Whether God Is a Body?
Objection 1: It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has
the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three
dimensions to God, for it is written: "He is higher than Heaven, and
what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? The
measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea" (Job
11:8, 9). Therefore God is a body.
Obj. 2: Further, everything that has figure is a body, since
figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it
is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" (Gen. 1:26).
Now a figure is called an image, according to the text: "Who being the
brightness of His glory and the figure," i.e. the image, "of His
substance" (Heb. 1:3). Therefore God is a body.
Obj. 3: Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now
Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God. "Hast thou an arm like
God?" (Job 40:4); and "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just" (Ps.
33:16); and "The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength" (Ps.
117:16). Therefore God is a body.
Obj. 4: Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But something
which supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: "I saw the
Lord sitting" (Isa. 6:1), and "He standeth up to judge" (Isa. 3:13).
Therefore God is a body.
Obj. 5: Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local
term _wherefrom_ or _whereto._ But in the Scriptures God is spoken of
as a local term _whereto,_ according to the words, "Come ye to Him and
be enlightened" (Ps. 33:6), and as a term _wherefrom_: "All they that
depart from Thee shall be written in the earth" (Jer. 17:13).
Therefore God is a body.
_On the contrary,_ It is written in the Gospel of St. John (John 4:24):
"God is a spirit."
_I answer that,_ It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this
can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless
it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been
already proved (Q. 2, A. 3), that God is the First Mover, and is
Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body.
Secondly, because the first being must of necessity be in act, and in
no way in potentiality. For although in any single thing that passes
from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to
the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior
to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into
actuality only by some being in actuality. Now it has been already
proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in
God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in
potentiality because the continuous, as such, is divisible to
infinity; it is therefore impossible that God should be a body.
Thirdly, because God is the most noble of beings. Now it is impossible
for a body to be the most noble of beings; for a body must be either
animate or inanimate; and an animate body is manifestly nobler than
any inanimate body. But an animate body is not animate precisely as
body; otherwise all bodies would be animate. Therefore its animation
depends upon some other thing, as our body depends for its animation
on the soul. Hence that by which a body becomes animated must be
nobler than the body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a
body.
Reply Obj. 1: As we have said above (Q. 1, A. 9), Holy Writ
puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of
corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes to God the three
dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His
virtual quantity; thus, by depth, it signifies His power of knowing
hidden things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by
length, the duration of His existence; by breadth, His act of love for
all. Or, as says Dionysius (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is
meant the incomprehensibility of His essence; by length, the
procession of His all-pervading power; by breadth, His overspreading
all things, inasmuch as all things lie under His protection.
Reply Obj. 2: Man is said to be after the image of God, not as
regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals.
Hence, when it is said, "Let us make man to our image and likeness",
it is added, "And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea"
(Gen. 1:26). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence;
hence it is according to his intelligence and reason, which are
incorporeal, that man is said to be according to the image of God.
Reply Obj. 3: Corporeal parts are attributed to God in
Scripture on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain
parallel. For instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye
attributed to God signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not
sensibly; and so on with the other parts.
Reply Obj. 4: Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only
attributed to God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as
sitting, on account of His unchangeableness and dominion; and as
standing, on account of His power of overcoming whatever withstands
Him.
Reply Obj. 5: We draw near to God by no corporeal steps, since
He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the
actions of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near
to or to withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on the
metaphor of local motion.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 2]
Whether God Is Composed of Matter and Form?
Objection 1: It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For
whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul is
the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it
is mentioned in Hebrews (Heb. 10:38), where God says: "But My just man
liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My
soul." Therefore God is composed of matter and form.
Obj. 2: Further, anger, joy and the like are passions of the
composite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: "The Lord was
exceeding angry with His people" (Ps. 105:40). Therefore God is
composed of matter and form.
Obj. 3: Further, matter is the principle of individualization.
But God seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many.
Therefore He is composed of matter and form.
_On the contrary,_ Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body;
for dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not
a body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not
composed of matter and form.
_I answer that,_ It is impossible that matter should exist in God.
First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown (Q. 2, A. 3)
that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is
impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly,
because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and
goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is participated, inasmuch
as matter participates the form. Now the first good and the
best--viz. God--is not a participated good, because the essential
good is prior to the participated good. Hence it is impossible that
God should be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, because every
agent acts by its form; hence the manner in which it has its form is
the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily
and essentially an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now
God is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause. He is
therefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and form.
Reply Obj. 1: A soul is attributed to God because His acts
resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our
soul. Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His
soul.
Reply Obj. 2: Anger and the like are attributed to God on
account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly
the act of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of
as His anger.
Reply Obj. 3: Forms which can be received in matter are
individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject
since it is the first underlying subject; although form of itself,
unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that
form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is
individualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject;
and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in
God.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 3]
Whether God is the Same as His Essence or Nature?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not the same as His essence or
nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of
God--i.e. the Godhead--is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that
God is not the same as His essence or nature.
Obj. 2: Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for
every agent produces its like. But in created things the _suppositum_
is not identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his
humanity. Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead.
_On the contrary,_ It is said of God that He is life itself, and not
only that He is a living thing: "I am the way, the truth, and the
life" (John 14:6). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same
as the relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is His
very Godhead.
_I answer that,_ God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand
this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the
nature or essence must differ from the _suppositum,_ because the
essence or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of
the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the
definition of man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this
that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now
individual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not
included in the definition of the species. For this particular flesh,
these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., are not included in
the definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the
accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not
included in humanity; and yet they are included in the thing which is
man. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has
humanity. Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical;
but humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because the
principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal
constituent in regard to the individualizing matter. On the other
hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which
individualization is not due to individual matter--that is to say, to
_this_ matter--the very forms being individualized of themselves--it
is necessary the forms themselves should be subsisting _supposita._
Therefore _suppositum_ and nature in them are identified. Since God
then is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own Godhead,
His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him.
Reply Obj. 1: We can speak of simple things only as though
they were like the composite things from which we derive our
knowledge. Therefore in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to
signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist
which are composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His
simplicity. In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are
in God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect
understands, but not that there is any composition in God.
Reply Obj. 2: The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly,
but only as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective,
precisely because what is simple and one, can only be represented by
divers things; consequently, composition is accidental to them, and
therefore, in them _suppositum_ is not the same as nature.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 4]
Whether Essence and Existence Are the Same in God?
Objection 1: It seems that essence and existence are not the same in
God. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to it.
Now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is
predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that God is being in
general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: "For
men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood" (Wis. 14:21).
Therefore God's existence is not His essence.
Obj. 2: Further, we can know _whether_ God exists as said above
(Q. 2, A. 2); but we cannot know _what_ He is. Therefore God's
existence is not the same as His essence--that is, as His quiddity or
nature.
_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (Trin. vii): "In God existence is not an
accidental quality, but subsisting truth." Therefore what subsists in
God is His existence.
_I answer that,_ God is not only His own essence, as shown in the
preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in
several ways. First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be
caused either by the constituent principles of that essence (like a
property that necessarily accompanies the species--as the faculty of
laughing is proper to a man--and is caused by the constituent
principles of the species), or by some exterior agent--as heat is
caused in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing
differs from its essence, this existence must be caused either by some
exterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible
for a thing's existence to be caused by its essential constituent
principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own
existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore that thing, whose
existence differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by
another. But this cannot be true of God; because we call God the first
efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence
should differ from His essence. Secondly, existence is that which
makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are
spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing.
Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is a
distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in
God there is no potentiality, as shown above (A. 1), it follows
that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His
essence is His existence. Thirdly, because, just as that which has
fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that
which has existence but is not existence, is a being by participation.
But God is His own essence, as shown above (A. 3); if, therefore, He
is not His own existence He will be not essential, but participated
being. He will not therefore be the first being--which is absurd.
Therefore God is His own existence, and not merely His own essence.
Reply Obj. 1: A thing that has nothing added to it can be of
two kinds. Either its essence precludes any addition; thus, for
example, it is of the essence of an irrational animal to be without
reason. Or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it,
inasmuch as its essence does not require that anything should be added
to it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because it is not of
the essence of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it to
lack reason. And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the
first sense; whereas universal being has nothing added to it in the
second sense.
Reply Obj. 2: "To be" can mean either of two things. It may
mean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a
proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject.
Taking "to be" in the first sense, we cannot understand God's
existence nor His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that
this proposition which we form about God when we say "God is," is
true; and this we know from His effects (Q. 2, A. 2).
______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 5]
Whether God Is Contained in a Genus?
Objection 1: It seems that God is contained in a genus. For a
substance is a being that subsists of itself. But this is especially
true of God. Therefore God is in a genus of substance.
Obj. 2: Further, nothing can be measured save by something of its
own genus; as length is measured by length and numbers by number. But
God is the measure of all substances, as the Commentator shows
(Metaph. x). Therefore God is in the genus of substance.
_On the contrary,_ In the mind, genus is prior to what it contains. But
nothing is prior to God either really or mentally. Therefore God is
not in any genus.
_I answer that,_ A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either
absolutely and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as
being reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a
point and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its
principles; while blindness and all other privations are reduced to
the genus of habit. But in neither way is God in a genus. That He
cannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways. First,
because a species is constituted of genus and difference. Now that
from which the difference constituting the species is derived, is
always related to that from which the genus is derived, as actuality
is related to potentiality. For animal is derived from sensitive
nature, by concretion as it were, for that is animal, which has a
sensitive nature. Rational being, on the other hand, is derived from
intellectual nature, because that is rational, which has an
intellectual nature, and intelligence is compared to sense, as
actuality is to potentiality. The same argument holds good in other
things. Hence since in God actuality is not added to potentiality, it
is impossible that He should be in any genus as a species. Secondly,
since the existence of God is His essence, if God were in any genus,
He would be the genus _being,_ because, since genus is predicated as
an essential it refers to the essence of a thing. But the Philosopher
has shown (Metaph. iii) that being cannot be a genus, for every genus
has differences distinct from its generic essence. Now no difference
can exist distinct from being; for non-being cannot be a difference.
It follows then that God is not in a genus. Thirdly, because all in
one genus agree in the quiddity or essence of the genus which is
predicated of them as an essential, but they differ in their
existence. For the existence of man and of horse is not the same; as
also of this man and that man: thus in every member of a genus,
existence and quiddity--i.e. essence--must differ. But in God they
do not differ, as shown in the preceding article. Therefore it is
plain that God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it
is also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor can there be
any definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration
of Him: for a definition is from genus and difference; and the mean of
a demonstration is a definition. That God is not in a genus, as
reducible to it as its principle, is clear from this, that a principle
reducible to any genus does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point
is the principle of continuous quantity alone; and unity, of
discontinuous quantity. But God is the principle of all being.
Therefore He is not contained in any genus as its principle.
Reply Obj. 1: The word substance signifies not only what
exists of itself--for existence cannot of itself be a genus, as shown
in the body of the article; but, it also signifies an essence that has
the property of existing in this way--namely, of existing of itself;
this existence, however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God
is not in the genus of substance.
Reply Obj. 2: This objection turns upon proportionate measure
which must be homogeneous with what is measured. Now, God is not a
measure proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of
all things, in the sense that everything has being only according as
it resembles Him.
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 6]
Whether in God There Are Any Accidents?
Objection 1: It seems that there are accidents in God. For substance
cannot be an accident, as Aristotle says (Phys. i). Therefore that
which is an accident in one, cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus
it is proved that heat cannot be the substantial form of fire, because
it is an accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like,
which are accidents in us, are attributes of God. Therefore in God
there are accidents.
Obj. 2: Further, in every genus there is a first principle. But
there are many genera of accidents. If, therefore, the primal
members of these genera are not in God, there will be many primal
beings other than God--which is absurd.
_On the contrary,_ Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a
subject, for "no simple form can be a subject", as Boethius says (De
Trin.). Therefore in God there cannot be any accident.
_I answer that,_ From all we have said, it is clear there can be no
accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents
as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made
actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality in God, as
was shown (Q. 2, A. 3). Secondly, because God is His own
existence; and as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may
have something superadded to it, this cannot apply to absolute being:
thus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to
it, as whiteness, nevertheless absolute heat can have nothing else
than heat. Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is
accidental. Whence as God is absolute primal being, there can be in
Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents
(as the capability of laughing is an essential accident of man),
because such accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the
subject. Now there can be nothing caused in God, since He is the first
cause. Hence it follows that there is no accident in God.
Reply Obj. 1: Virtue and wisdom are not predicated of God and
of us univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in
God as there are in us.
Reply Obj. 2: Since substance is prior to its accidents, the
principles of accidents are reducible to the principles of the
substance as to that which is prior; although God is not first as if
contained in the genus of substance; yet He is first in respect to all
being, outside of every genus.
_______________________
SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 7]
Whether God Is Altogether Simple?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not altogether simple. For whatever
is from God must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are all
beings; and from the first good is all good. But in the things which
God has made, nothing is altogether simple. Therefore neither is God
altogether simple.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever is best must be attributed to God. But
with us that which is composite is better than that which is simple;
thus, chemical compounds are better than simple elements, and animals
than the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot be said that God
is altogether simple.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): "God is truly and
absolutely simple."
_I answer that,_ The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many
ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is
neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a
body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His nature differ
from His _suppositum_; nor His essence from His existence; neither is
there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and
accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is
altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to
its component parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the first
being, as shown above (Q. 2, A. 3). Thirdly, because every
composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite
unless something causes them to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown
above (Q. 2, A. 3), since He is the first efficient cause.
Fourthly, because in every composite there must be potentiality and
actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts
actuates another, or at least all the parts are potential to the
whole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any
single one of its parts. And this is evident in a whole made up of
dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts
of the foot, a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although
something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part
(as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water),
nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which cannot
be predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if the whole volume
of water is two cubits, no part of it can be two cubits. Thus in every
composite there is something which is not it itself. But, even if this
could be said of whatever has a form, viz. that it has something which
is not it itself, as in a white object there is something which does
not belong to the essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself,
there is nothing besides itself. And so, since God is absolute form,
or rather absolute being, He can be in no way composite. Hilary
implies this argument, when he says (De Trin. vii): "God, Who is
strength, is not made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is
light, composed of things that are dim."
Reply Obj. 1: Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused
things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to
be in some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from
its essence, as will be shown hereafter, (Q. 4, A. 3).
Reply Obj. 2: With us composite things are better than simple
things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in
one simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine
goodness is found in one simple thing (QQ. 4, A. 1, and 6, A. 2).
_______________________
EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 8]
Whether God Enters into the Composition of Other Things?
Objection 1: It seems that God enters into the composition of other
things, for Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The being of all things
is that which is above being--the Godhead." But the being of all
things enters into the composition of everything. Therefore God enters
into the composition of other things.
Obj. 2: Further, God is a form; for Augustine says (De Verb.
Dom. [Serm. xxxviii]) that, "the word of God, which is God, is an
uncreated form." But a form is part of a compound. Therefore God is
part of some compound.
Obj. 3: Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from
each other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and in no
way differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same.
But primary matter enters into the composition things. Therefore also
does God. Proof of the minor--whatever things differ, they differ by
some differences, and therefore must be composite. But God and primary
matter are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ from each
other.
_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "There can be no
touching Him," i.e. God, "nor any other union with Him by mingling
part with part."
Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with
them, as the Philosopher says (De Causis).
_I answer that,_ On this point there have been three errors. Some have
affirmed that God is the world-soul, as is clear from Augustine (De
Civ. Dei vii, 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those
who assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven. Again, others
have said that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was
the theory of the Almaricians. The third error is that of David of
Dinant, who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter. Now all
these contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for God to
enter into the composition of anything, either as a formal or a
material principle. First, because God is the first efficient cause.
Now the efficient cause is not identical numerically with the form of
the thing caused, but only specifically: for man begets man. But
primary matter can be neither numerically nor specifically identical
with an efficient cause; for the former is merely potential, while the
latter is actual. Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient
cause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that which
enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and
essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for the hand does not
act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God
cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly, because no part of a compound
can be absolutely primal among beings--not even matter, nor form,
though they are the primal parts of every compound. For matter is
merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to
actuality, as is clear from the foregoing (Q. 3, A. 1): while a
form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as that
which participates is posterior to that which is essential, so
likewise is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is
posterior to fire that is essentially such. Now it has been proved
that God is absolutely primal being (Q. 2, A. 3).
Reply Obj. 1: The Godhead is called the being of all things,
as their efficient and exemplar cause, but not as being their essence.
Reply Obj. 2: The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form
that is part of a compound.
Reply Obj. 3: Simple things do not differ by added
differences--for this is the property of compounds. Thus man and
horse differ by their differences, rational and irrational; which
differences, however, do not differ from each other by other
differences. Hence, to be quite accurate, it is better to say that
they are, not different, but diverse. Hence, according to the
Philosopher (Metaph. x), "things which are diverse are absolutely
distinct, but things which are different differ by something."
Therefore, strictly speaking, primary matter and God do not differ,
but are by their very being, diverse. Hence it does not follow they
are the same.
_______________________
QUESTION 4
THE PERFECTION OF GOD
(In Three Articles)
Having considered the divine simplicity, we treat next of God's
perfection. Now because everything in so far as it is perfect is
called good, we shall speak first of the divine perfection; secondly
of the divine goodness.
Concerning the first there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is perfect?
(2) Whether God is perfect universally, as having in Himself the
perfections of all things?
(3) Whether creatures can be said to be like God?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 4, Art. 1]
Whether God is Perfect?
Objection 1: It seems that perfection does not belong to God. For we
say a thing is perfect if it is completely made. But it does not befit
God to be made. Therefore He is not perfect.
Obj. 2: Further, God is the first beginning of things. But the
beginnings of things seem to be imperfect, as seed is the beginning of
animal and vegetable life. Therefore God is imperfect.
Obj. 3: Further, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 4), God's essence
is existence. But existence seems most imperfect, since it is most
universal and receptive of all modification. Therefore God is
imperfect.
_On the contrary,_ It is written: "Be you perfect as also your heavenly
Father is perfect" (Matt. 5:48).
_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher relates (Metaph. xii), some ancient
philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans and Leucippus, did not
predicate "best" and "most perfect" of the first principle. The reason
was that the ancient philosophers considered only a material
principle; and a material principle is most imperfect. For since
matter as such is merely potential, the first material principle must
be simply potential, and thus most imperfect. Now God is the first
principle, not material, but in the order of efficient cause, which
must be most perfect. For just as matter, as such, is merely
potential, an agent, as such, is in the state of actuality. Hence, the
first active principle must needs be most actual, and therefore most
perfect; for a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of
actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing of the
mode of its perfection.
Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says (Moral. v, 26,29): "Though our
lips can only stammer, we yet chant the high things of God." For that
which is not made is improperly called perfect. Nevertheless because
created things are then called perfect, when from potentiality they
are brought into actuality, this word "perfect" signifies whatever is
not wanting in actuality, whether this be by way of perfection or not.
Reply Obj. 2: The material principle which with us is found to
be imperfect, cannot be absolutely primal; but must be preceded by
something perfect. For seed, though it be the principle of animal life
reproduced through seed, has previous to it, the animal or plant from
which is came. Because, previous to that which is potential, must be
that which is actual; since a potential being can only be reduced into
act by some being already actual.
Reply Obj. 3: Existence is the most perfect of all things, for
it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual;
for nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence
is that which actuates all things, even their forms. Therefore it is
not compared to other things as the receiver is to the received; but
rather as the received to the receiver. When therefore I speak of the
existence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is considered
a formal principle, and as something received; and not as that which
exists.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 4, Art. 2]
Whether the Perfections of All Things Are in God?
Objection 1: It seems that the perfections of all things are not in
God. For God is simple, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 7); whereas the
perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections
of all things are not in God.
Obj. 2: Further, opposites cannot coexist. Now the perfections of
things are opposed to each other, for each thing is perfected by its
specific difference. But the differences by which genera are
divided, and species constituted, are opposed to each other.
Therefore because opposites cannot coexist in the same subject, it
seems that the perfections of all things are not in God.
Obj. 3: Further, a living thing is more perfect than what merely
exists; and an intelligent thing than what merely lives. Therefore
life is more perfect than existence; and knowledge than life. But the
essence of God is existence itself. Therefore He has not the
perfections of life, and knowledge, and other similar perfections.
_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that "God in His one
existence prepossesses all things."
_I answer that,_ All created perfections are in God. Hence He is spoken
of as universally perfect, because He lacks not (says the Commentator,
_Metaph._ v) any excellence which may be found in any genus. This may
be seen from two considerations. First, because whatever perfection
exists in an effect must be found in the effective cause: either in the
same formality, if it is a univocal agent--as when man reproduces man;
or in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal agent--thus in the
sun is the likeness of whatever is generated by the sun's power. Now it
is plain that the effect pre-exists virtually in the efficient cause:
and although to pre-exist in the potentiality of a material cause is to
pre-exist in a more imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect,
and an agent as such is perfect; still to pre-exist virtually in the
efficient cause is to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more
perfect way. Since therefore God is the first effective cause of
things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a more
eminent way. Dionysius implies the same line of argument by saying of
God (Div. Nom. v): "It is not that He is this and not that, but that He
is all, as the cause of all." Secondly, from what has been already
proved, God is existence itself, of itself subsistent (Q. 3, A. 4).
Consequently, He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of
being. For it is clear that if some hot thing has not the whole
perfection of heat, this is because heat is not participated in its
full perfection; but if this heat were self-subsisting, nothing of the
virtue of heat would be wanting to it. Since therefore God is
subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection of being can be
wanting to Him. Now all created perfections are included in the
perfection of being; for things are perfect, precisely so far as they
have being after some fashion. It follows therefore that the perfection
of no one thing is wanting to God. This line of argument, too, is
implied by Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), when he says that, "God exists not
in any single mode, but embraces all being within Himself, absolutely,
without limitation, uniformly;" and afterwards he adds that, "He is the
very existence to subsisting things."
Reply Obj. 1: Even as the sun (as Dionysius remarks, (Div.
Nom. v)), while remaining one and shining uniformly, contains within
itself first and uniformly the substances of sensible things, and many
and diverse qualities; _a fortiori_ should all things in a kind of
natural unity pre-exist in the cause of all things; and thus things
diverse and in themselves opposed to each other, pre-exist in God as
one, without injury to His simplicity. This suffices for the Reply to
the Second Objection.
Reply Obj. 3: The same Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that,
although existence is more perfect than life, and life than wisdom, if
they are considered as distinguished in idea; nevertheless, a living
thing is more perfect than what merely exists, because living things
also exist and intelligent things both exist and live. Although
therefore existence does not include life and wisdom, because that
which participates in existence need not participate in every mode of
existence; nevertheless God's existence includes in itself life and
wisdom, because nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to
Him who is subsisting being itself.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 4, Art. 3]
Whether Any Creature Can Be Like God?
Objection 1: It seems that no creature can be like God. For it is
written (Ps. 85:8): "There is none among the gods like unto Thee, O
Lord." But of all creatures the most excellent are those which are
called by participation gods. Therefore still less can other creatures be
said to be like God.
Obj. 2: Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can be no
comparison between things in a different genus. Therefore neither
can there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like
whiteness. But no creature is in the same genus as God: since God is
no genus, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 5). Therefore no creature is
like God.
Obj. 3: Further, we speak of those things as like which agree in
form. But nothing can agree with God in form; for, save in God alone,
essence and existence differ. Therefore no creature can be like to
God.
Obj. 4: Further, among like things there is mutual likeness; for
like is like to like. If therefore any creature is like God, God will
be like some creature, which is against what is said by Isaias: "To
whom have you likened God?" (Isa. 40:18).
_On the contrary,_ It is written: "Let us make man to our image and
likeness" (Gen. 1:26), and: "When He shall appear we shall be like to
Him" (1 John 3:2).
_I answer that,_ Since likeness is based upon agreement or communication
in form, it varies according to the many modes of communication in
form. Some things are said to be like, which communicate in the same
form according to the same formality, and according to the same mode;
and these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their likeness;
as two things equally white are said to be alike in whiteness; and
this is the most perfect likeness. In another way, we speak of things
as alike which communicate in form according to the same formality,
though not according to the same measure, but according to more or
less, as something less white is said to be like another thing more
white; and this is imperfect likeness. In a third way some things are
said to be alike which communicate in the same form, but not according
to the same formality; as we see in non-univocal agents. For since
every agent reproduces itself so far as it is an agent, and everything
acts according to the manner of its form, the effect must in some way
resemble the form of the agent. If therefore the agent is contained in
the same species as its effect, there will be a likeness in form
between that which makes and that which is made, according to the same
formality of the species; as man reproduces man. If, however, the
agent and its effect are not contained in the same species, there will
be a likeness, but not according to the formality of the same species;
as things generated by the sun's heat may be in some sort spoken of as
like the sun, not as though they received the form of the sun in its
specific likeness, but in its generic likeness. Therefore if there is
an agent not contained in any genus, its effect will still more
distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to
participate in the likeness of the agent's form according to the same
specific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of
analogy; as existence is common to all. In this way all created
things, so far as they are beings, are like God as the first and
universal principle of all being.
Reply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), when Holy Writ
declares that nothing is like God, it does not mean to deny all
likeness to Him. For, "the same things can be like and unlike to God:
like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not
perfectly imitable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall
short of their cause," not merely in intensity and remission, as that
which is less white falls short of that which is more white; but
because they are not in agreement, specifically or generically.
Reply Obj. 2: God is not related to creatures as though
belonging to a different genus, but as transcending every genus,
and as the principle of all genera.
Reply Obj. 3: Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed on
account of agreement in form according to the formality of the same
genus or species, but solely according to analogy, inasmuch as God is
essential being, whereas other things are beings by participation.
Reply Obj. 4: Although it may be admitted that creatures are
in some sort like God, it must nowise be admitted that God is like
creatures; because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "A mutual
likeness may be found between things of the same order, but not
between a cause and that which is caused." For, we say that a statue
is like a man, but not conversely; so also a creature can be spoken of
as in some sort like God; but not that God is like a creature.
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QUESTION 5
OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL
(In Six Articles)
We next consider goodness: First, goodness in general. Secondly, the
goodness of God.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether goodness and being are the same really?
(2) Granted that they differ only in idea, which is prior in thought?
(3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good?
(4) To what cause should goodness be reduced?
(5) Whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order?
(6) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the
pleasant?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 1]
Whether Goodness Differs Really from Being?
Objection 1: It seems that goodness differs really from being. For
Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "I perceive that in nature the fact that
things are good is one thing: that they are is another." Therefore
goodness and being really differ.
Obj. 2: Further, nothing can be its own form. "But that is called
good which has the form of being," according to the commentary on _De
Causis._ Therefore goodness differs really from being.
Obj. 3: Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot
be more or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 42) that,
"inasmuch as we exist we are good."
_I answer that,_ Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only
in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence of
goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i): "Goodness is what all desire." Now it is
clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for
all desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as
it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as
it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is
clear from the foregoing (Q. 3, A. 4; Q. 4, A. 1). Hence it is
clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness
presents the aspect of desirableness, which being does not present.
Reply Obj. 1: Although goodness and being are the same really,
nevertheless since they differ in thought, they are not predicated of
a thing absolutely in the same way. Since being properly signifies
that something actually is, and actuality properly correlates to
potentiality; a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have being,
accordingly as it is primarily distinguished from that which is only
in potentiality; and this is precisely each thing's substantial being.
Hence by its substantial being, everything is said to have being
simply; but by any further actuality it is said to have being
relatively. Thus to be white implies relative being, for to be white
does not take a thing out of simply potential being; because only a
thing that actually has being can receive this mode of being. But
goodness signifies perfection which is desirable; and consequently of
ultimate perfection. Hence that which has ultimate perfection is said
to be simply good; but that which has not the ultimate perfection it
ought to have (although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some
perfection), is not said to be perfect simply nor good simply, but
only relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in its primal (i.e.
substantial) being a thing is said to be simply, and to be good
relatively (i.e. in so far as it has being) but viewed in its complete
actuality, a thing is said to be relatively, and to be good simply.
Hence the saying of Boethius (De Hebdom.), "I perceive that in nature
the fact that things are good is one thing; that they are is another,"
is to be referred to a thing's goodness simply, and having being
simply. Because, regarded in its primal actuality, a thing simply
exists; and regarded in its complete actuality, it is good simply--in
such sort that even in its primal actuality, it is in some sort good,
and even in its complete actuality, it in some sort has being.
Reply Obj. 2: Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness
signifies complete actuality.
Reply Obj. 3: Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less
according to a thing's superadded actuality, for example, as to
knowledge or virtue.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 2]
Whether Goodness Is Prior in Idea to Being?
Objection 1: It seems that goodness is prior in idea to being. For
names are arranged according to the arrangement of the things
signified by the names. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) assigned the
first place, amongst the other names of God, to His goodness rather
than to His being. Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.
Obj. 2: Further, that which is the more extensive is prior in
idea. But goodness is more extensive than being, because, as Dionysius
notes (Div. Nom. v), "goodness extends to things both existing and
non-existing; whereas existence extends to existing things alone."
Therefore goodness is in idea prior to being.
Obj. 3: Further, what is the more universal is prior in idea. But
goodness seems to be more universal than being, since goodness has the
aspect of desirable; whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for
it is said of Judas: "It were better for him, if that man had not been
born" (Matt. 26:24). Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.
Obj. 4: Further, not only is existence desirable, but life,
knowledge, and many other things besides. Thus it seems that existence
is a particular appetible, and goodness a universal appetible.
Therefore, absolutely, goodness is prior in idea to being.
_On the contrary,_ It is said by Aristotle (De Causis) that "the first
of created things is being."
_I answer that,_ In idea being is prior to goodness. For the meaning
signified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of
the thing and intends by the word that stands for it. Therefore, that
is prior in idea, which is first conceived by the intellect. Now the
first thing conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is
knowable only inasmuch as it is in actuality. Hence, being is the
proper object of the intellect, and is primarily intelligible; as
sound is that which is primarily audible. Therefore in idea being is
prior to goodness.
Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius discusses the Divine Names (Div. Nom.
i, iii) as implying some causal relation in God; for we name God, as
he says, from creatures, as a cause from its effects. But goodness,
since it has the aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final
cause, the causality of which is first among causes, since an agent
does not act except for some end; and by an agent matter is moved to
its form. Hence the end is called the cause of causes. Thus goodness,
as a cause, is prior to being, as is the end to the form. Therefore
among the names signifying the divine causality, goodness precedes
being. Again, according to the Platonists, who, through not
distinguishing primary matter from privation, said that matter was
non-being, goodness is more extensively participated than being; for
primary matter participates in goodness as tending to it, for all seek
their like; but it does not participate in being, since it is presumed
to be non-being. Therefore Dionysius says that "goodness extends to
non-existence" (Div. Nom. v).
