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THE BHAGAVADGÎTÂ
WITH THE SANATSUGÂTÎYA
AND THE ANUGÎTÂ
TRANSLATED BY
KÂSHINÂTH TRIMBAK TELANG, M. A.
Volume 8, The Sacred Books of the East
Oxford, The Clarendon Press
[1882]
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This book was obtained from the Internet Sacred Text Archive at http://www.sacred-texts.com/index.htm and is included here on this CD with their permission. You should check that excellent site for other related materials. The original for this particular text is at http://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/sbe08/index.htm
scanned at sacred-texts.com, April-May, 2002. J.B. Hare, Redactor
Notes from the Sacred Text Archive:
"The Sacred Books of the East (SBE) series, comprising fifty volumes, was issued by the Oxford University Press between 1879 and 1910. It has translations of key sacred texts of Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, Zoroastrianism, Jainism, and Islam. The series was edited by the famous linguist Max Müller, who also produced many of the translations."
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BHAGAVADGÎTÂ:
Introduction1
Translation37
SANATSUGÂTÎYA:
Introduction135
Translation149
ANUGÎTÂ:
Introduction197
Translation229
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INTRODUCTION TO BHAGAVADGÎTÂ.
IT has become quite a literary commonplace, that--to borrow the words of
Professor Max Müller in one of his recent lectures--history, in the ordinary
sense of the word, is almost unknown in Indian literature 1. And it is certainly
a remarkable irony of fate, that we should be obliged to make this remark on the
very threshold of an introduction to the Bhagavadgîtâ; for according to the
eminent French philosopher, Cousin 2, this great deficiency in Sanskrit
literature is due, in no inconsiderable measure, to the doctrines propounded in
the Bhagavadgîtâ itself. But however that may be, this much is certain, that the
student of the Bhagavadgîtâ must, for the present, go without that reliable
historical information touching the author of the work, the time at which it was
composed, and even the place it occupies in literature, which one naturally
desires, when entering upon the study of any work. More especially in an attempt
like the present, intended as it mainly is for students of the history of
religion, I should have been better pleased, if I could, in this Introduction,
have concentrated to a focus, as it were, only those well ascertained historical
results, on which there is something like a consensus of opinion among persons
qualified to judge. But there is no exaggeration in saying, that it is almost
impossible to lay down even a single proposition respecting any important matter
connected with the Bhagavadgîtâ, about which any such consensus can be said to
exist. The conclusions arrived at in this Introduction must, therefore, be
distinctly
p. 2
understood to embody individual opinions only, and must be taken accordingly for
what they are worth.
The full name of the work is Bhagavadgîtâ. In common parlance, we often
abbreviate the name into Gîtâ, and in Sanskrit literature the name occurs in
both forms. In the works of Sankarâkârya, quotations from the Gîtâ are
introduced, sometimes with the words 'In the Gîtâ,' or 'In the Bhagavadgîtâ,'
and sometimes with words which may be rendered 'In the Gîtâs,' the plural form
being used 1. In the colophons to the MSS. of the work, the form current,
apparently throughout India, is, 'In the Upanishads sung (Gîtâs) by the Deity.'
Sankarâkârya, indeed, sometimes calls it the Îsvara Gîtâ 2, which, I believe, is
the specific title of a different work altogether. The signification, however,
of the two names is identical, namely, the song sung by the Deity, or, as
Wilkins translates it, the Divine Lay.
This Divine Lay forms part of the Bhîshma Parvan of the Mahâbhârata--one of the
two well-known national epics of India. The Gîtâ gives its name to a subdivision
of the Bhîshma Parvan, which is called the Bhagavadgîtâ Parvan, and which
includes, in addition to the eighteen chapters of which the Gîtâ consists,
twelve other chapters. Upon this the question has naturally arisen, Is the Gîtâ
a genuine portion of the Mahâbhârata, or is it a later addition? The question is
one of considerable difficulty. But I cannot help saying, that the manner in
which it has been generally dealt with is not altogether satisfactory to my
mind. Before going any further into that question, however, it is desirable to
state some of the facts on which the decision must be based. It appears, then,
that the royal family of Hastinâpura was divided into two branches; the one
called the Kauravas, and the other the Pândavas. The former wished to keep the
latter out of the share of the kingdom claimed by them; and so, after many
attempts at
p. 3
an amicable arrangement had proved fruitless, it was determined to decide the
differences between the two parties by the arbitrament of arms. Each party
accordingly collected its adherents, and the hostile armies met on the 'holy
field of Kurukshetra,' I mentioned in the opening lines of our poem. At this
juncture, Krishna Dvaipâyana, alias Vyâsa, a relative of both parties and
endowed with more than human powers, presents himself before Dhritarâshtra, the
father of the Kauravas, who is stated to be altogether blind. Vyâsa asks
Dhritarâshtra whether it is his wish to look with his own eyes on the course of
the battle; and on Dhritarâshtra's expressing his reluctance, Vyâsa deputes one
Sañgaya to relate to Dhritarâshtra all the events of the battle, giving to
Sañgaya, by means of his own superhuman powers, all necessary aids for
performing the duty. Then the battle begins, and after a ten days' struggle, the
first great general of the Kauravas, namely Bhîshma, falls 1. At this point
Sañgaya comes up to Dhritarâshtra, and announces to him the sad result, which is
of course a great blow to his party. Dhritarâshtra then makes numerous enquiries
of Sañgaya regarding the course of the conflict, all of which Sañgaya duly
answers. And among his earliest answers is the account of the conversation
between Krishna and Arguna at the commencement of the battle, which constitutes
the Bhagavadgîtâ. After relating to Dhritarâshtra that 'wonderful and holy
dialogue,' and after giving an account of what occurred in the intervals of the
conversation, Sañgaya proceeds to narrate the actual events of the battle.
With this rough outline. of the framework of the story before us, we are now in
a, position to consider the opposing arguments on the point above noted. Mr.
Talboys Wheeler writes on that point as follows 2. 'But there remains one other
anomalous characteristic of the history of the great war, as it is recorded in
the Mahâbhârata, which cannot
p. 4
be passed over in silence; and that is the extraordinary abruptness and
infelicity with which Brahmanical discourses, such as essays on law, on morals,
sermons on divine things, and even instruction in the so-called sciences are
recklessly grafted upon the main narrative.... Krishna and Arguna on the morning
of the first day of the war, when both armies are drawn out in battle-array, and
hostilities are about to begin, enter into a long and philosophical dialogue
respecting the various forms of devotion which lead to the emancipation of the
soul; and it cannot be denied that, however incongruous and irrelevant such a
dialogue must appear on the eve of battle, the discourse of Krishna, whilst
acting as the charioteer of Arguna, contains the essence of the most spiritual
phases of Brahmanical teaching, and is expressed in language of such depth and
sublimity, that it has become deservedly known as the Bhagavad-gîtâ or Divine
Song. . . . Indeed no effort has been spared by the Brahmanical compilers to
convert the history of the great war into a vehicle for Brahmanical teaching;
and so skilfully are many of these interpolations interwoven with the story,
that it is frequently impossible to narrate the one, without referring to the
other, however irrelevant the matter may be to the main subject in hand.' It
appears to me, I own, very difficult to accept that as a satisfactory argument,
amounting, as it does, to no more than this--that 'interpolations,' which must
needs be referred to in narrating the main story even to make it intelligible,
are nevertheless to be regarded 'as evidently the product of a Brahmanical age
1,' and presumably also a later age, because, forsooth, they are irrelevant and
incongruous according to the 'tastes and ideas 1'--not of the time, be it
remembered, when the 'main story' is supposed to have been written, but--of this
enlightened nineteenth century. The support, too, which may be supposed to be
derived by this argument from the allegation that there has been an attempt to
Brahmanize, so to say, the
p. 5
history of the great war, appears to me to be extremely weak, so far as the Gîtâ
is concerned. But that is a point which will have to be considered more at large
in the sequel 1.
While, however, I am not prepared to admit the cogency of Mr. Wheeler's
arguments, I am not, on the other hand, to be understood as holding that the
Gîtâ must be accepted as a genuine part of the original Mahâbhârata. I own that
my feeling on the subject is something akin to that of the great historian of
Greece regarding the Homeric question, a feeling of painful diffidence regarding
the soundness of any conclusion whatever. While it is impossible not to feel
serious doubts about the critical condition of the Mahâbhârata generally; while,
indeed, we may be almost certain that the work has been tampered with from time
to time 2; it is difficult to come to a satisfactory conclusion regarding any
particular given section of it. And it must be remembered, also, that the
alternatives for us to choose from in these cases are not only these two, that
the section in question may be a genuine part of the work, or that it may be a
later interpolation: but also this, as suggested recently, though not for the
first time, by Mr. Freeman 3 with reference to the Homeric question, that the
section may have been in existence at the date of the original epos, and may
have been worked by the author of the epos into his own production. For that
absence of dread, 'either of the law or sentiment of copyright,' which Mr.
Freeman relies upon with regard to a primitive Greek poet, was by no means
confined to the Greek people, but may be traced amongst us also. The commentator
Madhusûdana Sarasvatî likens the Gîtâ to those dialogues which occur in sundry
Vedic works, particularly the Upanishads 4. Possibly--I will not use a stronger
word--possibly the Gîtâ may
p. 6
have existed as such a dialogue before the Mahâbhârata, and may have been
appropriated by the author of the Mahâbhârata to his own purposes 1. But yet,
upon the whole, having regard to the fact that those ideas of unity on which Mr.
Wheeler and others set so much store are scarcely appropriate to our old
literature; to the fact that the Gîtâ fits pretty well into the setting given to
it in the Bhîshma Parvan; to the fact that the feeling of Arguna, which gives
occasion to it, is not at all inconsistent, but is most consonant, with poetical
justice; to the fact that there is not in the Gîtâ, in my judgment, any trace of
a sectarian or 'Brahmanizing' spirit 2, such as Mr. Wheeler and also the late
Professor Goldstücker 3 hold to have animated the arrangers of the Mahâbhârata;
having regard, I say, to all these facts, I am prepared to adhere, I will not
say without diffidence, to the theory of the genuineness of the Bhagavadgîtâ as
a portion of the original Mahâbhârata.
The next point to consider is as to the authorship of the Gîtâ. The popular
notion on this subject is pretty well known. The whole of the Mahâbhârata is, by
our traditions, attributed to Vyâsa, whom we have already noticed as a relative
of the Kauravas and Pândavas; and therefore the Bhagavadgîtâ, also, is naturally
affiliated to the same author. The earliest written testimony to this
authorship, that I can trace, is to be found in Sankarâkârya's commentary on the
Gîtâ 4 itself and on the Brihadâranyakopanishad 5. To a certain extent, the
mention of Vyâsa in the body of the Gîtâ would, from a historic standpoint, seem
to militate against this tradition. But I have not seen in any of the
commentaries to which I have had access, any consideration of this point, as
there is of the mention in some
p. 7
Smritis and Sûtras of the names of those to whom those Smritis and Sûtras are
respectively ascribed 1.
We must now leave these preliminary questions, unluckily in a state far from
satisfactory, and proceed to that most important topic--the date when the Gîtâ
was composed, and the position it occupies in Sanskrit literature. We have here
to consider the external evidence bearing on these points, which is
tantalizingly meagre; and the internal evidence, which is, perhaps, somewhat
more full. And taking first the internal evidence, the various items falling
under that head may be marshalled into four groups. Firstly, we have to consider
the general character of the Gîtâ with reference to its mode of handling its
subject. Secondly, there is the character of its style and language. Thirdly, we
have to consider the nature of the versification of the Gîtâ. And fourthly and
lastly, we must take note of sundry points of detail, such as the attitude of
the Gîtâ towards the Vedas and towards caste, its allusions to other systems of
speculation, and other matters of the like nature. On each of these groups, in
the order here stated, we now proceed to make a few observations.
And first about the manner in which the Gîtâ deals with its subject. It appears
to me, that the work bears on the face of it very plain marks indicating that it
belongs to an age prior to the system-making age of Sanskrit philosophy In 1875,
I wrote as follows upon this point: 'My view is, that in the Gîtâ and the
Upanishads, the philosophical part has not been consistently and fully worked
out. We have there the results of free thought, exercised on different subjects
of great moment, unfettered by the exigencies of any foregone conclusions, or of
any fully developed theory. It is afterwards, it is at a later stage of
philosophical progress, that system-making arises. In that stage some thinkers
interpret whole works by the light of some particular doctrines or expressions.
And the result is the development of a whole multitude of philosophical sects,
following the lead of those thinkers, and all professing to draw their
p. 8
doctrine from the Gîtâ or the Upanishads, yet each differing remarkably from the
other 1.' Since this was written, Professor Max Müller's Hibbert Lectures have
been published. And I am happy to find, that as regards the Upanishads, his view
coincides exactly with that which I have expressed in the words now quoted.
Professor Max Müller says: 'There is not what may be called a philosophical
system in these Upanishads. They are in the true sense of the word guesses at
truth, frequently contradicting each other, yet all tending in one direction 2.'
Further corroboration for the same view is also forthcoming. Professor
Fitz-Edward Hall, in a passage which I had not noticed before, says 3: 'In the
Upanishads, the Bhagavadgîtâ, and other ancient Hindu books, we encounter, in
combination, the doctrines which, after having been subjected to modifications
that rendered them as wholes irreconcileable, were distinguished, at an
uncertain period, into what have for many ages been styled the Sânkhya and the
Vedânta.' We have thus very weighty authority for adhering to the view already
expressed on this important topic. But as Professor Weber appears to have
expressed an opinion 4 intended perhaps to throw some doubt on the correctness
of that view, it is desirable to go a little more into detail to fortify it by
actual reference to the contents of the Gîtâ, the more especially as we can thus
elucidate the true character of that work. Before doing so, however, it may be
pointed out, that the proposition we have laid down is one, the test of which
lies more in a comprehensive review of the whole of the Gîtâ, than in the
investigation of small details on which there is necessarily much room for
difference of opinion.
And first, let us compare that indisputably systematized work, the current
Yoga-sûtras 5, with the Bhagavadgîtâ on one
p. 9
or two topics, where they both travel over common ground. In the Gîtâ, chapter
VI, stanzas 33, 34 (p. 71), we have Arguna putting what is, in substance, a
question to Krishna, as to how the mind, which is admittedly 'fickle,
boisterous, strong, and obstinate,' is to be brought under control--such control
having been declared by Krishna to be necessary for attaining devotion (yoga)?
Krishna answers by saying that the mind may be restrained by 'practice (abhyâsa)
and indifference to worldly objects (vairâgya).' He then goes on to say, that
devotion cannot be attained without self-restraint, but that one who has
self-restraint, and works to achieve devotion, may succeed in acquiring it. Here
the subject drops. There is no further explanation of 'practice' or
'indifference to worldly objects,' no exposition of the mode in which they work,
and so forth. Contrast now the Yoga-sûtras. The topic is there discussed at the
very outset of the work. As usual the author begins with 'Now therefore the Yoga
is to be taught.' He then explains Yoga by the well-known definition 'Yoga is
the restraint of the movements of the mind.' And then after pointing out what
the movements of the mind are, he proceeds: 'Their restraint is by means of
practice and indifference to worldly objects 1,'--the very terms, be it remarked
in passing, which are used in the Bhagavadgîtâ. But having come thus far, the
author of the Sûtras does not drop the subject as the author of the Gîtâ does.
He goes on in this wise: Practice is the effort for keeping it steady.' 'And
that becomes firmly grounded when resorted to for a long time, without
interruption, and with correct conduct.' So far we have a discussion of the
first requisite specified, namely, practice. Patañgali then goes on to his
second requisite for mental restraint. 'Indifference to worldly objects is the
consciousness of having subdued desires &c. (Vasikâra sañgñâ) which belongs to
one having no longing for objects visible and those which are heard of' (from
Sâstras &c., such as heaven and so forth).
p. 10
He next proceeds to distinguish another and higher species of 'indifference,'
and then he goes on to point out the results of that self-restraint which is to
be acquired in the mode he has expounded. That is one instance. Now take
another. In chapter VI, stanza 10 and following stanzas, the Gîtâ sets forth
elaborately the mode of practically achieving. the mental abstraction called
Yoga. It need not be reproduced here. The reader can readily find out how sundry
directions are there given for the purpose specified, but without any attempt at
systematizing. Contrast the Yoga-sûtras. In the Sâdhanapâda, the section
treating of the acquisition of Yoga, Patañgali states in the twenty-ninth
aphorism the well-known eight elements of Yoga. Then he subdivides these
elements, and expatiates on each of them distinctly, defining them, indicating
the mode of acquiring them, and hinting at the results which flow from them.
'That inordinate love of subdivision,' which Dr. F. E. Hall 1 has somewhere
attributed to the Hindus, appears plainly in these aphorisms, while there is not
a trace of it in the corresponding passage in the Bhagavadgîtâ. In my opinion,
therefore, these comparisons strongly corroborate the proposition we have laid
down regarding the unsystematic, or rather non-systematic, character of the
work. In the one we have definition, classification, division, and subdivision.
In the other we have a set of practical directions, without any attempt to
arrange them in any very scientific order. In the one you have a set of
technical terms with specific significations. In the other no such precision is
yet manifest. In one word, you have in the Gîtâ the germs, and noteworthy germs
too, of a system 2, and you have most of the raw material of a system, but you
have no system ready-made.
Let us look at the matter now from a slightly different point of view. There are
sundry words used in the Bhagavadgîtâ, the significations of which are not quite
identical
p. 11
throughout the work. Take, for instance, the word 'yoga,' which we have rendered
'devotion.' At Gîtâ, chapter II, stanza 48 (p. 49), a definition is given of
that word. In chapter VI, the signification it bears is entirely different. And
again in chapter IX, stanza 5, there is still another sense in which the word is
used 1. The word 'Brahman' too occurs in widely varying significations. And one
of its meanings, indeed, is quite singular, namely, 'Nature' (see chapter XIV,
stanza 3). Similar observations, to a greater or less extent, apply to the words
Buddhi, Âtman, and Svabhâva 2. Now these are words which stand for ideas not
unimportant in the philosophy of the Bhagavadgîtâ. And the absence of scientific
precision about their use appears to me to be some indication of that
non-systematic character of which we have already spoken.
There is one other line of argument, which leads, I think, to the same
conclusion. There are several passages in the Gîtâ which it is not very easy to
reconcile with one another; and no attempt is made to harmonise them. Thus, for
example, in stanza 16 of chapter VII, Krishna divides his devotees into four
classes, one of which consists of 'men of knowledge,' whom, Krishna says, he
considers 'as his own self.' It would probably be difficult to imagine any
expression which could indicate higher esteem. Yet in stanza 46 of chapter VI,
we have it laid down, that the devotee is superior not only to the mere
performer of penances, but even to the men of knowledge. The commentators betray
their gnostic bias by interpreting 'men of knowledge' in this latter passage to
mean those who have acquired erudition in the Sâstras and their significations.
This is not an interpretation to be necessarily rejected. But there is in it a
certain twisting of words, which, under the circumstances here, I am not
inclined to accept. And on the other hand, it must not be forgotten, that the
implication fairly derivable from chapter IV, stanza 38 (pp. 62, 63), would seem
to
p. 12
be rather that knowledge is superior to devotion--is the higher stage to be
reached by means of devotion as the stepping-stone. In another passage again at
Gîtâ, chapter XII, stanza 12, concentration is preferred to knowledge, which
also seems to me to be irreconcileable with chapter VII, stanza 16. Take still
another instance. At Gîtâ, chapter V, stanza 15, it is said, that 'the Lord
receives the sin or merit of none.' Yet at chapter V, stanza 29, and again at
chapter IX, stanza 24, Krishna calls himself 'the Lord and enjoyer' of all
sacrifices and penances. How, it may well be asked, can the Supreme Being
'enjoy' that which he does not even receive?' Once more, at chapter X, stanza
29, Krishna declares that 'none is hateful to me, none dear.' And yet the
remarkable verses at the close of chapter XII seem to stand in point-blank
contradiction to that declaration. There through a most elaborate series of
stanzas, the burden of Krishna's eloquent sermon is 'such a one is dear to me.'
And again in those fine verses, where Krishna winds up his Divine Lay, he
similarly tells Arguna, that he, Arguna, is 'dear' to Krishna. And Krishna also
speaks of that devotee as 'dear' to him, who may publish the Mystery of the Gîtâ
among those who reverence the Supreme Being 1. And yet again, how are we to
reconcile the same passage about none being 'hateful or dear' to Krishna, with
his own words at chapter XVI, stanza 18 and following stanzas? The language used
in describing the 'demoniac' people there mentioned is not remarkable for
sweetness towards them, while Krishna says positively, 'I hurl down such people
into demoniac wombs, whereby they go down into misery and the vilest condition.'
These persons are scarcely characterised with accuracy 'as neither hateful nor
dear' to Krishna. It seems to me, that all these are real inconsistencies in the
Gîtâ, not such, perhaps, as might not be explained away, but such, I think, as
indicate a mind making guesses at truth., as Professor Max Müller puts it,
rather than a mind elaborating a complete
p. 13
and organised system of philosophy. There is not even a trace of consciousness
on the part of the author that these inconsistencies exist. And the contexts of
the various passages indicate, in my judgment, that a half-truth is struck out
here, and another half-truth there, with special reference to the special
subject then under discussion; but no attempt is made to organise the various
half-truths, which are apparently incompatible, into a symmetrical whole, where
the apparent inconsistencies might possibly vanish altogether in the higher
synthesis. And having regard to these various points, and to the further point,
that the sequence of ideas throughout the verses of the Gîtâ is not always
easily followed, we are, I think, safe in adhering to the opinion expressed
above, that the Gîtâ is a nonsystematic work, and in that respect belongs to the
same class as the older Upanishads.
We next come to the consideration of the style and language of the Bhagavadgîtâ.
And that, I think, furnishes a strong argument for the proposition, that it
belongs to an age considerably prior to the epoch of the artificial department
of Sanskrit literature--the epoch, namely, of the dramas and poems. In its
general character, the style impresses me as quite archaic in its simplicity.
Compounds, properly so called, are not numerous; such as there are, are not long
ones, and very rarely, if ever, present any puzzle in analysing. The contrast
there presented with what is called the classical literature, as represented by
Bâna or Dandin, or even Kâlidâsa, is not a little striking. In Kâlidâsa,
doubtless, the love for compounds is pretty well subdued, though I think his
works have a perceptibly larger proportion of them than the Gîtâ. But after
Kâlidâsa the love for compounds goes through a remarkable development, till in
later writings it may be said almost to have gone mad. Even in Bâna and Dandin,
Subandhu and Bhavabhûti, the plethora of compounds is often wearisome. And the
same remark applies to many of the copperplate and other inscriptions which have
been recently deciphered, and some of which date from the early centuries
p. 14
of the Christian era. Take again the exuberance of figures and tropes which is
so marked in the classical style. There is little or nothing of that in the
Gîtâ, where you have a plain and direct style of natural simplicity, and yet a
style not by any means devoid of æsthetic merit like the style of the Sûtra
literature. There is also an almost complete absence of involved syntactical
constructions; no attempt to secure that jingle of like sounds, which 'seems to
have proved a temptation too strong even for Kâlidâsa's muse entirely to resist.
But on the contrary, we have those repetitions of words and phrases, which are
characteristic, and not only in Sanskrit, of the style of an archaic period 1.
Adverting specially to the language as distinguished from the style of the Gîtâ,
we find such words as Anta, Bhâshâ, Brahman, some of which are collected in the
Sanskrit Index in this volume, which have gone out of use in the classical
literature in the significations they respectively bear in the Gîtâ. The word
'ha,' which occurs once, is worthy of special note. It is the equivalent of
'gha,' which occurs in the Vedic Samhitâs. In the form 'ha' it occurs in the
Brâhmanas. But it never occurs, I think, in what is properly called the
classical literature. It is, indeed, found in the Purânas. But that is a class
of works which occupies a very unique position. There is a good deal in the
Purânas that, I think, must be admitted to be very ancient 2; while undoubtedly
also there is a great deal in them that is very modern. It is, therefore,
impossible to treat the use of 'ha' in that class of works as negativing an
inference of the antiquity of any book where the word occurs; while its use in
Vedic works and its total absence from modern works indicate such antiquity
pretty strongly. We may, therefore, embody the result of this part of the
discussion in the proposition, that
p. 15
the Gîtâ is removed by a considerable linguistic and chronological distance from
classical Sanskrit literature. And so far as it goes, this proposition agrees
with the result of our investigation of the first branch of internal evidence.
The next branch of that evidence brings us to the character of the versification
of the Gîtâ. Here, again, a survey of Sanskrit verse generally, and the verse of
the Gîtâ in particular, leads us to a conclusion regarding the position of the
Gîtâ in Sanskrit literature, which is in strict accord with the conclusions we
have already drawn. In the verse of the Vedic Samhitâs, there is almost nothing
like a rigidly fixed scheme of versification, no particular collocation of long
and short syllables is absolutely necessary. If we attempt to chant them in the
mode in which classical Sanskrit verse is chanted, we invariably come across
lines where the chanting cannot be smooth. If we come next to the versification
of the Upanishads, we observe some progress made towards such fixity of scheme
as we have alluded to above. Though there are still numerous lines, which cannot
be smoothly chanted, there are, on the other hand, a not altogether
inconsiderable number which can be smoothly chanted. In the Bhagavadgîtâ a still
further advance, though a slight one, may, I think, be marked. A visibly larger
proportion of the stanzas in the Gîtâ conform to the metrical schemes as laid
down by the writers on prosody, though there are still sundry verses which do
not so conform, and cannot, accordingly, be chanted in the regular way. Lastly,
we come to the Kâvyas and Nâtakas--the classical literature. And here in
practice we find everywhere a most inflexible rigidity of scheme, while the
theory is laid down in a rule which says, that 'even mâsha may be changed to
masha, but a break of metre should be avoided.' This survey of Sanskrit verse
may, I think, be fairly treated as showing, that adhesion to the metrical
schemes is one test of the chronological position of a work--the later the work,
the more undeviating is such adhesion. I need not stay here to point out, how
this view receives corroboration from the rules given on this subject in the
standard work
p. 16
of Pingala on the Khandas Sâstra. I will only conclude this point by saying,
that the argument from the versification of the Gîtâ, so far as it goes,
indicates its position as being prior to the classical literature, and nearly
contemporaneous with the Upanishad literature.
We now proceed to investigate the last-group of facts falling under the head of
internal evidence, as mentioned above. And first as regards the attitude of the
Gîtâ towards the Vedas. If we examine all the passages in the Gîtâ, in which
reference is made to the Vedas, the aggregate result appears to be, that the
author of the Gîtâ does not throw the Vedas entirely overboard. He feels and
expresses reverence for them, only that reverence is of a somewhat special
character. He says in effect, that the precepts of the Vedas are suitable to a
certain class of people, of a certain intellectual and spiritual status, so to
say. So far their authority is unimpeached. But if the unwise sticklers for the
authority of the Vedas claim anything more for them than this, then the author
of the Gîtâ holds them to be wrong. He contends, on the contrary, that acting
upon the ordinances of the Vedas is an obstacle to the attainment of the summum
bonum 1. Compare this with the doctrine of the Upanishads. The coincidence
appears to me to be most noteworthy. In one of his recent lectures, Professor
Max Müller uses the following eloquent language regarding the Upanishads 2:
'Lastly come the Upanishads; and what is their object? To show the utter
uselessness, nay, the mischievousness of all ritual performances (compare our
Gîtâ, pp. 47, 48, 84 3); to condemn every sacrificial act which has for its
motive a desire or hope of reward (comp. Gîtâ, p. 119 4); to deny, if not the
existence, at least the exceptional and exalted character of the Devas (comp.
Gîtâ, pp. 76-84 5); and to teach that there is no hope of salvation and
deliverance except by the individual self recognising the true and universal
self, and finding rest there, where alone rest can be found 6' (comp. our Gîtâ
Translation, pp. 78-83).
p. 17
The passages to which I have given references in brackets will show, that
Professor Max Müller's words might all be used with strict accuracy regarding
the essential teaching of the Bhagavadgîtâ. We have here, therefore, another
strong circumstance in favour of grouping the Gîtâ with the Upanishads. One more
point is worthy of note. Wherever the Gîtâ refers to the Vedas in the somewhat
disparaging manner I have noted, no distinction is taken between the portion
whi.ch relates to the ritual and the portion which relates to that higher
science, viz. the science of the soul, which Sanatkumâri speaks of in his famous
dialogue with Nârada 1. At Gîtâ, chapter II, stanza 45, Arguna is told that the
Vedas relate only to the effects of the three qualities, which effects Arguna is
instructed to overcome. At Gîtâ, chapter VI, stanza 44, Arguna is told that he
who has acquired some little devotion, and then exerts himself for further
progress, rises above the Divine word--the Vedas. And there are also one or two
other passages of the like nature. They all treat the Vedas as concerned with
ritual alone. They make no reference to any portion of the Vedas dealing with
the higher knowledge. If the word Vedânta, at Gîtâ, chapter XV, stanza 15 (p.
113), signifies, as it seems to signify, this latter portion of the Vedas, then
that is the only allusion to it. But, from all the passages in the Gîtâ which
refer to the Vedas, I am inclined to draw the inference, that the Upanishads of
the Vedas, were composed at a time not far removed from the time of the
composition of the Gîtâ, and that at that period the Upanishads had not yet
risen to the position of high importance which they afterwards commanded. In the
passage referred to at chapter XV, the word Vedântas probably signifies the
Âranyakas, which may be regarded as marking the beginning of the epoch, which
the composition of the Upanishads brought to its close. And it is to the close
of this epoch, that I would assign the birth of the Gîtâ, which is
p. 18
probably one of the youngest members of the group to which it belongs.
It appears to me, that this conclusion is corroborated by the fact that a few
stanzas in the Gîtâ are identical with some stanzas in some of the Upanishads.
With regard to the epic age of Greece, Mr. E. A. Freeman has said that, in
carrying ourselves back to that age, 'we must cast aside all the notions with
which we are familiar in our own age about property legal or moral in literary
compositions. It is plain that there were phrases, epithets, whole lines, which
were the common property of the whole epic school of poetry 1.' It appears to me
that we must accept this proposition as equally applicable to the early days of
Sanskrit literature, having regard to the common passages which we meet with in
sundry of the Vedic works, and also sometimes, I believe, in the different
Purânas. If this view is correct, then the fact that the Gîtâ contains some
stanzas in the very words which we meet with in some of the Upanishads,
indicates, to my mind, that the conclusion already drawn from other data about
the position of the Gîtâ with regard to the Upanishads, is not by any means
unwarranted, but one to which the facts before us rather seem to point.
And here we may proceed to draw attention to another fact connected with the
relation of the Gîtâ to the Vedas. In stanza 17 of the ninth chapter of the
Gîtâ, only Rik, Sâman, and Yagus are mentioned. The Atharva-veda is not referred
to at all. This omission does certainly seem a very noteworthy one. For it is in
a passage where the Supreme Being is identifying himself with everything, and
where, therefore, the fourth Veda might fairly be expected to be mentioned. I
may add that in commenting on Sankarâkârya's remarks on this passage, Ânandagiri
(and Madhusûdana Sarasvatî also)seems evidently to have been conscious of the
possible force of this omission of the Atharva-veda. He accordingly says that by
force of the word 'and' in the verse in question, the Atharvângirasas, or
Atharva-veda must
p. 19
also be included. Are we at liberty to infer from this, that the Atharva-veda
did not exist in the days when the Gîtâ was composed? The explanation ordinarily
given for the omission of that Veda, where such omission occurs, namely, that it
is not of any use in ordinary sacrificial matters, is one which can scarcely
have any force in the present instance; though it is adequate, perhaps, to
explain the words 'those who know the three branches of knowledge,' which occur
only a few lines after the verse now under consideration. The commentators
render no further help than has been already stated. Upon the whole, however,
while I am not yet quite prepared to say, that the priority of the Gîtâ, even to
the recognition of the Atharva-veda as a real Veda, may be fairly inferred from
the passage in question, I think that the passage is noteworthy as pointing in
that direction. But further data in explanation of the omission referred to must
be awaited.
If the conclusions here indicated about the relative positions of the Gîtâ and
certain Vedic works are correct, we can fairly take the second century B. C. as
a terminus before which the Gîtâ must have been composed. For the Upanishads are
mentioned in the Mahâbhâshya of Patañgali, which we are probably safe in
assigning to the middle of that century. The epoch of the older Upanishads,
therefore, to which reference has been so frequently made here, may well be
placed at some period prior to the beginning of the second century B. C. The
Atharva-veda is likewise mentioned by Patañgali 1, and as 'ninefold,' too, be it
remembered; so that if we are entitled to draw the conclusion which has been
mentioned above from chapter IX, stanza 17, we come to the same period for the
date of the Gîtâ. Another point to note in this connexion is the reference to
the Sâma-veda as the best of the Vedas (see p. 88). That is a fact which seems
to be capable of yielding some chronological information. For the estimation in
which that Veda has been held appears to have varied at different times. Thus,
in the Aitareya-brâhmana 2, the glory
p. 20
of the Sâman is declared to be higher than that of the Rik, In the
Khândogya-upanishad 1 the Sâman is said to be the essence of the Rik, which
Sankara interprets by saying that the Sâman is more weighty, In the
Prasna-upanishad 2, too, the implication of the passage V, 5 (in which the Sâman
is stated as the guide to the Brahmaloka, while the Yagus is said to guide to
the lunar world, and the Rik to the, human world) is to the same effect. And we
may also mention as on the same side the Nrisimha Tâpinî-upanishad and the Vedic
passage cited in the commentary of, Sankara on the closing sentence of the first
khanda of that Upanishad 3. On the other side, we have the statement in Manu
that the sound of the Sâma-veda is unholy; and the consequent direction that
where the sound of it is heard, the Rik and Yagus should not be recited 4. We
have also the passages from some of the Purânas noted by Dr. Muir in his
excellent work, Original Sanskrit Texts, which point in the same direction 5.
And we have further the direction in the Âpastamba Dharma-sûtra, that the Sâman
hymns should not be recited where the other Vedas are being recited 6, as well
as the grouping of the sound of the Sâman with various classes of objectionable
and unholy noises, such as those of dogs and asses. It is pretty evident that
the view of Âpastamba is based on the same theory as that of Manu. Now in
looking at the two classes of authorities thus marshalled, it is plain that the
Gîtâ ranges itself with those which are unquestionably the more ancient. And
among the less ancient works, prior to which we may place the Gîtâ on account of
the facts now under consideration, are Manu and Âpastamba. Now Manu's date is
not ascertained, though, I believe, he is now generally considered to belong to
about the second or third century B. C. 7 But . I
p. 21
Dr. Bühler, in the Preface to his Âpastamba in the present series, has adduced
good reasons for holding that Âpastamba is prior to the third century B. C. 1,
and we therefore obtain that as a point of time prior to which the Gîtâ must
have been composed.
The next important item of internal evidence which we have to note, is the view
taken of caste in the Bhagavadgîtâ. Here, again, a comparison of the doctrine of
the Gîtâ with the conception of caste in Manu and Âpastamba is interesting and
instructive. The view of Manu has been already contrasted by me with the Gîtâ in
another place 2. I do not propose to dwell on that point here, as the date of
Manu is far from being satisfactorily ascertained. I prefer now to take up
Âpastamba only, whose date, as just now stated, is fairly well fixed by Dr.
Bühler. The division of castes, then, is twice referred to in the Bhagavadgîtâ.
In the first passage (p. 59) it is stated, that the division rests on
differences of qualities and duties; in the second (pp. 126, 127) the various
duties are distinctly stated according to the differences of qualities. Now in
the first place, noting as we pass along, that there is nothing in the Gîtâ to
indicate whether caste was hereditary, according to its view, whereas Âpastamba
distinctly states it to be such, let us compare the second passage of the Gîtâ
with the Sûtras of Âpastamba bearing on the point. The view enunciated in the
Gîtâ appears to me plainly to belong to an earlier age--to an age of
considerably less advancement in social and religious development. In the Gîtâ,
for instance, the duties of a Brâhmana are said to be tranquillity,
self-restraint, and so forth. In Âpastamba, they are the famous six duties,
namely, study, imparting instruction, sacrificing, officiating at others'
sacrifices, making gifts, and receiving gifts; and three others, namely,
inheritance, occupancy, and gleaning ears of corn, which, it may be remarked en
passant, are not stated in Manu. The former seem to my mind to point
p. 22
to the age when the qualities which in early times gave the Brâhmanas their
pre-eminence in Hindu society were still a living reality 1. It will be noted,
too, that there is nothing in that list of duties which has any necessary or
natural connexion with any privilege as belonging to the caste. The Law lays
down these duties, in the true sense of the word. In Âpastamba, on the contrary,
we see an advance towards the later view on both points. You have no reference
to moral and religious qualities now. You have to do with ceremonies and acts.
You have under the head 'duties not mere obligations, but rights. For the duty
of receiving gifts is a right, and so is the duty of teaching others and
officiating at others' sacrifices; as we know not merely from the subsequent
course of events, but also from a comparison of the duties of Brâhmanas on the
one hand, and Kshatriyas, Vaisyas, and Sûdras on the other, as laid down by Manu
and Âpastamba themselves. Âpastamba's rules, therefore, appear to belong to the
time when the Brâhmanas had long been an established power, and were assuming to
themselves those valuable privileges which they have always claimed in later
times. The rules of the Gîtâ, on the other hand, point to a time considerably
prior to this--to a time when the Brâhmanas were by their moral and intellectual
qualities laying the foundation of that preeminence in Hindu society which
afterwards enabled them to lord it over all castes. These observations mutatis
mutandis apply to the rules regarding. the other castes also. Here again, while
the Gîtâ still insists on the inner qualities, which properly constitute the
military profession, for instance, the rules of Âpastamba indicate the powerful
influence of the Brâhmanas 2. For, as stated before, officiating at others'
sacrifices, instructing others, and receiving presents, are here expressly
prohibited to Kshatriyas as also to Vaisyas. The result of that is, that the
Brâhmanas become indispensable to the Kshatriyas and Vaisyas, for
p. 23
upon both the duty of study, of offering sacrifices, and making gifts and
presents is inculcated. In his outline of the History of Ancient Religions,
Professor Tiele, speaking of the 'increasing influence of the Brâhmans,' writes
as follows: 'Subject at first to the princes and nobles, and dependent on them,
they began by insinuating themselves into their favour, and representing it as a
religious duty to show protection and liberality towards them. Meanwhile they
endeavoured to make themselves indispensable to them, gradually acquired the
sole right to conduct public worship, and made themselves masters of instruction
1'. And after pointing out the high position thus achieved by the Brâhmans, and
the low position of the Kândâlas and others of the inferior castes, he adds:
'Such a position could not long be endured; and this serves to explain not only
the rise of Buddhism, but also its rapid diffusion, and the radical revolution
which it brought about 2.' To proceed, however, with our comparison of the Gîtâ
and Âpastamba. The superiority distinctly claimed by the latter for the Brâhmana
is not quite clearly brought out in the Gîtâ. 'Holy Brâhmanas and devoted royal
saints' are bracketed together at p. 86; while the Kshatriyas are declared to
have been the channel of communication between the Deity and mankind as regards
the great doctrine of devotion propounded by the Bhagavadgîtâ. That indicates a
position for the Kshatriyas much more like what the Upanishads disclose 3, than
even that which Âpastamba assigns to them. The fact is further noteworthy, that
in the Gîtâ each caste has its own entirely distinct set of duties. There is no
overlapping, so to say. And that is a circumstance indicating a very early stage
in the development of the institution 4. Besides, as already indicated,
p. 24
the duties laid down by Âpastamba and Manu as common to Kshatriyas and Vaisyas
are the very duties which make those castes dependent to a very great extent on
the Brâhmanas. Lastly, it is not altogether unworthy of note, that in the
elaborate specification of the best of every species which we find in chapter X,
the Brâhmana is not mentioned as the best of the castes, there is nothing to
indicate the notion contained in the well-known later verse, 'The Brâhmana is
the head of the castes.' On the contrary, the ruler of men is specified as the
highest among men 1, indicating, perhaps, a state of society such as that
described at the beginning of the extract from Professor Tiele's work quoted
above.
We come now to another point. What is the position of the Gîtâ in regard to the
great reform of Sâkya Muni, The question is one of much interest, having regard
particularly to the remarkable coincidences between Buddhistic doctrines and the
doctrines of the Gîtâ to which we have drawn attention in the foot-notes to our
translation. But the materials for deciding the question are unhappily not
forthcoming. Professor Wilson, indeed, thought that there was an allusion to
Buddhism in the Gîtâ 2. But his idea was based on a confusion between the
Buddhists and the Kârvâkas or materialists 3. Failing that allusion, we have
nothing very tangible but the unsatisfactory 'negative argument' based on mere
non-mention of Buddhism in the Gîtâ. That argument is not quite satisfactory to
my own mind, although, as I have elsewhere pointed out 4, some of the ground
occupied by the Gîtâ is common to it with Buddhism, and although various
previous thinkers Are alluded to directly or indirectly in the Gîtâ. There is,
however, one view of the facts of this question, which appears to me to
corroborate the conclusion deducible by means of the negative argument here
referred to. The
p. 25
main points on which Buddha's protest against Brahmanism rests seem to be the
true authority of the Vedas and the true view of the differences of caste. On
most points of doctrinal speculation, Buddhism is still but one aspect of the
older Brahmanism 1. The various coincidences to which we have drawn attention
show that, if there is need to show it. Well now, on both these points, the
Gîtâ, while it does not go the whole length which Buddha goes, itself embodies a
protest against the views current about the time of its composition. The Gîtâ
does not, like Buddhism, absolutely reject the Vedas, but it shelves them. The
Gîtâ does not totally root out caste. It places caste on a less untenable basis.
One of two hypotheses therefore presents itself as a rational theory of these
facts. Either the Gîtâ and Buddhism were alike the outward manifestation of one
and the same spiritual upheaval which shook to its centre the current religion,
the Gîtâ being the earlier and less thorough-going form of it; or Buddhism
having already begun to tell on Brahmanism, the Gîtâ was an attempt to bolster
it up, so to say, at its least weak points, the weaker ones being altogether
abandoned. I do not accept the latter alternative, because I cannot see any
indication in the Gîtâ of an attempt to compromise with a powerful attack on the
old Hindu system; while the fact that, though strictly orthodox, the author of
the Gîtâ still undermines the authority, as unwisely venerated, of the Vedic
revelation; and the further fact, that in doing this, he is doing what others
also had done before him or about his time; go, in my opinion, a considerable
way towards fortifying the results of the negative argument already set forth.
To me Buddhism is perfectly intelligible as one outcome of that play of thought
on high spiritual topics, which in its other, and as we may say, less
thorough-going manifestations, we see in the Upanishads and the Gîtâ 2. But
assume that Buddhism was
p. 26
a protest against Brahmanism prior to its purification and elevation by the
theosophy of the Upanishads, and those remarkable productions of ancient Indian
thought become difficult to account for. Let us compare our small modem events
with those grand old occurrences. Suppose our ancestors to have been attached to
the ceremonial law of the Vedas, as we are now attached to a lifeless ritualism,
the Upanishads and the Gîtâ might be, in a way, comparable to movements like
that of the late Raja Rammohun Roy. Standing, as far as possible, on the antique
ways, they attempt, as Raja Rammohun attempted in these latter days, to bring
into prominence and to elaborate the higher and nobler aspects of the old
beliefs. Buddhism would be comparable to the further departure from old
traditions which was led by Babu Keshub Chander Sen. The points of dissent in
the olden times were pretty nearly the same as the points of dissent now. The
ultimate motive power also was in both cases identical--a sense of
dissatisfaction in its integrity with what had come down from old times
encrusted with the corruptions of years. In this view the old system, the
philosophy of the Upanishads and the Gîtâ, and the philosophy of Buddha,
constitute a regular intelligible progression. But suppose the turn events took
was different, as is supposed by the alternative theory indicated above. Suppose
Babu Keshub's movement was chronologically prior, and had begun to tell on
orthodox, society. Is it likely, that then one of the orthodox party would take
up the position which Rammohun Roy took? Would he still rely on old authorities,
but with sundry qualifications, and yet earnestly assail the current forms of
orthodoxy? I do not think so. I think the true view to be, as already stated,
very different. The Upanishads, with the Gîtâ, and the precepts of Buddha
p. 27
appear to me to be the successive 1 embodiments of the spiritual thought of the
age, as it became more and more dissatisfied with the system of mere ceremonial
then dominant.