Reply Obj. 2: The same solution is applied to this objection.
Or it may be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing
things, not so far as it can be predicated of them, but so far as it
can cause them--if, indeed, by non-existence we understand not simply
those things which do not exist, but those which are potential, and
not actual. For goodness has the aspect of the end, in which not only
actual things find their completion, but also towards which tend even
those things which are not actual, but merely potential. Now being
implies the habitude of a formal cause only, either inherent or
exemplar; and its causality does not extend save to those things which
are actual.
Reply Obj. 3: Non-being is desirable, not of itself, but only
relatively--i.e. inasmuch as the removal of an evil, which can only
be removed by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of an evil
cannot be desirable, except so far as this evil deprives a thing of
some being. Therefore being is desirable of itself; and non-being only
relatively, inasmuch as one seeks some mode of being of which one
cannot bear to be deprived; thus even non-being can be spoken of as
relatively good.
Reply Obj. 4: Life, wisdom, and the like, are desirable only
so far as they are actual. Hence, in each one of them some sort of
being is desired. And thus nothing can be desired except being; and
consequently nothing is good except being.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 3]
Whether Every Being Is Good?
Objection 1: It seems that not every being is good. For goodness is
something superadded to being, as is clear from A. 1. But whatever is
added to being limits it; as substance, quantity, quality, etc.
Therefore goodness limits being. Therefore not every being is good.
Obj. 2: Further, no evil is good: "Woe to you that call evil good
and good evil" (Isa. 5:20). But some things are called evil. Therefore
not every being is good.
Obj. 3: Further, goodness implies desirability. Now primary
matter does not imply desirability, but rather that which desires.
Therefore primary matter does not contain the formality of goodness.
Therefore not every being is good.
Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher notes (Metaph. iii) that "in
mathematics goodness does not exist." But mathematics are entities;
otherwise there would be no science of mathematics. Therefore not
every being is good.
_On the contrary,_ Every being that is not God is God's creature. Now
every creature of God is good (1 Tim. 4:4): and God is the greatest
good. Therefore every being is good.
_I answer that,_ Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as
being, has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act
implies some sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability
and goodness, as is clear from A. 1. Hence it follows that every being
as such is good.
Reply Obj. 1: Substance, quantity, quality, and everything
included in them, limit being by applying it to some essence or
nature. Now in this sense, goodness does not add anything to being
beyond the aspect of desirability and perfection, which is also proper
to being, whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not
limit being.
Reply Obj. 2: No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as
being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be
evil, because he lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil,
because it lacks the power to see well.
Reply Obj. 3: As primary matter has only potential being, so
it is only potentially good. Although, according to the Platonists,
primary matter may be said to be a non-being on account of the
privation attaching to it, nevertheless, it does participate to a
certain extent in goodness, viz. by its relation to, or aptitude for,
goodness. Consequently, to be desirable is not its property, but to
desire.
Reply Obj. 4: Mathematical entities do not subsist as
realities; because they would be in some sort good if they subsisted;
but they have only logical existence, inasmuch as they are abstracted
from motion and matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end,
which itself has the aspect of moving another. Nor is it repugnant
that there should be in some logical entity neither goodness nor form
of goodness; since the idea of being is prior to the idea of goodness,
as was said in the preceding article.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 4]
Whether Goodness Has the Aspect of a Final Cause?
Objection 1: It seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final
cause, but rather of the other causes. For, as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv), "Goodness is praised as beauty." But beauty has the aspect
of a formal cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of a formal
cause.
Obj. 2: Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv) that goodness is that whereby all things subsist, and
are. But to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient cause.
Therefore goodness has the aspect of an efficient cause.
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 31) that
"we exist because God is good." But we owe our existence to God as the
efficient cause. Therefore goodness implies the aspect of an efficient
cause.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "that is to be
considered as the end and the good of other things, for the sake of
which something is." Therefore goodness has the aspect of a final
cause.
_I answer that,_ Since goodness is that which all things desire, and
since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies
the aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes
the idea of an efficient cause, and also of a formal cause. For we see
that what is first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e.g.
heats first of all before it reproduces the form of fire; though the
heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in causing,
goodness and the end come first, both of which move the agent to act;
secondly, the action of the agent moving to the form; thirdly, comes
the form. Hence in that which is caused the converse ought to take
place, so that there should be first, the form whereby it is a being;
secondly, we consider in it its effective power, whereby it is perfect
in being, for a thing is perfect when it can reproduce its like, as
the Philosopher says (Meteor. iv); thirdly, there follows the
formality of goodness which is the basic principle of its perfection.
Reply Obj. 1: Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical
fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the
form; and consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ
logically, for goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness
being what all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an
end (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a thing). On the
other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful
things are those which please when seen. Hence beauty consists in due
proportion; for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, as in
what is after their own kind--because even sense is a sort of reason,
just as is every cognitive faculty. Now since knowledge is by
assimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty properly belongs
to the nature of a formal cause.
Reply Obj. 2: Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the
sense that an end is said to move.
Reply Obj. 3: He who has a will is said to be good, so far as
he has a good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever
powers we may have. Hence a man is said to be good, not by his good
understanding; but by his good will. Now the will relates to the end
as to its proper object. Thus the saying, "we exist because God is
good" has reference to the final cause.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 5]
Whether the Essence of Goodness Consists in Mode, Species and Order?
Objection 1: It seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in
mode, species and order. For goodness and being differ logically. But
mode, species and order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it
is written: "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and
weight" (Wis. 11:21). And to these three can be reduced species, mode
and order, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3): "Measure fixes the
mode of everything, number gives it its species, and weight gives it
rest and stability." Therefore the essence of goodness does not
consist in mode, species and order.
Obj. 2: Further, mode, species and order are themselves good.
Therefore if the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and
order, then every mode must have its own mode, species and order. The
same would be the case with species and order in endless succession.
Obj. 3: Further, evil is the privation of mode, species and
order. But evil is not the total absence of goodness. Therefore the
essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.
Obj. 4: Further, that wherein consists the essence of goodness
cannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we can speak of an evil mode, species
and order. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode,
species and order.
Obj. 5: Further, mode, species and order are caused by weight,
number and measure, as appears from the quotation from Augustine. But
not every good thing has weight, number and measure; for Ambrose says
(Hexam. i, 9): "It is of the nature of light not to have been created
in number, weight and measure." Therefore the essence of goodness does
not consist in mode, species and order.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. iii): "These
three--mode, species and order--as common good things, are in
everything God has made; thus, where these three abound the things are
very good; where they are less, the things are less good; where they
do not exist at all, there can be nothing good." But this would not be
unless the essence of goodness consisted in them. Therefore the
essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order.
_I answer that,_ Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect;
for in that way only is it desirable (as shown above, AA. 1, 3). Now
a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the
mode of its perfection. But since everything is what it is by its form
(and since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form
certain things necessarily follow), in order for a thing to be perfect
and good it must have a form, together with all that precedes and
follows upon that form. Now the form presupposes determination or
commensuration of its principles, whether material or efficient, and
this is signified by the mode: hence it is said that the measure marks
the mode. But the form itself is signified by the species; for
everything is placed in its species by its form. Hence the number is
said to give the species, for definitions signifying species are like
numbers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x); for as a unit added
to, or taken from a number, changes its species, so a difference added
to, or taken from a definition, changes its species. Further, upon the
form follows an inclination to the end, or to an action, or something
of the sort; for everything, in so far as it is in act, acts and tends
towards that which is in accordance with its form; and this belongs to
weight and order. Hence the essence of goodness, so far as it consists
in perfection, consists also in mode, species and order.
Reply Obj. 1: These three only follow upon being, so far as it
is perfect, and according to this perfection is it good.
Reply Obj. 2: Mode, species and order are said to be good, and
to be beings, not as though they themselves were subsistences, but
because it is through them that other things are both beings and good.
Hence they have no need of other things whereby they are good: for
they are spoken of as good, not as though formally constituted so by
something else, but as formally constituting others good: thus
whiteness is not said to be a being as though it were by anything
else; but because, by it, something else has accidental being, as an
object that is white.
Reply Obj. 3: Every being is due to some form. Hence,
according to every being of a thing is its mode, species, order. Thus,
a man has a mode, species and order as he is white, virtuous, learned
and so on; according to everything predicated of him. But evil
deprives a thing of some sort of being, as blindness deprives us of
that being which is sight; yet it does not destroy every mode, species
and order, but only such as follow upon the being of sight.
Reply Obj. 4: Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. xxiii), "Every
mode, as mode, is good" (and the same can be said of species and
order). "But an evil mode, species and order are so called as being
less than they ought to be, or as not belonging to that which they
ought to belong. Therefore they are called evil, because they are out
of place and incongruous."
Reply Obj. 5: The nature of light is spoken of as being
without number, weight and measure, not absolutely, but in comparison
with corporeal things, because the power of light extends to all
corporeal things; inasmuch as it is an active quality of the first
body that causes change, i.e. the heavens.
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 6]
Whether Goodness Is Rightly Divided into the Virtuous*, the Useful
and the Pleasant? [*"Bonum honestum" is the virtuous good considered
as fitting. Cf. II-II, Q. 141, A. 3; Q. 145.]
Objection 1: It seems that goodness is not rightly divided into the
virtuous, the useful and the pleasant. For goodness is divided by the
ten predicaments, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i). But the
virtuous, the useful and the pleasant can be found under one
predicament. Therefore goodness is not rightly divided by them.
Obj. 2: Further, every division is made by opposites. But these
three do not seem to be opposites; for the virtuous is pleasing, and
no wickedness is useful; whereas this ought to be the case if the
division were made by opposites, for then the virtuous and the useful
would be opposed; and Tully speaks of this (De Offic. ii). Therefore
this division is incorrect.
Obj. 3: Further, where one thing is on account of another, there
is only one thing. But the useful is not goodness, except so far as it
is pleasing and virtuous. Therefore the useful ought not to divided
against the pleasant and the virtuous.
_On the contrary,_ Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness (De
Offic. i, 9)
_I answer that,_ This division properly concerns human goodness. But if
we consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal
point of view, we shall find that this division properly concerns
goodness as such. For everything is good so far as it is desirable,
and is a term of the movement of the appetite; the term of whose
movement can be seen from a consideration of the movement of a natural
body. Now the movement of a natural body is terminated by the end
absolutely; and relatively by the means through which it comes to the
end, where the movement ceases; so a thing is called a term of
movement, so far as it terminates any part of that movement. Now the
ultimate term of movement can be taken in two ways, either as the
thing itself towards which it tends, e.g. a place or form; or a state
of rest in that thing. Thus, in the movement of the appetite, the
thing desired that terminates the movement of the appetite relatively,
as a means by which something tends towards another, is called the
useful; but that sought after as the last thing absolutely terminating
the movement of the appetite, as a thing towards which for its own
sake the appetite tends, is called the virtuous; for the virtuous is
that which is desired for its own sake; but that which terminates the
movement of the appetite in the form of rest in the thing desired, is
called the pleasant.
Reply Obj. 1: Goodness, so far as it is identical with being,
is divided by the ten predicaments. But this division belongs to it
according to its proper formality.
Reply Obj. 2: This division is not by opposite things; but by
opposite aspects. Now those things are called pleasing which have no
other formality under which they are desirable except the pleasant,
being sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue. Whereas the useful
applies to such as have nothing desirable in themselves, but are
desired only as helpful to something further, as the taking of bitter
medicine; while the virtuous is predicated of such as are desirable in
themselves.
Reply Obj. 3: Goodness is not divided into these three as
something univocal to be predicated equally of them all; but as
something analogical to be predicated of them according to priority
and posteriority. Hence it is predicated chiefly of the virtuous; then
of the pleasant; and lastly of the useful.
_______________________
QUESTION 6
THE GOODNESS OF GOD
(In Four Articles)
We next consider the goodness of God; under which head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether goodness belongs to God?
(2) Whether God is the supreme good?
(3) Whether He alone is essentially good?
(4) Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 6, Art. 1]
Whether God is good?
Objection 1: It seems that to be good does not belong to God. For
goodness consists in mode, species and order. But these do not seem to
belong to God; since God is immense and is not ordered to anything
else. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.
Obj. 2: Further, the good is what all things desire. But all
things do not desire God, because all things do not know Him; and
nothing is desired unless it is known. Therefore to be good does not
belong to God.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lam. 3:25): "The Lord is good to them
that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him."
_I answer that,_ To be good belongs pre-eminently to God. For a thing is
good according to its desirableness. Now everything seeks after its
own perfection; and the perfection and form of an effect consist in a
certain likeness to the agent, since every agent makes its like; and
hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For
the very thing which is desirable in it is the participation of its
likeness. Therefore, since God is the first effective cause of all
things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness
belong to Him; and hence Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) attributes good to
God as to the first efficient cause, saying that, God is called good
"as by Whom all things subsist."
Reply Obj. 1: To have mode, species and order belongs to the
essence of caused good; but good is in God as in its cause, and hence
it belongs to Him to impose mode, species and order on others;
wherefore these three things are in God as in their cause.
Reply Obj. 2: All things, by desiring their own perfection,
desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so
many similitudes of the divine being; as appears from what is said
above (Q. 4, A. 3). And so of those things which desire God, some
know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational
creature; others know some participation of His goodness, and this
belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a natural desire
without knowledge, as being directed to their ends by a higher
intelligence.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 6, Art. 2]
Whether God Is the Supreme Good?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not the supreme good. For the
supreme good adds something to good; otherwise it would belong to
every good. But everything which is an addition to anything else is a
compound thing: therefore the supreme good is a compound. But God is
supremely simple; as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 7). Therefore God
is not the supreme good.
Obj. 2: Further, "Good is what all desire," as the Philosopher
says (Ethic. i, 1). Now what all desire is nothing but God, Who is the
end of all things: therefore there is no other good but God. This
appears also from what is said (Luke 18:19): "None is good but God
alone." But we use the word supreme in comparison with others, as e.g.
supreme heat is used in comparison with all other heats. Therefore God
cannot be called the supreme good.
Obj. 3: Further, supreme implies comparison. But things not in
the same genus are not comparable; as, sweetness is not properly
greater or less than a line. Therefore, since God is not in the same
genus as other good things, as appears above (QQ. 3, A. 5;
4, A. 3) it seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in
relation to others.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. ii) that, the Trinity of the
divine persons is "the supreme good, discerned by purified minds."
_I answer that,_ God is the supreme good simply, and not only as
existing in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to
God, as was said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired
perfections flow from Him as from the first cause. They do not,
however, flow from Him as from a univocal agent, as shown above
(Q. 4, A. 2); but as from an agent which does not agree with its
effects either in species or genus. Now the likeness of an effect in
the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in the equivocal cause it
is found more excellently, as, heat is in the sun more excellently
than it is in fire. Therefore as good is in God as in the first, but
not the univocal, cause of all things, it must be in Him in a most
excellent way; and therefore He is called the supreme good.
Reply Obj. 1: The supreme good does not add to good any
absolute thing, but only a relation. Now a relation of God to
creatures, is not a reality in God, but in the creature; for it is in
God in our idea only: as, what is knowable is so called with relation
to knowledge, not that it depends on knowledge, but because knowledge
depends on it. Thus it is not necessary that there should be
composition in the supreme good, but only that other things are
deficient in comparison with it.
Reply Obj. 2: When we say that good is what all desire, it is
not to be understood that every kind of good thing is desired by all;
but that whatever is desired has the nature of good. And when it is
said, "None is good but God alone," this is to be understood of
essential goodness, as will be explained in the next article.
Reply Obj. 3: Things not of the same genus are in no way
comparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera. Now
we say that God is not in the same genus with other good things; not
that He is any other genus, but that He is outside genus, and is the
principle of every genus; and thus He is compared to others by excess,
and it is this kind of comparison the supreme good implies.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [I. Q. 6, Art. 3]
Whether to Be Essentially Good Belongs to God Alone?
Objection 1: It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to
God alone. For as _one_ is convertible with _being,_ so is _good;_ as
we said above (Q. 5, A. 1). But every being is one essentially, as
appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is
good essentially.
Obj. 2: Further, if good is what all things desire, since being
itself is desired by all, then the being of each thing is its good.
But everything is a being essentially; therefore every being is good
essentially.
Obj. 3: Further, everything is good by its own goodness.
Therefore if there is anything which is not good essentially, it is
necessary to say that its goodness is not its own essence. Therefore
its goodness, since it is a being, must be good; and if it is good by
some other goodness, the same question applies to that goodness also;
therefore we must either proceed to infinity, or come to some goodness
which is not good by any other goodness. Therefore the first
supposition holds good. Therefore everything is good essentially.
_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Hebdom.), that "all things but God
are good by participation." Therefore they are not good essentially.
_I answer that,_ God alone is good essentially. For everything is called
good according to its perfection. Now perfection of a thing is
threefold: first, according to the constitution of its own being;
secondly, in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for its
perfect operation; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to
something else as the end. Thus, for instance, the first perfection of
fire consists in its existence, which it has through its own
substantial form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness
and dryness, and the like; its third perfection is to rest in its own
place. This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own
essence; it belongs to God only, in Whom alone essence is existence;
in Whom there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others
accidentally belongs to Him essentially; as, to be powerful, wise and
the like, as appears from what is stated above (Q. 3, A. 6); and
He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the
last end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God alone has every
kind of perfection by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is
good essentially.
Reply Obj. 1: "One" does not include the idea of perfection,
but only of indivision, which belongs to everything according to its
own essence. Now the essences of simple things are undivided both
actually and potentially, but the essences of compounds are undivided
only actually; and therefore everything must be one essentially, but
not good essentially, as was shown above.
Reply Obj. 2: Although everything is good in that it has
being, yet the essence of a creature is not very being; and therefore
it does not follow that a creature is good essentially.
Reply Obj. 3: The goodness of a creature is not its very
essence, but something superadded; it is either its existence, or some
added perfection, or the order to its end. Still, the goodness itself
thus added is good, just as it is being. But for this reason is it
called being because by it something has being, not because it itself
has being through something else: hence for this reason is it called
good because by it something is good, and not because it itself has
some other goodness whereby it is good.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 6, Art. 4]
Whether All Things Are Good by the Divine Goodness?
Objection 1: It seems that all things are good by the divine goodness.
For Augustine says (De Trin. viii), "This and that are good; take away
this and that, and see good itself if thou canst; and so thou shalt
see God, good not by any other good, but the good of every good." But
everything is good by its own good; therefore everything is good by
that very good which is God.
Obj. 2: Further, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), all things are
called good, accordingly as they are directed to God, and this is by
reason of the divine goodness; therefore all things are good by the
divine goodness.
_On the contrary,_ All things are good, inasmuch as they have being. But
they are not called beings through the divine being, but through their
own being; therefore all things are not good by the divine goodness,
but by their own goodness.
_I answer that,_ As regards relative things, we must admit extrinsic
denomination; as, a thing is denominated "placed" from "place," and
"measured" from "measure." But as regards absolute things opinions
differ. Plato held the existence of separate ideas (Q. 84, A. 4)
of all things, and that individuals were denominated by them as
participating in the separate ideas; for instance, that Socrates is
called man according to the separate idea of man. Now just as he laid
down separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and
absolute horse, so likewise he laid down separate ideas of "being" and
of "one," and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and
by participation of these, everything was called "being" or "one"; and
what was thus absolute being and absolute one, he said was the supreme
good. And because good is convertible with being, as one is also; he
called God the absolute good, from whom all things are called good by
way of participation.
Although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in affirming separate
ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves--as Aristotle
argues in many ways--still, it is absolutely true that there is first
something which is essentially being and essentially good, which we
call God, as appears from what is shown above (Q. 2, A. 3), and
Aristotle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially
such, and good, everything can be called good and a being, inasmuch as
it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far
removed and defective; as appears from the above (Q. 4, A. 3).
Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from
the first exemplary effective and final principle of all goodness.
Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of
the divine goodness belonging to it, which is formally its own
goodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there
is one goodness, and yet many goodnesses.
This is a sufficient Reply to the Objections.
_______________________
QUESTION 7
THE INFINITY OF GOD
(In Four Articles)
After considering the divine perfection we must consider the divine
infinity, and God's existence in things: for God is everywhere, and in
all things, inasmuch as He is boundless and infinite.
Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is infinite?
(2) Whether anything besides Him is infinite in essence?
(3) Whether anything can be infinitude in magnitude?
(4) Whether an infinite multitude can exist?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 7, Art. 1]
Whether God Is Infinite?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not infinite. For everything
infinite is imperfect, as the Philosopher says; because it has parts
and matter, as is said in Phys. iii. But God is most perfect;
therefore He is not infinite.
Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i), finite
and infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity in God, for
He is not a body, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 1). Therefore it
does not belong to Him to be infinite.
Obj. 3: Further, what is here in such a way as not to be
elsewhere, is finite according to place. Therefore that which is a
thing in such a way as not to be another thing, is finite according to
substance. But God is this, and not another; for He is not a stone or
wood. Therefore God is not infinite in substance.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4) that "God is
infinite and eternal, and boundless."
_I answer that,_ All the ancient philosophers attribute infinitude to
the first principle, as is said (Phys. iii), and with reason; for they
considered that things flow forth infinitely from the first principle.
But because some erred concerning the nature of the first principle,
as a consequence they erred also concerning its infinity; forasmuch as
they asserted that matter was the first principle; consequently they
attributed to the first principle a material infinity to the effect
that some infinite body was the first principle of things.
We must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite because it
is not finite. Now matter is in a way made finite by form, and the
form by matter. Matter indeed is made finite by form, inasmuch as
matter, before it receives its form, is in potentiality to many forms;
but on receiving a form, it is terminated by that one. Again, form is
made finite by matter, inasmuch as form, considered in itself, is
common to many; but when received in matter, the form is determined to
this one particular thing. Now matter is perfected by the form by
which it is made finite; therefore infinite as attributed to matter,
has the nature of something imperfect; for it is as it were formless
matter. On the other hand, form is not made perfect by matter, but
rather is contracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on
the part of the form not determined by matter, has the nature of
something perfect. Now being is the most formal of all things, as
appears from what is shown above (Q. 4, A. 1, Obj. 3). Since
therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He
is His own subsistent being as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 4), it is
clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect.
From this appears the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply Obj. 2: Quantity is terminated by its form, which can be
seen in the fact that a figure which consists in quantity terminated,
is a kind of quantitative form. Hence the infinite of quantity is the
infinite of matter; such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed to
God; as was said above, in this article.
Reply Obj. 3: The fact that the being of God is self-subsisting,
not received in any other, and is thus called infinite, shows Him
to be distinguished from all other beings, and all others to be
apart from Him. Even so, were there such a thing as a
self-subsisting whiteness, the very fact that it did not exist in
anything else, would make it distinct from every other whiteness
existing in a subject.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 7, Art. 2]
Whether Anything but God Can Be Essentially Infinite?
Objection 1: It seems that something else besides God can be
essentially infinite. For the power of anything is proportioned to its
essence. Now if the essence of God is infinite, His power must also be
infinite. Therefore He can produce an infinite effect, since the
extent of a power is known by its effect.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever has infinite power, has an infinite
essence. Now the created intellect has an infinite power; for it
apprehends the universal, which can extend itself to an infinitude of
singular things. Therefore every created intellectual substance is
infinite.
Obj. 3: Further, primary matter is something other than God, as
was shown above (Q. 3, A. 8). But primary matter is infinite.
Therefore something besides God can be infinite.
_On the contrary,_ The infinite cannot have a beginning, as said in
Phys. iii. But everything outside God is from God as from its first
principle. Therefore besides God nothing can be infinite.
_I answer that,_ Things other than God can be relatively infinite, but
not absolutely infinite. For with regard to infinite as applied to
matter, it is manifest that everything actually existing possesses a
form; and thus its matter is determined by form. But because matter,
considered as existing under some substantial form, remains in
potentiality to many accidental forms, which is absolutely finite can
be relatively infinite; as, for example, wood is finite according to
its own form, but still it is relatively infinite, inasmuch as it is
in potentiality to an infinite number of shapes. But if we speak of
the infinite in reference to form, it is manifest that those things,
the forms of which are in matter, are absolutely finite, and in no way
infinite. If, however, any created forms are not received into matter,
but are self-subsisting, as some think is the case with angels, these
will be relatively infinite, inasmuch as such kinds of forms are not
terminated, nor contracted by any matter. But because a created form
thus subsisting has being, and yet is not its own being, it follows
that its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature.
Hence it cannot be absolutely infinite.
Reply Obj. 1: It is against the nature of a made thing for its
essence to be its existence; because subsisting being is not a created
being; hence it is against the nature of a made thing to be absolutely
infinite. Therefore, as God, although He has infinite power, cannot
make a thing to be not made (for this would imply that two
contradictories are true at the same time), so likewise He cannot make
anything to be absolutely infinite.
Reply Obj. 2: The fact that the power of the intellect extends
itself in a way to infinite things, is because the intellect is a form
not in matter, but either wholly separated from matter, as is the
angelic substance, or at least an intellectual power, which is not the
act of any organ, in the intellectual soul joined to a body.
Reply Obj. 3: Primary matter does not exist by itself in
nature, since it is not actually being, but potentially only; hence it
is something concreated rather than created. Nevertheless, primary
matter even as a potentiality is not absolutely infinite, but
relatively, because its potentiality extends only to natural forms.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 7, Art. 3]
Whether an Actually Infinite Magnitude Can Exist?
Objection 1: It seems that there can be something actually infinite in
magnitude. For in mathematics there is no error, since "there is no
lie in things abstract," as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii). But
mathematics uses the infinite in magnitude; thus, the geometrician in
his demonstrations says, "Let this line be infinite." Therefore it is
not impossible for a thing to be infinite in magnitude.
Obj. 2: Further, what is not against the nature of anything, can
agree with it. Now to be infinite is not against the nature of
magnitude; but rather both the finite and the infinite seem to be
properties of quantity. Therefore it is not impossible for some
magnitude to be infinite.
Obj. 3: Further, magnitude is infinitely divisible, for the
continuous is defined that which is infinitely divisible, as is clear
from Phys. iii. But contraries are concerned about one and the same
thing. Since therefore addition is opposed to division, and increase
opposed to diminution, it appears that magnitude can be increased to
infinity. Therefore it is possible for magnitude to be infinite.
Obj. 4: Further, movement and time have quantity and continuity
derived from the magnitude over which movement passes, as is said in
Phys. iv. But it is not against the nature of time and movement to be
infinite, since every determinate indivisible in time and circular
movement is both a beginning and an end. Therefore neither is it
against the nature of magnitude to be infinite.
_On the contrary,_ Every body has a surface. But every body which has a
surface is finite; because surface is the term of a finite body.
Therefore all bodies are finite. The same applies both to surface and
to a line. Therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude.
_I answer that,_ It is one thing to be infinite in essence, and another
to be infinite in magnitude. For granted that a body exists infinite
in magnitude, as fire or air, yet this could not be infinite in
essence, because its essence would be terminated in a species by its
form, and confined to individuality by matter. And so assuming from
these premises that no creature is infinite in essence, it still
remains to inquire whether any creature can be infinite in magnitude.
We must therefore observe that a body, which is a complete magnitude,
can be considered in two ways; mathematically, in respect to its
quantity only; and naturally, as regards its matter and form.
Now it is manifest that a natural body cannot be actually infinite.
For every natural body has some determined substantial form. Since
therefore the accidents follow upon the substantial form, it is
necessary that determinate accidents should follow upon a determinate
form; and among these accidents is quantity. So every natural body has
a greater or smaller determinate quantity. Hence it is impossible for
a natural body to be infinite. The same appears from movement; because
every natural body has some natural movement; whereas an infinite body
could not have any natural movement; neither direct, because nothing
moves naturally by a direct movement unless it is out of its place;
and this could not happen to an infinite body, for it would occupy
every place, and thus every place would be indifferently its own
place. Neither could it move circularly; forasmuch as circular motion
requires that one part of the body is necessarily transferred to a
place occupied by another part, and this could not happen as regards
an infinite circular body: for if two lines be drawn from the centre,
the farther they extend from the centre, the farther they are from
each other; therefore, if a body were infinite, the lines would be
infinitely distant from each other; and thus one could never occupy
the place belonging to any other.
The same applies to a mathematical body. For if we imagine a
mathematical body actually existing, we must imagine it under some
form, because nothing is actual except by its form; hence, since the
form of quantity as such is figure, such a body must have some figure,
and so would be finite; for figure is confined by a term or boundary.
Reply Obj. 1: A geometrician does not need to assume a line
actually infinite, but takes some actually finite line, from which he
subtracts whatever he finds necessary; which line he calls infinite.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the infinite is not against the nature
of magnitude in general, still it is against the nature of any species
of it; thus, for instance, it is against the nature of a bicubical or
tricubical magnitude, whether circular or triangular, and so on. Now
what is not possible in any species cannot exist in the genus; hence
there cannot be any infinite magnitude, since no species of magnitude
is infinite.
Reply Obj. 3: The infinite in quantity, as was shown above,
belongs to matter. Now by division of the whole we approach to matter,
forasmuch as parts have the aspect of matter; but by addition we
approach to the whole which has the aspect of a form. Therefore the
infinite is not in the addition of magnitude, but only in division.
Reply Obj. 4: Movement and time are whole, not actually but
successively; hence they have potentiality mixed with actuality. But
magnitude is an actual whole; therefore the infinite in quantity
refers to matter, and does not agree with the totality of magnitude;
yet it agrees with the totality of time and movement: for it is proper
to matter to be in potentiality.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 7, Art. 4]
Whether an Infinite Multitude Can Exist?
Objection 1: It seems that an actually infinite multitude is possible.
For it is not impossible for a potentiality to be made actual. But
number can be multiplied to infinity. Therefore it is possible for an
infinite multitude actually to exist.
Obj. 2: Further, it is possible for any individual of any species
to be made actual. But the species of figures are infinite. Therefore
an infinite number of actual figures is possible.
Obj. 3: Further, things not opposed to each other do not obstruct
each other. But supposing a multitude of things to exist, there can
still be many others not opposed to them. Therefore it is not
impossible for others also to coexist with them, and so on to
infinitude; therefore an actual infinite number of things is possible.
_On the contrary,_ It is written, "Thou hast ordered all things in
measure, and number, and weight" (Wis. 11:21).
_I answer that,_ A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some, as
Avicenna and Algazel, said that it was impossible for an actually
infinite multitude to exist absolutely; but that an accidentally
infinite multitude was not impossible. A multitude is said to be
infinite absolutely, when an infinite multitude is necessary that
something may exist. Now this is impossible; because it would entail
something dependent on an infinity for its existence; and hence its
generation could never come to be, because it is impossible to pass
through an infinite medium.
A multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its existence as
such is not necessary, but accidental. This can be shown, for example,
in the work of a carpenter requiring a certain absolute multitude;
namely, art in the soul, the movement of the hand, and a hammer; and
supposing that such things were infinitely multiplied, the
carpentering work would never be finished, forasmuch as it would
depend on an infinite number of causes. But the multitude of hammers,
inasmuch as one may be broken and another used, is an accidental
multitude; for it happens by accident that many hammers are used, and
it matters little whether one or two, or many are used, or an infinite
number, if the work is carried on for an infinite time. In this way
they said that there can be an accidentally infinite multitude.
This, however, is impossible; since every kind of multitude must
belong to a species of multitude. Now the species of multitude are to
be reckoned by the species of numbers. But no species of number is
infinite; for every number is multitude measured by one. Hence it is
impossible for there to be an actually infinite multitude, either
absolute or accidental. Likewise multitude in nature is created; and
everything created is comprehended under some clear intention of the
Creator; for no agent acts aimlessly. Hence everything created must be
comprehended in a certain number. Therefore it is impossible for an
actually infinite multitude to exist, even accidentally. But a
potentially infinite multitude is possible; because the increase of
multitude follows upon the division of magnitude; since the more a
thing is divided, the greater number of things result. Hence, as the
infinite is to be found potentially in the division of the continuous,
because we thus approach matter, as was shown in the preceding
article, by the same rule, the infinite can be also found potentially
in the addition of multitude.
Reply Obj. 1: Every potentiality is made actual according to
its mode of being; for instance, a day is reduced to act successively,
and not all at once. Likewise the infinite in multitude is reduced to
act successively, and not all at once; because every multitude can be
succeeded by another multitude to infinity.
Reply Obj. 2: Species of figures are infinite by infinitude of
number. Now there are various species of figures, such as trilateral,
quadrilateral and so on; and as an infinitely numerable multitude is
not all at once reduced to act, so neither is the multitude of
figures.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the supposition of some things does not
preclude the supposition of others, still the supposition of an
infinite number is opposed to any single species of multitude. Hence
it is not possible for an actually infinite multitude to exist.
_______________________
QUESTION 8
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS
(In Four Articles)
Since it evidently belongs to the infinite to be present everywhere,
and in all things, we now consider whether this belongs to God; and
concerning this there arise four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is in all things?
(2) Whether God is everywhere?
(3) Whether God is everywhere by essence, power, and presence?
(4) Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 8, Art. 1]
Whether God Is in All Things?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not in all things. For what is above
all things is not in all things. But God is above all, according to
the Psalm (Ps. 112:4), "The Lord is high above all nations," etc.
Therefore God is not in all things.
Obj. 2: Further, what is in anything is thereby contained. Now
God is not contained by things, but rather does He contain them.
Therefore God is not in things but things are rather in Him. Hence
Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 20), that "in Him things are,
rather than He is in any place."
Obj. 3: Further, the more powerful an agent is, the more extended
is its action. But God is the most powerful of all agents. Therefore
His action can extend to things which are far removed from Him; nor is
it necessary that He should be in all things.
Obj. 4: Further, the demons are beings. But God is not in the
demons; for there is no fellowship between light and darkness (2 Cor.
6:14). Therefore God is not in all things.
_On the contrary,_ A thing is wherever it operates. But God operates in
all things, according to Isa. 26:12, "Lord . . . Thou hast wrought all
our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us." Therefore God is in all things.
_I answer that,_ God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their
essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon
which it works. For an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts
immediately and touch it by its power; hence it is proved in Phys. vii
that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now since
God is very being by His own essence, created being must be His proper
effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God causes this
effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as
they are preserved in being; as light is caused in the air by the sun
as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing
has being, God must be present to it, according to its mode of being.
But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent
in all things since it is formal in respect of everything found in a
thing, as was shown above (Q. 7, A. 1). Hence it must be that God
is in all things, and innermostly.
Reply Obj. 1: God is above all things by the excellence of His
nature; nevertheless, He is in all things as the cause of the being of
all things; as was shown above in this article.
Reply Obj. 2: Although corporeal things are said to be in
another as in that which contains them, nevertheless, spiritual things
contain those things in which they are; as the soul contains the body.
Hence also God is in things containing them; nevertheless, by a
certain similitude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are
in God; inasmuch as they are contained by Him.
Reply Obj. 3: No action of an agent, however powerful it may
be, acts at a distance, except through a medium. But it belongs to the
great power of God that He acts immediately in all things. Hence
nothing is distant from Him, as if it could be without God in itself.
But things are said to be distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in
nature or grace; as also He is above all by the excellence of His own
nature.
Reply Obj. 4: In the demons there is their nature which is
from God, and also the deformity of sin which is not from Him;
therefore, it is not to be absolutely conceded that God is in the
demons, except with the addition, "inasmuch as they are beings." But
in things not deformed in their nature, we must say absolutely that
God is.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 8, Art. 2]
Whether God Is Everywhere?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not everywhere. For to be everywhere
means to be in every place. But to be in every place does not belong
to God, to Whom it does not belong to be in place at all; for
"incorporeal things," as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), "are not in a
place." Therefore God is not everywhere.
Obj. 2: Further, the relation of time to succession is the same
as the relation of place to permanence. But one indivisible part of
action or movement cannot exist in different times; therefore neither
can one indivisible part in the genus of permanent things be in every
place. Now the divine being is not successive but permanent. Therefore
God is not in many places; and thus He is not everywhere.
Obj. 3: Further, what is wholly in any one place is not in part
elsewhere. But if God is in any one place He is all there; for He has
no parts. No part of Him then is elsewhere; and therefore God is not
everywhere.
_On the contrary,_ It is written, "I fill heaven and earth." (Jer.
23:24).
_I answer that,_ Since place is a thing, to be in place can be
understood in a twofold sense; either by way of other things--i.e. as
one thing is said to be in another no matter how; and thus the
accidents of a place are in place; or by a way proper to place; and
thus things placed are in a place. Now in both these senses, in some
way God is in every place; and this is to be everywhere. First, as He
is in all things giving them being, power and operation; so He is in
every place as giving it existence and locative power. Again, things
placed are in place, inasmuch as they fill place; and God fills every
place; not, indeed, like a body, for a body is said to fill place
inasmuch as it excludes the co-presence of another body; whereas by
God being in a place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed,
by the very fact that He gives being to the things that fill every
place, He Himself fills every place.
Reply Obj. 1: Incorporeal things are in place not by contact
of dimensive quantity, as bodies are but by contact of power.
Reply Obj. 2: The indivisible is twofold. One is the term of
the continuous; as a point in permanent things, and as a moment in
succession; and this kind of the indivisible in permanent things,
forasmuch as it has a determinate site, cannot be in many parts of
place, or in many places; likewise the indivisible of action or
movement, forasmuch as it has a determinate order in movement or
action, cannot be in many parts of time. Another kind of the
indivisible is outside of the whole genus of the continuous; and in
this way incorporeal substances, like God, angel and soul, are called
indivisible. Such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the
continuous, as a part of it, but as touching it by its power; hence,
according as its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small
thing, or to a great one, in this way it is in one or in many places,
and in a small or large place.
Reply Obj. 3: A whole is so called with reference to its
parts. Now part is twofold: viz. a part of the essence, as the form
and the matter are called parts of the composite, while genus and
difference are called parts of species. There is also part of quantity
into which any quantity is divided. What therefore is whole in any
place by totality of quantity, cannot be outside of that place,
because the quantity of anything placed is commensurate to the
quantity of the place; and hence there is no totality of quantity
without totality of place. But totality of essence is not commensurate
to the totality of place. Hence it is not necessary for that which is
whole by totality of essence in a thing, not to be at all outside of
it. This appears also in accidental forms which have accidental
quantity; as an example, whiteness is whole in each part of the
surface if we speak of its totality of essence; because according to
the perfect idea of its species it is found to exist in every part of
the surface. But if its totality be considered according to quantity
which it has accidentally, then it is not whole in every part of the
surface. On the other hand, incorporeal substances have no totality
either of themselves or accidentally, except in reference to the
perfect idea of their essence. Hence, as the soul is whole in every
part of the body, so is God whole in all things and in each one.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 8, Art. 3]
Whether God Is Everywhere by Essence, Presence and Power?
Objection 1: It seems that the mode of God's existence in all things
is not properly described by way of essence, presence and power. For
what is by essence in anything, is in it essentially. But God is not
essentially in things; for He does not belong to the essence of
anything. Therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by
essence, presence and power.
Obj. 2: Further, to be present in anything means not to be absent
from it. Now this is the meaning of God being in things by His
essence, that He is not absent from anything. Therefore the presence
of God in all things by essence and presence means the same thing.
Therefore it is superfluous to say that God is present in things by
His essence, presence and power.
Obj. 3: Further, as God by His power is the principle of all
things, so He is the same likewise by His knowledge and will. But it
is not said that He is in things by knowledge and will. Therefore
neither is He present by His power.
Obj. 4: Further, as grace is a perfection added to the substance
of a thing, so many other perfections are likewise added. Therefore if
God is said to be in certain persons in a special way by grace, it
seems that according to every perfection there ought to be a special
mode of God's existence in things.
_On the contrary,_ A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles (5) says that,
"God by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power and
substance; still He is said to be present more familiarly in some by
grace." [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, (Hom. viii in Ezech.)].
_I answer that,_ God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way
after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things
created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of
operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations of
the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and
the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second way God is
especially in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually
or habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this
prerogative by grace, as will be shown later (Q. 12). He is said
to be thus in the saints by grace.
But how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from
human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in the whole kingdom
by his power, although he is not everywhere present. Again a thing is
said to be by its presence in other things which are subject to its
inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who
nevertheless may not be in substance in every part of the house.
Lastly, a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that
place in which its substance may be. Now there were some (the
Manichees) who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were subject
to the divine power; but that visible and corporeal things were
subject to the power of a contrary principle. Therefore against these
it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His power.
But others, though they believed that all things were subject to the
divine power, still did not allow that divine providence extended to
these inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, "He
walketh about the poles of the heavens; and He doth not consider our
things [*Vulg.: 'He doth not consider . . . and He walketh,' etc.]"
(Job 22:14). Against these it is necessary to say that God is in all
things by His presence.
Further, others said that, although all things are subject to God's
providence, still all things are not immediately created by God; but
that He immediately created the first creatures, and these created the
others. Against these it is necessary to say that He is in all things
by His essence.
Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things
are subject to His power; He is by His presence in all things, as all
things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His
essence, inasmuch as He is present to all as the cause of their being.
Reply Obj. 1: God is said to be in all things by essence, not
indeed by the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of their
essence; but by His own essence; because His substance is present to
all things as the cause of their being.
Reply Obj. 2: A thing can be said to be present to another,
when in its sight, though the thing may be distant in substance, as
was shown in this article; and therefore two modes of presence are
necessary; viz. by essence and by presence.
Reply Obj. 3: Knowledge and will require that the thing known
should be in the one who knows, and the thing willed in the one who
wills. Hence by knowledge and will things are more truly in God than
God in things. But power is the principle of acting on another; hence
by power the agent is related and applied to an external thing; thus
by power an agent may be said to be present to another.
Reply Obj. 4: No other perfection, except grace, added to
substance, renders God present in anything as the object known and
loved; therefore only grace constitutes a special mode of God's
existence in things. There is, however, another special mode of God's
existence in man by union, which will be treated of in its own place
(Part III).
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 8, Art. 4]
Whether to Be Everywhere Belongs to God Alone?
Objection 1: It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God
alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i), is
everywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in all
bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as appears from
what is said above (Q. 3). Therefore to be everywhere does not
belong to God alone.
Obj. 2: Further, number is in things numbered. But the whole
universe is constituted in number, as appears from the Book of Wisdom
(Wis. 11:21). Therefore there is some number which is in the whole
universe, and is thus everywhere.
Obj. 3: Further, the universe is a kind of "whole perfect body"
(Coel. et Mund. i). But the whole universe is everywhere, because
there is no place outside it. Therefore to be everywhere does not
belong to God alone.
Obj. 4: Further, if any body were infinite, no place would exist
outside of it, and so it would be everywhere. Therefore to be
everywhere does not appear to belong to God alone.
Obj. 5: Further, the soul, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), is
"whole in the whole body, and whole in every one of its parts."
Therefore if there was only one animal in the world, its soul would be
everywhere; and thus to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.
Obj. 6: Further, as Augustine says (Ep. 137), "The soul feels
where it sees, and lives where it feels, and is where it lives." But
the soul sees as it were everywhere: for in a succession of glances it
comprehends the entire space of the heavens in its sight. Therefore
the soul is everywhere.
_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Who dares to
call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things, and everywhere, and
always is, which assuredly belongs to the divinity alone?"
_I answer that,_ To be everywhere primarily and absolutely, is proper to
God. Now to be everywhere primarily is said of that which in its whole
self is everywhere; for if a thing were everywhere according to its
parts in different places, it would not be primarily everywhere,
forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part does not
belong to it primarily; thus if a man has white teeth, whiteness
belongs primarily not to the man but to his teeth. But a thing is
everywhere absolutely when it does not belong to it to be everywhere
accidentally, that is, merely on some supposition; as a grain of
millet would be everywhere, supposing that no other body existed. It
belongs therefore to a thing to be everywhere absolutely when, on any
supposition, it must be everywhere; and this properly belongs to God
alone. For whatever number of places be supposed, even if an infinite
number be supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary
that God should be in all of them; for nothing can exist except by
Him. Therefore to be everywhere primarily and absolutely belongs to
God and is proper to Him: because whatever number of places be
supposed to exist, God must be in all of them, not as to a part of
Him, but as to His very self.
Reply Obj. 1: The universal, and also primary matter are
indeed everywhere; but not according to the same mode of existence.
Reply Obj. 2: Number, since it is an accident, does not, of
itself, exist in place, but accidentally; neither is the whole but
only part of it in each of the things numbered; hence it does not
follow that it is primarily and absolutely everywhere.
Reply Obj. 3: The whole body of the universe is everywhere,
but not primarily; forasmuch as it is not wholly in each place, but
according to its parts; nor again is it everywhere absolutely,
because, supposing that other places existed besides itself, it would
not be in them.
Reply Obj. 4: If an infinite body existed, it would be
everywhere; but according to its parts.
Reply Obj. 5: Were there one animal only, its soul would be
everywhere primarily indeed, but only accidentally.
Reply Obj. 6: When it is said that the soul sees anywhere,
this can be taken in two senses. In one sense the adverb "anywhere"
determines the act of seeing on the part of the object; and in this
sense it is true that while it sees the heavens, it sees in the
heavens; and in the same way it feels in the heavens; but it does not
follow that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live and to
exist do not import an act passing to an exterior object. In another
sense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the act
of the seer, as proceeding from the seer; and thus it is true that
where the soul feels and sees, there it is, and there it lives
according to this mode of speaking; and thus it does not follow that
it is everywhere.
_______________________
QUESTION 9
THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD
(In Two Articles)
We next consider God's immutability, and His eternity following on His
immutability. On the immutability of God there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether God is altogether immutable?
(2) Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 9, Art. 1]
Whether God is altogether immutable?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not altogether immutable. For
whatever moves itself is in some way mutable. But, as Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit, viii, 20), "The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by
time, nor by place." Therefore God is in some way mutable.
Obj. 2: Further, it is said of Wisdom, that "it is more mobile
than all things active [Vulg. 'mobilior']" (Wis. 7:24). But God is
wisdom itself; therefore God is movable.
Obj. 3: Further, to approach and to recede signify movement. But
these are said of God in Scripture, "Draw nigh to God and He will draw
nigh to you" (James 4:8). Therefore God is mutable.
_On the contrary,_ It is written, "I am the Lord, and I change not"
(Malachi 3:6).
_I answer that,_ From what precedes, it is shown that God is altogether
immutable. First, because it was shown above that there is some first
being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act,
without the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason that,
absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is
in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. Hence it is
evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable.
Secondly, because everything which is moved, remains as it was in
part, and passes away in part; as what is moved from whiteness to
blackness, remains the same as to substance; thus in everything which
is moved, there is some kind of composition to be found. But it has
been shown above (Q. 3, A. 7) that in God there is no composition,
for He is altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be
moved. Thirdly, because everything which is moved acquires something
by its movement, and attains to what it had not attained previously.
But since God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all the plenitude
of perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend
Himself to anything whereto He was not extended previously. Hence
movement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients,
constrained, as it were, by the truth, decided that the first
principle was immovable.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine there speaks in a similar way to
Plato, who said that the first mover moves Himself; calling every
operation a movement, even as the acts of understanding, and willing,
and loving, are called movements. Therefore because God understands
and loves Himself, in that respect they said that God moves Himself,
not, however, as movement and change belong to a thing existing in
potentiality, as we now speak of change and movement.
Reply Obj. 2: Wisdom is called mobile by way of similitude,
according as it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things;
for nothing can exist which does not proceed from the divine wisdom by
way of some kind of imitation, as from the first effective and formal
principle; as also works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist.
And so in the same way, inasmuch as the similitude of the divine
wisdom proceeds in degrees from the highest things, which participate
more fully of its likeness, to the lowest things which participate of
it in a lesser degree, there is said to be a kind of procession and
movement of the divine wisdom to things; as when we say that the sun
proceeds to the earth, inasmuch as the ray of light touches the earth.
In this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. i) expounds the matter, that every
procession of the divine manifestation comes to us from the movement
of the Father of light.
Reply Obj. 3: These things are said of God in Scripture
metaphorically. For as the sun is said to enter a house, or to go out,
according as its rays reach the house, so God is said to approach to
us, or to recede from us, when we receive the influx of His goodness,
or decline from Him.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [I. Q. 9, Art. 2]
Whether to Be Immutable Belongs to God Alone?
Objection 1: It seems that to be immutable does not belong to God
alone. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that "matter is in
everything which is moved." But, according to some, certain created
substances, as angels and souls, have not matter. Therefore to be
immutable does not belong to God alone.
Obj. 2: Further, everything in motion moves to some end. What
therefore has already attained its ultimate end, is not in motion. But
some creatures have already attained to their ultimate end; as all the
blessed in heaven. Therefore some creatures are immovable.
Obj. 3: Further, everything which is mutable is variable. But
forms are invariable; for it is said (Sex Princip. i) that "form is
essence consisting of the simple and invariable." Therefore it does
not belong to God alone to be immutable.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. i), "God alone is
immutable; and whatever things He has made, being from nothing, are
mutable."
_I answer that,_ God alone is altogether immutable; whereas every
creature is in some way mutable. Be it known therefore that a mutable
thing can be called so in two ways: by a power in itself; and by a
power possessed by another. For all creatures before they existed,
were possible, not by any created power, since no creature is eternal,
but by the divine power alone, inasmuch as God could produce them into
existence. Thus, as the production of a thing into existence depends
on the will of God, so likewise it depends on His will that things
should be preserved; for He does not preserve them otherwise than by
ever giving them existence; hence if He took away His action from
them, all things would be reduced to nothing, as appears from
Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12). Therefore as it was in the Creator's
power to produce them before they existed in themselves, so likewise
it is in the Creator's power when they exist in themselves to bring
them to nothing. In this way therefore, by the power of
another--namely, of God--they are mutable, inasmuch as they are
producible from nothing by Him, and are by Him reducible from
existence to non-existence.
If, however, a thing is called mutable by a power in itself, thus also
in some manner every creature is mutable. For every creature has a
twofold power, active and passive; and I call that power passive which
enables anything to attain its perfection either in being, or in
attaining to its end. Now if the mutability of a thing be considered
according to its power for being, in that way all creatures are not
mutable, but those only in which what is potential in them is
consistent with non-being. Hence, in the inferior bodies there is
mutability both as regards substantial being, inasmuch as their matter
can exist with privation of their substantial form, and also as
regards their accidental being, supposing the subject to coexist with
privation of accident; as, for example, this subject _man_ can exist
with _not-whiteness_ and can therefore be changed from white to
not-white. But supposing the accident to be such as to follow on the
essential principles of the subject, then the privation of such an
accident cannot coexist with the subject. Hence the subject cannot be
changed as regards that kind of accident; as, for example, snow cannot
be made black. Now in the celestial bodies matter is not consistent
with privation of form, because the form perfects the whole
potentiality of the matter; therefore these bodies are not mutable as
to substantial being, but only as to locality, because the subject is
consistent with privation of this or that place. On the other hand
incorporeal substances, being subsistent forms which, although with
respect to their own existence are as potentiality to act, are not
consistent with the privation of this act; forasmuch as existence is
consequent upon form, and nothing corrupts except it lose its form.
Hence in the form itself there is no power to non-existence; and so
these kinds of substances are immutable and invariable as regards
their existence. Wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
"intellectual created substances are pure from generation and from
every variation, as also are incorporeal and immaterial substances."
Still, there remains in them a twofold mutability: one as regards
their potentiality to their end; and in that way there is in them a
mutability according to choice from good to evil, as Damascene says
(De Fide ii, 3,4); the other as regards place, inasmuch as by their
finite power they attain to certain fresh places--which cannot be
said of God, who by His infinity fills all places, as was shown above
(Q. 8, A. 2).
Thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change either as
regards substantial being as in the case of things corruptible; or as
regards locality only, as in the case of the celestial bodies; or as
regards the order to their end, and the application of their powers to
divers objects, as in the case with the angels; and universally all
creatures generally are mutable by the power of the Creator, in Whose
power is their existence and non-existence. Hence since God is in none
of these ways mutable, it belongs to Him alone to be altogether
immutable.
Reply Obj. 1: This objection proceeds from mutability as
regards substantial or accidental being; for philosophers treated of
such movement.
Reply Obj. 2: The good angels, besides their natural endowment
of immutability of being, have also immutability of election by divine
power; nevertheless there remains in them mutability as regards place.
Reply Obj. 3: Forms are called invariable, forasmuch as they
cannot be subjects of variation; but they are subject to variation
because by them their subject is variable. Hence it is clear that they
vary in so far as they are; for they are not called beings as though
they were the subject of being, but because through them something has
being.
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QUESTION 10
THE ETERNITY OF GOD
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider the eternity of God, concerning which arise six
points of inquiry:
(1) What is eternity?
(2) Whether God is eternal?
(3) Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?
(4) Whether eternity differs from time?
(5) The difference of aeviternity and of time.
(6) Whether there is only one aeviternity, as there is one time, and
one eternity?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 10, Art. 1]
Whether This Is a Good Definition of Eternity, "The Simultaneously-
Whole and Perfect Possession of Interminable Life"?
Objection 1: It seems that the definition of eternity given by
Boethius (De Consol. v) is not a good one: "Eternity is the
simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life." For
the word "interminable" is a negative one. But negation only belongs
to what is defective, and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore
in the definition of eternity the word "interminable" ought not to be
found.
Obj. 2: Further, eternity signifies a certain kind of duration.
But duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore the word
"life" ought not to come into the definition of eternity; but rather
the word "existence."
Obj. 3: Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is alien to
eternity which is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be
"whole."
Obj. 4: Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist
all at once. But in eternity, days and times are in the plural, for it
is said, "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of
eternity" (Micah 5:2); and also it is said, "According to the
revelation of the mystery hidden from eternity" (Rom. 16:25).
Therefore eternity is not omni-simultaneous.
Obj. 5: Further, the whole and the perfect are the same thing.
Supposing, therefore, that it is "whole," it is superfluously
described as "perfect."
Obj. 6: Further, duration does not imply "possession." But eternity
is a kind of duration. Therefore eternity is not possession.
_I answer that,_ As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way
of compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by
means of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by
_before_ and _after._ For since succession occurs in every movement,
and one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and
after in movement, makes us apprehend time, which is nothing else but
the measure of before and after in movement. Now in a thing bereft of
movement, which is always the same, there is no before or after. As
therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering of before and
after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity
of what is outside of movement, consists the idea of eternity.
Further, those things are said to be measured by time which have a
beginning and an end in time, because in everything which is moved
there is a beginning, and there is an end. But as whatever is wholly
immutable can have no succession, so it has no beginning, and no end.
Thus eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is
eternal is interminable--that is, has no beginning nor end (that is,
no term either way); secondly, because eternity has no succession,
being simultaneously whole.
Reply Obj. 1: Simple things are usually defined by way of negation;
as "a point is that which has no parts." Yet this is not to be taken
as if the negation belonged to their essence, but because our
intellect which first apprehends compound things, cannot attain to
the knowledge of simple things except by removing the opposite.
Reply Obj. 2: What is truly eternal, is not only being, but also
living; and life extends to operation, which is not true of being.
Now the protraction of duration seems to belong to operation rather
than to being; hence time is the numbering of movement.
Reply Obj. 3: Eternity is called whole, not because it has parts, but
because it is wanting in nothing.
Reply Obj. 4: As God, although incorporeal, is named in Scripture
metaphorically by corporeal names, so eternity though simultaneously
whole, is called by names implying time and succession.
Reply Obj. 5: Two things are to be considered in time: time itself,
which is successive; and the "now" of time, which is imperfect. Hence
the expression "simultaneously-whole" is used to remove the idea of
time, and the word "perfect" is used to exclude the "now" of time.
Reply Obj. 6: Whatever is possessed, is held firmly and quietly;
therefore to designate the immutability and permanence of eternity,
we use the word "possession."
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 10, Art. 2]
Whether God is Eternal?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be
predicated of God; for Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "The now that
flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity;" and
Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 28) "that God is the author of
eternity." Therefore God is not eternal.
Obj. 2: Further, what is before eternity, and after eternity, is
not measured by eternity. But, as Aristotle says (De Causis), "God is
before eternity and He is after eternity": for it is written that "the
Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond [*Douay: 'for ever and
ever']" (Ex. 15:18). Therefore to be eternal does not belong to God.
Obj. 3: Further, eternity is a kind of measure. But to be measured
belongs not to God. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be eternal.
Obj. 4: Further, in eternity, there is no present, past or future,
since it is simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding
article. But words denoting present, past and future time are applied
to God in Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal.
_On the contrary,_ Athanasius says in his Creed: "The Father is eternal,
the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal."
_I answer that,_ The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea
of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article.
Hence, as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to
be eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity;
whereas, no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own
being. Now God is His own uniform being; and hence as He is His own
essence, so He is His own eternity.
Reply Obj. 1: The "now" that stands still, is said to make eternity
according to our apprehension. As the apprehension of time is caused
in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the "now," so the
apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the
"now" standing still. When Augustine says that "God is the author of
eternity," this is to be understood of participated eternity. For God
communicates His eternity to some in the same way as He communicates
His immutability.
Reply Obj. 2: From this appears the answer to the Second Objection.
For God is said to be before eternity, according as it is shared by
immaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same book, it is said that
"intelligence is equal to eternity." In the words of Exodus, "The
Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond," eternity stands for age,
as another rendering has it. Thus it is said that the Lord will reign
beyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond every age, i.e. beyond
every kind of duration. For age is nothing more than the period of
each thing, as is said in the book _De Coelo_ i. Or to reign beyond
eternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived
to exist for ever, as the movement of the heavens according to some
philosophers, then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as His
reign is simultaneously whole.
Reply Obj. 3: Eternity is nothing else but God Himself. Hence God is
not called eternal, as if He were in any way measured; but the idea
of measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our
mind alone.
Reply Obj. 4: Words denoting different times are applied to God,
because His eternity includes all times; not as if He Himself were
altered through present, past and future.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 10, Art. 3]
Whether to Be Eternal Belongs to God Alone?
Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be
eternal. For it is written that "those who instruct many to justice,"
shall be "as stars unto perpetual eternities [*Douay: 'for all
eternity']" (Dan. 12:3). Now if God alone were eternal, there could
not be many eternities. Therefore God alone is not the only eternal.
Obj. 2: Further, it is written "Depart, ye cursed into eternal
[Douay: 'everlasting'] fire" (Matt. 25:41). Therefore God is not the
only eternal.
Obj. 3: Further, every necessary thing is eternal. But there are
many necessary things; as, for instance, all principles of
demonstration and all demonstrative propositions. Therefore God is
not the only eternal.
_On the contrary,_ Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum, xv) that "God is the
only one who has no beginning." Now whatever has a beginning, is not
eternal. Therefore God is the only one eternal.
_I answer that,_ Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone,
because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first
article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above
(Q. 9, A. 1). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability
from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability
from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is
said of the earth, "it standeth for ever" (Eccl. 1:4). Again, some
things are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their
duration, although they are in nature corruptible; thus (Ps. 75:5) the
hills are called "eternal" and we read "of the fruits of the eternal
hills." (Deut. 33:15). Some again, share more fully than others in the
nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either
in being or further still in operation; like the angels, and the
blessed, who enjoy the Word, because "as regards that vision of the
Word, no changing thoughts exist in the Saints," as Augustine says (De
Trin. xv). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life;
according to that text, "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee
the only true God," etc. (John 17:3).
Reply Obj. 1: There are said to be many eternities, accordingly as
many share in eternity, by the contemplation of God.
Reply Obj. 2: The fire of hell is called eternal, only because it
never ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost,
according to the words "To extreme heat they will pass from snowy
waters" (Job 24:19). Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but
rather time; according to the text of the Psalm "Their time will be
for ever" (Ps. 80:16).
Reply Obj. 3: Necessary means a certain mode of truth; and truth,
according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi), is in the mind. Therefore
in this sense the true and necessary are eternal, because they are in
the eternal mind, which is the divine intellect alone; hence it does
not follow that anything beside God is eternal.
______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [I. Q. 10, Art. 4]
Whether Eternity Differs from Time?
Objection 1: It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two
measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part of the
other; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together;
nevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together,
considering hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur
together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration. Since
therefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity
exceeds time, and includes it, it seems that time is a part of
eternity, and is not a different thing from eternity.
Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the "now"
of time remains the same in the whole of time. But the nature of
eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the
whole space of time. Therefore eternity is the "now" of time. But the
"now" of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore
eternity is not substantially different from time.
Obj. 3: Further, as the measure of the first movement is the
measure of every movement, as said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that
the measure of the first being is that of every being. But eternity is
the measure of the first being--that is, of the divine being.
Therefore eternity is the measure of every being. But the being of
things corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore is either
eternity or is a part of eternity.
_On the contrary,_ Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a
"before" and an "after." Therefore time and eternity are not the same
thing.
_I answer that,_ It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same.
Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has
neither beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end.