There are several other points of much interest in the Bhagavadgîtâ, such as the
reference to the Sânkhya, and Yoga; the place assigned to the Mârgasîrsha month;
the allusion to the doctrines of materialism; the nearly entire coincidence
between a stanza of the Gîtâ and one in the Manu Smriti. But in the present
state of our knowledge, I do not. think that we can extract any historical
results from any of them. Without dwelling on them any further 2, therefore, I
will only state it as my opinion that the Sânkhya, and Yoga of the Gîtâ are not
identical with the systems known to us under those names, and that the Manu
Smriti has probably borrowed from the Gîtâ the stanza common to the two works.
We now proceed to a discussion of some of the external evidence touching the age
of the Bhagavadgîtâ. It is, of course, unnecessary to consider any evidence of a
date later than the eighth century A. C., that being the date generally
received, though not on very strong grounds, as the date of Sankarâkârya, the
celebrated commentator of the Gîtâ 3 For the period prior to that limit, the
first testimony to consider is that of Bânabhatta, the author of the Kâdambarî.
The date of Bâna is now fairly well settled as the middle of the seventh century
A. C. The doubt which the late Dr. Bhâu Dâjî had cast upon its correctness 4, by
impugning the received date of king Harshavardhana, appears to me to have been
satisfactorily disposed of by the paper of
p. 28
my friend Professor R. G. Bhândârkar on the Kâlukya dates 1. In the Kâdambarî,
then, we have testimony to the existence of the Bhagavadgîtâ in the middle of
the seventh century A. C. For in that work, which, as is well known, abounds
with equivoques, we have a passage which compares the royal palace to the
Mahâbhârata, both being 'Anantagitâkarnanânanditanaram 2,' which, as applied to
the royal palace, means 'in which the people were delighted by hearing
innumerable songs;' and as applied to the Mahâbhârata means 'in which Arguna was
delighted at hearing the Anantagîtâ.' Anantagîtâ is evidently only another name
here for Bhagavadgîtâ. The conclusion deducible from this fact is not merely
that the Gîtâ existed, but that it existed as a recognised portion of the
Bhârata, in the seventh century A. C. Now the Kâdambarî shows, in numerous
passages, in what high esteem the Mahâbhârata was held in its days. The queen
Vilâsavatî used to attend at those readings and expositions of the Mahâbhârata,
which have continued down to our own times; and it was even then regarded as a
sacred work of extremely high authority, in the same way as it is now. It
follows., therefore, that the Gîtâ must have been several centuries old ill the
time of Bânabhatta.
Prior in time to Bâna is the Indian Shakespeare, Kâlidâsa, as he is referred to
in Bânabhatta's Harshakarita 3, and also in a copperplate inscription of the
early part of the seventh century, as a poet who had then already acquired a
high reputation 4. Unfortunately, it is not yet possible to fix exactly the date
at which Kâlidâsa flourished. Still, I think, we have pretty satisfactory
evidence to show that the middle of the fifth century A. C. is the very latest
date to which he can be referred. In a small tract (written by me in 1873),
discussing Professor Weber's theory about the Râmâyana, I have pointed out 5
that the Pañkatantra
p. 29
quotes from Kâlidâsa a passage which there is good reason to believe formed part
of the Pañkatantra when it was translated for king Nushirvan of Persia about the
beginning of the sixth century A. C. 1 Allowing for the time required to raise
Kâlidâsa to the position of being cited as an authority, and for the time
required for the spread of the fame of an Indian work to Persia in those early
days, I think, that the middle of the fifth century is a date to which Kâlidâsa
cannot well have been subsequent. Now in the works of Kâlidâsa we have some very
remarkable allusions to the Bhagavadgîtâ. It is not necessary to go through all
these allusions. I will only mention the most remarkable, one from the
Raghuvamsa, and one from the Kumârasambhava. In Raghu, canto X, stanza 67, the
gods addressing Vishnu say, 'There is nothing for you to acquire which has not
been acquired. The one motive in your birth and work is the good of the worlds.'
The first sentence here reminds one at once of Gîtâ, chapter III, stanza 22, the
coincidence with which in sense as well as expression is very striking. The
second sentence contains the words 'birth and work,' the precise words employed
at Gîtâ IV, 9; and the idea of 'good of the worlds' is identical with the idea
expressed in Gîtâ III, 20-24, the words only in which it is clothed being
different. Couple this passage with the one from Kumârasambhava, canto VI, 67,
where the seven Rishis say to the Himâlaya mountain, 'Well hast thou been called
Vishnu in a firmly-fixed form.' The allusion there to the Gîtâ, chapter X,
stanza 25 (p. 89), is, I venture to think, unmistakable. The word 'firmly-fixed'
is identical in both passages; the idea is identical, and Mallinâtha refers to
the passage in the Gîtâ as the authority which Kâlidâsa had in view. It follows,
therefore, that the Gîtâ must be prior to Kâlidâsa's time. It may be added, that
Kâlidâsa in his Raghu XV, 67, cites Manu as an authority
p. 30
for the proposition that a king must protect all castes and all orders or
âsramas. Manu, therefore, must have lived considerably earlier than Kâlidâsa,
and the Gîtâ, as we have already argued, must be considerably earlier, not only
than Manu, but also than his predecessor Âpastamba. The Gîtâ, may, therefore, be
safely said to belong to a period several centuries prior to the fifth century
A. C.
The next piece of external evidence is furnished by the Vedânta-sûtras of
Bâdarâyana. In several of those Sûtras, references are made to certain Smritis
as authorities for the propositions laid down. Take, for instance, I, 2, 6, or
I, 3, 23, and many others. Now three of these sûtras are very useful for our
present purpose. The first we have to consider is Sûtra II, 3, 45. The
commentators Sankarâkârya, Râmânuga, Madhva, and Vallabha 1 are unanimous in
understanding the passage in Gîtâ, chapter XV, stanza 7 (p. 112), to be the one
there referred to by the words of the Sûtra, which are, 'And it is said in a
Smriti.' Now a glance at the context of the Sûtra will, I think, satisfy us that
the commentators, who are unanimous though representing different and even
conflicting schools of thought, are also quite right. Sûtra 43, in the
elliptical language characteristic of that branch of our literature, says, 'A
part, from the statement of difference, and the reverse also; some lay down that
it is a fisherman or a cheat.' Sûtra 44 runs thus, 'And also from the words of
the Mantra.' And then comes Sûtra 45 as set out above. It is plain, that the
Sûtra No. 45 indicates an authority for something not specified, being regarded
as part of some other thing also not specified. Now the discussion in previous
Sûtras has been about the soul; so we can have little difficulty in accepting
the unanimous interpretation of the commentators, that the proposition here
sought to be made out is that the individual soul is part of the Supreme Soul,
which is the proposition laid down in the Gîtâ in the passage referred to. The
p. 31
next Sûtra to refer to is IV, 1, 10. I shall not set forth the other relevant
Sûtras here as in the preceding case. I only state that the three commentators,
Sankara, Râmânuga, and Madhva, agree that the Gîtâ is here referred to, namely,
chapter VI, stanza ii seq. Vallabha, however, I am bound to add, does not agree
with this, as he interprets the Sûtra in question and those which precede and
follow as referring to an entirely different matter. If I may be permitted to
say so, however, I consider his interpretation not so satisfactory as that of
the three other and older commentators. Lastly, we come to Sûtra IV, 2-19. On
this, again, all the four commentators are unanimous, and they say that Gîtâ,
chapter VIII, stanza 24 seq. (p. 80), is the authority referred to. And I think
there can be very little doubt that they are right. These various pieces of
evidence render it, I think, historically certain, that the Gîtâ must be
considerably prior to the Vedânta-sûtras; and that the word Brahma-sûtras, which
occurs at Gîtâ, chapter XIII, stanza 4 (p. 102), is correctly interpreted by the
commentators as not referring to the Vedânta-sûtras, which are also called
Brahma-sûtras, but to a different subject altogether 1. When were the
Vedânta-sûtras composed? The question must at once be admitted to be a difficult
one; but I think the following considerations will show that the date of those
Sutras must, at the latest, be considerably earlier than the period which we
have already reached in this part of our investigation. We may take it as fairly
well settled, that Bhatta Kumârila, the celebrated commentator of the Pûrva
Mîmâmsâ school, flourished not later than the end of the seventh century A. C. 2
A considerable time prior to him must be placed the great commentator on the
Mîmâmsâ-sûtras, namely, Sabarasyâmin. If we may judge from the style of his
great commentary, he cannot have flourished much later than Patañgali, who may
now be taken as historically proved to
p. 32
have flourished about 140 B. C. 1 Now a considerable time must have intervened
between Sabarasyâmin and another commentator on the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ, whom Sabara
quotes with the highly honorific title Bhagavân, the Venerable, namely,
Upavarsha. Upavarsha appears from Sankara's statement to have commented on the
Vedânta-sûtras 2. We have thus a long catena of works from the seventh century
A. C., indicating a pretty high antiquity for the Vedanta-sûtras, and therefore
a higher one for the Bhagavadgîtâ. The antiquity of the Vedânta-sûtras follows
also from the circumstance, which we have on the testimony of Râmânuga, repeated
by Mâdhavâkârya, that a commentary on the Sûtras was written by Baudhâyanâkârya
3, which commentary Râmânuga says he followed. Baudhâyanâ's date is not
accurately settled. But he appears to be older than Âpastamba, whose date, as
suggested by Dr. Bühler, has already been mentioned 4. The Vedânta-sûtras, then,
would appear to be at least as old as the fourth century B. C.; if the
information we have from Râmânuga may be trusted. A third argument may be
mentioned, bearing on the date of the Vedânta-sûtras. In Sûtra 110 of the third
Pâda of the fourth Adhyâya of Pânini's Sûtras, a Pârâsarya is mentioned as the
author of a Bhikshu-sûtra. Who is this Pârâsarya, and what the Bhikshu-sûtra?
Unluckily Patañgali gives us no information on this head, nor does the Kâsikâ
Vritti. But a note of Professor Târânâtha Tarkavâkaspati, of Calcutta, says that
Pârâsarya is Vyâsa, and the Bhikshu-sûtra is the Vedânta-sûtra 5. If this is
correct, the Vedânta-sûtras go very far indeed into antiquity. For Pânini can
certainly not be assigned to a later date than the fourth century B. C., while
that learned
p. 33
scholar, Professor Goldstücker, on grounds of considerable strength, assigned
him to a much earlier date 1. The question thus comes to this, Is the remark of
Professor Târânâtha, above set out, correct? I find then, from enquiries made of
my venerable and erudite friend Yagñesvar Sâstrin, the author of the
Âryavidyâsudhâkara, that the note of Târânâtha is based on the works of Bhattogî
Dîkshita, Nâgogî Bhatta, and Gñânendra Sarasvatî, who all give the same
interpretation of the Sûtra in question. It is certainly unfortunate that we
have no older authority on this point than Bhattogî. The interpretation is in
itself not improbable. Vyâsa is certainly by the current tradition 2 called the
author of the Vedânta-sûtras, and also the son of Parâsara. Nor is Bhikshu-sûtra
a name too far removed in sense from Vedânta-sûtra, though doubtless the former
name is not now in use, at all events as applied to the Sûtras attributed to
Bâdarâyana, and though, it must also be stated, a Bhikshu-sûtra Bhâshya Vârtika
is mentioned eo nomine by Professor Weber as actually in existence at the
present day 3. Taking all things together, therefore, we may provisionally
understand the Bhikshu-sûtra mentioned by Pânini to be identical with the
Vedânta-sûtras. But even apart from that identification, the other testimonies
we have adduced prove, I think, the high antiquity of those Sûtras, and
consequently of the Bhagavadgîtâ.
We have thus examined, at what, considering the importance and difficulty of the
subject, will not; I trust, be regarded as unreasonable length, some of the
principal pieces of internal and external evidence touching the age of the
Bhagavadgîtâ and its position in Sanskrit literature. Although, as stated at the
very outset, the conclusions we have deduced in the course of that examination
are not all such as at once to secure acceptance, I venture to think that we
have now adequate grounds for saying, that the various .and independent lines of
investigation, which we have pursued, converge to this point, that the Gîtâ, on
numerous and
p. 34
essential topics, ranges itself as a member of the Upanishad group, so to say;
in Sanskrit literature. Its philosophy, its mode of treating its subject, its
style, its language, its versification, its opinions on sundry subjects of the
highest importance, all point to that one conclusion. We may also, I think, lay
it down as more than probable, that the latest date at which the Gîtâ can have
been composed, must be earlier than the third century B. C., though it is
altogether impossible to say at present how much earlier. This proposition, too,
is supported by the cumulative strength of several independent lines of
testimony.
Before closing this Introduction, it is desirable to add a word concerning the
text of the Bhagavadgîtâ. The religious care with which that text has been
preserved is very worthy of note. Schlegel and Lassen 1 have both declared it as
their opinion, that we have the text now almost exactly in the condition in
which it was when it left the hands of the author. There are very few real
various readings, and some of the very few that exist are noted by the
commentators. Considering that the Mahâbhârata must have been tampered with on
numerous occasions, this preservation of the Gîtâ is most interesting. It
doubtless indicates that high veneration for it which is still felt, and has for
long been felt, by the Hindus, and which is embodied in the expression used in
the colophons of the MSS. describing the Gîtâ as the 'Upanishad sung by God 2.'
In view of the facts and deductions set forth in this essay that expression
existing as, I believe, it does, almost universally in Indian MSS. of the Gîtâ,
is not altogether devoid of historical value.
Schlegel draws attention to one other circumstance regarding the text of the
Gîtâ, which is also highly interesting, namely, that the number of the stanzas
is exactly 700.
p. 35
Schlegel concludes that the author must have fixed on that number deliberately,
in order to prevent, as far as be could, all subsequent interpolations 1. This
is certainly not unlikely; and if the aim of the author was such as Schlegel
suggests, it has assuredly been thoroughly successful. In the chapter of the
Mahâbhârata immediately succeeding the eighteenth chapter of the Gîtâ, the
extent of the work in slokas is distinctly stated. The verses in which this is
stated do not exist in the Gauda or Bengal recension, and are doubtless not
genuine. But, nevertheless, they are interesting, and I shall reproduce them
here. 'Kesava spoke 620 slokas, Arguna fifty-seven, Sañgaya sixty-seven, and
Dhritarâshtra one sloka; such is the extent of the Gîtâ.' It is very difficult
to account for these figures. According to them, the total number of verses in
the Gîtâ would be 745, whereas the number in the current MSS., and even in the
Mahâbhârata itself, is, as already stated, only 700 2. I cannot suggest any
explanation whatever of this discrepancy.
In conclusion, a few words may be added regarding the general principles
followed in the translation contained in this volume. My aim has been to make
that translation as close and literal a rendering as possible of the Gîtâ, as
interpreted by the commentators Sankarâkârya, Srîdharasvâmin, and Madhusûdana
Sarasvatî. Reference has also been frequently made to the commentary of
Râmânugâ-kârya, and also to that of Nîlakantha, which latter forms part of the
author's general commentary on the Mahâbhârata. In some places these
commentators differ among themselves, and then I have made my own choice. The
foot-notes are mainly intended to make clear that which necessarily remains
obscure in a literal translation. Some of the notes, however, also point out the
parallelisms existing between the Gîtâ and other works, principally the
Upanishads and the Buddhistic Dhammapada and Sutta Nipâta. Of the latter
p. 36
I have not been able to procure the original Pâlî; I have only used Sir M. C.
Swamy's translation. But I may here note, that there are some verses, especially
in the Salla Sutta (see pp. 124-127 of Sir M. C. Swamy's book), the similarity
of which, in doctrine and expression, to some of the verses of the Gîtâ is
particularly striking. The analogies between the Gîtâ and the Upanishads have
been made the basis of certain conclusions in this Introduction. Those between
the Gîtâ and these Buddhistic works are at present, to my mind, only
interesting; I am unable yet to say whether they may legitimately be made the
premises for any historical deductions.
There are two indexes: the first a general index of matters, the second
containing the principal words in the Gîtâ which may prove useful or interesting
for philological, historical, or other kindred purposes.
p. 37
Footnotes
1:1 Hibbert Lectures, p. 131.
1:2 Lectures on the History of Modem Philosophy (translated by O. W. Wight),
vol. i, pp. 49, 50. At p. 433 seq. of the second volume, M. Cousin gives a
general view of the doctrine of the Gîtâ. See also Mr. Maurice's and Ritter's
Histories of Philosophy.
2:1 Ex. gr. Sârîraka Bhâshya, vol. ii, p. 840. It is also often cited as a
Smriti, ibid. vol. i, p. 152.
2:2 See inter alia Sârîraka Bhâshya, vol. i, p. 455, vol. ii, p. 687, and
Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i, p. 355 (Madras); Lassen's edition of the Gîtâ,
XXXV.
3:1 The whole story is given in brief by the late Professor Goldstücker in the
Westminster Review, April 1868, p. 392 seq. See now his Literary Remains, II,
104 seq.
3:2 History of India, vol. i, p. 293.
4:1 History of India, vol. i, p. 288,; and compare generally upon this point the
remarks in Gladstone's Homer, especially vol. i, p. 70 seq.
5:1 Infra, p. 21 seq.
5:2 Compare the late Professor Goldstücker's remarks in the Westminster Review
for April 1868, p. 389.
5:3 Contemporary Review (February 1879).
5:4 Madhusûdana mentions the dialogue between Ganaka and Yâgñavalkya as a
specific parallel.
6:1 See to this effect M. Fauriel, quoted in Grote's Greece, II, 195 (Cabinet
ed.).
6:2 Compare also Weber's History of Indian Literature (English translation), p.
187. The instruction, however, as to 'the reverence clue to the priesthood' from
'the military caste,' which is there spoken of appears to me to be entirely
absent from the Gîtâ; see p. 21 seq. infra.
6:3 Westminster Review, April 1868, p. 388 seq.; and Remains, I, 104, 105.
6:4 P. 6 (Calcutta ed., Samvat, 1927).
6:5 p. 841 (Bibl. Indic. ed.); also Svetâsvatara, p. 278.
7:1 See, as to this, Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i, p. 328 (Madras).
8:1 See the Introductory Essay to my Bhagavadgîtâ, translated into English blank
verse, p. lxvii. See also Goldstücker's Remains, I, 48, 77; II, 10.
8:2 p. 317; cf. also p. 338.
8:3 Preface to Sânkhya Sâra, p. 7 (Bibl. Indic. ed.)
8:4 History of Indian Literature, p. 28.
8:5 Are we to infer from the circumstance mentioned in Weber's History of p. 9
Indian Literature (p. 223, note, 235), that the author of these Sûtras was older
than Buddha?
9:1 Sûtra, 12, Abhyâsa-vairâgyâbhyâm tannirodhah.
10:1 In the Preface to his Sânkhya Sâra, I think.
10:2 This is all that we can infer from the few cases of division and
classification which we do meet with in the Gîtâ. A subject like that treated of
in this work could not well he discussed without some classifications &c.
11:1 In chapter X the word occurs in two different senses in the same stanza
(st. 7).
11:2 Compare the various passages, references to which are collected in the
Sanskrit Index at the end of this volume.
12:1 And see, too, chapter VII, stanza 17, where the man of knowledge is
declared to he 'dear' to Krishna.
14:1 Compare Muir, Sanskrit Texts, vol. i, p. 5. See, too, Goldstücker's
Remains, I, 177.
14:2 This opinion, which I had expressed as long ago as 1874 in the Introduction
to my edition of Bhartrihari's Satakas, is, I find, also held by Dr. Bühler; see
his Introduction to Âpastamba in this series, p. xx seq., note. Purânas are
mentioned in the Sutta Nipâta (p. 115), as to the date of which, see inter alia
Swamy's Introduction, p. xvii.
16:1 Compare the passages collected under the word Vedas in our Index.
16:2 Hibbert Lectures, p. 340 seq.
16:3 II, 42-45; IX, 20, 21.
16:4 XVII, 12.
16:5 VII, 21-23; IX, 23-24.
16:6 VIII, 14-16; IX, 39-33.
17:1 See Khândogya-upanishad, p. 473, or rather I ought to have referred to the
Mundaka-upanishad, where the superiority and inferiority is more distinctly
stated in words, pp. 266, 267.
18:1 Contemporary Review, February 1879.
19:1 See also Sutta Nipâta, p. 115.
19:2 Haug's edition, p. 68.
20:1 Bibl. Ind. ed. 12
20:2 Bibl. Ind. ed., p. 221 seq.
20:3 Bibl. Ind. ed.: p. 11.
20:4 Chapter IV, stanzas 123, 124.
20:5 Vol. iii (2nd ed.), p. 11 seq. Cf. Goldstücker's Remains, I, 4, 28, 366;
II, 67.
20:6 Âpastamba (Bühler's ed.) I, 317, 18 (pp. 38, 39 in this series); see
further on this point Mr. Burnell's Devatâdhyâya-brâhmana, Introd., pp. viii,
ix, and notes.
20:7 Professor Tiele (History of Ancient Religions, p. 127) considers the 'main
features' of Manu to be 'pre-Buddhistic.'
21:1 P. xxxv.
21:2 See the introductory Essay to my Bhagavadgîtâ in English verse, published
in 1875, p. cxii.
22:1 The remarks in the text will show how little there is in the Gîtâ of that
'Brahmanizing' which has been shortly noticed on a previous page.
22:2 As to the Kshatriyas the contrast with Manu's rules is even stronger than
with Âpastamba's. See our Introduction to the Gîtâ in English verse, p. cxiii.
23:1 P. 120.
23:2 Pp. 129, 130.
23:3 See p. 58 intra; and compare with this Weber's remarks on one of the
classes into which he divides the whole body of Upanishads, History of Indian
Literature, p. 165. See also Muir, Sanskrit Texts, vol. i, p. 508; Max Müller,
Upanishads, vol. i, p. lxxv.
23:4 Cf. Sutta Nipâta, p. 32; and also Mr. Davids' note on that passage in his
Buddhism, p. 131.
24:1 P. 89 infra.
24:2 Essays on Sanskrit Literature, vol. iii, p. 150.
24:3 See our remarks on, this point in the Introductory Essay to our Gîtâ in
verse, p. ii seq.
24:4 Introduction to Gîtâ in English verse, p. v seq.
25:1 Cf. Max Müller's Hibbert Lectures, p. 137; Weber's Indian Literature, pp.
288, 289; and Mr. Rhys Davids' excellent little volume on Buddhism, p. 151; and
see also p. 83 of Mr. Davids' book.
25:2 Cf. Weber's History of Indian Literature, p. 285. in Mr. Davids' Buddhism,
p. 94, we have a noteworthy extract from a standard Buddhistic work, touching p.