This, however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute
difference because, granted that time always was and always will be,
according to the idea of those who think the movement of the heavens
goes on for ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity
and time, as Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that
eternity is simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied to time: for
eternity is the measure of a permanent being; while time is a measure
of movement. Supposing, however, that the aforesaid difference be
considered on the part of the things measured, and not as regards the
measures, then there is some reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is
measured by time which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the
movement of the heavens lasted always, time would not be of its
measure as regards the whole of its duration, since the infinite is
not measurable; but it would be the measure of that part of its
revolution which has beginning and end in time.
Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in
themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as
potentialities; because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it
is possible to note in time both the beginning and the end, by
considering its parts: thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a
day or of a year; which cannot be applied to eternity. Still these
differences follow upon the essential and primary differences, that
eternity is simultaneously whole, but that time is not so.
Reply Obj. 1: Such a reason would be a valid one if time and eternity
were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the case
when we consider those things of which the respective measures are
time and eternity.
Reply Obj. 2: The "now" of time is the same as regards its subject in
the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for inasmuch as
time corresponds to movement, its "now" corresponds to what is
movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject in all time,
but differs in aspect a being here and there; and such alteration is
movement. Likewise the flow of the "now" as alternating in aspect is
time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject and
aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the "now" of time.
Reply Obj. 3: As eternity is the proper measure of permanent being,
so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according as
any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to change,
it recedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore the being
of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured by
eternity, but by time; for time measures not only things actually
changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only measures
movement but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is
naturally movable, but is not actually in motion.
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 10, Art. 5]
The Difference of Aeviternity and Time
Objection 1: It seems that aeviternity is the same as time. For
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20, 22, 23), that "God moves the
spiritual through time." But aeviternity is said to be the measure of
spiritual substances. Therefore time is the same as aeviternity.
Obj. 2: Further, it is essential to time to have "before" and
"after"; but it is essential to eternity to be simultaneously whole,
as was shown above in the first article. Now aeviternity is not
eternity; for it is written (Ecclus. 1:1) that eternal "Wisdom is
before age." Therefore it is not simultaneously whole but has "before"
and "after"; and thus it is the same as time.
Obj. 3: Further, if there is no "before" and "after" in
aeviternity, it follows that in aeviternal things there is no
difference between being, having been, or going to be. Since then it
is impossible for aeviternal things not to have been, it follows that
it is impossible for them not to be in the future; which is false,
since God can reduce them to nothing.
Obj. 4: Further, since the duration of aeviternal things is
infinite as to subsequent duration, if aeviternity is simultaneously
whole, it follows that some creature is actually infinite; which is
impossible. Therefore aeviternity does not differ from time.
_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iii) "Who commandest time
to be separate from aeviternity."
_I answer that,_ Aeviternity differs from time, and from eternity, as
the mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to
consist in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end,
aeviternity, a beginning but no end, and time both beginning and end.
This difference, however, is but an accidental one, as was shown
above, in the preceding article; because even if aeviternal things had
always been, and would always be, as some think, and even if they
might sometimes fail to be, which is possible to God to allow; even
granted this, aeviternity would still be distinguished from eternity,
and from time.
Others assign the difference between these three to consist in the
fact that eternity has no "before" and "after"; but that time has
both, together with innovation and veteration; and that aeviternity
has "before" and "after" without innovation and veteration. This
theory, however, involves a contradiction; which manifestly appears
if innovation and veteration be referred to the measure itself. For
since "before" and "after" of duration cannot exist together, if
aeviternity has "before" and "after," it must follow that with the
receding of the first part of aeviternity, the after part of
aeviternity must newly appear; and thus innovation would occur in
aeviternity itself, as it does in time. And if they be referred to
the things measured, even then an incongruity would follow. For a
thing which exists in time grows old with time, because it has a
changeable existence, and from the changeableness of a thing
measured, there follows "before" and "after" in the measure, as is
clear from _Physic._ iv. Therefore the fact that an aeviternal thing
is neither inveterate, nor subject to innovation, comes from its
changelessness; and consequently its measure does not contain
"before" and "after." We say then that since eternity is the measure
of a permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from permanence
of being, it recedes from eternity. Now some things recede from
permanence of being, so that their being is subject to change, or
consists in change; and these things are measured by time, as are all
movements, and also the being of all things corruptible. But others
recede less from permanence of being, forasmuch as their being
neither consists in change, nor is the subject of change;
nevertheless they have change annexed to them either actually or
potentially. This appears in the heavenly bodies, the substantial
being of which is unchangeable; and yet with unchangeable being they
have changeableness of place. The same applies to the angels, who
have an unchangeable being as regards their nature with
changeableness as regards choice; moreover they have changeableness
of intelligence, of affections and of places in their own degree.
Therefore these are measured by aeviternity which is a mean between
eternity and time. But the being that is measured by eternity is not
changeable, nor is it annexed to change. In this way time has
"before" and "after"; aeviternity in itself has no "before" and
"after," which can, however, be annexed to it; while eternity has
neither "before" nor "after," nor is it compatible with such at all.
Reply Obj. 1: Spiritual creatures as regards successive affections
and intelligences are measured by time. Hence also Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. viii, 20, 22, 23) that to be moved through time, is
to be moved by affections. But as regards their nature they are
measured by aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they
have a share of eternity.
Reply Obj. 2: Aeviternity is simultaneously whole; yet it is not
eternity, because "before" and "after" are compatible with it.
Reply Obj. 3: In the very being of an angel considered absolutely,
there is no difference of past and future, but only as regards
accidental change. Now to say that an angel was, or is, or will be,
is to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation of
our intellect, which apprehends the angelic existence by comparison
with different parts of time. But when we say that an angel is, or
was, we suppose something, which being supposed, its opposite is not
subject to the divine power. Whereas when we say he will be, we do
not as yet suppose anything. Hence, since the existence and
non-existence of an angel considered absolutely is subject to the
divine power, God can make the existence of an angel not future; but
He cannot cause him not to be while he is, or not to have been, after
he has been.
Reply Obj. 4: The duration of aeviternity is infinite, forasmuch as
it is not finished by time. Hence, there is no incongruity in saying
that a creature is infinite, inasmuch as it is not ended by any other
creature.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I. Q. 10, Art. 6]
Whether There Is Only One Aeviternity?
Objection 1: It seems that there is not only one aeviternity; for it
is written in the apocryphal books of Esdras: "Majesty and power of
ages are with Thee, O Lord."
Obj. 2: Further, different genera have different measures. But
some aeviternal things belong to the corporeal genus, as the heavenly
bodies; and others are spiritual substances, as are the angels.
Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.
Obj. 3: Further, since aeviternity is a term of duration, where
there is one aeviternity, there is also one duration. But not all
aeviternal things have one duration, for some begin to exist after
others; as appears in the case especially of human souls. Therefore
there is not only one aeviternity.
Obj. 4: Further, things not dependent on each other do not seem
to have one measure of duration; for there appears to be one time for
all temporal things; since the first movement, measured by time, is in
some way the cause of all movement. But aeviternal things do not
depend on each other, for one angel is not the cause of another angel.
Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.
_On the contrary,_ Aeviternity is a more simple thing than time, and is
nearer to eternity. But time is one only. Therefore much more is
aeviternity one only.
_I answer that,_ A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some say
there is only one aeviternity; others that there are many
aeviternities. Which of these is true, may be considered from the
cause why time is one; for we can rise from corporeal things to the
knowledge of spiritual things.
Now some say that there is only one time for temporal things,
forasmuch as one number exists for all things numbered; as time is a
number, according to the Philosopher (Physic. iv). This, however,
is not a sufficient reason; because time is not a number abstracted
from the thing numbered, but existing in the thing numbered;
otherwise it would not be continuous; for ten ells of cloth are
continuous not by reason of the number, but by reason of the thing
numbered. Now number as it exists in the thing numbered, is not the
same for all; but it is different for different things. Hence, others
assert that the unity of eternity as the principle of all duration is
the cause of the unity of time. Thus all durations are one in that
view, in the light of their principle, but are many in the light of
the diversity of things receiving duration from the influx of the
first principle. On the other hand others assign primary matter as
the cause why time is one; as it is the first subject of movement,
the measure of which is time. Neither of these reasons, however, is
sufficient; forasmuch as things which are one in principle, or in
subject, especially if distant, are not one absolutely, but
accidentally. Therefore the true reason why time is one, is to be
found in the oneness of the first movement by which, since it is most
simple, all other movements are measured. Therefore time is referred
to that movement, not only as a measure is to the thing measured, but
also as accident is to subject; and thus receives unity from it.
Whereas to other movements it is compared only as the measure is to
the thing measured. Hence it is not multiplied by their multitude,
because by one separate measure many things can be measured.
This being established, we must observe that a twofold opinion existed
concerning spiritual substances. Some said that all proceeded from God
in a certain equality, as Origen said (Peri Archon. i); or at least
many of them, as some others thought. Others said that all spiritual
substances proceeded from God in a certain degree and order; and
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. x) seems to have thought so, when he said that
among spiritual substances there are the first, the middle and the
last; even in one order of angels. Now according to the first opinion,
it must be said that there are many aeviternities as there are many
aeviternal things of first degree. But according to the second
opinion, it would be necessary to say that there is one aeviternity
only; because since each thing is measured by the most simple element
of its genus, it must be that the existence of all aeviternal things
should be measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing,
which is all the more simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore
because the second opinion is truer, as will be shown later
(Q. 47, A. 2); we concede at present that there is only one
aeviternity.
Reply Obj. 1: Aeviternity is sometimes taken for age, that is, a
space of a thing's duration; and thus we say many aeviternities when
we mean ages.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the heavenly bodies and spiritual things
differ in the genus of their nature, still they agree in having a
changeless being, and are thus measured by aeviternity.
Reply Obj. 3: All temporal things did not begin together;
nevertheless there is one time for all of them, by reason of the
first measured by time; and thus all aeviternal things have one
aeviternity by reason of the first, though all did not begin together.
Reply Obj. 4: For things to be measured by one, it is not necessary
that the one should be the cause of all, but that it be more simple
than the rest.
_______________________
QUESTION 11
THE UNITY OF GOD
(In Four Articles)
After the foregoing, we consider the divine unity; concerning which
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?
(2) Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?
(3) Whether God is one?
(4) Whether He is in the highest degree one?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 11, Art. 1]
Whether "One" Adds Anything to "Being"?
Objection 1: It seems that "one" adds something to "being." For
everything is in a determinate genus by addition to being, which
penetrates all _genera._ But "one" is a determinate genus, for it is
the principle of number, which is a species of quantity. Therefore
"one" adds something to "being."
Obj. 2: Further, what divides a thing common to all, is an
addition to it. But "being" is divided by "one" and by "many."
Therefore "one" is an addition to "being."
Obj. 3: Further, if "one" is not an addition to "being," "one"
and "being" must have the same meaning. But it would be nugatory to
call "being" by the name of "being"; therefore it would be equally so
to call being "one." Now this is false. Therefore "one" is an addition
to "being."
_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 5, ult.): "Nothing which
exists is not in some way one," which would be false if "one" were an
addition to "being," in the sense of limiting it. Therefore "one" is
not an addition to "being."
_I answer that,_ "One" does not add any reality to "being"; but is only
a negation of division; for "one" means undivided "being." This is the
very reason why "one" is the same as "being." Now every being is
either simple or compound. But what is simple is undivided, both
actually and potentially. Whereas what is compound, has not being
whilst its parts are divided, but after they make up and compose it.
Hence it is manifest that the being of anything consists in
undivision; and hence it is that everything guards its unity as it
guards its being.
Reply Obj. 1: Some, thinking that the "one" convertible with "being"
is the same as the "one" which is the principle of number, were
divided into contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the
"one" convertible with "being" did not add any reality to "being,"
but signified the substance of "being" as undivided, thought that the
same applied to the "one" which is the principle of number. And
because number is composed of unities, they thought that numbers were
the substances of all things. Avicenna, however, on the contrary,
considering that "one" which is the principle of number, added a
reality to the substance of "being" (otherwise number made of unities
would not be a species of quantity), thought that the "one"
convertible with "being" added a reality to the substance of beings;
as "white" to "man." This, however, is manifestly false, inasmuch as
each thing is "one" by its substance. For if a thing were "one" by
anything else but by its substance, since this again would be "one,"
supposing it were again "one" by another thing, we should be driven
on to infinity. Hence we must adhere to the former statement;
therefore we must say that the "one" which is convertible with
"being," does not add a reality to being; but that the "one" which is
the principle of number, does add a reality to "being," belonging to
the genus of quantity.
Reply Obj. 2: There is nothing to prevent a thing which in one way is
divided, from being another way undivided; as what is divided in
number, may be undivided in species; thus it may be that a thing is
in one way "one," and in another way "many." Still, if it is
absolutely undivided, either because it is so according to what
belongs to its essence, though it may be divided as regards what is
outside its essence, as what is one in subject may have many
accidents; or because it is undivided actually, and divided
potentially, as what is "one" in the whole, and is "many" in parts;
in such a case a thing will be "one" absolutely and "many"
accidentally. On the other hand, if it be undivided accidentally, and
divided absolutely, as if it were divided in essence and undivided in
idea or in principle or cause, it will be "many" absolutely and "one"
accidentally; as what are "many" in number and "one" in species or
"one" in principle. Hence in that way, being is divided by "one" and
by "many"; as it were by "one" absolutely and by "many" accidentally.
For multitude itself would not be contained under "being," unless it
were in some way contained under "one." Thus Dionysius says (Div.
Nom., cap. ult.) that "there is no kind of multitude that is not in
a way one. But what are many in their parts, are one in their whole;
and what are many in accidents, are one in subject; and what are many
in number, are one in species; and what are many in species, are one
in genus; and what are many in processions, are one in principle."
Reply Obj. 3: It does not follow that it is nugatory to say
"being" is "one"; forasmuch as "one" adds an idea to "being."
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 11, Art. 2]
Whether "One" and "Many" Are Opposed to Each Other?
Objection 1: It seems that "one" and "many" are not mutually opposed.
For no opposite thing is predicated of its opposite. But every
_multitude_ is in a certain way _one,_ as appears from the preceding
article. Therefore "one" is not opposed to "multitude."
Obj. 2: Further, no opposite thing is constituted by its
opposite. But _multitude_ is constituted by _one._ Therefore it is not
opposed to "multitude."
Obj. 3: Further, "one" is opposed to "one." But the idea of "few"
is opposed to "many." Therefore "one" is not opposed to "many."
Obj. 4: Further, if "one" is opposed to "multitude," it is
opposed as the undivided is to the divided; and is thus opposed to it
as privation is to habit. But this appears to be incongruous; because
it would follow that "one" comes after "multitude," and is defined by
it; whereas, on the contrary, "multitude" is defined by "one." Hence
there would be a vicious circle in the definition; which is
inadmissible. Therefore "one" and "many" are not opposed.
_On the contrary,_ Things which are opposed in idea, are themselves
opposed to each other. But the idea of "one" consists in
indivisibility; and the idea of "multitude" contains division.
Therefore "one" and "many" are opposed to each other.
_I answer that,_ "One" is opposed to "many," but in various ways. The
_one_ which is the principle of number is opposed to _multitude_ which
is number, as the measure is to the thing measured. For "one" implies
the idea of a primary measure; and number is _multitude_ measured by
_one,_ as is clear from _Metaph._ x. But the _one_ which is convertible
with _being_ is opposed to _multitude_ by way of privation; as the
undivided is to the thing divided.
Reply Obj. 1: No privation entirely takes away the being of a thing,
inasmuch as privation means "negation in the subject," according to
the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Nevertheless every privation takes
away some being; and so in being, by reason of its universality, the
privation of being has its foundation in being; which is not the case
in privations of special forms, as of sight, or of whiteness and the
like. And what applies to being applies also to one and to good,
which are convertible with being, for the privation of good is
founded in some good; likewise the removal of unity is founded in
some one thing. Hence it happens that multitude is some one thing;
and evil is some good thing, and non-being is some kind of being.
Nevertheless, opposite is not predicated of opposite; forasmuch as
one is absolute, and the other is relative; for what is relative
being (as a potentiality) is non-being absolutely, i.e. actually; or
what is absolute being in the genus of substance is non-being
relatively as regards some accidental being. In the same way, what is
relatively good is absolutely bad, or vice versa; likewise what is
absolutely _one_ is relatively _many,_ and vice versa.
Reply Obj. 2: A _whole_ is twofold. In one sense it is homogeneous,
composed of like parts; in another sense it is heterogeneous,
composed of dissimilar parts. Now in every homogeneous whole, the
whole is made up of parts having the form of the whole; as, for
instance, every part of water is water; and such is the constitution
of a continuous thing made up of its parts. In every heterogeneous
whole, however, every part is wanting in the form belonging to the
whole; as, for instance, no part of a house is a house, nor is any
part of a man a man. Now multitude is such a kind of a whole.
Therefore inasmuch as its part has not the form of the multitude, the
latter is composed of unities, as a house is composed of not houses;
not, indeed, as if unities constituted multitude so far as they are
undivided, in which way they are opposed to multitude; but so far as
they have being, as also the parts of a house make up the house by
the fact that they are beings, not by the fact that they are not
houses.
Reply Obj. 3: "Many" is taken in two ways: absolutely, and in that
sense it is opposed to "one"; in another way as importing some kind
of excess, in which sense it is opposed to "few"; hence in the first
sense two are many but not in the second sense.
Reply Obj. 4: "One" is opposed to "many" privatively, inasmuch as the
idea of "many" involves division. Hence division must be prior to
unity, not absolutely in itself, but according to our way of
apprehension. For we apprehend simple things by compound things; and
hence we define a point to be, "what has no part," or "the beginning
of a line." "Multitude" also, in idea, follows on "one"; because we
do not understand divided things to convey the idea of multitude
except by the fact that we attribute unity to every part. Hence "one"
is placed in the definition of "multitude"; but "multitude" is not
placed in the definition of "one." But division comes to be
understood from the very negation of being: so what first comes to
mind is being; secondly, that this being is not that being, and thus
we apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly, comes the notion of
one; fourthly, the notion of multitude.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 11, Art. 3]
Whether God Is One?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not one. For it is written "For
there be many gods and many lords" (1 Cor. 8:5).
Obj. 2: Further, "One," as the principle of number, cannot be
predicated of God, since quantity is not predicated of God; likewise,
neither can "one" which is convertible with "being" be predicated of
God, because it imports privation, and every privation is an
imperfection, which cannot apply to God. Therefore God is not one.
_On the contrary,_ It is written "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is
one Lord" (Deut. 6:4).
_I answer that,_ It can be shown from these three sources that God is
one. First from His simplicity. For it is manifest that the reason why
any singular thing is "this particular thing" is because it cannot be
communicated to many: since that whereby Socrates is a man, can be
communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is
only communicable to one. Therefore, if Socrates were a man by what
makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many Socrates,
so there could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to God
alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as was shown above
(Q. 3, A. 3). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He
is this God. Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist.
Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it
was shown above (Q. 4, A. 2) that God comprehends in Himself the
whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would
necessarily differ from each other. Something therefore would belong
to one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation,
one of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one
of them would be without it. So it is impossible for many gods to
exist. Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by
truth, when they asserted an infinite principle, asserted likewise
that there was only one such principle.
Thirdly, this is shown from the unity of the world. For all things
that exist are seen to be ordered to each other since some serve
others. But things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same
order, unless they are ordered thereto by one. For many are reduced
into one order by one better than by many: because one is the _per se_
cause of one, and many are only the accidental cause of one, inasmuch
as they are in some way one. Since therefore what is first is most
perfect, and is so _per se_ and not accidentally, it must be that the
first which reduces all into one order should be only one. And this
one is God.
Reply Obj. 1: Gods are called many by the error of some who
worshipped many deities, thinking as they did that the planets and
other stars were gods, and also the separate parts of the world.
Hence the Apostle adds: "Our God is one," etc.
Reply Obj. 2: "One" which is the principle of number is not
predicated of God, but only of material things. For "one" the
principle of number belongs to the genus of mathematics, which are
material in being, and abstracted from matter only in idea. But "one"
which is convertible with being is a metaphysical entity and does not
depend on matter in its being. And although in God there is no
privation, still, according to the mode of our apprehension, He is
known to us by way only of privation and remotion. Thus there is no
reason why a certain kind of privation should not be predicated of
God; for instance, that He is incorporeal and infinite; and in the
same way it is said of God that He is one.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 11, Art. 4]
Whether God Is Supremely One?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not supremely _one._ For "one" is so
called from the privation of division. But privation cannot be greater
or less. Therefore God is not more "one" than other things which are
called "one."
Obj. 2: Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than what
is actually and potentially indivisible; such as a point and unity.
But a thing is said to be more "one" according as it is indivisible.
Therefore God is not more _one_ than unity is _one_ and a point is
_one._
Obj. 3: Further, what is essentially good is supremely good.
Therefore what is essentially _one_ is supremely _one._ But every
being is essentially _one,_ as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv).
Therefore every being is supremely _one;_ and therefore God is not
_one_ more than any other being is _one._
_On the contrary,_ Bernard says (De Consid. v): "Among all things called
one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first place."
_I answer that,_ Since _one_ is an undivided being, if anything is
supremely _one_ it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided.
Now both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch
as His being is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined;
since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He
is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither actually nor
potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether simple,
as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 7). Hence it is manifest that God is
_one_ in the supreme degree.
Reply Obj. 1: Although privation considered in itself is not
susceptive of more or less, still according as its opposite is
subject to more or less, privation also can be considered itself in
the light of more and less. Therefore according as a thing is more
divided, or is divisible, either less or not at all, in the degree it
is called more, or less, or supremely, _one._
Reply Obj. 2: A point and unity which is the principle of number, are
not supremely being, inasmuch as they have being only in some
subject. Hence neither of them can be supremely _one._ For as a
subject cannot be supremely _one,_ because of the difference within
it of accident and subject, so neither can an accident.
Reply Obj. 3: Although every being is _one_ by its substance, still
every such substance is not equally the cause of unity; for the
substance of some things is compound and of others simple.
_______________________
QUESTION 12
HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US
(In Thirteen Articles)
As hitherto we have considered God as He is in Himself, we now go on
to consider in what manner He is in the knowledge of creatures;
concerning which there are thirteen points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?
(2) Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any
created image?
(3) Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye?
(4) Whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its
own natural powers to see the essence of God?
(5) Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order
to see the essence of God?
(6) Whether of those who see God, one sees Him more perfectly than
another?
(7) Whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of God?
(8) Whether the created intellect seeing the essence of God, knows
all things in it?
(9) Whether what is there known is known by any similitudes?
(10) Whether the created intellect knows at once what it sees in God?
(11) Whether in the state of this life any man can see the essence of
God?
(12) Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life?
(13) Whether there is in this life any knowledge of God through grace
above the knowledge of natural reason?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 1]
Whether Any Created Intellect Can See the Essence of God?
Objection 1: It seems that no created intellect can see the essence of
God. For Chrysostom (Hom. xiv. in Joan.) commenting on John 1:18, "No
man hath seen God at any time," says: "Not prophets only, but neither
angels nor archangels have seen God. For how can a creature see what
is increatable?" Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i), speaking of God:
"Neither is there sense, nor image, nor opinion, nor reason, nor
knowledge of Him."
Obj. 2: Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But
God is infinite, as was shown above (Q. 7, A. 1). Therefore in
Himself He is unknown.
Obj. 3: Further, the created intellect knows only existing things.
For what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is
being. Now God is not something existing; but He is rather
super-existence, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God is
not intelligible; but above all intellect.
Obj. 4: Further, there must be some proportion between the knower
and the known, since the known is the perfection of the knower. But no
proportion exists between the created intellect and God; for there is
an infinite distance between them. Therefore the created intellect
cannot see the essence of God.
_On the contrary,_ It is written: "We shall see Him as He is" (1 John
2:2).
_I answer that,_ Since everything is knowable according as it is actual,
God, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in
Himself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself,
may not be knowable to a particular intellect, on account of the
excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for
example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be seen by the
bat by reason of its excess of light.
Therefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can
see the essence of God. This opinion, however, is not tenable. For as
the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest
function, which is the operation of his intellect; if we suppose that
the created intellect could never see God, it would either never
attain to beatitude, or its beatitude would consist in something else
beside God; which is opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection of
the rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of
its being; since a thing is perfect so far as it attains to its
principle. Further the same opinion is also against reason. For there
resides in every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect
which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect
of the rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause
of things, the natural desire would remain void.
Hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence
of God.
Reply Obj. 1: Both of these authorities speak of the vision of
comprehension. Hence Dionysius premises immediately before the words
cited, "He is universally to all incomprehensible," etc. Chrysostom
likewise after the words quoted says: "He says this of the most
certain vision of the Father, which is such a perfect consideration
and comprehension as the Father has of the Son."
Reply Obj. 2: The infinity of matter not made perfect by form, is
unknown in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form; whereas
the infinity of the form not limited by matter, is in itself
supremely known. God is Infinite in this way, and not in the first
way: as appears from what was said above (Q. 7, A. 1).
Reply Obj. 3: God is not said to be not existing as if He did not
exist at all, but because He exists above all that exists; inasmuch
as He is His own existence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot
be known at all, but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge; which
means that He is not comprehended.
Reply Obj. 4: Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a certain
relation of one quantity to another, according as double, treble and
equal are species of proportion. In another sense every relation of
one thing to another is called proportion. And in this sense there
can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related
to Him as the effect of its cause, and as potentiality to its act;
and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned to know God.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 2]
Whether the Essence of God Is Seen by the Created Intellect Through an
Image?
Objection 1: It seems that the essence of God is seen through an image
by the created intellect. For it is written: "We know that when He
shall appear, we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall
see Him as He is" (1 John 3:2).
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v): "When we know God,
some likeness of God is made in us."
Obj. 3: Further, the intellect in act is the actual intelligible;
as sense in act is the actual sensible. But this comes about inasmuch
as sense is informed with the likeness of the sensible object, and the
intellect with the likeness of the thing understood. Therefore, if God
is seen by the created intellect in act, it must be that He is seen by
some similitude.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xv) that when the Apostle
says, "We see through a glass and in an enigma [*Douay: 'in a dark
manner']," "by the terms 'glass' and 'enigma' certain similitudes are
signified by him, which are accommodated to the vision of God." But to
see the essence of God is not an enigmatic nor a speculative vision,
but is, on the contrary, of an opposite kind. Therefore the divine
essence is not seen through a similitude.
_I answer that,_ Two things are required both for sensible and for
intellectual vision--viz. power of sight, and union of the thing seen
with the sight. For vision is made actual only when the thing seen is
in a certain way in the seer. Now in corporeal things it is clear that
the thing seen cannot be by its essence in the seer, but only by its
likeness; as the similitude of a stone is in the eye, whereby the
vision is made actual; whereas the substance of the stone is not
there. But if the principle of the visual power and the thing seen
were one and the same thing, it would necessarily follow that the seer
would receive both the visual power and the form whereby it sees, from
that one same thing.
Now it is manifest both that God is the author of the intellectual
power, and that He can be seen by the intellect. And since the
intellective power of the creature is not the essence of God, it
follows that it is some kind of participated likeness of Him who is
the first intellect. Hence also the intellectual power of the
creature is called an intelligible light, as it were, derived from
the first light, whether this be understood of the natural power, or
of some perfection superadded of grace or of glory. Therefore, in
order to see God, there must be some similitude of God on the part of
the visual faculty, whereby the intellect is made capable of seeing
God. But on the part of the object seen, which must necessarily be
united to the seer, the essence of God cannot be seen by any created
similitude. First, because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), "by the
similitudes of the inferior order of things, the superior can in no
way be known;" as by the likeness of a body the essence of an
incorporeal thing cannot be known. Much less therefore can the
essence of God be seen by any created likeness whatever. Secondly,
because the essence of God is His own very existence, as was shown
above (Q. 3, A. 4), which cannot be said of any created form; and so
no created form can be the similitude representing the essence of God
to the seer. Thirdly, because the divine essence is uncircumscribed,
and contains in itself super-eminently whatever can be signified or
understood by the created intellect. Now this cannot in any way be
represented by any created likeness; for every created form is
determined according to some aspect of wisdom, or of power, or of
being itself, or of some like thing. Hence to say that God is seen by
some similitude, is to say that the divine essence is not seen at
all; which is false.
Therefore it must be said that to see the essence of God, there is
required some similitude in the visual faculty, namely, the light of
glory strengthening the intellect to see God, which is spoken of in
the Psalm (35:10), "In Thy light we shall see light." The essence of
God, however, cannot be seen by any created similitude representing
the divine essence itself as it really is.
Reply Obj. 1: That authority speaks of the similitude which is
caused by participation of the light of glory.
Reply Obj. 2: Augustine speaks of the knowledge of God here on earth.
Reply Obj. 3: The divine essence is existence itself. Hence as
other intelligible forms which are not their own existence are united
to the intellect by means of some entity, whereby the intellect itself
is informed, and made in act; so the divine essence is united to the
created intellect, as the object actually understood, making the
intellect in act by and of itself.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 3]
Whether the Essence of God Can Be Seen with the Bodily Eye?
Objection 1: It seems that the essence of God can be seen by the
corporeal eye. For it is written (Job 19:26): "In my flesh I shall see
. . . God," and (Job 42:5), "With the hearing of the ear I have heard
Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee."
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxix, 29): "Those
eyes" (namely the glorified) "will therefore have a greater power of
sight, not so much to see more keenly, as some report of the sight of
serpents or of eagles (for whatever acuteness of vision is possessed
by these creatures, they can see only corporeal things) but to see
even incorporeal things." Now whoever can see incorporeal things, can
be raised up to see God. Therefore the glorified eye can see God.
Obj. 3: Further, God can be seen by man through a vision of the
imagination. For it is written: "I saw the Lord sitting upon a
throne," etc. (Isa. 6:1). But an imaginary vision originates from
sense; for the imagination is moved by sense to act. Therefore God can
be seen by a vision of sense.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "No one
has ever seen God either in this life, as He is, nor in the angelic
life, as visible things are seen by corporeal vision."
_I answer that,_ It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of
sight, or by any other sense, or faculty of the sensitive power. For
every such kind of power is the act of a corporeal organ, as will be
shown later (Q. 78). Now act is proportional to the nature which
possesses it. Hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal
things. For God is incorporeal, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 1).
Hence He cannot be seen by the sense or the imagination, but only by
the intellect.
Reply Obj. 1: The words, "In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour," do
not mean that God will be seen with the eye of the flesh, but that
man existing in the flesh after the resurrection will see God.
Likewise the words, "Now my eye seeth Thee," are to be understood of
the mind's eye, as the Apostle says: "May He give unto you the spirit
of wisdom . . . in the knowledge of Him, that the eyes of your heart"
may be "enlightened" (Eph. 1:17, 18).
Reply Obj. 2: Augustine speaks as one inquiring, and conditionally.