26 the existence of the soul. Compare that with the corresponding doctrine in
the Gîtâ. It will be found that the two are at one in rejecting the identity of
the soul with the senses &c. The Gîtâ then goes an to admit a soul separate from
these. Buddhism rejects that also, and sees nothing but the senses.
27:1 The word Brahma-nirvâna, which occurs so often at the close of chapter V
and also at chapter II, 72, seems to me to indicate that nirvana had not yet
become technically pinned down, so to say, to the meaning which Buddhism
subsequently gave to it, as the name of what it deemed the summum bonum. Nirvâna
by itself occurs at VI, 15.
27:2 See some further remarks on these points in my Introduction to the Gîtâ in
verse.
27:3 Professor Tiele (History of Ancient Religions, p. 140) says Sankara was
born in 798 A.D.; on. the authority, I presume, of the Âryavidyâsudhâkara, p.
226.
27:4 Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. viii, p.
250; and see, too, Indian Antiquary, vol. vi, p. 61. Dr. Bühler).
28:1 Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. xiv, p. 16
seq.
28:2 P. 182 (Târânâtha's ed.)
28:3 See F. E. Hall's Vâsavadattâ, p. 14 note.
28:4 See Indian Antiquary, vol. v, p. 70.
28:5 'Was the Râmâyana copied from Homer?' See pp. 36-59.
29:1 Cf. Colebrooke's Essays, vol. ii. p. 166, seq. It may be remarked that this
argument is not affected by the attempt to distinguish the Kâlidâsa of the
Sakuntalâ from the Kâlidâsa of the Raghuvamsa. Because the work cited in the
Pañkatantra is the Kumârasambhava, which indisputably belongs to the same author
as the Raghuvamsa.
30:1 I am indebted to Professor M. M. Kunte for a loan of Vallabhâkârya's
commentary on the Sûtras noted in the text. I had not seen it in 1875, when I
last discussed this question.
31:1 Cf. Weber's Indian Literature, p. 241. See also Lassen's Preface to his
edition of Schlegers Gîtâ, XXXV. Râmânuga takes the other view.
31:2 See Burnell's Sâmavidhâna-brâhmana, Introduction, p. vi note.
32:1 The authorities are collected in our edition of Bhartrihâri (Bombay Series
of Sanskrit Classics), Introd. p. xi note. See also Bühler's Âpastamba in this
series, Introd. p. xxviii.
32:2 See Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i, p. 332. An Upavarsha is mentioned in the
Kathâsaritsâgara as living in the time of king Nanda, and having Pânini,
Kâtyâyana, and Vyâdi for his pupils.
32:3 See the Râmânuga Bhâshya; and the Râmânuga Darsana in
Sarvadarsana-sangraha.
32:4 Âpastamba, p. xvi.
32:5 See Siddhânta Kaumudî, vol. i, p. 592.
33:1 See his Pânini; and see also Bühler's Âpastamba in this series, Introd. p.
xxxii note.
33:2 The correctness of this tradition is very doubtful.
33:3 Indische Studien I. 470.
34:1 See the latter's edition of the Gîtâ, Preface, p. xxvii.
34:2 In the edition of the Gîtâ published in Bombay in Saka 1782, there is a
stanza which says that the Upanishads are the cows, Krishna the milkman, Arguna
the calf, and the milk is the nectar-like Gîtâ, which indicates the traditional
view of the Gîtâ--a view in consonance with that which we have been led to by
the facts and arguments contained in this Introduction.
35:1 p. xl (Lassen's ed.)
35:2 Sankara's commentary states in so many words that the Gîtâ he used
contained only 700 slokas.
*******************
BHAGAVADGÎTÂ.
CHAPTER I.
Dhritarâshtra said
What did my (people) and the Pândavas do, O Sañgaya! when they assembled
together on the holy field of Kurukshetra, desirous to do battle?
Sañgaya said:
Seeing the army of the Pândavas drawn up in battle-array 1, the prince
Duryodhana approached the preceptor, and spoke (these) words: 'O preceptor!
observe this grand army of the sons of Pându, drawn up in battle-array by your
talented pupil, the son of Drupada. In it are heroes (bearing) large bows, the
equals of Bhîma and Arguna in battle--(namely), Yuyudhâna, Virâta, and Drupada,
the master of a great car 2, and Dhrishtaketu, Kekitâna, and the valiant king of
Kâsî, Purugit and Kuntibhoga, and that eminent man Saibya; the heroic
Yudhâmanyu, the valiant Uttamaugas, the son of Subhadrâ, and the sons of
Draupadî--all masters of great cars. And now, O best of Brâhmanas!
p. 38
learn who are most distinguished among us, and are leaders of my army. I will
name them to you, in order that you may know them well. Yourself, and Bhîshma,
and Karna, and Kripa the victor of (many) battles; Asvatthâman, and Vikarna, and
also the son of Somadatta, and many other brave men, who have given up their
lives for me, who fight with various weapons, (and are) all dexterous in battle.
Thus our army which is protected by Bhîshma is unlimited; while this army of
theirs which is protected by Bhîma is very limited. And therefore do ye all,
occupying respectively the positions 1 assigned to you, protect Bhîshma 2 only.'
Then his powerful grandsire, Bhîshma, the oldest of the Kauravas, roaring aloud
like a lion, blew his conch, (thereby) affording delight to Duryodhana. And then
all at once, conchs, and kettledrums, and tabors, and trumpets were played upon;
and there was a tumultuous din. Then, too, Mâdhava and the son of Pându
(Arguna), seated in a grand chariot to which white steeds were yoked, blew their
heavenly conchs. Hrishîkesa 3 blew the Pâñkaganya 4, and Dhanañgaya the
Devadatta, and Bhîma, (the doer) of fearful deeds, blew the great conch Paundra.
King Yudhishthira, the son of Kuntî 5, blew the Anantavigaya, and Nakula and
Sahadeva (respectively)
p. 39
the Sughosha and Manipushpaka. And the king of Kâsî, too, who has an excellent
bow, and Sikhandin, the master of a great car, and Dhrishtadyumna, Virâta, and
the unconquered Sâtyaki, and Drupada, and the sons of Draupadî, and the son of
Subhadrâ, of mighty arms, blew conchs severally from all sides, O king of the
earth! That tumultuous din rent the hearts of all (the people) of
Dhritarâshtra's (party), causing reverberations throughout heaven and earth.
Then seeing (the people of ) Dhritarâshtra's party regularly marshalled, the son
of Pându, whose standard is the ape, raised his bow 1, after the discharge of
missiles had commenced, and O king of the earth! spake these words to
Hrishîkesa: 'O undegraded one! station my chariot between the two armies, while
I observe those, who stand here desirous to engage in battle, and with whom, in
the labours of this struggle, I must do battle. I will observe those who are
assembled here and who are about to engage in battle, wishing to do service in
battle 2 to the evil-minded son of Dhritarâshtra.'
Sañgaya said:
Thus addressed by Gudâkesa 3, O descendant of Bharata 4! Hrishîkesa stationed
that excellent chariot between the two armies, in front of Bhîshma and Drona and
of all the kings of the earth, and
p. 40
said O son of Prithâ! look at these assembled Kauravas.' There the son of Prithâ
saw in both armies, fathers and grandfathers, preceptors, maternal uncles,
brothers, sons 1, grandsons, companions, fathers-in-law, as well as friends. And
seeing all those kinsmen standing (there), the son of Kuntî was overcome by
excessive pity, and spake thus despondingly.
Arguna said:
Seeing these kinsmen, O Krishna! standing (here) desirous to engage in battle,
my limbs droop down; my mouth is quite dried up; a tremor comes on my body; and
my hairs stand on end; the Gândîva (bow) slips from my hand; my skin burns
intensely. I am unable, too, to stand up; my mind whirls round, as it were; O
Kesava! I see adverse omens 2; and I do not perceive any good (to accrue) after
killing (my) kinsmen in the battle. I do not wish for victory, O Krishna! nor
sovereignty, nor pleasures: what is sovereignty to us, O Govinda! what
enjoyments, and even life? Even those, for whose sake we desire sovereignty,
enjoyments, and pleasures, are standing here for battle, abandoning life and
wealth-preceptors, fathers, sons as well as grandfathers, maternal uncles,
fathers-in-law, grandsons, brothers-in-law, as also (other) relatives. These I
do not wish to kill, though they kill (me), O destroyer of Madhu 3! even for the
sake of sovereignty over the three worlds, how much less then for this earth
p. 41
(alone)? What joy shall be ours, O Ganârdana! after killing Dhritarâshtra's
sons? Killing these felons 1 we shall only incur sin. Therefore it is not proper
for us to kill our own kinsmen, the sons of Dhritarâshtra. For how, O Mâdhava!
shall we be happy after killing our own relatives? Although having their
consciences corrupted by avarice, they do not see the evils flowing from the
extinction of a family, and the sin in treachery to friends, still, O Ganârdana!
should not we, who do see the evils flowing from the extinction of a family,
learn to refrain from that sin? On the extinction of a family, the eternal rites
of families are destroyed 2. Those rites being destroyed, impiety predominates
over the whole family 3. In consequence of the predominance of impiety, O
Krishna! the women of the family become corrupt 4; and the women becoming
corrupt, O descendant of Vrishni! intermingling of castes results; that
intermingling necessarily leads the family and the destroyers of the family to
hell; for when the ceremonies of (offering) the balls of food and water (to
them) fail 5, their ancestors fall down (to hell). By these transgressions of
the destroyers of families, which occasion interminglings of castes, the eternal
rites of castes and rites, of families are
p. 42
subverted. And O Ganârdana! we have heard that men whose family-rites are
subverted, must necessarily live in hell. Alas! we are engaged in committing a
heinous sin, seeing that we are making efforts for killing our own kinsmen out
of greed of the pleasures of sovereignty. If the sons of Dhritarâshtra, weapon
in hand, should kill me in battle, me weaponless and not defending (myself),
that would be better for me.
Sañgaya said:
Having spoken thus, Arguna cast aside his bow together with the arrows, on the
battle-field, and sat down in (his) chariot, with a mind agitated by grief.
Footnotes
37:1 Several of these modes of array are described in Manu VII, 187, like a
staff, like a wain, like a boar, &c. That of the Pândavas, here referred to,
appears to have been like the thunderbolt, as to which see Manu VII, 191.
37:2 This is a literal rendering; the technical meaning is 'a warrior proficient
in military science, who can fight single-handed a thousand archers.'
38:1 The original word means, according to Srîdhara, 'the ways of entrance into
a Vyûha or phalanx.'
38:2 Who, as generalissimo, remained in the centre of the army.
38:3 Literally, according to the commentators, 'lord of the senses of
perception.'
38:4 Schlegel renders the names of these conchs by Gigantea, Theodotes,
Arundinea, Triumphatrix, Dulcisona, and Gemmiflorea respectively.
38:5 So called, par excellence, apparently.
39:1 I. e. to join in the fight.
39:2 In the original, several derivatives from the root yudh, meaning 'to
fight,' occur with the same frequency as 'battle' here.
39:3 Generally interpreted 'lord of sleep,' i. e. not indolent. Nîlakantha also
suggests, that it may mean 'of thick hair.'
39:4 The son of Dushyanta and Sakuntalâ, after whom India is called
'Bhâratavarsha,' and from whom both Pândavas and Kauravas were descended.
40:1 The words in this list include all standing in similar relationships to
those directly signified.
40:2 Such as the appearance of vultures, cars moving without horses, &c.,
mentioned in the Bhîshma Parvan II, 17. Cf. Sutta Nipâta, p. 100.
40:3 A demon of this name.
41:1 Six classes are mentioned: an incendiary; one who administers poison; one
who assaults another--weapon in hand; one who destroys property; one who robs
another of his wife; or his fields.
41:2 I. e. there being none to attend to the 'rites,' women being ineligible.
41:3 I. e. the surviving members.
41:4 I. e. either by the mere fact of relationship to such men, or by following
their bad example.
41:5 There being no qualified person to perform them; 'their ancestors'--that is
to say, of the 'destroyers of families.'
********************
CHAPTER II.
Sañgaya said:
To him, who was thus overcome with pity, and dejected, and whose eyes were full of tears and turbid, the destroyer of Madhu spoke these words.
The Deity said:
How (comes it that) this delusion, O Arguna! which is discarded by the good, which excludes from heaven, and occasions infamy, has overtaken you in this (place of) peril? Be not effeminate, O son of Prithâ! it is not worthy of you. Cast off this base weakness of heart, and arise, O terror of (your) foes!
Arguna said:
How, O destroyer of Madhu! shall I encounter with arrows in the battle Bhîshma and Drona--both, O destroyer of enemies! entitled to reverence? Not
p. 43
killing (my) preceptors--(men) of great glory--it is better to live even on alms in this world. But killing them, though they are avaricious of worldly goods, I should only enjoy blood-tainted enjoyments. Nor do we know which of the two is better for us-whether that we should vanquish them, or that they should vanquish us. Even those, whom having killed, we do not wish to live--even those sons of Dhritarâshtra stand (arrayed) against us. With a heart contaminated by the taint of helplessness 1, with a mind confounded about my duty, I ask you. Tell me what is assuredly good for me. I am your disciple; instruct me, who have thrown myself on your (indulgence). For I do not perceive what is to dispel that grief which will dry up my organs 2 after I shall have obtained a prosperous kingdom on earth without a foe, or even the sovereignty of the gods 3.
Sañgaya said:
Having spoken thus to Hrishîkesa, O terror of (your) foes! Gudâkesa said to Govinda, 'I shall not engage in battle;' and verily remained silent. To him thus desponding between the two armies, O descendant of Bharata! Hrishîkesa spoke these words with a slight smile.
The Deity said:
You have grieved for those who deserve no grief,
p. 44
and you talk words of wisdom 1. Learned men grieve not for the living nor the dead. Never did I not exist, nor you, nor these rulers of men; nor will any one of us ever hereafter cease to be. As, in this body, infancy and youth and old age (come) to the embodied (self) 2, so does the acquisition of another body; a sensible man is not deceived about that The contacts of the senses 3, O son of Kuntî! which produce cold and heat, pleasure and pain, are not permanent, they are ever coming and going. Bear them, O descendant of Bharata! For, O chief of men! that sensible man whom they 4 (pain and pleasure being alike to him) afflict not, he merits immortality. There is no existence for that which is unreal; there is no non-existence for that which is real. And the (correct) conclusion about both 5 is perceived by those who perceive the truth. Know that to be indestructible which pervades all this; the destruction of that inexhaustible (principle) none can bring about. These bodies appertaining to the embodied (self) which is eternal, indestructible, and indefinable, are said 6 to be perishable; therefore do engage in battle, O descendant of Bharata! He who thinks it to be the killer and he who thinks
p. 45
it to be killed, both know nothing. It kills not, is not killed 1. It is not born, nor does it ever die, nor, having existed, does it exist no more. Unborn, everlasting, unchangeable, and primeval, it is not killed when the body is killed 2. O son of Prithâ! how can that man who knows it thus to be indestructible, everlasting, unborn, and inexhaustible, how and whom can he kill, whom can he cause to be killed? As a man, casting off old clothes, puts on others and new ones, so the embodied (self) casting off old bodies, goes to others and new ones. Weapons do not divide it (into pieces); fire does not burn it, waters do not moisten it; the wind does not dry it up. It is not divisible; it is not combustible; it is not to be moistened; it is not to be dried up. It is everlasting, all-pervading, stable, firm, and eternal 3. It is said to be unperceived, to be unthinkable, to be unchangeable. Therefore knowing it to be such, you ought not to grieve, But even if you think that it is constantly born, and constantly dies, still, O you of mighty arms! you ought not to grieve thus. For to one that is born, death is certain; and to one that dies, birth is certain 4. Therefore
p. 46
about (this) unavoidable thing, you ought not to grieve. The source of things, O descendant of Bharata! is unperceived; their middle state is perceived; and their end again is unperceived. What (occasion is there for any) lamentation regarding them 1? One looks upon it 2 as a wonder; another similarly speaks of it as a wonder; another too hears of it as a wonder; and even after having heard of it, no one does really know it 3. This embodied (self), O descendant of Bharata! within every one's body is ever indestructible. Therefore you ought not to grieve for any being. Having regard to your own duty also, you ought not to falter, for there is nothing better for a Kshatriya 4 than a righteous battle. Happy those Kshatriyas, O son of Prithâ! who can find such a battle (to fight)--come of itself 5--an open door to heaven! But if you will not fight this righteous battle, then you will have abandoned your own duty and your fame, and you will incur sin. All beings, too, will tell of your everlasting infamy; and to one who has been honoured, infamy is (a) greater (evil) than death. (Warriors who are) masters of great cars will think that you abstained from the battle through fear, and having been highly thought of by them, you will fall down to littleness. Your enemies, too,
p. 47
decrying your power, will speak much about you that should not be spoken. And what, indeed, more lamentable than that? Killed, you will obtain heaven; victorious, you will enjoy the earth. Therefore arise, O son of Kuntî! resolved to (engage in) battle. Looking alike on pleasure and pain, on gain and loss, on victory and defeat, then prepare for battle, and thus you will not incur sin. The knowledge here declared to you is that relating to the Sânkhya, 1. Now hear that relating to the Yoga. Possessed of this knowledge, O son of Prithâ! you will cast off the bonds of action. In this (path to final emancipation) nothing that is commenced becomes abortive; no obstacles exist; and even a little of this (form of ) piety protects one from great danger 2. There is here 3, O descendant of Kuru! but one state of mind consisting in firm understanding. But the states of mind of those who have no firm understanding are many-branched and endless. The state of mind consisting in firm understanding regarding steady contemplation 4 does not belong to those, O son of Prithâ! who are strongly attached to (worldly) pleasures and power, and whose minds are drawn away by that flowery talk which is full of (ordinances of) specific acts for the attainment of (those) pleasures and (that) power, and which promises
p. 48
birth as the fruit of acts 1--(that flowery talk) which those unwise ones utter, who are enamoured of Vedic words, who say there is nothing else, who are full of desires, and whose goal is heaven 2. The Vedas (merely) relate to the effects of the three qualities 3; do you, O Arguna! rise above those effects of the three qualities, and be free from the pairs of opposites 4, always preserve courage 5, be free from anxiety for new acquisitions or protection of old acquisitions, and be self-controlled 6. To the instructed Brâhmana, there is in all the Vedas as much utility as in a reservoir of water into which waters flow from all sides 7. Your business is with action alone; not by any means with fruit. Let not the fruit of action be your motive (to action). Let not your attachment be (fixed) on inaction 8. Having recourse to devotion, O Dhanañgaya! perform actions, casting off (all) attachment, and being equable in success or
p. 49
ill-success; (such) equability is called devotion. Action, O Dhanañgaya! is far inferior to the devotion of the mind. In that devotion seek shelter. Wretched are those whose motive (to action) is the fruit (of action). He who has obtained devotion in this world casts off both merit and sin 1. Therefore apply yourself to devotion; devotion in (all) actions is wisdom. The wise who have obtained devotion cast off the fruit of action; and released from the shackles of (repeated)births 2, repair to that seat where there is no unhappiness 3. When your mind shall have crossed beyond the taint of delusion, then will you become indifferent to all that you have heard or will heard 4. When your mind, confounded by what you have heard 5, will stand firm and steady in contemplation 6, then will you acquire devotion.
Arguna said:
What are the characteristics, O Kesava! of one whose mind is steady, and who is intent on contemplation? How should one of steady mind speak, how sit, how move?
The Deity said:
When a man, O son of Prithâ! abandons all the
p. 50
desires of his heart, and is pleased in his self only and by his self 1, he is then called one of steady mind. He whose heart is not agitated in the midst of calamities, who has no longing for pleasures, and from whom (the feelings of) affection, fear, and wrath 2 have departed, is called a sage of steady mind. His mind is steady, who, being without attachments anywhere, feels no exultation and no aversion on encountering the various agreeable and disagreeable 3 (things of this world). A man's mind is steady, when he withdraws his senses from (all) objects of sense, as the tortoise (withdraws) its limbs from all sides. Objects of sense draw back from a person who is abstinent; not so the taste (for those objects). But even the taste departs from him, when he has seen the Supreme 4. The boisterous senses, O son of Kuntî! carry away by force the mind even of a wise man, who exerts himself (for final emancipation). Restraining them all, a man should remain engaged in devotion, making me his only resort. For his mind is steady whose senses are under his control. The man who ponders over objects of sense forms an attachment to them; from (that) attachment is produced desire; and from desire anger is produced 5; from anger results want of discrimination 6; from want of discrimination,
p. 51
confusion of the memory; from confusion of the memory, loss of reason; and in consequence of loss of reason. he is utterly ruined. But the self-restrained man who moves among 1 objects with senses under the control of his own self, and free from affection and aversion, obtains tranquillity 2. When there is tranquillity, all his miseries are destroyed, for the mind of him whose heart is tranquil soon becomes steady. He who is not self-restrained has no steadiness of mind; nor has he who is not self-restrained perseverance 3 in the pursuit of self-knowledge; there is no tranquillity for him who does not persevere in the pursuit of self-knowledge; and whence can there be happiness for one who is not tranquil? For the heart which follows the rambling senses leads away his judgment, as the wind leads a boat astray upon the waters. Therefore, O you of mighty arms! his mind is steady whose senses are restrained on all sides from objects of sense. The self-restrained man is awake, when it is night for all beings; and when all beings are awake, that is the night of the right-seeing sage 4. He into whom all objects of desire enter, as waters enter the ocean, which, (though) replenished, (still) keeps its position unmoved,-he only obtains tranquillity; not he who desires (those) objects of desire. The man who, casting
p. 52
off all desires, lives free from attachments, who is free from egoism 1, and from (the feeling that this or that is) mine 2, obtains tranquillity. This, O son of Prithâ! is the Brahmic 3 state; attaining to this, one is never deluded; and remaining in it in (one's) last moments, one attains (brahma-nirvâna) the Brahmic bliss 4.
Footnotes
43:1 The commentators say that 'heart' here signifies the dispositions which are stated in chapter XVIII infra, p. 126. The feeling. of 'helplessness' is incompatible with what is there stated as the proper disposition for a Kshatriya.
43:2 I. e. by the heat of vexation; the meaning is, 'which will cause constant vexation of spirit.'
43:3 I. e. if the means employed are the sinful acts referred to.
44:1 Scil. regarding family-rites, &c.,. for, says Nîlakantha, they indicate knowledge of soul as distinct from body.
44:2 A common word in the Gîtâ, that which presides over each individual body.