This appears from what he says previously: "Therefore they will have
an altogether different power (viz. the glorified eyes), if they
shall see that incorporeal nature;" and afterwards he explains this,
saying: "It is very credible, that we shall so see the mundane bodies
of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see most clearly God
everywhere present, governing all corporeal things, not as we now see
the invisible things of God as understood by what is made; but as
when we see men among whom we live, living and exercising the
functions of human life, we do not believe they live, but see it."
Hence it is evident how the glorified eyes will see God, as now our
eyes see the life of another. But life is not seen with the corporeal
eye, as a thing in itself visible, but as the indirect object of the
sense; which indeed is not known by sense, but at once, together with
sense, by some other cognitive power. But that the divine presence is
known by the intellect immediately on the sight of, and through,
corporeal things, happens from two causes--viz. from the perspicuity
of the intellect, and from the refulgence of the divine glory infused
into the body after its renovation.
Reply Obj. 3: The essence of God is not seen in a vision of the
imagination; but the imagination receives some form representing God
according to some mode of similitude; as in the divine Scripture
divine things are metaphorically described by means of sensible
things.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 4]
Whether Any Created Intellect by Its Natural Powers Can See the Divine
Essence?
Objection 1: It seems that a created intellect can see the Divine
essence by its own natural power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv):
"An angel is a pure mirror, most clear, receiving, if it is right to
say so, the whole beauty of God." But if a reflection is seen, the
original thing is seen. Therefore since an angel by his natural power
understands himself, it seems that by his own natural power he
understands the Divine essence.
Obj. 2: Further, what is supremely visible, is made less visible to
us by reason of our defective corporeal or intellectual sight. But
the angelic intellect has no such defect. Therefore, since God is
supremely intelligible in Himself, it seems that in like manner He is
supremely so to an angel. Therefore, if he can understand other
intelligible things by his own natural power, much more can he
understand God.
Obj. 3: Further, corporeal sense cannot be raised up to understand
incorporeal substance, which is above its nature. Therefore if to see
the essence of God is above the nature of every created intellect, it
follows that no created intellect can reach up to see the essence of
God at all. But this is false, as appears from what is said above (A.
1). Therefore it seems that it is natural for a created intellect to
see the Divine essence.
_On the contrary,_ It is written: "The grace of God is life everlasting"
(Rom. 6:23). But life everlasting consists in the vision of the Divine
essence, according to the words: "This is eternal life, that they may
know Thee the only true God," etc. (John 17:3). Therefore to see the
essence of God is possible to the created intellect by grace, and not
by nature.
_I answer that,_ It is impossible for any created intellect to see the
essence of God by its own natural power. For knowledge is regulated
according as the thing known is in the knower. But the thing known is
in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence the knowledge
of every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If therefore the
mode of anything's being exceeds the mode of the knower, it must
result that the knowledge of the object is above the nature of the
knower. Now the mode of being of things is manifold. For some things
have being only in this one individual matter; as all bodies. But
others are subsisting natures, not residing in matter at all, which,
however, are not their own existence, but receive it; and these are
the incorporeal beings, called angels. But to God alone does it belong
to be His own subsistent being. Therefore what exists only in
individual matter we know naturally, forasmuch as our soul, whereby we
know, is the form of certain matter. Now our soul possesses two
cognitive powers; one is the act of a corporeal organ, which naturally
knows things existing in individual matter; hence sense knows only the
singular. But there is another kind of cognitive power in the soul,
called the intellect; and this is not the act of any corporeal organ.
Wherefore the intellect naturally knows natures which exist only in
individual matter; not as they are in such individual matter, but
according as they are abstracted therefrom by the considering act of
the intellect; hence it follows that through the intellect we can
understand these objects as universal; and this is beyond the power of
the sense. Now the angelic intellect naturally knows natures that are
not in matter; but this is beyond the power of the intellect of our
soul in the state of its present life, united as it is to the body. It
follows therefore that to know self-subsistent being is natural to the
divine intellect alone; and this is beyond the natural power of any
created intellect; for no creature is its own existence, forasmuch as
its existence is participated. Therefore the created intellect cannot
see the essence of God, unless God by His grace unites Himself to the
created intellect, as an object made intelligible to it.
Reply Obj. 1: This mode of knowing God is natural to an
angel--namely, to know Him by His own likeness refulgent in the angel
himself. But to know God by any created similitude is not to know the
essence of God, as was shown above (A. 2). Hence it does not follow
that an angel can know the essence of God by his own power.
Reply Obj. 2: The angelic intellect is not defective, if defect be
taken to mean privation, as if it were without anything which it
ought to have. But if the defect be taken negatively, in that sense
every creature is defective, when compared with God; forasmuch as it
does not possess the excellence which is in God.
Reply Obj. 3: The sense of sight, as being altogether material,
cannot be raised up to immateriality. But our intellect, or the
angelic intellect, inasmuch as it is elevated above matter in its own
nature, can be raised up above its own nature to a higher level by
grace. The proof is, that sight cannot in any way know abstractedly
what it knows concretely; for in no way can it perceive a nature
except as this one particular nature; whereas our intellect is able
to consider abstractedly what it knows concretely. Now although it
knows things which have a form residing in matter, still it resolves
the composite into both of these elements; and it considers the form
separately by itself. Likewise, also, the intellect of an angel,
although it naturally knows the concrete in any nature, still it is
able to separate that existence by its intellect; since it knows that
the thing itself is one thing, and its existence is another. Since
therefore the created intellect is naturally capable of apprehending
the concrete form, and the concrete being abstractedly, by way of a
kind of resolution of parts; it can by grace be raised up to know
separate subsisting substance, and separate subsisting existence.
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 5]
Whether the Created Intellect Needs Any Created Light in Order to See the
Essence of God?
Objection 1: It seems that the created intellect does not need any
created light in order to see the essence of God. For what is of
itself lucid in sensible things does not require any other light in
order to be seen. Therefore the same applies to intelligible things.
Now God is intelligible light. Therefore He is not seen by means of
any created light.
Obj. 2: Further, if God is seen through a medium, He is not seen
in His essence. But if seen by any created light, He is seen through a
medium. Therefore He is not seen in His essence.
Obj. 3: Further, what is created can be natural to some creature.
Therefore if the essence of God is seen through any created light,
such a light can be made natural to some other creature; and thus,
that creature would not need any other light to see God; which is
impossible. Therefore it is not necessary that every creature should
require a superadded light in order to see the essence of God.
_On the contrary,_ It is written: "In Thy light we shall see light" (Ps.
35:10).
_I answer that,_ Everything which is raised up to what exceeds its
nature, must be prepared by some disposition above its nature; as, for
example, if air is to receive the form of fire, it must be prepared by
some disposition for such a form. But when any created intellect sees
the essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible
form of the intellect. Hence it is necessary that some supernatural
disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it may be
raised up to such a great and sublime height. Now since the natural
power of the created intellect does not avail to enable it to see the
essence of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is necessary
that the power of understanding should be added by divine grace. Now
this increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of
the intellect, as we also call the intelligible object itself by the
name of light of illumination. And this is the light spoken of in the
Apocalypse (Apoc. 21:23): "The glory of God hath enlightened
it"--viz. the society of the blessed who see God. By this light the
blessed are made "deiform"--i.e. like to God, according to the
saying: "When He shall appear we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.:
'because'] we shall see Him as He is" (1 John 2:2).
Reply Obj. 1: The created light is necessary to see the
essence of God, not in order to make the essence of God intelligible,
which is of itself intelligible, but in order to enable the intellect
to understand in the same way as a habit makes a power abler to act.
Even so corporeal light is necessary as regards external sight,
inasmuch as it makes the medium actually transparent, and susceptible
of color.
Reply Obj. 2: This light is required to see the divine
essence, not as a similitude in which God is seen, but as a perfection
of the intellect, strengthening it to see God. Therefore it may be
said that this light is to be described not as a medium in which God
is seen, but as one by which He is seen; and such a medium does not
take away the immediate vision of God.
Reply Obj. 3: The disposition to the form of fire can be
natural only to the subject of that form. Hence the light of glory
cannot be natural to a creature unless the creature has a divine
nature; which is impossible. But by this light the rational creature
is made deiform, as is said in this article.
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [I. Q. 12, Art. 6]
Whether of Those Who See the Essence of God, One Sees More Perfectly Than
Another?
Objection 1: It seems that of those who see the essence of God, one
does not see more perfectly than another. For it is written (1 John
3:2): "We shall see Him as He is." But He is only in one way.
Therefore He will be seen by all in one way only; and therefore He
will not be seen more perfectly by one and less perfectly by another.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xxxii):
"One person cannot see one and the same thing more perfectly than
another." But all who see the essence of God, understand the Divine
essence, for God is seen by the intellect and not by sense, as was
shown above (A. 3). Therefore of those who see the divine essence,
one does not see more clearly than another.
Obj. 3: Further, That anything be seen more perfectly than another
can happen in two ways: either on the part of the visible object, or
on the part of the visual power of the seer. On the part of the
object, it may so happen because the object is received more
perfectly in the seer, that is, according to the greater perfection
of the similitude; but this does not apply to the present question,
for God is present to the intellect seeing Him not by way of
similitude, but by His essence. It follows then that if one sees Him
more perfectly than another, this happens according to the difference
of the intellectual power; thus it follows too that the one whose
intellectual power is higher, will see Him the more clearly; and this
is incongruous; since equality with angels is promised to men as
their beatitude.
_On the contrary,_ Eternal life consists in the vision of God, according
to John 17:3: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only
true God," etc. Therefore if all saw the essence of God equally in
eternal life, all would be equal; the contrary to which is declared by
the Apostle: "Star differs from star in glory" (1 Cor. 15:41).
_I answer that,_ Of those who see the essence of God, one sees Him more
perfectly than another. This, indeed, does not take place as if one
had a more perfect similitude of God than another, since that vision
will not spring from any similitude; but it will take place because
one intellect will have a greater power or faculty to see God than
another. The faculty of seeing God, however, does not belong to the
created intellect naturally, but is given to it by the light of glory,
which establishes the intellect in a kind of "deiformity," as appears
from what is said above, in the preceding article.
Hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God
the more perfectly; and he will have a fuller participation of the
light of glory who has more charity; because where there is the
greater charity, there is the more desire; and desire in a certain
degree makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object
desired. Hence he who possesses the more charity, will see God the
more perfectly, and will be the more beatified.
Reply Obj. 1: In the words, "We shall see Him as He is," the
conjunction "as" determines the mode of vision on the part of the
object seen, so that the meaning is, we shall see Him to be as He is,
because we shall see His existence, which is His essence. But it does
not determine the mode of vision on the part of the one seeing; as if
the meaning was that the mode of seeing God will be as perfect as is
the perfect mode of God's existence.
Thus appears the answer to the Second Objection. For when it is said
that one intellect does not understand one and the same thing better
than another, this would be true if referred to the mode of the thing
understood, for whoever understands it otherwise than it really is,
does not truly understand it, but not if referred to the mode of
understanding, for the understanding of one is more perfect than the
understanding of another.
Reply Obj. 3: The diversity of seeing will not arise on the part of
the object seen, for the same object will be presented to all--viz.
the essence of God; nor will it arise from the diverse participation
of the object seen by different similitudes; but it will arise on the
part of the diverse faculty of the intellect, not, indeed, the
natural faculty, but the glorified faculty.
_______________________
SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 7]
Whether Those Who See the Essence of God Comprehend Him?
Objection 1: It seems that those who see the divine essence,
comprehend God. For the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "But I follow
after, if I may by any means comprehend [Douay: 'apprehend']." But the
Apostle did not follow in vain; for he said (1 Cor. 9:26): "I . . . so
run, not as at an uncertainty." Therefore he comprehended; and in the
same way, others also, whom he invites to do the same, saying: "So run
that you may comprehend."
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "That
is comprehended which is so seen as a whole, that nothing of it is
hidden from the seer." But if God is seen in His essence, He is seen
whole, and nothing of Him is hidden from the seer, since God is
simple. Therefore whoever sees His essence, comprehends Him.
Obj. 3: Further, if we say that He is seen as a "whole," but not
"wholly," it may be contrarily urged that "wholly" refers either to
the mode of the seer, or to the mode of the thing seen. But he who
sees the essence of God, sees Him wholly, if the mode of the thing
seen is considered; forasmuch as he sees Him as He is; also, likewise,
he sees Him wholly if the mode of the seer is meant, forasmuch as the
intellect will with its full power see the Divine essence. Therefore
all who see the essence of God see Him wholly; therefore they
comprehend Him.
_On the contrary,_ It is written: "O most mighty, great, and powerful,
the Lord of hosts is Thy Name. Great in counsel, and incomprehensible
in thought" (Jer. 32:18,19). Therefore He cannot be comprehended.
_I answer that,_ It is impossible for any created intellect to
comprehend God; yet "for the mind to attain to God in some degree is
great beatitude," as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. xxxviii).
In proof of this we must consider that what is comprehended is
perfectly known; and that is perfectly known which is known so far as
it can be known. Thus, if anything which is capable of scientific
demonstration is held only by an opinion resting on a probably proof,
it is not comprehended; as, for instance, if anyone knows by
scientific demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two
right angles, he comprehends that truth; whereas if anyone accepts it
as a probable opinion because wise men or most men teach it, he cannot
be said to comprehend the thing itself, because he does not attain to
that perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable.
But no created intellect can attain to that perfect mode of the
knowledge of the Divine intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable.
Which thus appears--Everything is knowable according to its
actuality. But God, whose being is infinite, as was shown above
(Q. 7), is infinitely knowable. Now no created intellect can know
God infinitely. For the created intellect knows the Divine essence
more or less perfectly in proportion as it receives a greater or
lesser light of glory. Since therefore the created light of glory
received into any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly
impossible for any created intellect to know God in an infinite
degree. Hence it is impossible that it should comprehend God.
Reply Obj. 1: "Comprehension" is twofold: in one sense it is taken
strictly and properly, according as something is included in the one
comprehending; and thus in no way is God comprehended either by
intellect, or in any other way; forasmuch as He is infinite and
cannot be included in any finite being; so that no finite being can
contain Him infinitely, in the degree of His own infinity. In this
sense we now take comprehension. But in another sense "comprehension"
is taken more largely as opposed to "non-attainment"; for he who
attains to anyone is said to comprehend him when he attains to him.
And in this sense God is comprehended by the blessed, according to
the words, "I held him, and I will not let him go" (Cant. 3:4); in
this sense also are to be understood the words quoted from the
Apostle concerning comprehension. And in this way "comprehension" is
one of the three prerogatives of the soul, responding to hope, as
vision responds to faith, and fruition responds to charity. For even
among ourselves not everything seen is held or possessed, forasmuch
as things either appear sometimes afar off, or they are not in our
power of attainment. Neither, again, do we always enjoy what we
possess; either because we find no pleasure in them, or because such
things are not the ultimate end of our desire, so as to satisfy and
quell it. But the blessed possess these three things in God; because
they see Him, and in seeing Him, possess Him as present, having the
power to see Him always; and possessing Him, they enjoy Him as the
ultimate fulfilment of desire.
Reply Obj. 2: God is called incomprehensible not because anything of
Him is not seen; but because He is not seen as perfectly as He is
capable of being seen; thus when any demonstrable proposition is
known by probable reason only, it does not follow that any part of it
is unknown, either the subject, or the predicate, or the composition;
but that it is not as perfectly known as it is capable of being
known. Hence Augustine, in his definition of comprehension, says the
whole is comprehended when it is seen in such a way that nothing of
it is hidden from the seer, or when its boundaries can be completely
viewed or traced; for the boundaries of a thing are said to be
completely surveyed when the end of the knowledge of it is attained.
Reply Obj. 3: The word "wholly" denotes a mode of the object; not
that the whole object does not come under knowledge, but that the
mode of the object is not the mode of the one who knows. Therefore he
who sees God's essence, sees in Him that He exists infinitely, and is
infinitely knowable; nevertheless, this infinite mode does not extend
to enable the knower to know infinitely; thus, for instance, a person
can have a probable opinion that a proposition is demonstrable,
although he himself does not know it as demonstrated.
_______________________
EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 8]
Whether Those Who See the Essence of God See All in God?
Objection 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God see all
things in God. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv): "What do they not see,
who see Him Who sees all things?" But God sees all things. Therefore
those who see God see all things.
Obj. 2: Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees what is reflected in
the mirror. But all actual or possible things shine forth in God as in
a mirror; for He knows all things in Himself. Therefore whoever sees
God, sees all actual things in Him, and also all possible things.
Obj. 3: Further, whoever understands the greater, can understand
the least, as is said in _De Anima_ iii. But all that God does, or can
do, are less than His essence. Therefore whoever understands God, can
understand all that God does, or can do.
Obj. 4: Further, the rational creature naturally desires to know
all things. Therefore if in seeing God it does not know all things,
its natural desire will not rest satisfied; thus, in seeing God it
will not be fully happy; which is incongruous. Therefore he who sees
God knows all things.
_On the contrary,_ The angels see the essence of God; and yet do not
know all things. For as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), "the
inferior angels are cleansed from ignorance by the superior angels."
Also they are ignorant of future contingent things, and of secret
thoughts; for this knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore whosoever
sees the essence of God, does not know all things.
_I answer that,_ The created intellect, in seeing the divine essence,
does not see in it all that God does or can do. For it is manifest
that things are seen in God as they are in Him. But all other things
are in God as effects are in the power of their cause. Therefore all
things are seen in God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is
clear that the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its effects
can be seen in it. For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon as
one demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge
of many conclusions; but this is beyond one of a weaker intellect, for
he needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an intellect
can know all the effects of a cause and the reasons for those effects
in the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no
created intellect can comprehend God wholly, as shown above
(A. 7). Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know all
that God does or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power;
but of what God does or can do any intellect can know the more, the
more perfectly it sees God.
Reply Obj. 1: Gregory speaks as regards the object being sufficient,
namely, God, who in Himself sufficiently contains and shows forth all
things; but it does not follow that whoever sees God knows all
things, for he does not perfectly comprehend Him.
Reply Obj. 2: It is not necessary that whoever sees a mirror should
see all that is in the mirror, unless his glance comprehends the
mirror itself.
Reply Obj. 3: Although it is more to see God than to see all things
else, still it is a greater thing to see Him so that all things are
known in Him, than to see Him in such a way that not all things, but
the fewer or the more, are known in Him. For it has been shown in
this article that the more things are known in God according as He is
seen more or less perfectly.
Reply Obj. 4: The natural desire of the rational creature is to know
everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect, namely,
the species and the genera of things and their types, and these
everyone who sees the Divine essence will see in God. But to know
other singulars, their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to
the perfection of the created intellect nor does its natural desire
go out to these things; neither, again, does it desire to know things
that exist not as yet, but which God can call into being. Yet if God
alone were seen, Who is the fount and principle of all being and of
all truth, He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that
nothing else would be desired, and the seer would be completely
beatified. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v): "Unhappy the man who
knoweth all these" (i.e. all creatures) "and knoweth not Thee! but
happy whoso knoweth Thee although he know not these. And whoso
knoweth both Thee and them is not the happier for them, but for Thee
alone."
_______________________
NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 9]
Whether What Is Seen in God by Those Who See the Divine Essence, Is Seen
Through Any Similitude?
Objection 1: It seems that what is seen in God by those who see the
Divine essence, is seen by means of some similitude. For every kind of
knowledge comes about by the knower being assimilated to the object
known. For thus the intellect in act becomes the actual intelligible,
and the sense in act becomes the actual sensible, inasmuch as it is
informed by a similitude of the object, as the eye by the similitude
of color. Therefore if the intellect of one who sees the Divine
essence understands any creatures in God, it must be informed by their
similitudes.
Obj. 2: Further, what we have seen, we keep in memory. But Paul,
seeing the essence of God whilst in ecstasy, when he had ceased to see
the Divine essence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 28,34),
remembered many of the things he had seen in the rapture; hence he
said: "I have heard secret words which it is not granted to man to
utter" (2 Cor. 12:4). Therefore it must be said that certain
similitudes of what he remembered, remained in his mind; and in the
same way, when he actually saw the essence of God, he had certain
similitudes or ideas of what he actually saw in it.
_On the contrary,_ A mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one
likeness. But all things are seen in God as in an intelligible mirror.
Therefore if God Himself is not seen by any similitude but by His own
essence, neither are the things seen in Him seen by any similitudes or
ideas.
_I answer that,_ Those who see the divine essence see what they see in
God not by any likeness, but by the divine essence itself united to
their intellect. For each thing is known in so far as its likeness is
in the one who knows. Now this takes place in two ways. For as things
which are like one and the same thing are like to each other, the
cognitive faculty can be assimilated to any knowable object in two
ways. In one way it is assimilated by the object itself, when it is
directly informed by a similitude, and then the object is known in
itself. In another way when informed by a similitude which resembles
the object; and in this way, the knowledge is not of the thing in
itself, but of the thing in its likeness. For the knowledge of a man
in himself differs from the knowledge of him in his image. Hence to
know things thus by their likeness in the one who knows, is to know
them in themselves or in their own nature; whereas to know them by
their similitudes pre-existing in God, is to see them in God. Now
there is a difference between these two kinds of knowledge. Hence,
according to the knowledge whereby things are known by those who see
the essence of God, they are seen in God Himself not by any other
similitudes but by the Divine essence alone present to the intellect;
by which also God Himself is seen.
Reply Obj. 1: The created intellect of one who sees God is
assimilated to what is seen in God, inasmuch as it is united to the
Divine essence, in which the similitudes of all things pre-exist.
Reply Obj. 2: Some of the cognitive faculties form other images from
those first conceived; thus the imagination from the preconceived
images of a mountain and of gold can form the likeness of a golden
mountain; and the intellect, from the preconceived ideas of genus and
difference, forms the idea of species; in like manner from the
similitude of an image we can form in our minds the similitude of the
original of the image. Thus Paul, or any other person who sees God,
by the very vision of the divine essence, can form in himself the
similitudes of what is seen in the divine essence, which remained in
Paul even when he had ceased to see the essence of God. Still this
kind of vision whereby things are seen by this likeness thus
conceived, is not the same as that whereby things are seen in God.
_______________________
TENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 10]
Whether Those Who See the Essence of God See All They See in It at the
Same Time?
Objection 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God do not see
all they see in Him at one and the same time. For according to the
Philosopher (Topic. ii): "It may happen that many things are known,
but only one is understood." But what is seen in God, is understood;
for God is seen by the intellect. Therefore those who see God do not
see all in Him at the same time.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 22, 23), "God
moves the spiritual creature according to time"--i.e. by intelligence
and affection. But the spiritual creature is the angel who sees God.
Therefore those who see God understand and are affected successively;
for time means succession.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xvi): "Our thoughts will not
be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another; but we shall
see all we know at one glance."
_I answer that,_ What is seen in the Word is seen not successively, but
at the same time. In proof whereof, we ourselves cannot know many
things all at once, forasmuch as understand many things by means of
many ideas. But our intellect cannot be actually informed by many
diverse ideas at the same time, so as to understand by them; as one
body cannot bear different shapes simultaneously. Hence, when many
things can be understood by one idea, they are understood at the same
time; as the parts of a whole are understood successively, and not all
at the same time, if each one is understood by its own idea; whereas
if all are understood under the one idea of the whole, they are
understood simultaneously. Now it was shown above that things seen in
God, are not seen singly by their own similitude; but all are seen by
the one essence of God. Hence they are seen simultaneously, and not
successively.
Reply Obj. 1: We understand one thing only when we understand by one
idea; but many things understood by one idea are understood
simultaneously, as in the idea of a man we understand "animal" and
"rational"; and in the idea of a house we understand the wall and the
roof.
Reply Obj. 2: As regards their natural knowledge, whereby they know
things by diverse ideas given them, the angels do not know all things
simultaneously, and thus they are moved in the act of understanding
according to time; but as regards what they see in God, they see all
at the same time.
_______________________
ELEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 11]
Whether Anyone in This Life Can See the Essence of God?
Objection 1: It seems that one can in this life see the Divine
essence. For Jacob said: "I have seen God face to face" (Gen. 32:30).
But to see Him face to face is to see His essence, as appears from the
words: "We see now in a glass and in a dark manner, but then face to
face" (1 Cor. 13:12).
Obj. 2: Further, the Lord said to Moses: "I speak to him mouth to
mouth, and plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see the
Lord" (Num. 12:8); but this is to see God in His essence. Therefore it
is possible to see the essence of God in this life.
Obj. 3: Further, that wherein we know all other things, and whereby
we judge of other things, is known in itself to us. But even now we
know all things in God; for Augustine says (Confess. viii): "If we
both see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say
is true; where, I ask, do we see this? neither I in thee, nor thou in
me; but both of us in the very incommutable truth itself above our
minds." He also says (De Vera Relig. xxx) that, "We judge of all
things according to the divine truth"; and (De Trin. xii) that, "it
is the duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things according to
the incorporeal and eternal ideas; which unless they were above the
mind could not be incommutable." Therefore even in this life we see
God Himself.
Obj. 4: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24, 25),
those things that are in the soul by their essence are seen by
intellectual vision. But intellectual vision is of intelligible
things, not by similitudes, but by their very essences, as he also
says (Gen. ad lit. xiii, 24, 25). Therefore since God is in our soul
by His essence, it follows that He is seen by us in His essence.
_On the contrary,_ It is written, "Man shall not see Me, and live" (Ex.
32:20), and a gloss upon this says, "In this mortal life God can be
seen by certain images, but not by the likeness itself of His own
nature."
_I answer that,_ God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human
being, except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is
because, as was said above (A. 4), the mode of knowledge follows
the mode of the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live
in this life, has its being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it
knows only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a
form. Now it is evident that the Divine essence cannot be known
through the nature of material things. For it was shown above
(AA. 2, 9) that the knowledge of God by means of any created
similitude is not the vision of His essence. Hence it is impossible
for the soul of man in this life to see the essence of God. This can
be seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted from
corporeal things, the more it is capable of receiving abstract
intelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations of the bodily
senses divine revelations and foresight of future events are perceived
the more clearly. It is not possible, therefore, that the soul in this
mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of intelligible
objects, i.e. to the divine essence.
Reply Obj. 1: According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv) a man is said
in the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are
formed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude
representing in part the divinity. So when Jacob says, "I have seen
God face to face," this does not mean the Divine essence, but some
figure representing God. And this is to be referred to some high mode
of prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imaginary
vision; as will later be explained (II-II, Q. 174) in treating of the
degrees of prophecy. We may also say that Jacob spoke thus to
designate some exalted intellectual contemplation, above the ordinary
state.
Reply Obj. 2: As God works miracles in corporeal things, so also He
does supernatural wonders above the common order, raising the minds
of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to the
vision of His own essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 26,
27, 28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher
of the Gentiles. This will be treated more fully in the question of
rapture (II-II, Q. 175).
Reply Obj. 3: All things are said to be seen in God and all things
are judged in Him, because by the participation of His light, we know
and judge all things; for the light of natural reason itself is a
participation of the divine light; as likewise we are said to see and
judge of sensible things in the sun, i.e., by the sun's light. Hence
Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 8), "The lessons of instruction can only
be seen as it were by their own sun," namely God. As therefore in
order to see a sensible object, it is not necessary to see the
substance of the sun, so in like manner to see any intelligible
object, it is not necessary to see the essence of God.
Reply Obj. 4: Intellectual vision is of the things which are in the
soul by their essence, as intelligible things are in the intellect.
And thus God is in the souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our
soul, but by presence, essence and power.
_______________________
TWELFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 12]
Whether God Can Be Known in This Life by Natural Reason?
Objection 1: It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in
this life. For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that "reason does not
grasp simple form." But God is a supremely simple form, as was shown
above (Q. 3, A. 7). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know
Him.
Obj. 2: Further, the soul understands nothing by natural reason
without the use of the imagination. But we cannot have an imagination
of God, Who is incorporeal. Therefore we cannot know God by natural
knowledge.
Obj. 3: Further, the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both
good and evil, inasmuch as they have a common nature. But the
knowledge of God belongs only to the good; for Augustine says (De
Trin. i): "The weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that
excellent light unless purified by the justice of faith." Therefore
God cannot be known by natural reason.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 1:19), "That which is known of
God," namely, what can be known of God by natural reason, "is manifest
in them."
_I answer that,_ Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our
natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things.
But our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of
God; because the sensible effects of God do not equal the power of God
as their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole
power of God cannot be known; nor therefore can His essence be seen.
But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we can be
led from them so far as to know of God "whether He exists," and to
know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of
all things, exceeding all things caused by Him.
Hence we know that His relationship with creatures so far as to be the
cause of them all; also that creatures differ from Him, inasmuch as He
is not in any way part of what is caused by Him; and that creatures
are not removed from Him by reason of any defect on His part, but
because He superexceeds them all.
Reply Obj. 1: Reason cannot reach up to simple form, so as to
know "what it is"; but it can know "whether it is."
Reply Obj. 2: God is known by natural knowledge through the
images of His effects.
Reply Obj. 3: As the knowledge of God's essence is by grace, it
belongs only to the good; but the knowledge of Him by natural reason
can belong to both good and bad; and hence Augustine says (Retract.
i), retracting what he had said before: "I do not approve what I said
in prayer, 'God who willest that only the pure should know truth.'
For it can be answered that many who are not pure can know many
truths," i.e. by natural reason.
_______________________
THIRTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 13]
Whether by Grace a Higher Knowledge of God Can Be Obtained Than by
Natural Reason?
Objection 1: It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of God is not
obtained than by natural reason. For Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol.
i) that whoever is the more united to God in this life, is united to
Him as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses, who
nevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred
by grace. But to be united to God while ignoring of Him "what He is,"
comes about also by natural reason. Therefore God is not more known to
us by grace than by natural reason.
Obj. 2: Further, we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by
natural reason only through the imagination; and the same applies to
the knowledge given by grace. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that
"it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon us except as
screened round about by the many colored sacred veils." Therefore we
cannot know God more fully by grace than by natural reason.
Obj. 3: Further, our intellect adheres to God by grace of faith.
But faith does not seem to be knowledge; for Gregory says (Hom. xxvi
in Ev.) that "things not seen are the objects of faith, and not of
knowledge." Therefore there is not given to us a more excellent
knowledge of God by grace.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says that "God hath revealed to us His
spirit," what "none of the princes of this world knew" (1 Cor. 2:10),
namely, the philosophers, as the gloss expounds.
_I answer that,_ We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than
by natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have
by natural reason contains two things: images derived from the
sensible objects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling us to
abstract from them intelligible conceptions.