44:3 Scil. with external objects.
44:4 I.e. the. 'contacts.'
44:5 The sense is this--there are two things apparently, the soul which is indestructible, and the feelings of pain &c. which 'come and go.' The true philosopher knows that the former only is real and exists; and that the latter is unreal and non-existent. He therefore does not mind the latter.
44:6 Scil. by those who are possessed of true knowledge.
45:1 Cf. Katha-upanishad, p. 104.
45:2 Katha-upanishad, pp. 103, 104.
45:3 'Eternal.' Nîlakantha explains this by 'unlimited by time, place,' &c. Sankara and others as 'uncreated,' 'without cause.' Stable =not assuming new forms; firm = not abandoning the original form. (Srîdhara.) The latter signifies a slight change; the former a total change.
45:4 Cf. the following from the Sutta Nipâta (Sir M. C. Swamy's translation), pp. 124, 125: 'There is, indeed, no means by which those born could be prevented from dying.' Even thus the world is afflicted with death and decay; therefore wise men, knowing the course of things in the world, do not give way to grief.
46:1 Cf. Sutta Nipâta, p. 125. 'In vain do you grieve, not knowing well the two ends of him whose manner either of coming or going you know not.'
46:2 I. e. the self spoken of above.
46:3 Katha-upanishad, p. 96.
46:4 One of the warrior caste.
46:5 Without any effort, that is to say, of one's own.
47:1 Sânkhya is explained in different modes by the different commentators, but the resulting meaning here seems to be, that the doctrine stated is the doctrine of true knowledge and emancipation by its means. See infra, p. 52.
47:2 Viz. this mortal mundane life.
47:3 I. e. for those who enter on this 'path.'
47:4 I.e. of the supreme Being; Yoga meaning really the dedication of all acts to that Being.
48:1 See Sutta Nipâta, p. 4.
48:2 This is a merely temporary good, and not therefore deserving to be aspired to before final emancipation.
48:3 I. e. the whole course of worldly affairs. As to qualities, see chapter XIV.
48:4 Heat and cold, pain and pleasure, and so forth. Cf. Manu I, 26.
48:5 Cf. Sutta Nipâta, p. 17 and other places.
48:6 Keeping the mind from worldly objects.
48:7 The meaning here is not easily apprehended. I suggest the following explanation:--Having said that the Vedas are concerned with actions for special benefits, Krishna compares them to a reservoir which provides water for various special purposes, drinking, bathing, &c. The Vedas similarly prescribe particular rites and ceremonies for going to heaven, or destroying an enemy, &c. But, says Krishna, man's duty is merely to perform the actions prescribed for him among these, and not entertain desires for the special benefits named. The stanza occurs in the Sanatsugâtîya, too.
48:8 Doing nothing at all.
49:1 Merit merely leads to heaven, as to which see note on last page. Cf. Sutta Nipâta, pp. 4, 136, 145 note.
49:2 Sutta Nipâta, pp. 3-7, &c.
49:3 Sutta Nipâta, p. 21.
49:4 This, according to Ânandagiri, means all writings other than those on the science of the soul.
49:5 I. e. about the means for the acquisition of various desired things.
49:6 I. e. of the soul (Sankara), of the supreme Being (Srîdhara). Substantially they both mean the same thing.
50:1 I. e. pleased, without regard to external objects, by self-contemplation alone.
50:2 Cf. Sutta Nipâta, p. 3.
50:3 The word subhâsubha in this sense also occurs in the Dhammapada, stanza 78, and in the Maitrî-upanishad, p. 34.
50:4 See on this, Wilson's Essays on Sanskrit Literature, vol. iii, p. 130.
50:5 I. e. when the desire is frustrated.
50:6 I. e. between right and wrong. Confusion of memory = forgetfulness of Sâstras and rules prescribed in them.
51:1 Cf. Sutta Nipâta, p. 45.
51:2 Cf. Maitrî-upanishad, p. 134, where the commentator explains it to mean freedom from desires.
51:3 For a somewhat similar use of the word bhâvanâ in this sense, comp. Dhammapada, stanza 301.
51:4 Spiritual matters are dark as night to the common run of men, while they are wide awake in all worldly pursuits. With the sage the case is exactly the reverse.
52:1 Either pride or, better, the false notion mentioned infra, p. 55.
52:2 An almost identical expression occurs in the Dhammapada, stanza 367, and Maitrî-upanishad, p. 37.
52:3 The state of identification of oneself with the Brahman, which results from a correct knowledge of the Brahman.
52:4 Infra, p. 66.
****************************
CHAPTER III.
Arguna said:
If, O Ganârdana! devotion is deemed by you to be superior to action, then why, O
Kesava! do you prompt me to (this) fearful action? You seem, indeed, to confuse
my mind by equivocal words. Therefore, declare one thing determinately, by which
I may attain the highest good.
The Deity said:
O sinless one! I have already declared, that in this world there is a twofold
path 5--that of the Sânkhyas by devotion in the shape of (true) knowledge; and
that of the Yogins by devotion in the shape of action. A man does not attain
freedom from action 6 merely by not engaging in action; nor does he attain
perfection 7 by mere 8 renunciation. For nobody ever remains even for an instant
without
p. 53
performing some action; since the qualities of nature constrain everybody, not
having free-will (in the matter), to some action 1. The deluded man who,
restraining the organs of action 2, continues to think in his mind about objects
of sense, is called a hypocrite. But he, O Arguna! who restraining his senses by
his mind 3. and being free from attachments, engages in devotion (in the shape)
of action, with the organs of action, is far superior. Do you perform prescribed
action, for action is better than inaction, and the support of your body, too,
cannot be accomplished with inaction. This world is fettered by all action other
than action for the purpose of the sacrifice 4. Therefore, O son of Kuntî! do
you, casting off attachment, perform action for that purpose. The Creator,
having in olden times created men together with the sacrifice, said: 'Propagate
with this. May it be the giver to you of the things you desire. Please the gods
with this, and may those gods please you. Pleasing each other, you will attain
the highest good. For pleased with the sacrifices, the gods will give you the
enjoyments you desire. And he who enjoys himself without giving them what they
have given, is, indeed, a thief.' The good, who eat the leavings of a sacrifice,
are released from all sins. But the unrighteous ones, who prepare food for
themselves only, incur sin 5.
p. 54
From food are born (all) creatures; from rain is the production of food; rain is
produced by sacrifices; sacrifices are the result of action; know that action
has its source in the Vedas; the Vedas come from the Indestructible. Therefore
the all-comprehending Vedas are always concerned with sacrifices 1. He who in
this world does not turn round the wheel revolving thus, is of sinful life,
indulging his senses, and, O son of Prithâ! he lives in vain. But the man who is
attached to his self only, who is contented in his self, and is pleased with his
self 2, has nothing to do. He has no interest at all in what is done, and none
whatever in what is not done, in this world 3; nor is any interest of his
dependent on any being. Therefore 4 always perform action, which must be
performed, without attachment. For a man, performing action without attachment,
attains the Supreme. By action alone, did Ganaka and the rest work for
perfection 5. And having regard also to the keeping of people (to their duties)
you should perform action. Whatever a great man does, that other men also do.
And people follow whatever he receives as authority. There is nothing, O son of
Prithâ! for me to do in (all) the three worlds,
p. 55
nothing to acquire which has not been acquired. Still I do engage in action. For
should I at any time not engage without sloth in action, men would follow in my
path from all sides, O son of Prithâ! If I did not perform actions, these worlds
would be destroyed, I should be the cause of caste interminglings; and I should
be ruining these people. As the ignorant act, O descendant of Bharata! with
attachment to action, so should a wise man act without attachment, wishing to
keep the people (to their duties). A wise man should not shake the convictions
of the ignorant who are attached to action, but acting with devotion (himself )
should make them apply themselves to all action. He whose mind is deluded by
egoism thinks himself the doer of the actions, which, in every way, are done by
the qualities of nature 1. But he, O you of mighty arms! who knows the truth
about the difference from qualities and the difference from actions 2, forms no
attachments, believing that qualities deal with qualities 3. But those who are
deluded by the qualities of nature form attachments to the actions of the
qualities 4. A man of perfect knowledge should not shake these men of imperfect
knowledge (in their convictions). Dedicating all actions to me with a mind
knowing the relation of the supreme and individual self, engage in battle
without
p. 56
desire, without (any feeling that this or that is) mine, and without any mental
trouble 1. Even those men who always act on this opinion of mine, full of faith,
and without carping, are released from all actions. But those who carp at my
opinion and do not act upon it, know them to be devoid of discrimination,
deluded as regards all knowledge 2, and ruined. Even a man of knowledge acts
consonantly to his own nature 3. All beings follow nature. What will restraint
effect? Every sense has its affections and aversions towards its objects fixed.
One should not become subject to them, for they are one's opponents 4. One's own
duty, though defective, is better than another's duty well performed. Death in
(performing) one's own duty is preferable; the (performance of the) duty of
others is dangerous.
Arguna said:
But by whom, O descendant of Vrishni! is man impelled, even though unwilling,
and, as it were, constrained by force, to commit sin?
p. 57
The Deity said:
It is desire, it is wrath 1, born from the quality of passion; it is very
ravenous, very sinful. Know that that is the foe in this world. As fire is
enveloped by smoke, a mirror by dust, the fœtus by the womb, so is this 2
enveloped by desire. Knowledge, O son of Kuntî! is enveloped by this constant
foe of the man of knowledge, in the shape of desire, which is like a fire 3 and
insatiable. The senses, the mind, and the understanding are said to be its seat
4; with these it deludes the embodied (self) after enveloping knowledge.
Therefore, O chief of the descendants of Bharata! first restrain your senses,
then cast off this sinful thing which destroys knowledge and experience 5. It
has been said 6, Great are the senses, greater than the senses is the mind,
greater than the mind is the understanding. What is greater than the
understanding is that 7. Thus knowing that which is higher than the
understanding, and restraining (your)self by (your)self, O you of mighty
p. 58
arms! destroy this unmanageable enemy in the shape of desire.
Footnotes
52:5 Supra, p. 47.
52:6 I. e., according to Sankara, identification of oneself with Brahman.
52:7 Final emancipation.
52:8 I. e. not coupled with knowledge and purity of heart.
53:1 Cf. infra, pp. 122-128.
53:2 Hands, feet, &c.
53:3 By means of true discrimination keeping the senses from attachments to
worldly objects, which lead to sin and evil.
53:4 Cf. infra, pp. 60, 61. Probably the 'sacrifices' spoken of in that passage
must be taken to be the same as those referred to in the Creator's injunction
mentioned in this passage.
53:5 Cf. Maitrî-upanishad, p. 143
54:1 The commentators explain this to mean that though the Vedas elucidate all
matters, their principal subject is the sacrifice.
54:2 The distinctions here are rather nice,--an ordinary man is 'attached' to
worldly objects, is 'contented' with goods &c., and is pleased' with special
gains.
54:3 No good or evil accrues to him from anything he does or omits to do.
54:4 Srîdhara says that Arguna is here told to perform action, as freedom from
it is only for the man of true knowledge, which Arguna is not as yet.
54:5 I. e. final emancipation; cf. p. 59 infra, and Îsopanishad, p. 6.
55:1 The active principle is nature, the aggregate of the three qualities; the
soul is only the looker-on;, cf. inter alia, p. 104 infra.
55:2 Scil. the difference of the soul from the collection of qualities, viz. the
body, senses. &c., and from the actions of which they are the authors.
55:3 Qualities (i. e. senses) deal with qualities, i. e. objects of sense.
55:4 I. e. all mundane affairs.
56:1 About the consequences of your actions.
56:2 Of actions, or of the Brahman in its various forms.
56:3 Which is the result of the virtues and vices of a preceding life. The
sequence of ideas here is as follows:--The true view stated here about the
'difference from qualities and actions' is disregarded by some, owing to their
nature' as now explained. Then the question is, if nature is so potent, what is
the good of the Sâstras? The answer is, Nature only acts through our likes and
dislikes. Withstand them and then you can follow the Sâstras. It is under the
influence of these likes and dislikes, that some may say, we shall practise
duties prescribed for others (our own being bad ones) as they are equally
prescribed by the Sâstras. That, as stated in the last sentence here, is wrong.
56:4 Cf. Sutta Nipâta, p. 101, as to 'likings and dislikings.'
57:1 Vide p. 50 supra.
57:2 I. e. knowledge, mentioned in the next sentence, for which construction p.
71 and p. 98 may be compared.
57:3 Which becomes more powerful the more it is fed.
57:4 The mind is that which ponders over things as such or such the
understanding is that which finally determines (cf. Lewes' History of
Philosophy, II, 463-465). These and the senses are the 'seat' of desire, because
the perception of an object by the sense, the pondering over it by the mind, and
the determination about it by the understanding are the preliminaries to the
awakening of the desire; supra, p. 50.
57:5 Knowledge is from books or teachers, experience is the result of personal
perception.
57:6 Kathopanishad, p. 114; and see also pp. 148, 149.
57:7 I. e. the supreme Being, as in the Kathopanishad.
*******************
CHAPTER IV.
The Deity said:
This everlasting 1 (system of) devotion I declared to the sun, the sun declared
it to Manu 2, and Manu communicated it to Ikshvâku. Coming thus by steps, it
became known to royal sages. But, O terror of (your) foes! that devotion was
lost to the world by long (lapse of) time. That same primeval devotion I have
declared to you to-day, seeing. that you are my devotee and friend, for it is
the highest mystery.
Arguna said:
Later is your birth the birth of the sun is prior. How then shall I understand
that you declared (this) first?
The Deity said:
I have passed through many births, O Arguna I and you also. I know them all, but
you, O terror of (your) foes! do not know them. Even though I am unborn and
inexhaustible in (my) essence, even though I am lord of all beings, still I take
up the control of my own nature 3, and am born by means
p. 59
of my delusive power. Whensoever, O descendant of Bharata! piety languishes, and
impiety is in the ascendant, I create myself. I am born age after age, for the
protection of the good, for the destruction of evil-doers, and the establishment
of piety. Whoever truly knows thus my divine birth and work, casts off (this)
body and is not born again. He comes to me, O Arguna! Many from whom affection,
fear 1, and wrath have departed, who are full of me, who depend on me, and who
are purified by the penance of knowledge 2, have come into my essence. I serve
men in the way in which they approach me 3. In every way, O son of Prithâ! men
follow in my path 4. Desiring the success of actions 5, men in this world
worship the divinities, for in this world of mortals, the success produced by
action is soon obtained. The fourfold division of castes was created by me
according to the apportionment of qualities and duties. But though I am its
author, know me to be inexhaustible, and not the author. Actions defile me not.
I have no attachment to the fruit of actions. He who knows me thus is not tied
down by actions. Knowing this, the men of old who wished for final emancipation,
performed action. Therefore do you, too, perform action as was done by men of
old in olden times. Even sages are confused as to what
p. 60
is action, what inaction. Therefore I will speak to you about action, and
learning that, you will be freed from (this world of) evil. One must possess
knowledge about action; one must also possess knowledge about prohibited action;
and again one must possess knowledge about inaction. The truth regarding action
is abstruse. He is wise among men, he is possessed of devotion, and performs all
actions 1, who sees inaction in action, and action in inaction. The wise call
him learned, whose acts are all free from desires and fancies, and whose actions
are burnt down by the fire of knowledge. Forsaking all attachment to the fruit
of action, always contented, dependent on none, he does nothing at all, though
he engages in action. Devoid of expectations, restraining the mind and the self,
and casting off all belongings 2, he incurs no sin, performing actions merely
for the sake of the body 3. Satisfied with earnings coming spontaneously 4,
rising above the pairs of opposites, free from all animosity, and equable on
success or ill-success, he is not fettered down, even though he performs
(actions). The acts of one who is devoid of attachment, who is free 5, whose
mind is fixed on knowledge, and who performs action for (the purpose of) the
sacrifice 6 are all destroyed.
p. 61
Brahman is the oblation; with Brahman (as a sacrificial instrument) it is
offered up; Brahman is in the fire; and by Brahman it is thrown; and Brahman,
too, is the goal to which he proceeds who meditates on Brahman in the action 1.
Some devotees perform the sacrifice to the gods, some offer up the sacrifice by
the sacrifice itself in the fire of Brahman 2. Others offer up the senses, such
as the sense of hearing and others, in the fires of restraint 3; others offer up
the objects of sense, such as sound and so forth, into the fires of the senses
4. Some again offer up all the operations of the senses and the operations of
the life-breaths into the fire of devotion by self-restraint 5, kindled by
knowledge. Others perform the sacrifice of wealth, the sacrifice of penance, the
sacrifice of concentration of mind, the sacrifice of Vedic study 6, and of
knowledge, and others are ascetics of rigid vows. Some offer up the upward
life-breath into the downward life-breath, and the downward life-breath into the
upper life-breath, and stopping up the motions of the upward and downward
life-breaths, devote themselves to the restraint of the life-breaths 7. Others,
who (take) limited food, offer up the life-breaths into
p. 62
the life-breaths. All of these, conversant with the sacrifice, have their sins
destroyed by the sacrifice. Those who eat the nectar-like leavings of the
sacrifice repair to the eternal Brahman 1. This world is not for those who
perform no sacrifice, whence (then) the other, O best of the Kauravas! Thus
sacrifices of various sorts are laid down in the Vedas. Know them all to be
produced from action 2, and knowing this you will be released (from the fetters
of this world). The sacrifice of knowledge, O terror of (your) foes! is superior
to the sacrifice of wealth, for action, O son of Prithâ! is wholly and entirely
comprehended in knowledge. That 3 you should learn by salutation, question, and
service 4. The men of knowledge who perceive the truth will teach knowledge to
you. Having learnt that, O son of Pându! you will not again fall thus into
delusion; and by means of it, you will see all beings, without exception, first
in yourself, and then in me 5. Even if you are the most sinful of all sinful
men, you will cross over all trespasses by means of the boat of knowledge alone.
As a fire well kindled, O Arguna! reduces fuel to ashes, so the fire of
knowledge reduces all actions to ashes 6. For there is in this world no means of
sanctification like knowledge 7, and that one perfected by devotion finds within
one's self in time. He who has faith, whose
p. 63
senses are restrained, and who is assiduous, obtains knowledge 1. Obtaining
knowledge, he acquires, without delay, the highest tranquillity. He who is
ignorant and devoid of faith, and whose self is full of misgivings, is ruined.
Not this world, not the next, nor happiness, is for him whose self is full of
misgivings. Actions, O Dhanañgaya! do not fetter one who is self-possessed 2,
who has renounced action by devotion, and who has destroyed misgivings by
knowledge. Therefore, O descendant of Bharata! destroy, with the sword of
knowledge, these misgivings of yours which fill your mind, and which are
produced from ignorance. Engage in devotion. Arise!
Footnotes
58:1 Because its fruit is imperishable, viz. final emancipation.
58:2 In the Khândogya-upanishad, Manu is the channel of communication for some
doctrine taught by Pragâpati, which Manu teaches the 'people,' interpreted by
Sankara to mean Ikshvâku, &c. (p. 178; see too p. 625).
58:3 Nature is what goes to the formation of the material form in which he is
born; the 'power' includes knowledge, omnipotence, &c. It is delusive because he
is still really 'unborn.'
59:1 Cf. Sutta Nipâta, p. 73.
59:2 Cf. infra, p. 61.
59:3 I. e. I give to each worshipper what is proper for him.
59:4 The original words used here occur before in a different sense (see p. 55).
Here the meaning is that to whomsoever directly addressed, all worship is
worship of me (see p. 84). In the whole passage, Krishna says that the Deity is
not chargeable with partiality on account of the variety of human qualities and
states.
59:5 Such as acquisition of sons, cattle, &c.
60:1 Devoted though performing all actions.
60:2 'Appropriating nothing,' at Sutta Nipâta, p. 101, seems to be the same
idea. 'Self' just before this means senses.
60:3 Preferably, perhaps, 'with the body only.' But Sankara rejects this.
60:4 Cf. infra, p. 101; and Sutta Nipâta, p. 12.
60:5 The commentators vary in their interpretations of this word (mukta), but
the common point appears to be 'free from attachment to worldly concerns,' Cf.
Sutta Nipâta, p. 8.
60:6 Sacrifice here apparently means every act for the attainment of p. 61 the
supreme; cf. supra, p. 53. In Âsvalâyana Grihya-sûtra III, 1, 5, a text is cited
meaning 'salutation verily is a sacrifice.'
61:1 This thorough identification with the Brahman explains why the action is
'destroyed' and does not 'fetter' the doer.
61:2 I. e. all acts, religious and other, offered up to the Brahman in the mode
above stated.
61:3 Practise 'yoga' and other like exercises.
61:4 Remaining unattached to sensuous enjoyments.
61:5 Stopping the bodily operations mentioned, and engaging in contemplation.
61:6 This is called Brahmayagña, Âsvalâyana Grihya-sûtra III, 1, 3.
61:7 Maitrî-upanishad, p. 129.
62:1 Supra, p. 53.
62:2 Operations of mind, senses, &c.; cf. supra, p. 54.
62:3 I. e. knowledge.
62:4 Addressed to men of knowledge. Cf. Mundakopanishad, p. 282.
62:5 The essential unity of the supreme and individual soul and the whole
universe. Cf. Îsopanishad, pp. 13, 14.
62:6 Supra, p. 60.
62:7 Sutta Nipâta, p. 48.
63:1 Sutta Nipâta, p. 49.
63:2 Cautious, free from heedlessness.
***************
CHAPTER V.
Arguna said:
O Krishna! you praise renunciation of actions and also the pursuit (of them).
Tell me determinately which one of these two is superior.
The Deity said:
Renunciation and pursuit of action are both instruments of happiness. But of the
two, pursuit of action is superior to renunciation of action. He should be
understood to be always an ascetic 3, who has no aversion and no desire. For, O
you of mighty arms! he who is free from the pairs of opposites is easily
released from (all) bonds. Children--not wise men--talk of sankhya and yoga as
p. 64
distinct. One who pursues either well obtains the fruit of both. The seat which
the sânkhyas obtain is reached by the yogas 1 also. He sees (truly), who sees
the sânkhya and yoga as one. Renunciation, O you of mighty arms! is difficult to
reach without devotion; the sage possessed of devotion attains Brahman 2 without
delay. He who is possessed of devotion, whose self is pure, who has restrained
his self 3, and who has controlled his senses, and who identifies his self with
every being, is not tainted though he performs (actions). The man of devotion,
who knows the truth, thinks he does nothing at all, when he sees 4, hears,
touches, smells, eats, move-b, sleeps, breathes, talks, throws out 5, takes,
opens or closes the eyelids; he holds that the senses deal with the objects of
the senses. He who, casting off (all) attachment, performs actions dedicating
them to Brahman, is not tainted by sin, as the lotus-leaf 6 (is not tainted) by
water. Devotees, casting off attachment, perform actions for attaining purity of
self, with the body, the mind, the understanding, or even the senses 7--(all)
free (from
p. 65
egoistic notions). He who is possessed of devotion, abandoning the fruit of
actions, attains the highest tranquillity. He who is without devotion, and
attached to the fruit (of action), is tied down by (reason of his) acting in
consequence of (some) desire. The self-restrained, embodied (self) lies at case
within the city of nine portals 1, renouncing all actions by the mind, not doing
nor causing (any thing) to be done. The Lord is not the cause of actions, or of
the capacity of performing actions amongst men, or of the connexion of action
and fruit. But nature only works. The Lord receives no one's sin, nor merit
either. Knowledge is enveloped by ignorance, hence all creatures are deluded 2.
But to those who have destroyed that ignorance by knowledge of the self, (such)
knowledge, like the sun, shows forth that supreme (principle). And those whose
mind is (centred) on it, whose (very) self it is, who are thoroughly devoted to
it, and whose final goal it is, go never to return, having their sins destroyed
by knowledge. The wise look upon a Brâhmana possessed of learning and humility,
on a cow, an elephant, a dog, and a Svapâka, as alike 3. Even here, those have
conquered the material world, whose mind rests in equability 4; since Brahman is
free from defects and equable, therefore they rest in
p. 66
Brahman. He who knows Brahman, whose mind is steady, who is not deluded, and who
rests in Brahman, does not exult on finding anything agreeable, nor does he
grieve on finding anything disagreeable 1. One whose self is not attached to
external objects, obtains the happiness that is in (one's) self; and by means of
concentration of mind, joining one's self (with the Brahman), one obtains
indestructible happiness. For the enjoyments born of contact (between senses and
their objects) are, indeed, sources of misery; they have a beginning as well as
an end 2. O son of Kuntî! a wise man feels no pleasure in them. He who even in
this world, before his release from the body, is able to bear the agitations
produced from desire and wrath, is a devoted man, he is a happy man. The devotee
whose happiness is within (himself), whose recreation is within (himself), and
whose light (of knowledge) also is within (himself), becoming (one with) the
Brahman 3, obtain the Brahmic bliss 4. The sages whose sins have perished, whose
misgivings are destroyed, who are self-restrained, and who are intent on the
welfare of all beings 5, obtain the Brahmic bliss. To the ascetics, who are free
from desire and wrath 6, and whose minds are restrained, and who have knowledge
of the self, the Brahmic bliss is on both sides (of death). The sage who
excludes (from his mind)
p. 67
external objects, (concentrates) the visual power between the brows 1, and
making the upward and downward life-breaths even, confines their movements
within the nose, who restrains senses, mind, and understanding 2, whose highest
goal is final emancipation, from whom desire, fear, and wrath have departed, is,
indeed, for ever released (from birth and death). He knowing me to be the
enjoyer of all sacrifices and penances, the great Lord of all worlds, and the
friend of all beings, attains tranquillity.
Footnotes
63:3 I. e. one who has performed 'renunciation.'
64:1 Those who follow the yoga 'path.' The form is noteworthy, grammatically.
64:2 I. e. 'attains true renunciation,' says Sankara; Srîdhara says, 'attains
Brahman, after becoming a "renouncer."'
64:3 Here self is explained as body; in the line which goes before it is
explained as heart.
64:4 These are the various operations of the organs of perception, action, &c.
64:5 Excretions, &c.
64:6 A very common simile. Cf. inter alia Khândogya-upanishad, p. 276; Sutta
Nipâta, pp. 107-134; and Davids' Buddhism, p. 158 note.
64:7 Body = bathing, &c.; mind = meditation, &c.; understanding = ascertainment
of truth; senses = hearing and celebrating God's name.
65:1 Cf. Prasnopanishad, p. 202; Svetâsvatara, p. 332; Sutta Nipâta, p. 52. The
Kathopanishad has eleven portals (p. 132). The nine are the eyes, nostrils,
ears, mouth, and the two for excretions.
65:2 As regards the Lord's relation to man's merit or sin.
65:3 As manifestations of Brahman, though of different qualities and classes. As
to Svapâka, a very low caste, see Sutta Nipâta, p. 36.
65:4 As stated in the preceding words.
66:1 Kathopanishad, p. 100.
66:2 Cf. supra, p. 44.
66:3 He is one with the Brahman as he is intent exclusively on the Brahman.
66:4 The bliss of assimilation with the Brahman, or, as Râmânuga puts it, the
bliss of direct knowledge of the self.
66:5 Sutta Nipâta, p. 39; also Davids' Buddhism, p. 109.
66:6 Cf. Sutta Nipâta, p. 3.
67:1 Cf. infra, p. 18.
67:2 p. 57 and Kathopanishad, p. 157.
************
CHAPTER VI.
The Deity said:
He who, regardless of the fruit of actions, performs the actions which ought to
be performed, is the devotee and renouncer; not he who discards the (sacred)
fires 3, nor he who performs no acts. Know, O son of Pându! that what is called
renunciation is devotion; for nobody becomes a devotee who has not renounced
(all) fancies 4. To the sage who wishes to rise to devotion, action is said to
be a means, and to him, when he has risen to devotion, tranquillity 5 is said to
be a means. When one does not attach oneself to objects of sense, nor to action,
renouncing all fancies, then is one said to have risen to devotion. (A man)
should elevate his self by his self 6; he should not debase his self, for even
(a man's) own self is his
p. 68
friend, (a man's) own self is also his enemy 1. To him who has subjugated his
self by his self 2, his self is a friend; but to him who has not restrained his
self, his own self behaves inimically, like an enemy. The self of one who has
subjugated his self and is tranquil, is absolutely concentrated (on itself), in
the midst of cold and heat, pleasure and pain, as well as honour and dishonour.
The devotee whose self is contented with knowledge and experience 3, who is
unmoved 4, who has restrained his senses, and to whom a sod, a stone, and gold
are alike, is said to be devoted. And he is esteemed highest, who thinks alike 5
about well-wishers, friends, and enemies, and those who are indifferent, and
those who take part with both sides, and those who are objects of hatred, and
relatives, as well as about the good and the sinful. A devotee should constantly
devote his self to abstraction, remaining in a secret place 6, alone, with his
mind and self 7 restrained, without expectations, and without belongings. Fixing
his seat firmly in a clean 8 place, not too high nor too low, and covered over
with a sheet of cloth, a deerskin, and (blades of) Kusa (grass),--and there
seated on (that) seat, fixing his mind exclusively on one point, with the
workings of the mind and senses
p. 69
restrained, he should practice devotion for purity of self. Holding his body,
head, and neck even and unmoved, (remaining) steady, looking at the tip of his
own nose 1, and not looking about in (all) directions, with a tranquil self,
devoid of fear, and adhering to the rules of Brahmakârins 2, he should restrain
his mind, and (concentrate it) on me, and sit down engaged in devotion,
regarding me as his final goal. Thus constantly devoting his self to
abstraction, a devotee whose mind is restrained, attains that tranquillity which
culminates in final emancipation, and assimilation with me. Devotion is not his,
O Arguna! who eats too much, nor his who cats not at all; not his who is
addicted to too much sleep, nor his who is (ever) awake. That devotion which
destroys (all) misery is his, who takes due food and exercise 3, who toils duly
in all works, and who sleeps and awakes (in) due (time) 4. When (a man's) mind
well restrained becomes steady upon the self alone, then he being indifferent to
all objects of desire, is said to be devoted. As a light standing in a windless
(place) flickers not, that is declared to be the parallel for a devotee, whose
mind is restrained, and who devotes his self to abstraction. That (mental
condition), in which the mind restrained by practice of abstraction, ceases to
work; in which too, one seeing the self by the self 5, is pleased in
p. 70
the self; in which one experiences that infinite happiness which transcends the
senses, and which can be grasped by the understanding only; and adhering to
which, one never swerves from the truth; acquiring which, one thinks no other
acquisition higher than it; and adhering to which, one is not shaken off even by
great misery; that should be understood to be called devotion in which there is
a severance of all connexion with pain. That devotion should be practised with
steadiness and with an undesponding heart. Abandoning, without exception, all
desires 1, which are produced from fancies, and restraining the whole group of
the senses on all sides by the mind only 2, one should by slow steps become
quiescent 3, with a firm resolve coupled with courage 4; and fixing his mind
upon the self, should think of nothing. Wherever the active and unsteady mind
breaks forth 5, there one should ever restrain it, and fix it steadily on the
self alone. The highest happiness comes to such a devotee, whose mind is fully
tranquil, in whom the quality of passion has been suppressed, who is free from
sin, and who is become (one with) the Brahman. Thus constantly devoting his self
to abstraction, a devotee, freed from sin, easily obtains that supreme
happiness--contact with the Brahman 6. He who has devoted his self to
abstraction, by devotion, looking alike on everything, sees the self abiding in
all beings, and all beings in
p. 71
the self 1. To him who sees me in everything, and everything in me, I am never
lost, and he is not lost to me 2. The devotee who worships me abiding in all
beings, holding that all is one 3, lives in me, however he may be living 4. That
devotee, O Arguna! is deemed to be the best, who looks alike on pleasure or
pain, whatever it may be, in all (creatures), comparing. all with his own
(pleasure or pain) 5.
Arguna said:
I cannot see, O destroyer of Madhu! (how) the sustained existence (is to be
secured) of this devotion by means of equanimity which you have declared-in
consequence of fickleness. For, O Krishna! the mind is fickle, boisterous 6
strong, and obstinate; and I think that to restrain it is as difficult as (to
restrain) the wind.
The Deity said:
Doubtless, O you of mighty arms! the mind is difficult to restrain, and fickle
7. Still, O son of Kuntî! it may be restrained by constant practice and by
indifference (to worldly objects). It is my belief, that devotion is hard to
obtain for one who does not restrain his self. But by one who is self-restrained
p. 72
and assiduous, it can be obtained through (proper) expedients.
Arguna said:
What is the end of him, O Krishna! who does not attain the consummation of his
devotion, being not assiduous 1, and having a mind shaken off from devotion,
(though) full of faith? Does he, fallen from both (paths) 2, go to ruin like a
broken cloud, being, O you of mighty arms! without support, and deluded on the
path (leading) to the Brahman? Be pleased, O Krishna! to entirely destroy this
doubt of mine, for none else than you can destroy this doubt.
The Deity said:
O son of Prithâ! neither in this world nor the next, is ruin for him; for, O
dear friend! none who performs good (deeds) comes to an evil end. He who is
fallen from devotion attains the worlds of those who perform meritorious acts,
dwells (there) for many a year, and is afterwards born into a family of holy and
illustrious 3 men. Or he is even born into a family of talented devotees; for
such a birth as that in this world is more difficult to obtain. There he comes
into contact with the knowledge which belonged to him in his former body, and
then again, O descendant of Kuru! he works for perfection 4. For even though
reluctant 5, he is led away by the
p. 73
self-same former practice, and although he only wishes to learn devotion, he
rises above the (fruits of action laid down in the) divine word. But the devotee
working with great efforts 1, and cleared of his sins, attains perfection after
many births, and then reaches the supreme goal. The devotee is esteemed higher
than the performers of penances, higher even than the men of knowledge, and the
devotee is higher than the men of action; therefore, O Arguna! become a devotee.
And even among all devotees, he who, being full of faith, worships me, with his
inmost self intent on me, is esteemed by me to be the most devoted.
Footnotes
67:3 Which are required for ordinary religious rites.
67:4 Which are the cause of desires; see supra, p. 50.
67:5 Abandonment of distracting actions; means scil. to perfect knowledge, says
Srîdhara.
67:6 I. e. by means of a mind possessed of true discrimination.
68:1 Self is here explained as mind, the unsteadiness of which prevents the
acquisition of devotion, p. 71
68:2 This means restraining senses by mind. See Maitrî-upanishad, p. 180.
68:3 Supra, p. 57.
68:4 By any of the vexations of the world.
68:5 I. e. is free from affection or aversion towards them.
68:6 'Release from society' is insisted on at Sutta Nipâta, p. 55.
68:7 Self is here explained as senses; in the previous clause as mind.
68:8 This requisite is prescribed by many authorities. Cf. Khândogya-upanishad,
p. 626; Maitrî, p. 156) Svetâsvatara, pp. 318-319 and Âsvalâyana (Grihya-sûtra)
III, 2, 2, for Vedic study too.
69:1 Cf. Kumârasambhava, Canto III, 47. This is done in order to prevent the
sight from rambling--a total closing of the eyes being objectionable as leading
to sleep.
69:2 See these in Âpastamba (p. 7 in this series); and cf. Sutta Nipâta, pp.
159, 160; and Müller's Hibbert Lectures, p. 158.
69:3 Cf. Sutta Nipâta, pp. 28, 95.
69:4 Buddhism shows similar injunctions. Cf. Sutta Nipâta, pp. 21, 28, 95; and
Dhammapada, stanza. 8.
69:5 Sees the highest principle by a mind purified by abstraction.
70:1 Cf. Sutta Nipâta, p. 62.
70:2 Cf. supra, p. 53.
70:3 I. e. cease to think of objects of sense. Cf. supra, p. 69.
70:4 I. e. an undespairing and firm resolution that devotion will be achieved
ultimately.
70:5 Cf. Sutta Nipâta, p. 106.
70:6 Assimilation with the Brahman.
71:1 Realises the essential unity of everything.
71:2 He has access to me, and I am kind to him.
71:3 Cf. Îsopanishad, p. 13.
71:4 'Even abandoning all action,' says Srîdhara; and cf. infra, p. 105.
71:5 Who believes that pleasure and pain are as much liked or disliked by others
as by himself, and puts himself in fact in the place of others.
71:6 Troublesome to the body, senses, &c.
71:7 Cf. Dhammapada, stanza 33 seq.
72:1 Cf. p. 73 infra.
72:2 The path to heaven, and that to final emancipation.
72:3 Kings or emperors,' says Madhusûdana.
72:4 I. e. final emancipation.
72:5 'As Arguna himself,' says Madhusûdana, 'receives instruction in knowledge,
though he comes to the battle-field without any such object; hence it was said
before, "nothing is here abortive."' See p. 47.
73:1 As distinguished from the others who work half-heartedly, so to say. See p.
72.
********************
CHAPTER VII.
The Deity said:
O son of Prithâ! now hear how you can without doubt know me fully, fixing your
mind on me, and resting in me, and practising devotion. I will now tell you
exhaustively about knowledge together with experience; that being known, there
is nothing further left in this world to know. Among thousands of men, only some
2 work for perfection 3; and even of those who have reached perfection, and who
are assiduous, only some know me truly. Earth, water, fire, air, space, mind,
understanding,
p. 74
and egoism 1, thus is my nature divided eightfold. But this is a lower (form of
my) nature. Know (that there is) another (form of my) nature, and higher than
this, which is animate, O you of mighty arms! and by which this universe is
upheld. Know that all things have these (for their) source 2. I am the producer
and the destroyer of the whole universe. There is nothing else, O Dhanañgaya!
higher than myself; all this is woven upon me, like numbers of pearls upon a
thread 3. I am the taste in water, O son of Kuntî! I am the light of the sun and
moon. I am 'Om 4' in all the Vedas, sound 5 in space, and manliness in human
beings; I am the fragrant smell in the earth, refulgence in the fire; I am life
in all beings, and penance 6 in those who perform penance. Know me, O son of
Prithâ! to be the eternal seed of all beings; I am the discernment of the
discerning ones, and I the glory of the glorious 7. I am also the strength,
unaccompanied by fondness or desire 8, of the strong. And, O chief of the
descendants of Bharata! I am love unopposed to piety 9 among all
p. 75
beings. And all entities which are of the quality of goodness, and those which
are of the quality of passion and of darkness, know that they are, indeed, all
from me; I am not in them, but they are in me 1. The whole universe deluded by
these three states of mind, developed from the qualities, does not know me, who
am beyond them and inexhaustible; for this delusion of mine, developed from the
qualities, is divine and difficult to transcend. Those cross beyond this
delusion who resort to me alone. Wicked men, doers of evil (acts), who are
deluded, who are deprived of their knowledge by (this) delusion, and who incline
to the demoniac state of mind 2, do not resort to me. But, O Arguna! doers of
good (acts) of four classes worship me: one who is distressed, one who is
seeking after knowledge, one who wants wealth, and one, O chief of the
descendants of Bharata! who is possessed of knowledge. Of these, he who is
possessed of knowledge, who is always devoted, and whose worship is (addressed)
to one (Being) only, is esteemed highest. For to the man of knowledge I am dear
above all things, and he is dear to me. All these are noble. But the man
possessed of knowledge is deemed by me to be my own self. For he with (his) self
devoted to abstraction, has taken to me as the goal than which there is nothing
higher. At the end of many lives, the man possessed of knowledge approaches me,
(believing) that Vâsudeva is everything. Such a high-souled man is very hard to
find. Those who are deprived of knowledge by various desires approach other
p. 76
divinities, observing various regulations 1, and controlled by their own natures
2. Whichever form (of deity) any worshipper wishes to worship with faith, to
that form I render his faith steady. Possessed Of that faith, he seeks to
propitiate (the deity in) that (form), and obtains from it those beneficial
things which he desires, (though they are) really given by me. But the fruit
thus (obtained) by them, who have little judgment, is perishable. Those who
worship the divinities go to the divinities 3, and my worshippers, too, go to
me. The undiscerning ones, not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible
essence, than which there is nothing higher, think me, who am unperceived, to
have become perceptible 4. Surrounded by the delusion of my mystic power 5, I am
not manifest to all. This deluded world knows not me unborn and inexhaustible. I
know, O Arguna! the things which have been, those which are, and those which are
to be. But me nobody knows. All beings, O terror of (your) foes! are deluded at
the time of birth by the delusion, O descendant of Bharata! caused by the pairs
of opposites arising from desire and aversion. But the men of meritorious
actions, whose sins have terminated, worship me, being released from the
delusion (caused) by the pairs of
p. 77
opposites, and being firm in their beliefs 1. Those who, resting on me, work for
release from old age and death 2, know the Brahman 3, the whole Adhyâtma, and
all action. And those who know me with the Adhibhûta, the Adhidaiva, and the
Adhiyagña, having minds devoted to abstraction, know me at the time of departure
(from this world).
Footnotes
73:2 'Some one' in the original.
73:3 I. e. knowledge of the self. Sankara says, as to the next clause, that
those even who work for final emancipation must be deemed to have 'reached
perfection.'
74:1 This accords with the Sânkhya philosophy. See chapter I. sutra 61 of the
current aphorisms.
74:2 Cf. infra, p. 105.
74:3 Cf. Mundakopanishad, p. 298.
74:4 Infra, p. 79. Cf. Goldstücker's Remains, I, 14, 122; Yoga-sûtras I, 27.
74:5 I. e. the occult essence which underlies all these and the other qualities
of the various things mentioned.
74:6 I. e. power to bear the pairs of opposites.
74:7 Glory here seems to mean dignity, greatness.
74:8 Desire is the wish to obtain new things; fondness is the anxiety to retain
what has been obtained. The strength here spoken of, therefore, is that which is
applied to the performance of one's own duties only.
74:9 I. e. indulged within the bounds allowed by the rules of the Sâstras,
namely, for the procreation of sons &c. only.
75:1 They do not dominate over me, I rule them.
75:2 Infra, p. 115.
76:1 Fasts and so forth.
76:2 Which are the result of the actions done in previous lives.
76:3 And the divinities are not eternal, so the fruit obtained is ephemeral.
76:4 The ignorant do not know the real divinity of Vishnu, thinking him to be no
higher than as he is seen in the human form. This gives them an inadequate
notion of the purity and eternity of the happiness to be obtained by worshipping
him; cf. infra, p. 83.
76:5 The veil surrounding me is created by my mysterious power, and that
everybody cannot pierce through; cf. Katha, p. 117.
77:1 Concerning the supreme principle and the mode of worshipping it.
77:2 Cf. infra, p. 109.
77:3 See the next chapter.
************************
CHAPTER VIII.
Arguna said:
What is that Brahman, what the Adhyâtma, and what, O best of beings! is action?
And what is called the Adhibhûta? And who is the Adhiyagña, and how in this
body, O destroyer of Madhu? And how, too, are you to be known at the time of
departure (from this world) by those who restrain their selfs?
The Deity said:
The Brahman is the supreme, the indestructible. Its manifestation (as an
individual self) is called the Adhyâtma. The offering (of an oblation to any
divinity), which is the cause of the production and development of all things,
is named action. The Adhibhûta is all perishable things. The Adhidaivata is the
(primal) being. And the Adhiyagña, O best of embodied (beings)! is I myself in
this body 4.
p. 78
And he who leaves this body and departs (from this world) remembering me in
(his) last moments, comes into my essence. There is no doubt of that. Also
whichever form 1 (of deity) he remembers when he finally leaves this body, to
that he goes, O son of Kuntî! having been used to ponder on it. Therefore, at
all times remember me, and engage in battle. Fixing your mind and understanding
on me, you will come to me, there is no doubt. He who thinks of the supreme
divine Being, O son of Prithâ! with a mind not (running) to other (objects), and
possessed of abstraction in the shape of continuous meditation (about the
supreme), goes to him. He who, possessed of reverence (for the supreme Being)
with a steady mind, and with the power of devotion, properly concentrates the
life-breath between the brows 2, and meditates on the ancient Seer, the ruler,
more minute than the minutest atom 3, the supporter of all, who is of an
unthinkable form, whose brilliance is like that of the sun, and who is beyond
all darkness 4, he attains to that transcendent and divine Being. I 5 will tell
you briefly about the seat, which those who know the Vedas declare to be
indestructible; which entered by ascetics from whom all desires have departed;
and wishing for which, people pursue the
p. 79
mode of life of Brahmakârins 1. He who leaves the body and departs (from this
world), stopping up all passages 2, and confining the mind within the heart 3,
placing the life-breath in the head, and adhering to uninterrupted meditation 4,
repeating the single syllable 'Om,' (signifying) the eternal Brahman 5, and
meditating on me, he reaches the highest goal. To the devotee who constantly
practises abstraction, O son of Prithâ! and who with a mind not (turned) to
anything else, is ever and constantly meditating on me, I am easy of access. The
high-souled ones, who achieve the highest perfection, attaining to me, do not
again come to life, which is transient, a home of woes 6. All worlds, O Arguna!
up to the world of Brahman, are (destined) to return 7. But, O son of Kuntî!
after attaining to me, there is no birth again. Those who know a day of Brahman
to end after one thousand ages, and the night to terminate after one thousand
ages, are the persons
p. 80
who know day and night 1. On the advent of day, all perceptible things are
produced from the unperceived; and on the advent of night they dissolve in that
same (principle) called the unperceived. This same assemblage of entities, being
produced again and again, dissolves on the advent of night, and, O son of
Prithâ! issues forth on the advent of day, without a will of its own 2. But
there is another entity, unperceived and eternal, and distinct from this
unperceived (principle), which is not destroyed when all entities are destroyed.