Now in both of these, human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of
grace. For the intellect's natural light is strengthened by the
infusion of gratuitous light; and sometimes also the images in the
human imagination are divinely formed, so as to express divine things
better than those do which we receive from sensible objects, as
appears in prophetic visions; while sometimes sensible things, or even
voices, are divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the
Baptism, the Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice
of the Father was heard, "This is My beloved Son" (Matt. 3:17).
Reply Obj. 1: Although by the revelation of grace in this life we
cannot know of God "what He is," and thus are united to Him as to one
unknown; still we know Him more fully according as many and more
excellent of His effects are demonstrated to us, and according as we
attribute to Him some things known by divine revelation, to which
natural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that God is Three and
One.
Reply Obj. 2: From the images either received from sense in the
natural order, or divinely formed in the imagination, we have so much
the more excellent intellectual knowledge, the stronger the
intelligible light is in man; and thus through the revelation given
by the images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of the
divine light.
Reply Obj. 3: Faith is a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the intellect
is determined by faith to some knowable object. But this
determination to one object does not proceed from the vision of the
believer, but from the vision of Him who is believed. Thus as far as
faith falls short of vision, it falls short of the knowledge which
belongs to science, for science determines the intellect to one
object by the vision and understanding of first principles.
_______________________
QUESTION 13
THE NAMES OF GOD
(In Twelve Articles)
After the consideration of those things which belong to the divine
knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the divine names.
For everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it.
Under this head, there are twelve points for inquiry:
(1) Whether God can be named by us?
(2) Whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him
substantially?
(3) Whether any names applied to God are said of Him literally, or
are all to be taken metaphorically?
(4) Whether any names applied to God are synonymous?
(5) Whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally
or equivocally?
(6) Whether, supposing they are applied analogically, they are
applied first to God or to creatures?
(7) Whether any names are applicable to God from time?
(8) Whether this name "God" is a name of nature, or of the operation?
(9) Whether this name "God" is a communicable name?
(10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God,
by nature, by participation, and by opinion?
(11) Whether this name, "Who is," is the supremely appropriate name
of God?
(12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 1]
Whether a Name Can Be Given to God?
Objection 1: It seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. i) that, "Of Him there is neither name, nor can one be
found of Him;" and it is written: "What is His name, and what is the
name of His Son, if thou knowest?" (Prov. 30:4).
Obj. 2: Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But
concrete names do not belong to God, since He is simple, nor do
abstract names belong to Him, forasmuch as they do not signify any
perfect subsisting thing. Therefore no name can be said of God.
Obj. 3: Further, nouns are taken to signify substance with quality;
verbs and participles signify substance with time; pronouns the same
with demonstration or relation. But none of these can be applied to
God, for He has no quality, nor accident, nor time; moreover, He
cannot be felt, so as to be pointed out; nor can He be described by
relation, inasmuch as relations serve to recall a thing mentioned
before by nouns, participles, or demonstrative pronouns. Therefore
God cannot in any way be named by us.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 15:3): "The Lord is a man of war,
Almighty is His name."
_I answer that,_ Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i),
words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is
evident that words relate to the meaning of things signified through
the medium of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore that
we can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now
it was shown above (Q. 12, AA. 11, 12) that in this life we cannot
see the essence of God; but we know God from creatures as their
principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way
therefore He can be named by us from creatures, yet not so that the
name which signifies Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus
the name "man" expresses the essence of man in himself, since it
signifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the
idea expressed by the name is the definition.
Reply Obj. 1: The reason why God has no name, or is said to be
above being named, is because His essence is above all that we
understand about God, and signify in word.
Reply Obj. 2: Because we know and name God from creatures, the
names we attribute to God signify what belongs to material creatures,
of which the knowledge is natural to us. And because in creatures of
this kind what is perfect and subsistent is compound; whereas their
form is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that whereby a
thing is; hence it follows that all names used by us to signify a
complete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning as applicable
to compound things; whereas names given to signify simple forms,
signify a thing not as subsisting, but as that whereby a thing is; as,
for instance, whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And
as God is simple, and subsisting, we attribute to Him abstract names
to signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His substance
and perfection, although both these kinds of names fail to express His
mode of being, forasmuch as our intellect does not know Him in this
life as He is.
Reply Obj. 3: To signify substance with quality is to signify the
_suppositum_ with a nature or determined form in which it subsists.
Hence, as some things are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify
His subsistence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied to God
signifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and participles
which signify time, are applied to Him because His eternity includes
all time. For as we can apprehend and signify simple subsistences
only by way of compound things, so we can understand and express
simple eternity only by way of temporal things, because our intellect
has a natural affinity to compound and temporal things. But
demonstrative pronouns are applied to God as describing what is
understood, not what is sensed. For we can only describe Him as far
as we understand Him. Thus, according as nouns, participles and
demonstrative pronouns are applicable to God, so far can He be
signified by relative pronouns.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 2]
Whether Any Name Can Be Applied to God Substantially?
Objection 1: It seems that no name can be applied to God
substantially. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): "Everything
said of God signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what
He is not; or expresses some relation, or something following from His
nature or operation."
Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "You will find a
chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly
and praiseworthily the divine processions in the denomination of God."
Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising God are
distinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what
expresses the procession of anything, does not signify its essence.
Therefore the names applied to God are not said of Him substantially.
Obj. 3: Further, a thing is named by us according as we
understand it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His
substance. Therefore neither is any name we can use applied
substantially to God.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi): "The being of God is
the being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of
that simplicity whereby His substance is signified." Therefore all
names of this kind signify the divine substance.
_I answer that,_ Negative names applied to God, or signifying His
relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His substance,
but rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His
relation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures to
Himself.
But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God, as "good,"
"wise," and the like, various and many opinions have been given. For
some have said that all such names, although they are applied to God
affirmatively, nevertheless have been brought into use more to express
some remotion from God, rather than to express anything that exists
positively in Him. Hence they assert that when we say that God lives,
we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing; and the same in like
manner applies to other names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses.
Others say that these names applied to God signify His relationship
towards creatures: thus in the words, "God is good," we mean, God is
the cause of goodness in things; and the same rule applies to other
names.
Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons.
First because in neither of them can a reason be assigned why some
names more than others are applied to God. For He is assuredly the
cause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause of good things;
therefore if the words "God is good," signified no more than, "God is
the cause of good things," it might in like manner be said that God is
a body, inasmuch as He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He
is a body implies that He is not a mere potentiality, as is primary
matter. Secondly, because it would follow that all names applied to
God would be said of Him by way of being taken in a secondary sense,
as healthy is secondarily said of medicine, forasmuch as it signifies
only the cause of the health in the animal which primarily is called
healthy. Thirdly, because this is against the intention of those who
speak of God. For in saying that God lives, they assuredly mean more
than to say the He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from
inanimate bodies.
Therefore we must hold a different doctrine--viz. that these names
signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially of God,
although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is
proved thus. For these names express God, so far as our intellects
know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows
Him as far as creatures represent Him. Now it is shown above
(Q. 4, A. 2) that God prepossesses in Himself all the perfections
of creatures, being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence
every creature represents Him, and is like Him so far as it possesses
some perfection; yet it represents Him not as something of the same
species or genus, but as the excelling principle of whose form the
effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness
thereto, even as the forms of inferior bodies represent the power of
the sun. This was explained above (Q. 4, A. 3), in treating of the
divine perfection. Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine
substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent it
imperfectly. So when we say, "God is good," the meaning is not, "God
is the cause of goodness," or "God is not evil"; but the meaning is,
"Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God," and in a
more excellent and higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is
good, because He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He
causes goodness in things because He is good; according to what
Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because He is good, we
are."
Reply Obj. 1: Damascene says that these names do not signify what God
is, forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed what
He is; but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as
creatures represent Him imperfectly.
Reply Obj. 2: In the significance of names, that from which the name
is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to
signify, as for instance, this name "stone" [lapis] is imposed from
the fact that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem], but it is not imposed
to signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain
kind of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot would be a
stone [*This refers to the Latin etymology of the word _lapis,_ which
has no place in English]. So we must say that these kinds of divine
names are imposed from the divine processions; for as according to
the diverse processions of their perfections, creatures are the
representations of God, although in an imperfect manner; so likewise
our intellect knows and names God according to each kind of
procession; but nevertheless these names are not imposed to signify
the procession themselves, as if when we say "God lives," the sense
were, "life proceeds from Him"; but to signify the principle itself
of things, in so far as life pre-exists in Him, although it
pre-exists in Him in a more eminent way than can be understood or
signified.
Reply Obj. 3: We cannot know the essence of God in this life, as He
really is in Himself; but we know Him accordingly as He is
represented in the perfections of creatures; and thus the names
imposed by us signify Him in that manner only.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 3]
Whether Any Name Can Be Applied to God in Its Literal Sense?
Objection 1: It seems that no name is applied literally to God. For
all names which we apply to God are taken from creatures; as was
explained above (A. 1). But the names of creatures are applied to
God metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the
like. Therefore names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.
Obj. 2: Further, no name can be applied literally to anything if it
should be withheld from it rather than given to it. But all such
names as "good," "wise," and the like are more truly withheld from
God than given to Him; as appears from Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
ii). Therefore none of these names belong to God in their literal
sense.
Obj. 3: Further, corporeal names are applied to God in a metaphorical
sense only; since He is incorporeal. But all such names imply some
kind of corporeal condition; for their meaning is bound up with time
and composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore all these
names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.
_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Fide ii), "Some names there are
which express evidently the property of the divinity, and some which
express the clear truth of the divine majesty, but others there are
which are applied to God metaphorically by way of similitude."
Therefore not all names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense,
but there are some which are said of Him in their literal sense.
_I answer that,_ According to the preceding article, our knowledge of
God is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures,
which perfections are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures.
Now our intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures, and as it
apprehends them it signifies them by names. Therefore as to the names
applied to God--viz. the perfections which they signify, such as
goodness, life and the like, and their mode of signification. As
regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God,
and more properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied
primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification, they do
not properly and strictly apply to God; for their mode of
signification applies to creatures.
Reply Obj. 1: There are some names which signify these perfections
flowing from God to creatures in such a way that the imperfect way in
which creatures receive the divine perfection is part of the very
signification of the name itself as "stone" signifies a material
being, and names of this kind can be applied to God only in a
metaphorical sense. Other names, however, express these perfections
absolutely, without any such mode of participation being part of
their signification as the words "being," "good," "living," and the
like, and such names can be literally applied to God.
Reply Obj. 2: Such names as these, as Dionysius shows, are denied of
God for the reason that what the name signifies does not belong to
Him in the ordinary sense of its signification, but in a more eminent
way. Hence Dionysius says also that God is above all substance and
all life.
Reply Obj. 3: These names which are applied to God literally imply
corporeal conditions not in the thing signified, but as regards their
mode of signification; whereas those which are applied to God
metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing
signified.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 4]
Whether Names Applied to God Are Synonymous?
Objection 1: It seems that these names applied to God are synonymous
names. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same. But
these names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God; for
the goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it is His wisdom.
Therefore these names are entirely synonymous.
Obj. 2: Further, if it be said these names signify one and the same
thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that an idea
to which no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if these
ideas are many, and the thing is one, it seems also that all these
ideas are vain notions.
Obj. 3: Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is more
one than what is one in reality and many in idea. But God is
supremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and
many in idea; and thus the names applied to God do not signify
different ideas; and thus they are synonymous.
_On the contrary,_ All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as
when we say, "vesture clothing." Therefore if all names applied to God
are synonymous, we cannot properly say "good God" or the like, and yet
it is written, "O most mighty, great and powerful, the Lord of hosts
is Thy name" (Jer. 32:18).
_I answer that,_ These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This
would be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to
remove, or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it
would follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse
things denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even
according to what was said above (A. 2), that these names signify
the divine substance, although in an imperfect manner, it is also
clear from what has been said (AA. 1, 2) that they have diverse
meanings. For the idea signified by the name is the conception in the
intellect of the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since
it knows God from creatures, in order to understand God, forms
conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to
creatures, which perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply,
whereas in creatures they are received and divided and multiplied. As
therefore, to the different perfections of creatures, there
corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections
of creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the various
and multiplied conceptions of our intellect, there corresponds one
altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions,
imperfectly understood. Therefore although the names applied to God
signify one thing, still because they signify that under many and
different aspects, they are not synonymous.
Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous
terms signify one thing under one aspect; for words which signify
different aspects of one thing, do not signify primarily and
absolutely one thing; because the term only signifies the thing
through the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above.
Reply Obj. 2: The many aspects of these names are not empty and
vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality
represented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.
Reply Obj. 3: The perfect unity of God requires that what are
manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and
unitedly. Thus it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet
multiple in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold
manner, as things represent Him.
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 5]
Whether What Is Said of God and of Creatures Is Univocally Predicated
of Them?
Objection 1: It seems that the things attributed to God and creatures
are univocal. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal, as
many are reduced to one; for if the name "dog" be said equivocally of
the barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said of some
univocally--viz. of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to
infinitude. Now there are some univocal agents which agree with their
effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are
some agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat,
although the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it seems
that the first agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an
univocal agent: and thus what is said of God and creatures, is
predicated univocally.
Obj. 2: Further, there is no similitude among equivocal things.
Therefore as creatures have a certain likeness to God, according to
the word of Genesis (Gen. 1:26), "Let us make man to our image and
likeness," it seems that something can be said of God and creatures
univocally.
Obj. 3: Further, measure is homogeneous with the thing measured.
But God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore God is
homogeneous with creatures; and thus a word may be applied univocally
to God and to creatures.
_On the contrary,_ whatever is predicated of various things under the
same name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no
name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures;
for instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God. Now a
different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the
definition; and the same applies to other things. Therefore whatever
is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally.
Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are
from each other. But the distance of some creatures makes any univocal
predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which
are not in the same genus. Therefore much less can anything be
predicated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal
predication can be applied to them.
_I answer that,_ Univocal predication is impossible between God and
creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an
adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the
similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that
falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects
resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example
the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various
forms in all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the
preceding article, all perfections existing in creatures divided and
multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly. Thus when any term expressing
perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection
distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term
"wise" applied to man, we signify some perfection distinct from a
man's essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all
similar things; whereas when we apply to it God, we do not mean to
signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or existence.
Thus also this term "wise" applied to man in some degree circumscribes
and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when
it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as
incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name. Hence
it is evident that this term "wise" is not applied in the same way to
God and to man. The same rule applies to other terms. Hence no name is
predicated univocally of God and of creatures.
Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in
a purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because if that were so,
it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated
about God at all; for the reasoning would always be exposed to the
fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who
proved many things about God, and also against what the Apostle says:
"The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the
things that are made" (Rom. 1:20). Therefore it must be said that
these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e.
according to proportion.
Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things
are proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy" predicated of
medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body,
of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause: or
according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is
said of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in
the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and
creatures analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely
univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures (A. 1). Thus
whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the
relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all
perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of
community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple
univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals,
one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but
a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various
proportions to some one thing; thus "healthy" applied to urine
signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine
signifies the cause of the same health.
Reply Obj. 1: Although equivocal predications must be reduced to
univocal, still in actions, the non-univocal agent must precede the
univocal agent. For the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of
the whole species, as for instance the sun is the cause of the
generation of all men; whereas the univocal agent is not the
universal efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise it would be
the cause of itself, since it is contained in the species), but is a
particular cause of this individual which it places under the species
by way of participation. Therefore the universal cause of the whole
species is not an univocal agent; and the universal cause comes
before the particular cause. But this universal agent, whilst it is
not univocal, nevertheless is not altogether equivocal, otherwise it
could not produce its own likeness, but rather it is to be called an
analogical agent, as all univocal predications are reduced to one
first non-univocal analogical predication, which is being.
Reply Obj. 2: The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect, for
it does not represent one and the same generic thing (Q. 4, A. 3).
Reply Obj. 3: God is not the measure proportioned to things measured;
hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in the
same genus.
The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these
names are not predicated univocally of God and creatures; yet they do
not prove that they are predicated equivocally.
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 6]
Whether Names Predicated of God Are Predicated Primarily of Creatures?
Objection 1: It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures
rather than of God. For we name anything accordingly as we know it,
since "names", as the Philosopher says, "are signs of ideas." But we
know creatures before we know God. Therefore the names imposed by us
are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God.
Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We name God from
creatures." But names transferred from creatures to God, are said
primarily of creatures rather than of God, as "lion," "stone," and the
like. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures are applied
primarily to creatures rather than to God.
Obj. 3: Further, all names equally applied to God and creatures,
are applied to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says
(De Mystica Theol.). But what is applied to anything through its
cause, is applied to it secondarily, for "healthy" is primarily
predicated of animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of
health. Therefore these names are said primarily of creatures rather
than of God.
_On the contrary,_ It is written, "I bow my knees to the Father, of our
Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named"
(Eph. 3:14,15); and the same applies to the other names applied to God
and creatures. Therefore these names are applied primarily to God
rather than to creatures.
_I answer that,_ In names predicated of many in an analogical sense,
all are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and
this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And
since that expressed by the name is the definition, as the
Philosopher says (Metaph. iv), such a name must be applied primarily
to that which is put in the definition of such other things, and
secondarily to these others according as they approach more or less
to that first. Thus, for instance, "healthy" applied to animals comes
into the definition of "healthy" applied to medicine, which is called
healthy as being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the
definition of "healthy" which is applied to urine, which is called
healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal's health. Thus all
names applied metaphorically to God, are applied to creatures
primarily rather than to God, because when said of God they mean only
similitudes to such creatures. For as "smiling" applied to a field
means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like the
beauty of the human smile by proportionate likeness, so the name of
"lion" applied to God means only that God manifests strength in His
works, as a lion in his. Thus it is clear that applied to God the
signification of names can be defined only from what is said of
creatures. But to other names not applied to God in a metaphorical
sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as the
cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, "God is
good," it would then only mean "God is the cause of the creature's
goodness"; thus the term good applied to God would included in its
meaning the creature's goodness. Hence "good" would apply primarily
to creatures rather than to God. But as was shown above (A. 2), these
names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially.
For the words, "God is good," or "wise," signify not only that He is
the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a
more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name signifies, these
names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because
these perfections flow from God to creatures; but as regards the
imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to
creatures which we know first. Hence they have a mode of
signification which belongs to creatures, as said above (A. 3).
Reply Obj. 1: This objection refers to the imposition of the name.
Reply Obj. 2: The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and
to other names, as said above.
Reply Obj. 3: This objection would be valid if these names were
applied to God only as cause, and not also essentially, for
instance as "healthy" is applied to medicine.
_______________________
SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 7]
Whether Names Which Imply Relation to Creatures Are Predicated of
God Temporally?
Objection 1: It seems that names which imply relation to creatures
are not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the
divine substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose says (De
Fide i) that this name "Lord" is the name of power, which is the
divine substance; and "Creator" signifies the action of God, which is
His essence. Now the divine substance is not temporal, but eternal.
Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally, but
eternally.
Obj. 2: Further, that to which something applies temporally can be
described as made; for what is white temporally is made white. But to
make does not apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of
God temporally.
Obj. 3: Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as
implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all
things that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of
God implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for from
eternity He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: "I
have loved thee with an everlasting love" (Jer. 31:3). Therefore also
other names implying relation to creatures, as "Lord" and "Creator,"
are applied to God from eternity.
Obj. 4: Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore that
relation must be something in God, or in the creature only. But it
cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case
God would be called "Lord" from the opposite relation which is in
creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the
relation must be something in God also. But nothing temporal can be
in God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied
to God temporally.
Obj. 5: Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for
instance lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if
the relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it
follows that God is not really Lord, which is plainly false.
Obj. 6: Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in
nature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can
exist without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (Praedic.
v). But relative things which are said of God and creatures are not
simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God
to the creature even without the existence of the creature; and thus
these names "Lord" and "Creator" are predicated of God from eternity,
and not temporally.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative
appellation "Lord" is applied to God temporally.
_I answer that,_ The names which import relation to creatures are
applied to God temporally, and not from eternity.
To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a
reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen to be false from
the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and
habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary to know that since relation has
two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or
logical. Sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only, as when
mutual order or habitude can only go between things in the
apprehension of reason; as when we say a thing "the same as itself."
For reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it
apprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same
applies to relations between _being_ and _non-being_ formed by reason,
apprehending _non-being_ as an extreme. The same is true of relations
that follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species, and the like.
Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both
extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things
according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all
relations, consequent upon quantity; as great and small, double and
half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same
applies to relations consequent upon action and passion, as motive
power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like.
Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in
the other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens whenever two
extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively
to sensible things and to intellectual things; which, inasmuch as they
are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible
and intellectual existence. Therefore in science and in sense a real
relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge or
to the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in
themselves are outside this order, and hence in them there is no real
relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the
intellect apprehends them as terms of the relations of science and
sense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they are called
relative, not forasmuch as they are related to other things, but as
others are related to them. Likewise for instance, "on the right" is
not applied to a column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the
right side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the
animal.
Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all
creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that
creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is
no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch
as creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent
these names which import relation to the creature from being
predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but
by reason of the change of the creature; as a column is on the right
of an animal, without change in itself, but by change in the animal.
Reply Obj. 1: Some relative names are imposed to signify the
relative habitudes themselves, as "master" and "servant," "father,"
and "son," and the like, and these relatives are called predicamental
[secundum esse]. But others are imposed to signify the things from
which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the
head and the thing that has a head, and the like: and these relatives
are called transcendental [secundum dici]. Thus, there is the same
two-fold difference in divine names. For some signify the habitude
itself to the creature, as "Lord," and these do not signify the divine
substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they presuppose the
divine substance; as dominion presupposes power, which is the divine
substance. Others signify the divine essence directly, and
consequently the corresponding habitudes, as "Saviour," "Creator," and
suchlike; and these signify the action of God, which is His essence.
Yet both names are said of God temporarily so far as they imply a
habitude either principally or consequently, but not as signifying the
essence, either directly or indirectly.
Reply Obj. 2: As relations applied to God temporally are only
in God in our idea, so, "to become" or "to be made" are applied to God
only in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say,
"Lord, Thou art become [Douay: 'hast been'] our refuge" (Ps. 89:1).
Reply Obj. 3: The operation of the intellect and the will is
in the operator, therefore names signifying relations following upon
the action of the intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity;
whereas those following upon the actions proceeding according to our
mode of thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, as
"Saviour," "Creator," and the like.
Reply Obj. 4: Relations signified by these names which are
applied to God temporally, are in God only in idea; but the opposite
relations in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should
be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet so
that the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us at
the same time; in the sense that God is spoken of relatively to the
creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the
Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable
relatively because knowledge relates to it.
Reply Obj. 5: Since God is related to the creature for the
reason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of
subjection is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in
idea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to the
manner in which the creature is subject to Him.
Reply Obj. 6: To know whether relations are simultaneous by
nature or otherwise, it is not necessary [to consider the order] of
things to which they belong but the meaning of the relations
themselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and vice versa,
then they are simultaneous by nature: as double and half, father and
son, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another, and not
vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to
science and its object; for the object knowable is considered as a
potentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the
knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science,
but if the same object is considered in act, then it is simultaneous
with science in act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it
is known. Thus, though God is prior to the creature, still because the
signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa,
these two relative terms, "Lord" and "servant," are simultaneous by
nature. Hence, God was not "Lord" until He had a creature subject to
Himself.
_______________________
EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 8]
Whether This Name "God" Is a Name of the Nature?
Objection 1: It seems that this name, "God," is not a name of the
nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 1) that "God (_Theos_) is so
called from _theein_ which means to take care of, and to cherish all
things; or from _aithein_ that is, to burn, for our God is a fire
consuming all malice; or from _theasthai,_ which means to consider all
things." But all these names belong to operation. Therefore this name
"God" signifies His operation and not His nature.
Obj. 2: Further, a thing is named by us as we know it. But the
divine nature is unknown to us. Therefore this name "God" does not
signify the divine nature.
_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Fide i) that "God" is a name of the
nature.
_I answer that,_ Whence a name is imposed, and what the name signifies
are not always the same thing. For as we know substance from its
properties and operations, so we name substance sometimes for its
operation, or its property; e.g. we name the substance of a stone from
its act, as for instance that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem]; but
still this name is not meant to signify the particular action, but the
stone's substance. The things, on the other hand, known to us in
themselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness and the like, are not named
from other things. Hence as regards such things the meaning of the
name and its source are the same.
Because therefore God is not known to us in His nature, but is made
known to us from His operations or effects, we name Him from these, as
said in A. 1; hence this name "God" is a name of operation so far as
relates to the source of its meaning. For this name is imposed from
His universal providence over all things; since all who speak of God
intend to name God as exercising providence over all; hence Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. ii), "The Deity watches over all with perfect
providence and goodness." But taken from this operation, this name
"God" is imposed to signify the divine nature.
Reply Obj. 1: All that Damascene says refers to providence; which is
the source of the signification of the name "God."
Reply Obj. 2: We can name a thing according to the knowledge we have
of its nature from its properties and effects. Hence because we can
know what stone is in itself from its property, this name "stone"
signifies the nature of the stone itself; for it signifies the
definition of stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which
the name signifies is the definition, as is said in _Metaph._ iv. Now
from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature in itself,
so as to know what it is; but only by way of eminence, and by way of
causality, and of negation as stated above (Q. 12, A. 12). Thus the
name "God" signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to
signify something existing above all things, the principle of all
things and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to
signify all this.
_______________________
NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 9]
Whether This Name "God" Is Communicable?
Objection 1: It seems that this name "God" is communicable. For
whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name
itself. But this name "God" signifies the divine nature, which is
communicable to others, according to the words, "He hath given us
great [Vulg.: 'most great'] and precious promises, that by these we
[Vulg.: 'ye'] may be made partakers of the divine nature" (2 Pet.
1:4). Therefore this name "God" can be communicated to others.
Obj. 2: Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this
name "God" is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears
from the fact that it has a plural, according to the text, "I have
said, You are gods" (Ps. 81:6). Therefore this name "God" is
communicable.
Obj. 3: Further, this name "God" comes from operation, as explained.
But other names given to God from His operations or effects are
communicable; as "good," "wise," and the like. Therefore this name
"God" is communicable.
_On the contrary,_ It is written: "They gave the incommunicable name to
wood and stones" (Wis. 14:21), in reference to the divine name.
Therefore this name "God" is incommunicable.
_I answer that,_ A name is communicable in two ways: properly, and by
similitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole
signification can be given to many; by similitude it is communicable
according to some part of the signification of the name. For instance
this name "lion" is properly communicable to all things of the same
nature as "lion"; by similitude it is communicable to those who
participate in the nature of a lion, as for instance by courage, or
strength, and those who thus participate are called lions
metaphorically. To know, however, what names are properly
communicable, we must consider that every form existing in the
singular subject, by which it is individualized, is common to many
either in reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many in
reality, and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is not common to
many in reality, but only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be
understood as existing in many subjects; and the reason is because the
mind understands the nature of every species by abstraction from the
singular. Hence to be in one singular subject or in many is outside
the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the idea of a
species, it can be understood as existing in many. But the singular,
from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others.
Hence every name imposed to signify any singular thing is
incommunicable both in reality and idea; for the plurality of this
individual thing cannot be; nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no
name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many,
but only by way of similitude; as for instance a person can be called
"Achilles" metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess something of
the properties of Achilles, such as strength. On the other hand, forms
which are individualized not by any _suppositum,_ but by and of
themselves, as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in
themselves, could not be communicable either in reality or in idea;
but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was said of individuals.
Forasmuch as we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms
as they really are, we understand them as compound things having forms
in matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give them
concrete names signifying a nature existing in some _suppositum._
Hence, so far as concerns images, the same rules apply to names we
impose to signify the nature of compound things as to names given to
us to signify simple subsisting natures.
Since, then, this name "God" is given to signify the divine nature as
stated above (A. 8), and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied
as shown above (Q. 11, A. 3), it follows that this name "God" is
incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the
same way as this name "sun" would be communicable according to the
opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is
written: "You served them who by nature are not gods," (Gal. 4:8),
and a gloss adds, "Gods not in nature, but in human opinion."
Nevertheless this name "God" is communicable, not in its whole
signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that
those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness, according to
the text, "I have said, You are gods" (Ps. 81:6).
But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as
to His _suppositum,_ accordingly as He is considered as "this
something," that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for
instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the Hebrew; and this is
like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing.
Reply Obj. 1: The divine nature is only communicable according to the
participation of some similitude.
Reply Obj. 2: This name "God" is an appellative name, and not a
proper name, for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor;
although God Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular.
For names do not follow upon the mode of being in things, but upon
the mode of being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable
according to the truth of the thing, as was said above concerning the
name "sun."
Reply Obj. 3: These names "good," "wise," and the like, are imposed
from the perfections proceeding from God to creatures; but they do
not signify the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections
themselves absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable
to many. But this name "God" is given to God from His own proper
operation, which we experience continually, to signify the divine
nature.
_______________________
TENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 10]
Whether This Name "God" Is Applied to God Univocally by Nature,
by Participation, and According to Opinion?
Objection 1: It seems that this name "God" is applied to God
univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion. For
where a diverse signification exists, there is no contradiction of
affirmation and negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction. But
a Catholic who says: "An idol is not God," contradicts a pagan who
says: "An idol is God." Therefore "God" in both senses is spoken of
univocally.
Obj. 2: Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth,
so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion,
and not in truth. But this name "beatitude" is applied univocally to
this supposed happiness, and also to true happiness. Therefore also
this name "God" is applied univocally to the true God, and to God also
in opinion.
Obj. 3: Further, names are called univocal because they contain one
idea. Now when a Catholic says: "There is one God," he understands by
the name God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while
the heathen understands the same when he says: "An idol is God."
Therefore this name "God" is applied univocally to both.
_On the contrary,_ The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is
in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. But the word "animal" applied
to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore
this name "God" applied to the true God and to God in opinion is
applied equivocally.
Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen
does not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol is God, he
does not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, a Catholic
signifies the true Deity when he says that there is one God. Therefore
this name "God" is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true
God, and to God according to opinion.
_I answer that,_ This name "God" in the three aforesaid significations
is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This is
apparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean absolutely the same
thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas in analogical
terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the
definition of the same word taken in other senses; as, for instance,
"being" which is applied to "substance" is placed in the definition of
being as applied to "accident"; and "healthy" applied to animal is
placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine and medicine.
For urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the
cause of health.
The same applies to the question at issue. For this name "God," as
signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when it is used to
denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god
by participation, we understand by the name of god some likeness of
the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we
understand and signify something which men think is God; thus it is
manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is
comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said
analogically.