It is called the unperceived, the indestructible; they call it the highest goal.
Attaining to it, none returns 3. That is my supreme abode. That supreme Being, O
son of Prithâ! he in whom all these entities dwell 4, and by whom all this is
permeated, is to be attained to by reverence not (directed) to another. I will
state the times, O descendant of Bharata! at which devotees departing (from this
world) go, never to return, or to return. The fire, the flame 5, the day,
p. 81
the bright fortnight, the six months of the northern solstice, departing (from
the world) in these, those who know the Brahman go to the Brahman. Smoke, night,
the dark fortnight, the six months of the southern solstice, (dying) in these,
the devotee goes to the lunar light and returns 1. These two paths, bright and
dark, are deemed to be eternal in this world 2. By the one, (a man) goes never
to return, by the other he comes back. Knowing these two paths, O son of Prithâ!
no devotee is deluded 3. Therefore at all times be possessed of devotion, O
Arguna! A devotee knowing all this 4, obtains all the holy fruit which is
prescribed for (study of) the Vedas, for sacrifices, and also for penances and
gifts, and he attains to the highest and primeval seat.
Footnotes
77:4 Adhyâtma where it occurs before (e. g. p. 55) has been rendered 'the
relation between the supreme and individual soul.' As to p. 78 action, cf. pp.
53, 54. Adhibhûta is apparently the whole inanimate creation, and Adhidaivata is
the being supposed to dwell in the sun. Adhiyagña is Krishna. Cf. too pp. 113,
114.
78:1 Some commentators say 'whatever thing' generally. The 'form' remembered in
one's last moments would be that which had been most often meditated on during
life.
78:2 Cf. supra, p. 67.
78:3 Katha, p. 105; Svetâsvatara, p. 333.
78:4 Cf. Svetâsvatara-upanishad, p. 327.
78:5 Kathopanishad, p. 102.
79:1 As to Brahmakârins, see supra, p. 69.
79:2 'The senses,' say the commentators. Might it not refer to the 'nine
portals' at p. 65 supra? See also, however, p. 108.
79:3 I. e. thinking of nothing, making the mind cease to work. Cf.
Maitrî-upanishad, p. 179.
79:4 Cf. Maitrî-upanishad, p. 130, uninterrupted, like 'oil when poured out,'
says the commentator.
79:5 Cf. Khândogya-upanishad, p. 151; Mândukya, pp. 330-388 (Om is all-past,
present, and future); Nrisimha Tâpinî, pp. 110, 117, 171; Maitrî, p. 140;
Prasna, p. 220. On the opening passage of the Khândogya, Sankara says, 'Om is
the closest designation of the supreme Being. He is pleased when it is
pronounced, as people are at the mention of a favourite name.' See also Max
Müller, Hibbert Lectures, p. 84; Goldstücker's Remains, I, 122.
79:6 See infra, p. 86; and cf. Sutta Nipâta, p. 125.
79:7 They are only temporary, not the everlasting seats of the soul.
80:1 Cf. Manu I, 73. Sankara says, that this explains why the abodes of Brahmâ
and others are said to be not lasting. They are limited by time. As to ages,
Srîdhara says, a human year is a day and night of the gods. Twelve thousand
years made of such days and nights make up the four ages: one thousand such,
'quaternions of ages' make up a day, and another thousand a night of Brahmâ. Of
such days and nights Brahmâ has a hundred years to live. At the close of his
life, the universe is destroyed.
80:2 Cf. p. 82 infra; also Manu-smriti I, 52; and Kâlidâsa's Kumârasambhava II,
8.
80:3 Cf. Kathopanishad, p. 149; and also p. 112 infra.
80:4 I. e. by whom, as the cause of them, all these entities are supported; cf.
p. 82 infra.
80:5 Srîdhara understands 'the time when,' in the sentence preceding this, to
mean the path indicated by a deity presiding over p. 81 time, by which;' and the
fire-flame as included in this, though having no connexion with time. Sankara
agrees, though he also suggests that fire means a deity presiding over time. I
own I have no clear notion of the meaning of these verses. Cf. Khândogya, p.
342; Brihad-âranyaka-upanishad, p. 1057 seq.
81:1 Cf. Prasna-upanishad, p. 64; and Sârîraka Bhâshya, p. 747 seq.
81:2 I. e. for those who are fitted for knowledge or action.
81:3 I. e. does not desire heaven, but devotes himself to the supreme Being,
seeing that heavenly bliss is only temporary.
81:4 All that is stated in this chapter.
****************
CHAPTER IX.
Now I will speak to you, who are not given to carping, of that most mysterious
knowledge, accompanied by experience, by knowing which you will be released from
evil. It is the chief among the sciences, the chief among the mysteries. It is
the best means of sanctification. It is imperishable, not
p. 82
opposed to the sacred law. It is to be apprehended directly 1, and is easy to
practise. O terror of your foes! those men who have no faith in this holy
doctrine, return to the path of this mortal world, without attaining to me. This
whole universe is pervaded by me in an unperceived form. All entities live in
me, but I do not live in them 2. Nor yet do all entities live in me. See my
divine power. Supporting all entities and producing all entities, my self lives
not in (those) entities. As the great and ubiquitous atmosphere always remains
in space, know that similarly all entities live in me 3. At the expiration of a
Kalpa, O son of Kuntî! all entities enter my nature; and at the beginning of a
Kalpa, I again bring them forth. Taking the control of my own nature 4, I bring
forth again and again this whole collection of entities, without a will of its
own 5, by the power of nature. But, O Arguna! these actions do not fetter 6 me,
who remain like one unconcerned, and who am unattached to those actions. Nature
gives birth to movables and immovables through me, the supervisor, and by reason
of that 7, O son of Kuntî! the universe revolves. Deluded people of vain hopes,
vain acts, vain
p. 83
knowledge 1, whose minds are disordered, and who are inclined to the delusive
nature of Asuras and Râkshasas, not knowing my highest nature as great lord of
all entities, disregard me as I have assumed a human body 2. But the high-souled
ones, O son of Prithâ! who are inclined to the godlike nature, knowing me as the
inexhaustible source of (all) entities, worship me with minds not (turned)
elsewhere.
Constantly glorifying me, and exerting themselves 3, firm in their vows 4, and
saluting me with reverence,
they worship me, being always devoted. And others again, offering up the
sacrifice of knowledge, worship me as one, as distinct, and as all-pervading in
numerous forms 5. I am the Kratu 6, I am the Yagña, I am the Svadhâ, I the
product of the herbs. I am the sacred verse. I too am the sacrificial butter,
and I the fire, I the offering 7. I am the father of this universe, the mother,
the creator, the grandsire, the thing to be known, the means of sanctification,
the syllable Om 8, the Rik, Sâman, and Yagus also; the goal, the sustainer, the
lord, the supervisor, the
p. 84
residence 1, the asylum, the friend, the source, and that in which it merges,
the support, the receptacle, and the inexhaustible seed. I cause heat and I send
forth and stop showers. I am immortality and also death; and I, O Arguna! am
that which is and that which is not 2. Those who know the three (branches of)
knowledge, who drink the Soma juice, whose sins are washed away, offer
sacrifices and pray to me for a passage into heaven; and reaching the holy world
of the lord of gods, they enjoy in the celestial regions the celestial pleasures
of the gods. And having enjoyed that great heavenly world, they enter the mortal
world when (their) merit is exhausted 3. Thus those who wish for objects of
desire, and resort to the ordinances of the three (Vedas), obtain (as the fruit)
going and coming. To those men who worship me, meditating on me and on no one
else, and who are constantly devoted, I give new gifts and preserve what is
acquired by them 4. Even those, O son of Kuntî! who being devotees of other
divinities worship with faith, worship me only, (but) irregularly 5. For I am
the enjoyer as well as the lord 6 of all sacrifices. But they know me not truly,
therefore do they fall 7. Those who make vows 8 to the gods go to the gods;
p. 85
those who make vows to the manes go to the manes, those who worship the Bhûtas
go to the Bhûtas; and those likewise who worship me go to me. Whoever with
devotion offers me leaf, flower, fruit, water, that, presented with devotion, I
accept from him whose self is pure. Whatever you do, O son of Kuntî! whatever
you eat, whatever sacrifice you make, whatever you give, whatever penance you
perform, do that as offered to me 1. Thus will you be released from the bonds of
action, the fruits of which are agreeable or disagreeable. And with your self
possessed of (this) devotion, (this) renunciation 2, you will be released (from
the bonds of action) and will come to me. I am alike to all beings; to me none
is hateful, none dear. But those who worship me with devotion (dwell) in me 3,
and I too in them. Even if a very ill-conducted man worships me, not worshipping
any one else, he must certainly be deemed to be good, for he has well resolved
4. He soon becomes devout of heart, and obtains lasting tranquillity. (You may)
affirm, O son of Kuntî! that my devotee is never ruined. For, O son of Prithâ!
even those who are of sinful birth 5, women, Vaisyas; and Sûdras likewise,
resorting to me, attain the supreme goal. What then (need
p. 86
be said of) holy Brâhmanas and royal saints who are (my) devotees? Coming to
this transient unhappy 1 world, worship me. (Place your) mind on me, become my
devotee, my worshipper; reverence me, and thus making me your highest goal, and
devoting your self to abstraction, you will certainly come to me.
Footnotes
82:1 I. e. by immediate consciousness, not mediately; 'not opposed to the sacred
law,' i.e. like the Syena sacrifice for destroying a foe.
82:2 Because he is untainted by anything. And therefore also the entities do not
live in him, as said in the next sentence. See p. 80 supra.
82:3 As space is untainted and unaffected by the air which remains in it, so am
I by the entities.
82:4 Supra, p. 58. Nature = the unperceived principle.
82:5 Cf. p. 80 supra.
82:6 I am not affected by the differences in the conditions of these entities.
82:7 Viz. the supervision.
83:1 Hope, viz. that some other deity will give them what they want; acts, vain
as not offered to the supreme; knowledge, vain as abounding in foolish doubts,
&c.
83:2 Cf. p. 76 supra.
83:3 For a knowledge of the supreme, or for the means of such knowledge.
83:4 Vows = veracity, harmlessness, &c.
83:5 Sacrifice of knowledge, viz. the knowledge that Vâsudeva is all; as one =
believing that all is one; as distinct = believing that sun, moon, &c. are
different manifestations of 'me.'
83:6 Kratu is a Vedic sacrifice; Yagña, a sacrifice laid down in Smritis. Svadhâ
= offering to the manes; 'product of the herbs' = food prepared from vegetables,
or medicine.
83:7 Cf. p. 61 supra.
83:8 P. 9 supra.
84:1 I. e. the seat of enjoyment; receptacle = where things are preserved for
future use, say the commentators.
84:2 The gross and the subtle elements, or causes and effects.
84:3 Cf. Mundakopanishad, p. 279; and Khândogya, p. 344.
84:4 Cf. Dhammapada, stanza 23. I. e. attainment to the Brahman and not
returning from it.--Râmânuga.
84:5 Because in form they worship other divinities.
84:6 Giver of the fruit. As to enjoyer, cf. p. 67 supra.
84:7 I. e. return to the mortal world.
84:8 I. e. some regulation as to mode of worship. Cf. also p. 76 supra.
85:1 Cf. p. 55 supra, and other passages.
85:2 This mode of action is at once devotion and renunciation: the first,
because one cares not for fruit; the second, because it is offered to the
supreme.
85:3 'They dwell in me' by their devotion to me; I dwell in them as giver of
happiness to them.
85:4 Viz. that the supreme Being alone should be reverenced.
85:5 Sankara takes Vaisyas &c. as examples of this; not so Srîdhara. Cf. as to
women and Sûdras, Nrisimha-tâpinî, p. 14. 'Of sinful birth' = of low birth
(Srîdhara) = birth resulting from sins (Sankara).
86:1 Cf. p. 79 supra.
****************
CHAPTER X.
Yet again, O you of mighty arms! listen to my excellent 2 words, which, out of a
wish for your welfare, I speak to you who are delighted (with them). Not the
multitudes of gods, nor the great sages know my source; for I am in every way 3
the origin of the gods and great sages. Of (all) mortals, he who knows me to be
unborn, without beginning, the great lord of the world, being free from
delusion, is released from all sins. Intelligence, knowledge, freedom from
delusion, forgiveness, truth, restraint of the senses, tranquillity, pleasure,
pain, birth, death, fear, and also security, harmlessness, equability,
contentment, penance, (making) gifts, glory, disgrace, all these different
tempers 4 of living beings are from me alone. The seven great sages, and
likewise the four ancient Manus 5, whose descendants are (all) these people in
the world, were all born from my
p. 87
mind 1, (partaking) of my powers. Whoever correctly knows these powers and
emanations of mine, becomes possessed of devotion free from indecision; of this
(there is) no doubt. The wise, full of love 2, worship me, believing that I am
the origin of all, and that all moves on through me. (Placing their) minds on
me, offering (their) lives to me, instructing each other, and speaking about me,
they are always contented and happy. To these, who are constantly devoted, and
who worship with love,, I give that knowledge by which they attain to me. And
remaining in their hearts, I destroy, with the brilliant lamp of knowledge, the
darkness born of ignorance in such (men) only, out of compassion for them.
Arguna said:
You are the supreme Brahman, the supreme goal, the holiest of the holy. All
sages, as well as the divine sage Nârada, Asita 3, Devala, and Vyâsa, call you
the eternal being, divine, the first god, the unborn, the all-pervading. And so,
too, you tell me yourself, O Kesava! I believe all this that you tell me (to be)
true; for, O lord! neither the gods nor demons understand your manifestation 4.
You only know your self by your self. O best of beings! creator of all things!
lord of all things! god of gods! lord of the universe! be pleased to declare
without, exception your divine emanations, by which emanations
p. 88
you stand pervading all these worlds. How shall I know you, O you of mystic
power! always meditating on you? And in what various entities 1, O lord! should
I meditate on you? Again, O Ganârdana! do you yourself declare your powers and
emanations; because hearing this nectar, I (still) feel no satiety.
The Deity said:
Well then, O best of Kauravas! I will state to you my own divine emanations; but
(only) the chief (ones), for there is no end to the extent of my (emanations). I
am the self, O Gudâkesa! seated in the hearts of all beings 2. I am the
beginning and the middle and the end also of all beings. I am Vishnu among the
Âdityas 3, the beaming sun among the shining (bodies); I am Marîki among the
Maruts 4, and the moon among the lunar mansions 5. Among the Vedas, I am the
Sâma-veda 6. I am Indra among the gods. And I am mind among the senses 7. I am
consciousness in (living) beings. And I am Sankara 8 among the Rudras, the lord
of wealth 9 among Yakshas and Rakshases. And I am fire among the Vasus, and Meru
10 among the high-topped (mountains). And know me, O Arguna! to
p. 89
be Brihaspati, the chief among domestic priests. I am Skanda among generals. I
am the ocean among reservoirs of water 1. I am Bhrigu among the great sages. I
am the single syllable (Om 2) among words. Among sacrifices I am the Gapa
sacrifice 3; the Himâlaya among the firmly-fixed (mountains); the Asvattha 4
among all trees, and Nârada among divine sages; Kitraratha among the heavenly
choristers, the sage Kapila among the Siddhas 5. Among horses know me to be
Ukkaissravas 6, brought forth by (the labours for) the nectar; and Airâvata
among the great elephants, and the ruler. of men among men 7. I am the
thunderbolt among weapons, the wish-giving (cow) among cows. And I am love which
generates 8. Among serpents I am Vâsuki. Among Nâga 9 snakes I am Ananta; I am
Varuna among aquatic beings. And I am Aryaman among the manes, and Yama 10 among
rulers. Among demons, too, I am Pralhâda. I am the king of death (Kâla, time)
among those that count 11. Among beasts I
p. 90
am the lord of beasts, and the son of Vinatâ 1 among birds. I am the wind among
those that blow 2. I am Râma 3 among those that wield weapons. Among fishes I am
Makara 4, and among streams the Gâhnavî 5. Of created things I am the beginning
and the end and the middle also, O Arguna! Among sciences, I am the science of
the Adhyâtma, and I am the argument of controversialists. Among letters I am the
letter A 6, and among the group of compounds the copulative 7 compound. I myself
am time inexhaustible, and I the creator whose faces are in all directions. I am
death who seizes all, and the source of what is to be. And among females, fame
8, fortune, speech, memory, intellect, courage. forgiveness. Likewise among
Sâman hymns, I am the Brihat-sâman 9, and I the Gâyatrî 10 among metres. I am
Mârgasîrsha among the months, the spring
p. 91
among the seasons 1; of cheats, I am the game of dice; I am the glory of the
glorious, I am victory, I am industry, I am the goodness of the good. I am
Vâsudeva among the descendants of Vrishni 2, and Arguna among the Pândavas.
Among sages also, I am Vyâsa 3; and among the discerning ones, I am the
discerning Usanas 4. I am the rod of those that restrain, and the policy 5 of
those that desire victory. I am silence respecting secrets. I am the knowledge
of those that have knowledge And, O Arguna! I am also that which is the seed of
all things. There is nothing movable or immovable which can exist without me. O
terror of your foes! there is no end to my divine emanations. Here I have
declared the extent of (those) emanations only in part. Whatever thing (there
is) of power, or glorious, or splendid, know all that to be produced from
portions of my energy. Or rather, O Arguna! what have you to do, knowing all
this at large? I stand supporting all this by (but) a single portion (of myself)
6.
p. 92
Footnotes
86:2 As referring to the supreme soul.
86:3 As creator, as moving agent in workings of the intellect, &c.
86:4 The names are not always names of 'tempers,' but the corresponding 'temper'
must be understood.
86:5 The words are also otherwise construed, 'The four ancients (Sanaka,
Sanandana, Sanâtana, Sanatkumâra) and the Manus.' According to the later
mythology the Manus are fourteen.
87:1 By the mere operation of my thought. As to ancients, cf. Aitareya-âranyaka,
p. 136.
87:2 Sankara renders the word here by perseverance in pursuit of truth.
87:3 Ânandagiri calls Asita father of Devala. See also Davids' Buddhism, p. 185;
Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit., p. 463.
87:4 Scil. in human form for the good of the gods and the destruction of demons.
88:1 To know you fully being impossible, what special manifestation of you
should we resort to for our meditations?
88:2 P. 129 infra.
88:3 'Âditya is used in the Veda chiefly as a general epithet for a number of
solar deities.' Max Müller, Hibbert Lectures, p. 264.
88:4 The storm-gods, as Max Müller calls them.
88:5 Cf. Sutta Nipâta, p. 121.
88:6 As being, probably, full of music.
88:7 Cf. Khândogya, p. 121, where Sankara says, 'Mind is the chief of man's
inner activities.'
88:8 Now the third member of our Trinity.
88:9 Kubera.
88:10 The Golden Mount.
89:1 Cf. Sutta Nipâta, p. 121.
89:2 Vide p. 79 supra.
89:3 Gapa is the silent meditation. Madhusûdana says it is superior owing to its
not involving the slaughter of any animal, &c.
89:4 The fig tree. It is the symbol of 'life' in chapter XV infra.
89:5 Those who even from birth are possessed of piety, knowledge, indifference
to the world, and superhuman power. Cf. Svetâsvatara-upanishad, p. 357.
89:6 This is Indra's horse, brought out at the churning of the ocean. Airâvata
is Indra's elephant.
89:7 Cf. Sutta Nipâta, p. 121.
89:8 I. e. not the merely carnal passion. Cf. p. 74 supra.
89:9 Nâgas are without poison, says Srîdhara. Varuna is the sea-god.
89:10 Yama is death, and Pralhâda the virtuous demon for whom Vishnu became
incarnate as the man-lion. As to manes, see Goldstücker's Remains, I, 133.
89:11 'Counts the number of men's sins,' Râmânuga; Srîdhara says p. 90 this
refers to 'time, with its divisions into years, months,' &c.; while a little
further on it means 'time eternal.'
90:1 I. e. the Garuda or eagle, who is the vehicle of Vishnu in Hindu mythology.
90:2 'Those who have the capacity of motion,' says Râmânuga.
90:3 The hero of the Hindu epos, Râmâyana, translated into verse by Mr. R. T. H.
.
90:4 The dolphin.
90:5 The Ganges.
90:6 That letter is supposed to comprehend all language. Cf. Aitareya-âranyaka,
p. 346, and. another text there cited by Mâdhava in his commentary (p. 348).
90:7 This is said to be the best, because all its members are co-ordinate with
one another, not one depending on another.
90:8 I. e. the deities of fame, &c.
90:9 See, as to this, Muir, Sanskrit Texts, vol. i, p. 16. Sankara says this
hymn relates to final emancipation.
90:10 Cf. Khândogya-upanishad, p. 181, where Sankara says, 'Gâyatrî is the chief
metre, because it is the means to a knowledge of the Brahman.' It is the metre
of the celebrated verse 'Om Tatsavitur,' &c.
91:1 Cf. Khândogya-upanishad, p. 126. Mârgasîrsha is November-December.
Madhusûdana says this is the best month, as being neither too hot nor too cold;
but see Schlegel's Bhagavadgîtâ, ed. Lassen, p. 276.
91:2 One of Krishna's ancestors.
91:3 The compiler of the Vedas.
91:4 The preceptor of the Daityas or demons. A work on politics is ascribed to
him.
91:5 Making peace, bribing, &c.
91:6 Cf. Purusha-sûkta (Muir, Sanskrit Texts, vol. i, p, 9).
*************************
CHAPTER XI.