Reply Obj. 1: The multiplication of names does not depend on the
predication of the name, but on the signification: for this name
"man," of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is
predicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the name
"man" we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one
meant to signify by this name "man" what man really is, and another
meant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence
it is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God
contradicts the pagan asserting that it is God; because each of them
uses this name "God" to signify the true God. For when the pagan says
an idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning God in opinion,
for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use
the name in that sense, as in the Psalm, "All the gods of the
Gentiles are demons" (Ps. 95:5).
The same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For these
reasons proceed from the different predication of the name, and not
from its various significations.
Reply Obj. 4 ["On the contrary," par. 1]: The term "animal" applied
to a true and a pictured animal is not purely equivocal; for the
Philosopher takes equivocal names in a large sense, including
analogous names; because also being, which is predicated
analogically, is sometimes said to be predicated equivocally of
different predicaments.
Reply Obj. 5 ["On the contrary," par. 2] : Neither a Catholic nor a
pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one
knows it according to some idea of causality, or excellence, or
remotion (Q. 12, A. 12). So a pagan can take this name "God" in the
same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying
an idol is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God
altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use
names the meaning of which we know not.
_______________________
ELEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 11]
Whether This Name, HE WHO IS, Is the Most Proper Name of God?
Objection 1: It seems that this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper
name of God. For this name "God" is an incommunicable name. But this
name HE WHO IS, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name HE
WHO IS is not the most proper name of God.
Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "the name of
good excellently manifests all the processions of God." But it
especially belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things.
Therefore this name "good" is supremely proper to God, and not this
name HE WHO IS.
Obj. 3: Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to
creatures, for God is known to us only through creatures. But this
name HE WHO IS imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name
HE WHO IS is not the most applicable to God.
_On the contrary,_ It is written that when Moses asked, "If they should
say to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them?" The Lord
answered him, "Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to
you" (Ex. 3:13, 14). Therefore this name HE WHO IS most properly belongs
to God.
_I answer that,_ This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God,
for three reasons:
First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but
simply existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is His
essence itself, which can be said of no other (Q. 3, A. 4), it is
clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for
everything is denominated by its form.
Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are
either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add something above
it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine
it. Now our intellect cannot know the essence of God itself in this
life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining
what it understands about God, it falls short of the mode of what God
is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the
more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are
applied to God. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that, "HE WHO
IS, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending
all in itself, it contains existence itself as an infinite and
indeterminate sea of substance." Now by any other name some mode of
substance is determined, whereas this name HE WHO IS, determines no
mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it
denominates the "infinite ocean of substance."
Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present
existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose existence
knows not past or future, as Augustine says (De Trin. v).
Reply Obj. 1: This name HE WHO IS is the name of God more properly
than this name "God," as regards its source, namely, existence; and
as regards the mode of signification and consignification, as said
above. But as regards the object intended by the name, this name
"God" is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature;
and still more proper is the Tetragrammaton, imposed to signify the
substance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak,
singular.
Reply Obj. 2: This name "good" is the principal name of God in so far
as He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered
absolutely comes before the idea of cause.
Reply Obj. 3: It is not necessary that all the divine names should
import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed
from some perfections flowing from God to creatures. Among these the
first is existence, from which comes this name, HE WHO IS.
_______________________
TWELFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 12]
Whether Affirmative Propositions Can Be Formed About God?
Objection 1: It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed
about God. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that "negations about
God are true; but affirmations are vague."
Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that "a simple form
cannot be a subject." But God is the most absolutely simple form, as
shown (Q. 3): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about
which an affirmative proposition is made is taken as a subject.
Therefore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God.
Obj. 3: Further, every intellect is false which understands a
thing otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any
composition as shown above (Q. 3, A. 7). Therefore since every
affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows
that a true affirmative proposition about God cannot be made.
_On the contrary,_ What is of faith cannot be false. But some
affirmative propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and One;
and that He is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can
be formed about God.
_I answer that,_ True affirmative propositions can be formed about God.
To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition
the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in
reality, and different things in idea. And this appears to be the case
both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those
which have an essential predicate. For it is manifest that "man" and
"white" are the same in subject, and different in idea; for the idea
of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same
applies when I say, "man is an animal"; since the same thing which is
man is truly animal; for in the same _suppositum_ there is sensible
nature by reason of which he is called animal, and the rational nature
by reason of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and
subject are the same as to _suppositum,_ but different as to idea. But
in propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same
rule in some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the
_suppositum_ what it places in the subject; and what it places in the
predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the
_suppositum_; according to the saying that "predicates are to be taken
formally, and subjects materially." To this diversity in idea
corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject, while the
intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition
itself.
God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple,
yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions because it cannot
see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him
under different conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple
object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of
predicate and subject represents the plurality of idea; and the
intellect represents the unity by composition.
Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius says that the affirmations about God
are vague or, according to another translation, "incongruous,"
inasmuch as no name can be applied to God according to its mode of
signification.
Reply Obj. 2: Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting
forms, as they really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as
compound things in which there is something taken as subject and
something that is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form
as a subject, and attributes something else to it.
Reply Obj. 3: This proposition, "The intellect understanding anything
otherwise than it is, is false," can be taken in two senses,
accordingly as this adverb "otherwise" determines the word
"understanding" on the part of the thing understood, or on the part
of the one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing
understood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any
intellect which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is,
is false. But this does not hold in the present case; because our
intellect, when forming a proposition about God, does not affirm that
He is composite, but that He is simple. But taken as referring to the
one who understands, the proposition is false. For the mode of the
intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in
its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect understands
material things below itself in an immaterial manner; not that it
understands them to be immaterial things; but its manner of
understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when it understands simple
things above itself, it understands them according to its own mode,
which is in a composite manner; yet not so as to understand them to
be composite things. And thus our intellect is not false in forming
composition in its ideas concerning God.
_______________________
QUESTION 14
OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE
(In Sixteen Articles)
Having considered what belongs to the divine substance, we have now
to treat of God's operation. And since one kind of operation is
immanent, and another kind of operation proceeds to the exterior
effect, we treat first of knowledge and of will (for understanding
abides in the intelligent agent, and will is in the one who wills);
and afterwards of the power of God, the principle of the divine
operation as proceeding to the exterior effect. Now because to
understand is a kind of life, after treating of the divine knowledge,
we consider the divine life. And as knowledge concerns truth, we
consider truth and falsehood. Further, as everything known is in the
knower, and the types of things as existing in the knowledge of God
are called ideas, to the consideration of knowledge will be added the
treatment of ideas.
Concerning knowledge, there are sixteen points for inquiry:
(1) Whether there is knowledge in God?
(2) Whether God understands Himself?
(3) Whether He comprehends Himself?
(4) Whether His understanding is His substance?
(5) Whether He understands other things besides Himself?
(6) Whether He has a proper knowledge of them?
(7) Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?
(8) Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?
(9) Whether God has knowledge of non-existing things?
(10) Whether He has knowledge of evil?
(11) Whether He has knowledge of individual things?
(12) Whether He knows the infinite?
(13) Whether He knows future contingent things?
(14) Whether He knows enunciable things?
(15) Whether the knowledge of God is variable?
(16) Whether God has speculative or practical knowledge of things?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 1]
Whether There Is Knowledge [*Scientia] in God?
Objection 1: It seems that in God there is not knowledge. For
knowledge is a habit; and habit does not belong to God, since it is
the mean between potentiality and act. Therefore knowledge is not in
God.
Obj. 2: Further, since science is about conclusions, it is a kind of
knowledge caused by something else which is the knowledge of
principles. But nothing is caused in God; therefore science is not in
God.
Obj. 3: Further, all knowledge is universal, or particular. But in God
there is no universal or particular (Q. 3, A. 5). Therefore in God
there is not knowledge.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says, "O the depth of the riches of the
wisdom and of the knowledge of God" (Rom. 11:33).
_I answer that,_ In God there exists the most perfect knowledge. To
prove this, we must note that intelligent beings are distinguished
from non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own
form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also
the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in
the knower. Hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-intelligent
being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of
intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore
the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that "the soul is in a sense all
things." Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence,
as we have said above (Q. 7, A. 1) forms according as they are the
more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore
it is clear that the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is
cognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is the mode of
knowledge. Hence it is said in _De Anima_ ii that plants do not know,
because they are wholly material. But sense is cognitive because it
can receive images free from matter, and the intellect is still
further cognitive, because it is more separated from matter and
unmixed, as said in _De Anima_ iii. Since therefore God is in the
highest degree of immateriality as stated above (Q. 7, A. 1), it
follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge.
Reply Obj. 1: Because perfections flowing from God to creatures exist
in a higher state in God Himself (Q. 4, A. 2), whenever a name taken
from any created perfection is attributed to God, it must be
separated in its signification from anything that belongs to that
imperfect mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a quality
of God, nor a habit; but substance and pure act.
Reply Obj. 2: Whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists
in God simply and unitedly (Q. 13, A. 4). Now man has different kinds
of knowledge, according to the different objects of His knowledge. He
has _intelligence_ as regards the knowledge of principles; he has
_science_ as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has _wisdom,_
according as he knows the highest cause; he has _counsel_ or
_prudence,_ according as he knows what is to be done. But God knows
all these by one simple act of knowledge, as will be shown (A. 7).
Hence the simple knowledge of God can be named by all these names; in
such a way, however, that there must be removed from each of them, so
far as they enter into divine predication, everything that savors of
imperfection; and everything that expresses perfection is to be
retained in them. Hence it is said, "With Him is wisdom and strength,
He hath counsel and understanding" (Job 12:13).
Reply Obj. 3: Knowledge is according to the mode of the one who
knows; for the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of
the knower. Now since the mode of the divine essence is higher than
that of creatures, divine knowledge does not exist in God after the
mode of created knowledge, so as to be universal or particular, or
habitual, or potential, or existing according to any such mode.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 2]
Whether God Understands Himself?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not understand Himself. For it is
said by the Philosopher (De Causis), "Every knower who knows his own
essence, returns completely to his own essence." But God does not go
out from His own essence, nor is He moved at all; thus He cannot
return to His own essence. Therefore He does not know His own essence.
Obj. 2: Further, to understand is a kind of passion and movement,
as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii); and knowledge also is a kind
of assimilation to the object known; and the thing known is the
perfection of the knower. But nothing is moved, or suffers, or is made
perfect by itself, "nor," as Hilary says (De Trin. iii), "is a thing
its own likeness." Therefore God does not understand Himself.
Obj. 3: Further, we are like to God chiefly in our intellect,
because we are the image of God in our mind, as Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit. vi). But our intellect understands itself, only as it
understands other things, as is said in _De Anima_ iii. Therefore God
understands Himself only so far perchance as He understands other
things.
_On the contrary,_ It is written: "The things that are of God no man
knoweth, but the Spirit of God" (1 Cor. 2:11).
_I answer that,_ God understands Himself through Himself. In proof
whereof it must be known that although in operations which pass to an
external effect, the object of the operation, which is taken as the
term, exists outside the operator; nevertheless in operations that
remain in the operator, the object signified as the term of operation,
resides in the operator; and accordingly as it is in the operator, the
operation is actual. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that
"the sensible in act is sense in act, and the intelligible in act is
intellect in act." For the reason why we actually feel or know a thing
is because our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible
or intelligible species. And because of this only, it follows that
sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or intelligible
object, since both are in potentiality.
Since therefore God has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is pure
act, His intellect and its object are altogether the same; so that He
neither is without the intelligible species, as is the case with our
intellect when it understands potentially; nor does the intelligible
species differ from the substance of the divine intellect, as it
differs in our intellect when it understands actually; but the
intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself, and thus
God understands Himself through Himself.
Reply Obj. 1: Return to its own essence means only that a thing
subsists in itself. Inasmuch as the form perfects the matter by
giving it existence, it is in a certain way diffused in it; and it
returns to itself inasmuch as it has existence in itself. Therefore
those cognitive faculties which are not subsisting, but are the acts
of organs, do not know themselves, as in the case of each of the
senses; whereas those cognitive faculties which are subsisting, know
themselves; hence it is said in _De Causis_ that, "whoever knows his
essence returns to it." Now it supremely belongs to God to be
self-subsisting. Hence according to this mode of speaking, He
supremely returns to His own essence, and knows Himself.
Reply Obj. 2: Movement and passion are taken equivocally, according
as to understand is described as a kind of movement or passion, as
stated in _De Anima_ iii. For to understand is not a movement that is
an act of something imperfect passing from one to another, but it is
an act, existing in the agent itself, of something perfect. Likewise
that the intellect is perfected by the intelligible object, i.e. is
assimilated to it, this belongs to an intellect which is sometimes in
potentiality; because the fact of its being in a state of
potentiality makes it differ from the intelligible object and
assimilates it thereto through the intelligible species, which is the
likeness of the thing understood, and makes it to be perfected
thereby, as potentiality is perfected by act. On the other hand, the
divine intellect, which is no way in potentiality, is not perfected
by the intelligible object, nor is it assimilated thereto, but is its
own perfection, and its own intelligible object.
Reply Obj. 3: Existence in nature does not belong to primary matter,
which is a potentiality, unless it is reduced to act by a form. Now
our passive intellect has the same relation to intelligible objects
as primary matter has to natural things; for it is in potentiality as
regards intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural
things. Hence our passive intellect can be exercised concerning
intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected by the
intelligible species of something; and in that way it understands
itself by an intelligible species, as it understands other things:
for it is manifest that by knowing the intelligible object it
understands also its own act of understanding, and by this act knows
the intellectual faculty. But God is a pure act in the order of
existence, as also in the order of intelligible objects; therefore He
understands Himself through Himself.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 3]
Whether God Comprehends Himself?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not comprehend Himself. For
Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "whatever comprehends
itself is finite as regards itself." But God is in all ways infinite.
Therefore He does not comprehend Himself.
Obj. 2: If it is said that God is infinite to us, and finite to
Himself, it can be urged to the contrary, that everything in God is
truer than it is in us. If therefore God is finite to Himself, but
infinite to us, then God is more truly finite than infinite; which is
against what was laid down above (Q. 7, A. 1). Therefore God does
not comprehend Himself.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that
"Everything that understands itself, comprehends itself." But God
understands Himself. Therefore He comprehends Himself.
_I answer that,_ God perfectly comprehends Himself, as can be thus
proved. A thing is said to be comprehended when the end of the
knowledge of it is attained, and this is accomplished when it is known
as perfectly as it is knowable; as, for instance, a demonstrable
proposition is comprehended when known by demonstration, not, however,
when it is known by some probable reason. Now it is manifest that God
knows Himself as perfectly as He is perfectly knowable. For everything
is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality; since a thing
is not known according as it is in potentiality, but in so far as it
is in actuality, as said in _Metaph._ ix. Now the power of God in
knowing is as great as His actuality in existing; because it is from
the fact that He is in act and free from all matter and potentiality,
that God is cognitive, as shown above (AA. 1, 2). Whence it is
manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that
reason He perfectly comprehends Himself.
Reply Obj. 1: The strict meaning of "comprehension" signifies that
one thing holds and includes another; and in this sense everything
comprehended is finite, as also is everything included in another.
But God is not said to be comprehended by Himself in this sense, as
if His intellect were a faculty apart from Himself, and as if it held
and included Himself; for these modes of speaking are to be taken by
way of negation. But as God is said to be in Himself, forasmuch as He
is not contained by anything outside of Himself; so He is said to be
comprehended by Himself, forasmuch as nothing in Himself is hidden
from Himself. For Augustine says (De Vid. Deum. ep. cxii), "The whole
is comprehended when seen, if it is seen in such a way that nothing
of it is hidden from the seer."
Reply Obj. 2: When it is said, "God is finite to Himself," this is to
be understood according to a certain similitude of proportion,
because He has the same relation in not exceeding His intellect, as
anything finite has in not exceeding finite intellect. But God is not
to be called finite to Himself in this sense, as if He understood
Himself to be something finite.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 4]
Whether the Act of God's Intellect Is His Substance?
Objection 1: It seems that the act of God's intellect is not His
substance. For to understand is an operation. But an operation
signifies something proceeding from the operator. Therefore the act of
God's intellect is not His substance.
Obj. 2: Further, to understand one's act of understanding, is to
understand something that is neither great nor chiefly understood,
but secondary and accessory. If therefore God be his own act of
understanding, His act of understanding will be as when we understand
our act of understanding: and thus God's act of understanding will not
be something great.
Obj. 3: Further, every act of understanding means understanding
something. When therefore God understands Himself, if He Himself is
not distinct from this act of understanding, He understands that He
understands Himself; and so on to infinity. Therefore the act of God's
intellect is not His substance.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vii), "In God to be is
the same as to be wise." But to be wise is the same thing as to
understand. Therefore in God to be is the same thing as to
understand. But God's existence is His substance, as shown above
(Q. 3, A. 4). Therefore the act of God's intellect is His substance.
_I answer that,_ It must be said that the act of God's intellect is
His substance. For if His act of understanding were other than His
substance, then something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph.
xii), would be the act and perfection of the divine substance, to
which the divine substance would be related, as potentiality is to
act, which is altogether impossible; because the act of understanding
is the perfection and act of the one understanding. Let us now
consider how this is. As was laid down above (A. 2), to understand is
not an act passing to anything extrinsic; for it remains in the
operator as his own act and perfection; as existence is the
perfection of the one existing: just as existence follows on the
form, so in like manner to understand follows on the intelligible
species. Now in God there is no form which is something other than
His existence, as shown above (Q. 3). Hence as His essence itself is
also His intelligible species, it necessarily follows that His act of
understanding must be His essence and His existence.
Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God, intellect, and
the object understood, and the intelligible species, and His act of
understanding are entirely one and the same. Hence when God is said
to be understanding, no kind of multiplicity is attached to His
substance.
Reply Obj. 1: To understand is not an operation proceeding out of the
operator, but remaining in him.
Reply Obj. 2: When that act of understanding which is not subsistent
is understood, something not great is understood; as when we
understand our act of understanding; and so this cannot be likened to
the act of the divine understanding which is subsistent.
Thus appears the Reply to the Third Objection. For the act of divine
understanding subsists in itself, and belongs to its very self and is
not another's; hence it need not proceed to infinity.
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 5]
Whether God Knows Things Other Than Himself?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not know things besides Himself.
For all other things but God are outside of God. But Augustine says
(Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi) that "God does not behold anything out
of Himself." Therefore He does not know things other than Himself.
Obj. 2: Further, the object understood is the perfection of the one
who understands. If therefore God understands other things besides
Himself, something else will be the perfection of God, and will be
nobler than He; which is impossible.
Obj. 3: Further, the act of understanding is specified by the
intelligible object, as is every other act from its own object. Hence
the intellectual act is so much the nobler, the nobler the object
understood. But God is His own intellectual act. If therefore God
understands anything other than Himself, then God Himself is specified
by something else than Himself; which cannot be. Therefore He does not
understand things other than Himself.
_On the contrary,_ It is written: "All things are naked and open to His
eyes" (Heb. 4:13).
_I answer that,_ God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For
it is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His
existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of
understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows of
necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of
anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its power
extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by
the very fact that it is the first effective cause of all things, as
is clear from the aforesaid (Q. 2, A. 3), God must necessarily know
things other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we
add that the very existence of the first effective cause--viz.
God--is His own act of understanding. Hence whatever effects
pre-exist in God, as in the first cause, must be in His act of
understanding, and all things must be in Him according to an
intelligible mode: for everything which is in another, is in it
according to the mode of that in which it is.
Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must
consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself, and in another.
A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species
adequate to the knowable object; as when the eye sees a man through
the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of
that which contains it; as when a part is seen in the whole by the
image of the whole; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in
the mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in
another.
So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself
through His essence; and He sees other things not in themselves, but
in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things
other than Himself.
Reply Obj. 1: The passage of Augustine in which it is said that God
"sees nothing outside Himself" is not to be taken in such a way, as
if God saw nothing outside Himself, but in the sense that what is
outside Himself He does not see except in Himself, as above explained.
Reply Obj. 2: The object understood is a perfection of the one
understanding not by its substance, but by its image, according to
which it is in the intellect, as its form and perfection, as is said
in _De Anima_ iii. For "a stone is not in the soul, but its image."
Now those things which are other than God are understood by God,
inasmuch as the essence of God contains their images as above
explained; hence it does not follow that there is any perfection in
the divine intellect other than the divine essence.
Reply Obj. 3: The intellectual act is not specified by what is
understood in another, but by the principal object understood in which
other things are understood. For the intellectual act is specified by
its object, inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle of the
intellectual operation: since every operation is specified by the form
which is its principle of operation; as heating by heat. Hence the
intellectual operation is specified by that intelligible form which
makes the intellect in act. And this is the image of the principal
thing understood, which in God is nothing but His own essence in which
all images of things are comprehended. Hence it does not follow that
the divine intellectual act, or rather God Himself, is specified by
anything else than the divine essence itself.
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 6]
Whether God Knows Things Other Than Himself by Proper Knowledge?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not know things other than
Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown (A. 5), God knows
things other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But
other things are in Him as in their common and universal cause, and
are known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to
know them by general, and not by proper knowledge. Therefore God
knows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper knowledge.
Obj. 2: Further, the created essence is as distant from the divine
essence, as the divine essence is distant from the created essence.
But the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence, as
said above (Q. 12, A. 2). Therefore neither can the created essence
be known by the divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His
essence, it follows that He does not know what the creature is in its
essence, so as to know "what it is," which is to have proper
knowledge of it.
Obj. 3: Further, proper knowledge of a thing can come only through
its proper ratio [i.e., concept]. But as God knows all things by His
essence, it seems that He does not know each thing by its proper
ratio; for one thing cannot be the proper ratio of many and diverse
things. Therefore God has not a proper knowledge of things, but a
general knowledge; for to know things otherwise than by their proper
ratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of them.
_On the contrary,_ To have a proper knowledge of things is to know them
not only in general, but as they are distinct from each other. Now God
knows things in that manner. Hence it is written that He reaches "even
to the division of the soul and the spirit, of the joints also and the
marrow, and is a discerner of thoughts and intents of the heart;
neither is there any creature invisible in His sight" (Heb. 4:12,13).
_I answer that,_ Some have erred on this point, saying that God knows
things other than Himself only in general, that is, only as beings.
For as fire, if it knew itself as the principle of heat, would know
the nature of heat, and all things else in so far as they are hot; so
God, through knowing Himself as the principle of being, knows the
nature of being, and all other things in so far as they are beings.
But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general and not in
particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect,
when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a
universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows them in
particular; as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is
clear from _Phys._ i. If therefore the knowledge of God regarding things
other than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow
that His understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore
neither would His being be perfect; and this is against what was said
above (Q. 4, A. 1). We must therefore hold that God knows things
other than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as
being is common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from
the other. In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to show
that God knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as,
for instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines
that proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it would know
all colors.
Now these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as
regards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this respect,
that multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal
principle, not as regards that which is the principle of distinction,
but only as regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity
of colors is not caused by the light only, but by the different
disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise,
the diversity of the lines is caused by their different position.
Hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known
in its principle by proper knowledge, but only in a general way. In
God, however, it is otherwise. For it was shown above (Q. 4, A. 2)
that whatever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists and
is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not only what is
common to creatures--viz. being--belongs to their perfection, but
also what makes them distinguished from each other; as living and
understanding, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished
from the non-living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent.
Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its own
species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not
only as regards what is common to all, but also as regards what
distinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains
all perfections in Himself, the essence of God is compared to all
other essences of things, not as the common to the proper, as unity is
to numbers, or as the centre (of a circle) to the (radiating) lines;
but as perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were to compare man to
animal; or six, a perfect number, to the imperfect numbers contained
under it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act imperfect acts can
be known not only in general, but also by proper knowledge; thus, for
example, whoever knows a man, knows an animal by proper knowledge; and
whoever knows the number six, knows the number three also by proper
knowledge.
As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection
contained in the essence of any other being, and far more, God can
know in Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature
proper to each thing consists in some degree of participation in the
divine perfection. Now God could not be said to know Himself perfectly
unless He knew all the ways in which His own perfection can be shared
by others. Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly,
unless He knew all modes of being. Hence it is manifest that God knows
all things with proper knowledge, in their distinction from each
other.
Reply Obj. 1: So to know a thing as it is in the knower, may be
understood in two ways. In one way this adverb "so" imports the mode
of knowledge on the part of the thing known; and in that sense it is
false. For the knower does not always know the object known according
to the existence it has in the knower; since the eye does not know a
stone according to the existence it has in the eye; but by the image
of the stone which is in the eye, the eye knows the stone according
to its existence outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge
of the object known according to the (mode of) existence it has in
the knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its (mode
of) existence outside the knower; thus the intellect knows a stone
according to the intelligible existence it has in the intellect,
inasmuch as it knows that it understands; while nevertheless it knows
what a stone is in its own nature. If however the adverb 'so' be
understood to import the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the
knower, in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge
of the object known as it is in the knower; for the more perfectly
the thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the mode of
knowledge.
We must say therefore that God not only knows that all things are in
Himself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows them in their
own nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is
in Him.
Reply Obj. 2: The created essence is compared to the essence of God
as the imperfect to the perfect act. Therefore the created essence
cannot sufficiently lead us to the knowledge of the divine essence,
but rather the converse.
Reply Obj. 3: The same thing cannot be taken in an equal manner as
the ratio of different things. But the divine essence excels all
creatures. Hence it can be taken as the proper ratio of each thing
according to the diverse ways in which diverse creatures participate
in, and imitate it.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 7]
Whether the Knowledge of God Is Discursive?
Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the
knowledge of God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge. Now
the Philosopher says (Topic. ii): "The habit of knowledge may regard
many things at once; but actual understanding regards only one thing
at a time." Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as
shown above (AA. 2, 5), it seems that He does not understand all at
once, but discourses from one to another.
Obj. 2: Further, discursive knowledge is to know the effect through
its cause. But God knows things through Himself; as an effect (is
known) through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is discursive.
Obj. 3: Further, God knows each creature more perfectly than we know
it. But we know the effects in their created causes; and thus we go
discursively from causes to things caused. Therefore it seems that
the same applies to God.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "God does not see all
things in their particularity or separately, as if He saw alternately
here and there; but He sees all things together at once."
_I answer that,_ In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the
proof of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold
discursion: one is according to succession only, as when we have
actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand
something else; while the other mode of discursion is according to
causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge of
conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. For
many things, which we understand in succession if each is considered
in itself, we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one
thing; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see
different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things in one (thing),
which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not
successively. Likewise the second mode of discursion cannot be
applied to God. First, because this second mode of discursion
presupposes the first mode; for whosoever proceeds from principles to
conclusions does not consider both at once; secondly, because to
discourse thus is to proceed from the known to the unknown. Hence it
is manifest that when the first is known, the second is still
unknown; and thus the second is known not in the first, but from the
first. Now the term of discursive reasoning is attained when the
second is seen in the first, by resolving the effects into their
causes; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God sees His effects
in Himself as their cause, His knowledge is not discursive.
Reply Obj. 1: Although there is only one act of understanding in
itself, nevertheless many things may be understood in one (medium),
as shown above.
Reply Obj. 2: God does not know by their cause, known, as it were
previously, effects unknown; but He knows the effects in the cause;
and hence His knowledge is not discursive, as was shown above.
Reply Obj. 3: God sees the effects of created causes in the causes
themselves, much better than we can; but still not in such a manner
that the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him by the knowledge
of the created causes, as is the case with us; and hence His
knowledge is not discursive.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 8]
Whether the Knowledge of God Is the Cause of Things?
Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is not the cause of
things. For Origen says, on Rom. 8:30, "Whom He called, them He also
justified," etc.: "A thing will happen not because God knows it as
future; but because it is future, it is on that account known by God,
before it exists."
Obj. 2: Further, given the cause, the effect follows. But the
knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if the knowledge of God is
the cause of things created, it seems that creatures are eternal.
Obj. 3: Further, "The thing known is prior to knowledge, and is
its measure," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x). But what is
posterior and measured cannot be a cause. Therefore the knowledge
of God is not the cause of things.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "Not because they are,
does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He
knows them, therefore they are."
_I answer that,_ The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the
knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the
artificer is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the
artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact
that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the
intellect must be the principle of action; as heat is the principle of
heating. Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural form, being a
form that remains in that to which it gives existence, denotes a
principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an
effect; and likewise, the intelligible form does not denote a
principle of action in so far as it resides in the one who understands
unless there is added to it the inclination to an effect, which
inclination is through the will. For since the intelligible form has a
relation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to
opposites), it would not produce a determinate effect unless it were
determined to one thing by the appetite, as the Philosopher says
(Metaph. ix). Now it is manifest that God causes things by His
intellect, since His being is His act of understanding; and hence His
knowledge must be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined
to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the cause of things is usually
called the "knowledge of approbation."
Reply Obj. 1: Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge
to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is
joined to it, as is said above.
But when he says the reason why God foreknows some things is because
they are future, this must be understood according to the cause of
consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things
are in the future, it follows that God knows them; but not that the
futurity of things is the cause why God knows them.
Reply Obj. 2: The knowledge of God is the cause of things according
as things are in His knowledge. Now that things should be eternal was
not in the knowledge of God; hence although the knowledge of God is
eternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal.
Reply Obj. 3: Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God
and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of
which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural
objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its measure,
so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the
measure of them; as, for instance, a house is midway between the
knowledge of the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one
who gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already built.
_______________________
NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 9]
Whether God Has Knowledge of Things That Are Not?
Objection 1: It seems that God has not knowledge of things that are
not. For the knowledge of God is of true things. But "truth" and
"being" are convertible terms. Therefore the knowledge of God is not
of things that are not.
Obj. 2: Further, knowledge requires likeness between the knower and
the thing known. But those things that are not cannot have any
likeness to God, Who is very being. Therefore what is not, cannot be
known by God.
Obj. 3: Further, the knowledge of God is the cause of what is known
by Him. But it is not the cause of things that are not, because a
thing that is not, has no cause. Therefore God has no knowledge of
things that are not.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says: "Who . . . calleth those things
that are not as those that are" (Rom. 4:17).
_I answer that,_ God knows all things whatsoever that in any way are.
Now it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in a
certain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas
things which are not actual, are in the power either of God Himself or
of a creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in power
of thought or of imagination, or of any other manner of meaning
whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by the
creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God,
although they are not actual. And in so far it can be said that He has
knowledge even of things that are not.
Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those
things that are not actual. For though some of them may not be in act
now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all
these with the knowledge of vision: for since God's act of
understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since
eternity is without succession, comprehending all time, the present
glance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in
any time, as to objects present to Him. But there are other things in
God's power, or the creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor will
be, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have knowledge, not
of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so called because the
things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer.
Reply Obj. 1: Those things that are not actual are true in so far as
they are in potentiality; for it is true that they are in
potentiality; and as such they are known by God.
Reply Obj. 2: Since God is very being everything is, in so far as it
participates in the likeness of God; as everything is hot in so far
as it participates in heat. So, things in potentiality are known by
God, although they are not in act.
Reply Obj. 3: The knowledge of God, joined to His will is the cause
of things. Hence it is not necessary that what ever God knows, is, or
was, or will be; but only is this necessary as regards what He wills
to be, or permits to be. Further, it is in the knowledge of God not
that they be, but that they be possible.
_______________________
TENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 10]
Whether God Knows Evil Things?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not know evil things. For the
Philosopher (De Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in
potentiality does not know privation. But "evil is the privation of
good," as Augustine says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the
intellect of God is never in potentiality, but is always in act, as is
clear from the foregoing (A. 2), it seems that God does not know evil
things.
Obj. 2: Further, all knowledge is either the cause of the thing
known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of God is not the cause
of evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God does not know evil
things.
Obj. 3: Further, everything known is known either by its likeness,
or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He knows through His
essence, as is clear from the foregoing (A. 5). Now the divine
essence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it;
for to the divine essence there is no contrary, as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things.
Obj. 4: Further, what is known through another and not through
itself, is imperfectly known. But evil is not known by God; for the
thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if evil is known through
another, namely, through good, it would be known by Him imperfectly;
which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not imperfect. Therefore
God does not know evil things.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 15:11), "Hell and destruction
are before God [Vulg: 'the Lord']."
_I answer that,_ Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that
can be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which
corruption by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good
things perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is
knowable in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the
essence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact that
God knows good things, He knows evil things also; as by light is
known darkness. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "God through
Himself receives the vision of darkness, not otherwise seeing
darkness except through light."
Reply Obj. 1: The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as
meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not
know privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what
he said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing are
known by privation of division. This is because simple and
indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually, but only
potentially; for were they actually in our intellect, they would not
be known by privation. It is thus that simple things are known by
separate substances. God therefore knows evil, not by privation
existing in Himself, but by the opposite good.
Reply Obj. 2: The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but is
the cause of the good whereby evil is known.
Reply Obj. 3: Although evil is not opposed to the divine essence,
which is not corruptible by evil; it is opposed to the effects of
God, which He knows by His essence; and knowing them, He knows the
opposite evils.
Reply Obj. 4: To know a thing by something else only, belongs to
imperfect knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is
not of itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means
the privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined nor
known except by good.
_______________________
ELEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 11]
Whether God Knows Singular Things?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not know singular things. For the
divine intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect. Now the
human intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know singular
things; but as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii), "reason has to do
with universals, sense with singular things." Therefore God does not
know singular things.
Obj. 2: Further, in us those faculties alone know the singular, which
receive the species not abstracted from material conditions. But in
God things are in the highest degree abstracted from all materiality.
Therefore God does not know singular things.
Obj. 3: Further, all knowledge comes about through the medium of some
likeness. But the likeness of singular things in so far as they are
singular, does not seem to be in God; for the principle of
singularity is matter, which, since it is in potentiality only, is
altogether unlike God, Who is pure act. Therefore God cannot know
singular things.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 16:2), "All the ways of a man
are open to His eyes."
_I answer that,_ God knows singular things. For all perfections found
in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the
foregoing (Q. 4, A. 2). Now to know singular things is part of our
perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher
considers it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown
to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and _Metaph._
iii) that God would be most ignorant if He did not know discord. Now
the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply
and unitedly in God; hence, although by one faculty we know the
universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material
things, nevertheless God knows both by His simple intellect.
Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows
singular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in any
singular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They
give the example of an astrologer who knows all the universal
movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that
are to come. This, however, is not enough; for singular things from
universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however
they may be joined together, are not individualized except by
individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or
because he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that
kind, would not know him in so far as he is this particular man. Hence
according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know singular things in
their singularity.
On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by
the application of universal causes to particular effects. But this
will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless
he first knows that thing; hence the said application cannot be the
reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of
singular things.
Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of
things by His knowledge, as stated above (A. 8), His knowledge
extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of
God extends not only to forms, which are the source of universality,
but also to matter, as we shall prove further on (Q. 44, A. 2), the
knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are
individualized by matter. For since He knows things other than
Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their
active principle, His essence must be the sufficing principle of
knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in
the singular. The same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer,
if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form.
Reply Obj. 1: Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from
the individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in our
intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and on
that account our intellect does not know the singular. But the
intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of
God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of itself, being the
principle of all the principles which enter into the composition of
things, whether principles of the species or principles of the
individual; hence by it God knows not only universal, but also
singular things.
Reply Obj. 2: Although as regards the species in the divine intellect
its being has no material conditions like the images received in the
imagination and sense, yet its power extends to both immaterial and
material things.
Reply Obj. 3: Although matter as regards its potentiality recedes
from likeness to God, yet, even in so far as it has being in this
wise, it retains a certain likeness to the divine being.
_______________________
TWELFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 12]
Whether God Can Know Infinite Things?
Objection 1: It seems that God cannot know infinite things. For the
infinite, as such, is unknown; since the infinite is that which, "to
those who measure it, leaves always something more to be measured,"
as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xii) that "whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded
by the comprehension of the knower." Now infinite things have no
boundary. Therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of
God.
Obj. 2: Further, if we say that things infinite in themselves are
finite in God's knowledge, against this it may be urged that the
essence of the infinite is that it is untraversable, and the finite
that it is traversable, as said in _Phys._ iii. But the infinite is
not traversable either by the finite or by the infinite, as is proved
in Phys. vi. Therefore the infinite cannot be bounded by the finite,
nor even by the infinite; and so the infinite cannot be finite in
God's knowledge, which is infinite.
Obj. 3: Further, the knowledge of God is the measure of what is
known. But it is contrary to the essence of the infinite that it be
measured. Therefore infinite things cannot be known by God.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii), "Although we cannot
number the infinite, nevertheless it can be comprehended by Him whose
knowledge has no bounds."
_I answer that,_ Since God knows not only things actual but also
things possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above (A.
9), and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows
infinite things. Although the knowledge of vision which has relation
only to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite
things, as some say, for we do not say that the world is eternal, nor
that generation and movement will go on for ever, so that individuals
be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we
must hold that God knows infinite things even by the knowledge of
vision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts,
which will be multiplied to infinity as rational creatures go on for
ever.
The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the knowledge of
every knower is measured by the mode of the form which is the
principle of knowledge. For the sensible image in sense is the
likeness of only one individual thing, and can give the knowledge of
only one individual. But the intelligible species of our intellect is
the likeness of the thing as regards its specific nature, which is
participable by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the
intelligible species of man in a certain way knows infinite men; not
however as distinguished from each other, but as communicating in the
nature of the species; and the reason is because the intelligible
species of our intellect is the likeness of man not as to the
individual principles, but as to the principles of the species. On
the other hand, the divine essence, whereby the divine intellect
understands, is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can
be, not only as regards the universal principles, but also as regards
the principles proper to each one, as shown above. Hence it follows
that the knowledge of God extends to infinite things, even as
distinct from each other.
Reply Obj. 1: The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity, as the
Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the idea of quantity implies the
order of parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode
of the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way the
infinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken,
there will always remain something else outside. But God does not
know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after
part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not successively,
as said above (A. 7). Hence there is nothing to prevent Him from
knowing infinite things.
Reply Obj. 2: Transition imports a certain succession of parts; and
hence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite, nor
by the infinite. But equality suffices for comprehension, because
that is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside the
comprehender. Hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be
comprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite in itself can
be called finite to the knowledge of God as comprehended; but not as
if it were traversable.
Reply Obj. 3: The knowledge of God is the measure of things, not
quantitatively, for the infinite is not subject to this kind of
measure; but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things.
For everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which
it imitates the knowledge of God, as the thing made by art agrees
with the art. Granted, however, an actually infinite number of
things, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude in
continuous quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of the ancients
held; yet it is manifest that these would have a determinate and
finite being, because their being would be limited to some
determinate nature. Hence they would be measurable as regards the
knowledge of God.
_______________________
THIRTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 13]
Whether the Knowledge of God Is of Future Contingent Things?
Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future
contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary
effect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said
above (A. 8). Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He
knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of
contingent things.
Obj. 2: Further, every conditional proposition of which the
antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary
consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are
to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only a necessary
conclusion can follow, as is proved in _Poster._ i. But this is a true
conditional proposition, "If God knew that this thing will be, it will
be," for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the
antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it is
eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore the consequent
is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows, is
necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not of contingent things.
Obj. 3: Further, everything known by God must necessarily be,
because even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and, of
course, the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. But no
future contingent things must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent
future thing is known by God.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 32:15), "He Who hath made the
hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works," i.e.
of men. Now the works of men are contingent, being subject to free
will. Therefore God knows future contingent things.
_I answer that,_ Since as was shown above (A. 9), God knows all
things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and
creature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it
follows that God knows future contingent things.
In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be
considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in
act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as
present; neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference)
to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this
it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to
the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In
another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its
cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as a
contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent
cause has relation to opposite things: and in this sense a contingent
thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a
contingent effect in its cause only, has merely a conjectural
knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things not only as they
are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in
itself. And although contingent things become actual successively,
nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they
are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is
because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being;
and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said
above (Q. 10, A. 2). Hence all things that are in time are present to
God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things
present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried
from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality.
Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by
God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their
presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to
their own causes.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may
be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as
the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate
contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which is the first
cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent
on account of their proximate causes, while the knowledge of God,
which is the first cause, is necessary.
Reply Obj. 2: Some say that this antecedent, "God knew this
contingent to be future," is not necessary, but contingent; because,
although it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This
however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had
relation to the future, must have had it, although the future
sometimes does not follow. On the other hand some say that this
antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and
contingent; as this saying is contingent, "Socrates is a white man."
But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, "God knew this
contingent to be future," contingent is used here only as the matter
of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence its
contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or
contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or false. For it
may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said
Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies to necessary and
contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely
necessary. Nor does it follow, as some say, that the consequent is
absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of
the consequent, which is contingent by reason of the proximate cause.
But this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were
its antecedent the remote necessary cause, and the consequent a
contingent effect; as, for example, if I said, "if the sun moves, the
grass will grow."
Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains
anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent must be
taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the
existence of a thing in itself is different from the existence of a
thing in the soul. For example, when I say, "What the soul
understands is immaterial," this is to be understood that it is
immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself.
Likewise if I say, "If God knew anything, it will be," the consequent
must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. as
it is in its presentiality. And thus it is necessary, as also is the
antecedent: "For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily
be," as the Philosopher says in _Peri Herm._ i.
Reply Obj. 3: Things reduced to act in time, as known by us
successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is
above time. Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know
future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God
alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who
goes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas
he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling
by the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it
is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be
known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according
to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as
already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes.
Hence also this proposition, "Everything known by God must
necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the
thing, or to the saying. If it refers to the thing, it is divided and
false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary."
If understood of the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense
is, "This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary."
Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good
with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I
said, "It is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false as
applied to the saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a thing
which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, "a white thing
is black" can never be true. But in forms that are inseparable from
the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said,
"A black crow can be white"; for in both senses it is false. Now to
be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what is known by
God cannot be known. This objection, however, would hold if these
words "that which is known" implied any disposition inherent to the
subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be
attributed to the thing known, in itself (even if it always be
known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under
actual knowledge; thus material existence is attributed to a stone in
itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known.
_______________________
FOURTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 14]
Whether God Knows Enunciable Things?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not know enunciable things. For to
know enunciable things belongs to our intellect as it composes and
divides. But in the divine intellect, there is no composition.
Therefore God does not know enunciable things.
Obj. 2: Further, every kind of knowledge is made through some
likeness. But in God there is no likeness of enunciable things, since
He is altogether simple. Therefore God does not know enunciable
things.
_On the contrary,_ It is written: "The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men"
(Ps. 93:11). But enunciable things are contained in the thoughts of
men. Therefore God knows enunciable things.
_I answer that,_ Since it is in the power of our intellect to form
enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in
that of creatures, as said above (A. 9), it follows of necessity
that God knows all enunciations that can be formed.
Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite
things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not after the
manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were
composition or division of enunciations; for He knows each thing by
simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if
we by the very fact that we understand what man is, were to understand
all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in
our intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch
as the intelligible species represents one thing in such a way as not
to represent another. Hence when we understand what man is, we do not
forthwith understand other things which belong to him, but we
understand them one by one, according to a certain succession. On this
account the things we understand as separated, we must reduce to one
by way of composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now the
species of the divine intellect, which is God's essence, suffices to
represent all things. Hence by understanding His essence, God knows
the essences of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to
them.
Reply Obj. 1: This objection would avail if God knew enunciable
things after the manner of enunciable things.
Reply Obj. 2: Enunciatory composition signifies some existence of a
thing; and thus God by His existence, which is His essence, is the
similitude of all those things which are signified by enunciation.
_______________________
FIFTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 15]
Whether the Knowledge of God Is Variable?
Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is variable. For
knowledge is related to what is knowable. But whatever imports
relation to the creature is applied to God from time, and varies
according to the variation of creatures. Therefore the knowledge of
God is variable according to the variation of creatures.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever God can make, He can know. But God can
make more than He does. Therefore He can know more than He knows.
Thus His knowledge can vary according to increase and diminution.
Obj. 3: Further, God knew that Christ would be born. But He does
not know now that Christ will be born; because Christ is not to be
born in the future. Therefore God does not know everything He once
knew; and thus the knowledge of God is variable.
_On the contrary,_ It is said, that in God "there is no change nor
shadow of alteration" (James 1:17).
_I answer that,_ Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is
clear from the foregoing (A. 4), just as His substance is altogether
immutable, as shown above (Q. 9, A. 1), so His knowledge likewise
must be altogether invariable.
Reply Obj. 1: "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import relations to
creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of
God imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in God;
because everything is actually understood according as it is in the
one who understands. Now created things are in God in an invariable
manner; while they exist variably in themselves. We may also say that
"Lord", "Creator" and the like, import the relations consequent upon
the acts which are understood as terminating in the creatures
themselves, as they are in themselves; and thus these relations are
attributed to God variously, according to the variation of creatures.
But "knowledge" and "love," and the like, import relations consequent
upon the acts which are understood to be in God; and therefore these
are predicated of God in an invariable manner.
Reply Obj. 2: God knows also what He can make, and does not make.
Hence from the fact that He can make more than He makes, it does not
follow that He can know more than He knows, unless this be referred
to the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said to know
those things which are in act in some period of time. But from the
fact that He knows some things might be which are not, or that some
things might not be which are, it does not follow that His knowledge
is variable, but rather that He knows the variability of things. If,
however, anything existed which God did not previously know, and
afterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable. But this could
not be; for whatever is, or can be in any period of time, is known by
God in His eternity. Therefore from the fact that a thing exists in
some period of time, it follows that it is known by God from
eternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that God can know more than
He knows; because such a proposition implies that first of all He did
not know, and then afterwards knew.
Reply Obj. 3: The ancient Nominalists said that it was the same thing
to say "Christ is born" and "will be born" and "was born"; because
the same thing is signified by these three--viz. the nativity of
Christ. Therefore it follows, they said, that whatever God knew, He
knows; because now He knows that Christ is born, which means the same
thing as that Christ will be born. This opinion, however, is false;
both because the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes a
diversity of enunciations; and because it would follow that a
proposition which is true once would be always true; which is
contrary to what the Philosopher lays down (Categor. iii) when he
says that this sentence, "Socrates sits," is true when he is sitting,
and false when he rises up. Therefore, it must be conceded that this
proposition is not true, "Whatever God knew He knows," if referred to
enunciable propositions. But because of this, it does not follow that
the knowledge of God is variable. For as it is without variation in
the divine knowledge that God knows one and the same thing sometime
to be, and sometime not to be, so it is without variation in the
divine knowledge that God knows an enunciable proposition is sometime
true, and sometime false. The knowledge of God, however, would be
variable if He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation, by
composition and division, as occurs in our intellect. Hence our
knowledge varies either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if
when either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when a
thing suffers change we retained the same opinion about it; or as
regards diverse opinions, as if we first thought that anyone was
sitting, and afterwards thought that he was not sitting; neither of
which can be in God.
_______________________
SIXTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 16]
Whether God Has a Speculative Knowledge of Things?
Objection 1: It seems that God has not a speculative knowledge of
things. For the knowledge of God is the cause of things, as shown
above (A. 8). But speculative knowledge is not the cause of the
things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative.
Obj. 2: Further, speculative knowledge comes by abstraction from
things; which does not belong to the divine knowledge. Therefore the
knowledge of God is not speculative.
_On the contrary,_ Whatever is the more excellent must be attributed to
God. But speculative knowledge is more excellent than practical
knowledge, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of Metaphysics.
Therefore God has a speculative knowledge of things.
_I answer that,_ Some knowledge is speculative only; some is practical
only; and some is partly speculative and partly practical. In proof
whereof it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative
in three ways: first, on the part of the things known, which are not
operable by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about natural or
divine thing[s]. Secondly, as regards the manner of knowing--as, for
instance, if a builder consider a house by defining and dividing, and
considering what belongs to it in general: for this is to consider
operable things in a speculative manner, and not as practically
operable; for operable means the application of form to matter, and
not the resolution of the composite into its universal formal
principles. Thirdly, as regards the end; "for the practical intellect
differs in its end from the speculative," as the Philosopher says (De
Anima iii). For the practical intellect is ordered to the end of the
operation; whereas the end of the speculative intellect is the
consideration of truth. Hence if a builder should consider how a house
can be made, not ordering this to the end of operation, but only to
know (how to do it), this would be only a speculative considerations
as regards the end, although it concerns an operable thing. Therefore
knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing itself known, is
merely speculative. But that which is speculative either in its mode
or as to its end is partly speculative and partly practical: and when
it is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical.
In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that God has of
Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He Himself is not operable.
But of all other things He has both speculative and practical
knowledge. He has speculative knowledge as regards the mode; for
whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing, God
knows all this much more perfectly.
Now of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He has
not a practical knowledge, according as knowledge is called practical
from the end. But He has a practical knowledge of what He makes in
some period of time. And, as regards evil things, although they are
not operable by Him, yet they fall under His practical knowledge, like
good things, inasmuch as He permits, or impedes, or directs them; as
also sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the physician,
inasmuch as he cures them by his art.
Reply Obj. 1: The knowledge of God is the cause, not indeed of
Himself, but of other things. He is actually the cause of some, that
is, of things that come to be in some period of time; and He is
virtually the cause of others, that is, of things which He can make,
and which nevertheless are never made.
Reply Obj. 2: The fact that knowledge is derived from things known
does not essentially belong to speculative knowledge, but only
accidentally in so far as it is human.
In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must say that
perfect knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if they are
known in so far as they are operable. Therefore, since the knowledge
of God is in every way perfect, He must know what is operable by Him,
formally as such, and not only in so far as they are speculative.
Nevertheless this does not impair the nobility of His speculative
knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other than Himself in
Himself, and He knows Himself speculatively; and so in the speculative
knowledge of Himself, he possesses both speculative and practical
knowledge of all other things.
_______________________
QUESTION 15
OF IDEAS
(In Three Articles)
After considering the knowledge of God, it remains to consider ideas.
And about this there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are ideas?
(2) Whether they are many, or one only?
(3) Whether there are ideas of all things known by God?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 15, Art. 1]
Whether There Are Ideas?
Objection 1: It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. vii), that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas
are for nothing else except that things may be known through them.
Therefore there are no ideas.
Obj. 2: Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been
already said (Q. 14, A. 5). But He does not know Himself through
an idea; neither therefore other things.
Obj. 3: Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of
knowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient
principle of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore
necessary to suppose ideas.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),
"Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless
they are understood."
_I answer that,_ It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind.
For the Greek word _Idea_ is in Latin _Forma._ Hence by ideas are
understood the forms of things, existing apart from the things
themselves. Now the form of anything existing apart from the thing
itself can be for one of two ends: either to be the type of that of
which it is called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge
of that thing, inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are said to be
in him who knows them. In either case we must suppose ideas, as is
clear for the following reason:
In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of
any generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on account of
the form, except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the
agent, as may happen in two ways. For in some agents the form of the
thing to be made pre-exists according to its natural being, as in
those that act by their nature; as a man generates a man, or fire
generates fire. Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing to be
made pre-exists) according to intelligible being, as in those that
act by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists in
the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the
house, since the builder intends to build his house like to the form
conceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but
by God acting by His intellect, as will appear later (Q. 46, A. 1),
there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which
the world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists.
Reply Obj. 1: God does not understand things according to an idea
existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the
opinion of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not
in the intellect.
Reply Obj. 2: Although God knows Himself and all else by His own
essence, yet His essence is the operative principle of all things,
except of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with
respect to other things; though not with respect to Himself.
Reply Obj. 3: God is the similitude of all things according to His
essence; therefore an idea in God is identical with His essence.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 15, Art. 2]
Whether Ideas Are Many?
Objection 1: It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is
His essence. But God's essence is one only. Therefore there is only
one idea.
Obj. 2: Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and
operating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several
arts or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas.
Obj. 3: Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according to
their relations to different creatures, it may be argued on the
contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are
many, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must be the cause of
the eternal.
Obj. 4: Further, these relations are either real in creatures only,
or in God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not from
eternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas
are multiplied only according to these relations. But if they are
real in God, it follows that there is a real plurality in God other
than the plurality of Persons: and this is against the teaching of
Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in God all things are one,
except "ingenerability, generation, and procession." Ideas therefore
are not many.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),
"Ideas are certain principal forms, or permanent and immutable types
of things, they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal,
and existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the
divine intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come
into being nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with them
everything is formed that can rise or decay, and all that actually
does so."
_I answer that,_ It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In
proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the
ultimate end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the
order of an army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now the
highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the
universe, as the Philosopher clearly teaches in _Metaph._ xii.
Therefore the order of the universe is properly intended by God, and
is not the accidental result of a succession of agents, as has been
supposed by those who have taught that God created only the first
creature, and that this creature created the second creature, and so
on, until this great multitude of beings was produced. According to
this opinion God would have the idea of the first created thing
alone; whereas, if the order itself of the universe was created by
Him immediately, and intended by Him, He must have the idea of the
order of the universe. Now there cannot be an idea of any whole,
unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is
made; just as a builder cannot conceive the idea of a house unless he
has the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must needs be that in
the divine mind there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence
Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "that each thing was
created by God according to the idea proper to it," from which it
follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can easily be
seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God, if we
consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator as
that which is understood, and not as the image whereby he
understands, which is a form that makes the intellect in act. For the
form of the house in the mind of the builder, is something understood
by him, to the likeness of which he forms the house in matter. Now,
it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it
understand many things; though it would be repugnant to its
simplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality of
images. Hence many ideas exist in the divine mind, as things
understood by it; as can be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own
essence perfectly, He knows it according to every mode in which it
can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as
it can be participated in by creatures according to some degree of
likeness. But every creature has its own proper species, according to
which it participates in some degree in likeness to the divine
essence. So far, therefore, as God knows His essence as capable of
such imitation by any creature, He knows it as the particular type
and idea of that creature; and in like manner as regards other
creatures. So it is clear that God understands many particular types
of things and these are many ideas.
Reply Obj. 1: The divine essence is not called an idea in so far as
it is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or type
of this or that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as
many types are understood through the self-same essence.
Reply Obj. 2: By wisdom and art we signify that by which God
understands; but an idea, that which God understands. For God by one
understands many things, and that not only according to what they are
in themselves, but also according as they are understood, and this is
to understand the several types of things. In the same way, an
architect is said to understand a house, when he understands the form
of the house in matter. But if he understands the form of a house, as
devised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he
understands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of the house.
Now not only does God understand many things by His essence, but He
also understands that He understands many things by His essence. And
this means that He understands the several types of things; or that
many ideas are in His intellect as understood by Him.
Reply Obj. 3: Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are
caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect
comparing its own essence with these things.
Reply Obj. 4: Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created
things, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as those
whereby the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood by
God.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 15, Art. 3]
Whether There Are Ideas of All Things That God Knows?
Objection 1: It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things
that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would
follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God.
Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows.
Obj. 2: Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be,
nor have been, as has been said above (A. 9). But of such things
there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of
the divine will are the determining and effective types of things."
Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him.
Obj. 3: Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be
no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.
Obj. 4: Further, it is certain that God knows not only species, but
also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas of
these, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as
Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore there are
not ideas in God of all things known by Him.
_On the contrary,_ Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is
clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the
proper types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas
of all things known by Him.
_I answer that,_ As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the
knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold
office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the
principle of the making of things, it may be called an "exemplar," and
belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of
knowledge, it is properly called a "type," and may belong to
speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect
to everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a
principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God, even
though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows
according to their proper type, in so far as they are known by Him in
a speculative manner.
Reply Obj. 1: Evil is known by God not through its own type, but
through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God,
neither in so far as an idea is an "exemplar" nor as a "type."
Reply Obj. 2: God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of
things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with
respect to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies
an "exemplar" but only in so far as it denotes a "type."
Reply Obj. 3: Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not
created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a
concause with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by
God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; but not
apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can
neither exist, nor be known.
Reply Obj. 4: Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species,
in so far as idea denotes an "exemplar"; for genus cannot exist
except in some species. The same is the case with those accidents
that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being
along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the
subject, have their special idea. For an architect produces through
the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it;
whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such
as painting, or any other such thing, are produced through some other
form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea
than that of species; both because particular things are
individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated
and the concause with the idea; and because the intention of nature
regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the
species may be preserved. However, divine providence extends not
merely to species; but to individuals as will be shown later (Q. 22,
A. 3).
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QUESTION 16
OF TRUTH
(In Eight Articles)
Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration
of the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. About this
there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?
(2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?
(3) On the comparison of the true to being.
(4) On the comparison of the true to the good.
(5) Whether God is truth?
(6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?
(7) On the eternity of truth.
(8) On the unchangeableness of truth.
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 1]
Whether Truth Resides Only in the Intellect?
Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the
intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5)
condemns this definition of truth, "That is true which is seen"; since
it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not
be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following,
"That is true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and
able to know," for hence it would follow that nothing would be true,
unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: "That
is true which is." It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and
not in the intellect.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If,
then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except in
so far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient
philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true is so.
Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by
different persons at the same time.
Obj. 3: Further, "that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself
more so," as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But it is
from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is
true or false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore
truth resides rather in things than in the intellect.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), " The true and the
false reside not in things, but in the intellect."
_I answer that,_ As the good denotes that towards which the appetite
tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now
there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or
any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing
known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer
tends towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely
good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect,
namely true, is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing
so far as that thing is related to the appetite--and hence the aspect
of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so
far as the appetite is called good if its object is good; so, since
the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the
object understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the
intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood
is said to be true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect.
Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either
essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect
on which it depends as regards its essence; but accidentally to an
intellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is
related essentially to the intellect of the architect, but
accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend.
Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by
what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true
absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it
depends; and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true as
being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that
expresses the likeness of the form in the architect's mind; and words
are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the
intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so
far as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine
mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to
a stone, according to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus,
then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in
things according as they are related to the intellect as their
principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth.
Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is that whereby is made
manifest that which is;" and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that "Truth
makes being clear and evident" and this pertains to truth according as
it is in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as they
are related to the intellect, we have Augustine's definition (De Vera
Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is a supreme likeness without any unlikeness to
a principle": also Anselm's definition (De Verit. xii), "Truth is
rightness, perceptible by the mind alone"; for that is right which is
in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's definition (Metaph.
viii, 6), "The truth of each thing is a property of the essence which
is immutably attached to it." The definition that "Truth is the
equation of thought and thing" is applicable to it under either
aspect.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking about the truth of things, and
excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect;
for what is accidental is excluded from every definition.
Reply Obj. 2: The ancient philosophers held that the species of
natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced
by chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect,
they were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to
our intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible,
and which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. iv). Such, however, do not
follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their relation
to the divine intellect.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the
thing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily,
any more than that health should be primarily in medicine, rather
than in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not its health,
is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the
same way, the being of the thing, not its truth, is the cause of
truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought or
a word is true "from the fact that a thing is, not because a thing is
true."
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 2]
Whether Truth Resides Only in the Intellect Composing and Dividing?
Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect
composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that
as the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible
objects, so is the intellect as regards "what a thing is." Now
composition and division are neither in the senses nor in the
intellect knowing "what a thing is." Therefore truth does not reside
only in the intellect composing and dividing.
Obj. 2: Further, Isaac says in his book _On Definitions_ that truth
is the equation of thought and thing. Now just as the intellect with
regard to complex things can be equated to things, so also with regard
to simple things; and this is true also of sense apprehending a thing
as it is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect
composing and dividing.
_On the contrary,_ the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi) that with regard to
simple things and "what a thing is," truth is "found neither in the
intellect nor in things."
_I answer that,_ As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect,
in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has the
form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing,
must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the thing known, this
being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the
conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity
is to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For although
sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the
comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which itself
apprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own
conformity with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it
by knowing of a thing "what a thing is." When, however, it judges that
a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing,
then first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and
dividing: for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes
from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by the
predicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing,
as is also the intellect, when it knows "what a thing is"; but it does
not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with
complex or non-complex words. Truth therefore may be in the senses, or
in the intellect knowing "what a thing is," as in anything that is
true; yet not as the thing known in the knower, which is implied by
the word "truth"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as
known. Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect
composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect
knowing "what a thing is."
And thus the Objections given are solved.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 3]
Whether the True and Being Are Convertible Terms?
Objection 1: It seems that the true and being are not convertible
terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated
(A. 1); but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not
convertible.
Obj. 2: Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not
convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being;
for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not.
Therefore the true and being are not convertible.
Obj. 3: Further, things which stand to each other in order of
priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true
appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except
under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not
convertible.
_On the contrary,_ the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the
same disposition of things in being and in truth.
_I answer that,_ As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth
is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so
far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in _De Anima_ iii that "the
soul is in some manner all things," through the senses and the
intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the
true. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true
adds relation to the intellect.
Reply Obj. 1: The true resides in things and in the intellect, as
said before (A. 1). But the true that is in things is convertible
with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect
is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the manifested;
for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already (A.
1). It may, however, be said that being also is in things and in the
intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in the
intellect, while being is primarily in things; and this is so because
truth and being differ in idea.
Reply Obj. 2: Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be
known; y | |