Arguna said:
In consequence of the excellent and mysterious words concerning the relation of
the supreme and individual soul,, which you have spoken for my welfare, this
delusion of mine is gone away. O you whose eyes are like lotus leaves! I have
heard from you at large about the production and dissolution of things, and also
about your inexhaustible greatness. O highest lord! what you have said about
yourself is so. I wish, O best of beings! to see your divine form. If, O lord!
you think that it is possible for me to look upon it, then, O lord of the
possessors of mystic power 1! show your inexhaustible form to me.
The Deity said:
In hundreds and in thousands see my forms, O son of Prithâ! various, divine, and
of various colours and shapes. See the Âdityas, Vasus, Rudras, the two Asvins,
and Maruts likewise. And O descendant of Bharata! see wonders, in numbers,
unseen before. Within my body, O Gudâkesa! see to-day the whole universe,
including (everything) movable and immovable, (all) in one, and whatever else
you wish to see. But you will not be able to see me with merely, this eye of
yours. I give you an eye divine. (Now) see my divine power.
Sañgaya said
Having spoken thus, O king! Hari, the great
p. 93
lord of the possessors of mystic power, then showed to the son of Prithâ. his
supreme divine form, having many mouths and eyes, having (within it) many
wonderful sights, having many celestial ornaments, having many celestial weapons
held erect, wearing celestial flowers and vestments, having an anointment of
celestial perfumes, full of every wonder, the infinite deity with faces in all
directions 1. If in the heavens, the lustre of a thousand suns burst forth all
at once, that would be like the lustre of that mighty one. There the son of
Pându then observed in the body of the god of gods the whole universe (all) in
one, and divided into numerous 2 (divisions). Then Dhanañgaya filled with
amazement, and with hair standing on end, bowed his head before the god, and
spoke with joined hands.
Arguna said:
O god! I see within your body the gods, as also all the groups of various
beings; and the lord Brahman seated on (his) lotus seat, and all the sages and
celestial snakes. I see you, who are of countless forms, possessed of many arms,
stomachs, mouths, and eyes on all sides. And, O lord of the universe! O you of
all forms! I do not see your end or middle or beginning. I see you bearing a
coronet and a mace and a discus--a mass of glory, brilliant on all sides,
difficult to look at, having on
p. 94
all sides the effulgence of a blazing fire or sun, and indefinable. You are
indestructible, the supreme one to be known. You are the highest support 1 of
this universe. You are the inexhaustible protector of everlasting piety. I
believe you to be the eternal being. I see you void of beginning, middle,
end--of infinite power, of unnumbered arms, having the sun and moon for eyes,
having a mouth like a blazing fire, and heating the universe with your radiance.
For this space between heaven and earth and all the quarters are pervaded by you
alone. Looking at this wonderful and terrible form of yours, O high-souled one!
the three worlds are affrighted. For here these groups of gods are entering into
you. Some being afraid are praying with joined hands, and the groups of great
sages and Siddhas are saying 'Welfare 2!' and praising you with abundant (hymns)
of praise. The Rudras, and Âdityas, the Vasus, the Sâdhyas, the Visvas, the two
Asvins, the Maruts, and the Ushmapas, and the groups of Gandharvas, Yakshas,
demons, and Siddhas are all looking at you amazed. Seeing your mighty form, with
many mouths and eyes, with many arms, thighs, and feet, with many stomachs, and
fearful with many jaws, all people, and I likewise, are much alarmed, O you of
mighty arms! Seeing you, O Vishnu! touching the skies, radiant, possessed of
many hues, with a gaping mouth, and with large blazing eyes, I am much alarmed
in my inmost self, and feel no courage, no tranquillity.
p. 95
And seeing your mouths terrible by the jaws, and resembling the fire of
destruction, I cannot recognise the (various) directions, I feel no comfort. Be
gracious, O lord of gods! who pervadest the universe. And all these sons of
Dhritarâshtra, together with all the bands of kings, and Bhîshma and Drona, and
this charioteer's son 1 likewise, together with our principal warriors also, are
rapidly entering your mouths, fearful and horrific 2 by (reason of your) jaws.
And some with their heads smashed are seen (to be) stuck in the spaces between
the teeth. As the many rapid currents of a river's waters run towards the sea
alone, so do these heroes of the human world enter your mouths blazing all
round. As butterflies, with increased velocity, enter a blazing fire to their
destruction, so too do these people enter your mouths with increased velocity
(only) to their destruction. Swallowing all these people, you are licking them
over and over again from all sides, with your blazing mouths. Your fierce
splendours, O Vishnu! filling the whole universe with (their) effulgence, are
heating it. Tell me who you are in this fierce form. Salutations be to thee, O
chief of the gods! Be gracious. I wish to know you, the primeval, one, for I do
not understand your actions.
The Deity said:
I am death, the destroyer of the worlds, fully developed, and I am now active
about the overthrow
p. 96
of the worlds. Even without you, the warriors standing in the adverse hosts,
shall all cease to be. Therefore, be up, obtain glory, and vanquishing (your)
foes, enjoy a prosperous kingdom. All these have been already killed by me. Be
only the instrument, O Savyasâkin 1! Drona, and Bhîshma, and Gayadratha, and
Karna, and likewise other valiant warriors also, whom I have killed, do you
kill. Be not alarmed. Do fight. And in the battle you will conquer your foes.
Sañgaya said:
Hearing these words of Kesava, the wearer of the coronet 2, trembling, and with
joined hands, bowed down; and sorely afraid, and with throat choked up, he again
spoke to Krishna after saluting him.
Arguna said:
It is quite proper, O Hrishîkesa! that the universe is delighted and charmed by
your renown, that the demons run away affrighted in all directions, and that all
the assemblages of Siddhas bow down,(to you). And why, O high-souled one! should
they not bow down to you (who are) greater than Brahman, and first cause? O
infinite lord of gods! O you pervading the universe! you are the indestructible,
that which is, that which is not, and what is beyond them 3. You are the primal
p. 97
god, the ancient being, you are the highest support of this universe 1. You are
that which has knowledge, that which is the object of knowledge, you are the
highest goal. By you is this universe pervaded., O you of infinite forms! You
are the wind, Yama, fire, Varuna, the moon, you Pragâpati, and the great
grandsire 2. Obeisance be to thee a thousand times, and again and again
obeisance to thee! In front and from behind obeisance to thee! Obeisance be to
thee from all sides, O you who are all! You are of infinite power, of unmeasured
glory; you pervade all, and therefore you are all! Whatever I have said
contemptuously,--for instance, 'O Krishna!' 'O Yâdava!' 'O friend!'--thinking
you to be (my) friend, and not knowing your greatness (as shown in) this
(universal form), or through friendliness, or incautiously; and whatever
disrespect I have shown you for purposes of merriment, on (occasions of) play,
sleep, dinner, or sitting (together), whether alone or in the presence (of
friends),--for all that, O undegraded one! I ask pardon of you who are
indefinable 3. You are the father of the world-movable and immovable,--you its
great and venerable master; there is none equal to you, whence can there be one
greater, O you whose power is unparalleled in all the three worlds? Therefore I
bow and prostrate myself, and would propitiate you, the praiseworthy lord. Be
pleased,
p. 98
O god! to pardon (my guilt) as a father (that of his) son, a friend (that of
his) friend, or a husband (that of his) beloved. I am delighted at seeing what I
had never seen before, and my heart is also alarmed by fear. Show me that same
form, O god! Be gracious, O lord of gods! O you pervading the universe! I wish
to see you bearing the coronet and the mace, with the discus in hand, just the
same (as before) 1. O you of thousand arms! O you of all forms! assume that same
four-handed form.
The Deity said:
O Arguna! being pleased (with you), I have by my own mystic power shown you this
supreme form, full of glory, universal, infinite, primeval, and which has not
been seen before by any one else but you, O you hero among the Kauravas! I
cannot be seen in this form by any one but you, (even) by (the help of) the
study of the Vedas, or of 2 sacrifices, nor by gifts, nor by actions, nor by
fierce penances. Be not alarmed, be not perplexed, at seeing this form of mine,
fearful like this. Free from fear and with delighted heart, see now again that
same form of mine.
Sañgaya said:
Having thus spoken to Arguna, Vâsudeva again showed his own form, and the
high-souled one becoming again of a mild form, comforted him who had been
affrighted.
p. 99
Arguna said:
O Ganardana! seeing this mild, human form of yours, I am new in my right mind,
and have come to my normal state.
The Deity said:
Even the gods are always desiring to see this form of mine, which it is
difficult to get a sight of, and which you have seen. I cannot be seen, as you
have seen me, by (means of) the Vedas, not by penance, not by gift, nor yet by
sacrifice. But, O Arguna! by devotion to me exclusively, I can in this form be
truly known, seen, and assimilated 1 with, O terror of your foes! He who
performs acts for (propitiating) me, to whom I am the highest (object), who is
my devotee, who is free from attachment, and who has no enmity towards any
being, he, O son of Pându! comes to me.
Footnotes
92:1 Madhusûdana takes power to mean capacity of becoming small or great, of
obtaining what is wanted, &c.; the so-called eight Bhûtis.
93:1 Cf. p. 90 supra. Sankara explains it as meaning 'pervading everything.' The
expression occurs in the Nrisimha-tâpinî-upanishad, p. 50, where it is said,
'as, without organs, it sees, hears, goes, takes from all sides and pervades
everything, therefore it has faces on all sides.'
93:2 Gods, manes, men, and so forth.
94:1 The words are the same as at p. 97 infra, where see the note.
94:2 Seeing signs of some great cataclysm, they say, 'May it be well with the
universe,' and then proceed to pray to you.
95:1 I. e. Karna, who was really the eldest brother of the Pândavas, but having
been immediately on birth abandoned by Kuntî, was brought up by a charioteer.
Karna was told of his, true origin by Bhîshma on his deathbed, and advised to
join the Pândavas, but he declined.
95:2 By reason of the ruggedness and distortion of face.
96:1 Arguna, as he could shoot with his left hand as well as the
right.--Srîdhara.
96:2 Arguna, who had this coronet given him by Indra.--Madhusûdana.
96:3 The commentators interpret this to mean the perceptible, the unperceived,
and the higher principle. Cf. p. 84 supra, and also pp. 103, 113 infra and notes
there.
97:1 See p. 94 supra. Here the commentators say the words mean 'that in which
the universe is placed at deluge-time.'
97:2 Professor Tiele mentions great-grandfather as a name for the Creator among
Kaffirs (History of Religion, p. 18). Cf. p. 83 supra.
97:3 I. e. of whom it is impossible to ascertain whether he is such or such. Cf.
p. 94 supra.
98:1 This is the ordinary form of Krishna.
98:2 This is the original construction. One suspects that sacrifices and study
of the Vedas are meant. Cf. the speech of Krishna on the next page.
99:1 Literally, 'entered into;' it means final emancipation. See p. 128.
******************
CHAPTER XII.
Arguna said:
Of the worshippers, who thus, constantly devoted, meditate on you, and those who
(meditate) on the unperceived and indestructible, which best know devotion?
The Deity said:
Those who being constantly devoted, and possessed of the highest faith, worship
me with a mind fixed on me, are deemed by me to be the most devoted. But those,
who, restraining the (whole) group of the senses, and with a mind at all times
p. 100
equable, meditate on the indescribable, indestructible, unperceived (principle)
which is all-pervading, unthinkable, indifferent 1, immovable, and constant,
they, intent on the good of all beings, necessarily attain to me. For those
whose minds are attached to the unperceived, the trouble is much greater.
Because the unperceived goal 2 is obtained by embodied (beings) with difficulty.
As to those, however, O son of Prithâ! who, dedicating all their actions to me,
and (holding) me as their highest (goal), worship me, meditating on me with a
devotion towards none besides me, and whose minds are fixed on me, I, Without
delay, come forward as their deliverer from the ocean of this world of death.
Place your mind on me only; fix your understanding on me. In me you will dwell 3
hereafter, (there is) no doubt. But if you are unable to fix your mind steadily
on me, then, O Dhanañgaya! endeavour 4 to obtain me by the abstraction of mind
(resulting) from continuous meditation 5. If you are unequal even to continuous
meditation, then let acts for (propitiating) me be your highest (aim). Even
performing actions for (propitiating) me, you will attain perfection. If you are
unable to do even this, then resort to devotion 6 to me, and, with
self-restraint, abandon all fruit of action. For knowledge is better than
continuous meditation; concentration 7 is esteemed higher
p. 101
than knowledge; and the abandonment of fruit of action than concentration; from
(that) abandonment, tranquillity soon (results). That devotee of mine, who hates
no being, who is friendly and compassionate, who is free from egoism, and from
(the idea that this or that is) mine, to whom happiness and misery are alike,
who is forgiving, contented, constantly devoted, self-restrained, and firm in
his determinations, and whose mind and understanding are devoted to me, he is
dear to me. He through whom the world is not agitated 1, and who is not agitated
by the world, who is free from joy and anger and fear and agitation, he too is
dear to me. That devotee of mine, who is unconcerned 2, pure, assiduous 3,
impartial, free from distress 4, who abandons all actions (for fruit 5), he is
dear to me. He who is full of devotion to me, who feels no joy and no aversion,
who does not grieve and does not desire, who abandons (both what is) agreeable
and (what is) disagreeable, he is dear to me. He who is alike to friend and foe,
as also in honour and dishonour, who is alike in cold and heat, pleasure and
pain, who is free from attachments, to whom praise and blame are alike, who is
taciturn 6, and contented with anything whatever (that comes), who is homeless
7, and of a steady mind, and full of devotion,
p. 102
that man is dear to me. But those devotees who, imbued with faith, and
(regarding) me as their highest (goal), resort to this holy (means for
attaining) immortality, as stated, they are extremely dear to me.
Footnotes
100:1 Passively looking on what occurs on earth; immovable = changeless;
constant = eternal.
100:2 Viz. the indestructible.
100:3 I. e. assimilated with me, as expressed before.
100:4 Literally, 'wish.'
100:5 Cf. p. 78 supra.
100:6 Performing actions, but dedicating them to me.
100:7 Fixing the mind with effort on the object of contemplation. Cf.
Maitrî-upanishad, p. 130.
101:1 No disturbance results from him to other men, or from other men to him.
Cf. Sutta Nipâta, p. 56.
101:2 Indifferent to worldly objects.
101:3 Ready to do work as it arises.
101:4 Not feeling afflicted by other people's doing an injury to him.
101:5 'For fruit' must be understood here.
101:6 I. e. governs his tongue properly. Cf. Sutta Nipâta, p. 55, and
Dhammapada, stanza 96.
101:7 Cf. Sutta Nipâta, pp. 94, 101, 122; Âpastamba, Dharma-sûtra, p. 102 p. 86
(p. 152 in this series); and Dhammapada, stanzas 40-91 (where the identical word
is used).
*********************
CHAPTER XIII.
The Deity said:
This body, O son of Kuntî! is called Kshetra 1, and the learned call him who
knows it the Kshetragña. 2. And know me also, O descendant of Bharata! to be the
Kshetragña in all Kshetras. The knowledge of Kshetra and Kshetragña is deemed by
me (to be real) knowledge. Now hear from me in brief what that Kshetra (is),
what (it is) like, what changes (it undergoes), and whence (it comes), and what
is he 3, and what his powers, (all which) is sung in various ways by sages in
numerous hymns 4, distinctly, and in well-settled texts full of argument, giving
indications or full instruction about the Brahman. The great elements 5, egoism,
the understanding, the unperceived also, the ten senses, and the one, and the
five objects of sense, desire,
p. 103
aversion, pleasure, pain, body, consciousness, courage, thus in brief has been
declared the Kshetra with changes 1. Absence of vanity, absence of
ostentatiousness, absence of hurtfulness, forgiveness, straightforwardness,
devotion to a preceptor, purity 2, steadiness, self-restraint, indifference
towards objects of sense, and also absence of egoism; perception of the misery
and evil of birth, death 3, old age, and disease; absence of attachment, absence
of self-identifying regard for son, wife 4, home, and so forth; and constant
equability on the approach of (both what is) agreeable and (what is)
disagreeable; unswerving devotion to me, without meditation on any one else;
resorting to clean places, distaste for assemblages of men 5, constancy in
knowledge of the relation of the individual self to the supreme, perception of
the object 6 of knowledge of the truth, this is called knowledge; that is
ignorance which is opposed to this. I will declare that which is the object of
knowledge, knowing which, one reaches immortality; the highest Brahman, having
no beginning nor end, which cannot be said to be existent or non-existent 7. It
has hands and feet on all sides, it has eyes, heads, and faces on all sides, it
has ears on all sides, it
p. 104
stands pervading everything in the world. Possessed of the qualities of all the
senses, (but) devoid of all senses 1, unattached, it supports all, is devoid of
qualities, and the enjoyer 2 of qualities. It is within all things and without
them; it is movable and also immovable; it is unknowable through (its) subtlety;
it stands afar and near 3. Not different in (different) things 4, but standing
as though different, it should be known to be the supporter of (all) things, and
that which absorbs and creates (them). It is the radiance even of the radiant
(bodies); it is said (to be) beyond darkness. It is knowledge, the object of
knowledge, that which is to be attained to by knowledge, and placed in the heart
of all 5. Thus in brief have Kshetra, knowledge, and the object of knowledge
been declared. My devotee, knowing this, becomes fit for assimilation with me.
Know nature and spirit both (to be) without beginning, and know all developments
and qualities 6 (to be) produced from nature. Nature is said to be the origin of
the capacity of working (residing) in the body and the senses; and spirit is
said (to be) the origin of the capacity of enjoying pleasures and
p. 105
pains 1. For spirit with nature joined, enjoys the qualities born of nature. And
the cause of its birth in good or evil wombs is the connexion with the qualities
2. The supreme spirit in this body is called supervisor, adviser 3, supporter,
enjoyer, the great lord, and the supreme self also. He who thus knows nature and
spirit, together with the qualities, is not born again, however living 4. Some
by concentration see the self in the self by the self; others by the
Sânkya-yoga; and others still by the Karma-yoga 5; others yet, not knowing this,
practise concentration, after hearing from others 6. They, too, being (thus)
devoted to hearing (instruction) cross beyond death. Whatever thing movable or
immovable comes into existence, know that to be from the connexion of Kshetra
and Kshetragña, O chief of the descendants of Bharata! He sees (truly)
p. 106
who sees the supreme lord abiding alike in all entities, and not destroyed
though they are destroyed. For he who sees the lord abiding everywhere alike,
does not destroy himself 1by himself, and then reaches the highest goal. He sees
(truly), who sees (all) actions (to be) in every way done by nature alone, and
likewise the self (to be) not the doer. When a man sees all the variety of
entities as existing in one 2, and (all as) emanating from that, then he becomes
(one with) the Brahman. This inexhaustible supreme self, being without beginning
and without qualities, does not act, and is not tainted, O son of Kuntî! though
stationed in the body. As by (reason of its) subtlety the all-pervading space is
not tainted, so the self stationed in every body is not tainted. As the sun
singly lights up all this world, so the Kshetragña, O descendant of Bharata!
lights up the whole Kshetra. Those who, with the eye of knowledge, thus
understand the difference between Kshetra and Kshetragña, and the destruction of
the nature of all entities 3, go to the supreme.
Footnotes
102:1 I retain the original for want of a good equivalent.
102:2 Cf. Svetâsvataropanishad, p. 368, and Maitrî, pp. 25-72.
102:3 I. e. the Kshetragña.
102:4 Hymns = scil. from the Vedas about ordinary or special actions and so
forth. Argument = e.g. in texts like 'How can entity come from non-entity? Who
could breathe, if &c.?'
102:5 Cf. Aitareya-âranyaka, p. 97. The subtle elements, earth, fire, &c., are
meant. The unperceived = nature; the one = mind; courage = that by which the
drooping body and senses are supported; egoism = self-consciousness-the feeling
'this is I.'
103:1 See the last page. Changes = development.
103:2 Internal as well as external; as to devotion to a preceptor, cf.
Âpastamba, p. 11 (p. 23 in this series); Taittirîya-upanishad, p. 38;
Svetâsvatara, p. 117; and Sutta Nipâta, p. 87; as to egoism, see p. 52 supra.
103:3 Cf. Sutta Nipâta, pp. 18-95.
103:4 Cf. Sutta Nipâta, p. 12.
103:5 Cf. Sutta Nipâta, p. 11.
103:6 Viz. removal of ignorance and acquisition of happiness.
103:7 Words indicate a class, a quality, an action, or a relation, says Sankara.
None of these can be predicated of the Brahman; so you cannot apply either of
these words to it. Cf. pp. 84, 96 supra, also Svetâsvatara, p. 346.
104:1 Cf. Svetâsvatara, p. 331. He has no ears, but has the quality of hearing,
and so forth; unattached = really out of relation to everything, though seeming
to be connected with other things through delusion.
104:2 I. e. he perceives them.
104:3 Îsopanishad, p. 12; Mundaka, p. 313.
104:4 Everything being really one. Cf. inter alia, p. 124 infra. The various
manifestations of The Brahman are really one in essence, though apparently
different, like foam and water.
104:5 Cf. p. 88.
104:6 Developments = body, senses, &c. Qualities = pleasure, pain, &c.;
altogether the expression means the body and feelings and so forth.
105:1 Srîdhara says that 'is said to be' means by Kapila and others. For the
notion that activity is not a function of the soul, see inter alia, p. 55 supra.
Enjoyment, however, is, according to this passage, the function of the soul, not
of nature. See also Maitrî-upanishad, pp. 107, 108.
105:2 I. e. 'the senses,' says Srîdhara; good = gods, &c. evil beasts, &c.
105:3 Scil. concerning the operations of the body and senses. Cf.
Nrisimha-tâpinî, p. 224. He is adviser because, though he does not interfere, he
sees and therefore may be said to sanction the operations alluded to. Supporter,
i. e. of body &c. in their workings.
105:4 I. e. though he may have transgressed rules.
105:5 Concentration = fixing of the mind exclusively on the soul, the senses
being quiescent. 'See the self,' i. e. the soul; 'in the self,' i. e. within
themselves; 'by the self,' i. e. by the mind. Sânkhya-yoga = belief that
qualities are distinct from the self, which is only a passive spectator of their
operations. Cf. Svetâsvatara, p. 109. Karma-yoga = dedication of actions to the
supreme. Cf. as to this the gloss on Sankara's Bhâshya on Vedânta-sûtra IV, 2,
21.
105:6 Cf. Sutta Nipâta, p. 49.
106:1 Not to have true knowledge, is equivalent to self-destruction. Cf.
Îsopanishad, pp. 9, 15, 16.
106:2 I. e. absorbed at the time of the deluge in nature, one of the energies of
the supreme; 'emanating,' i.e. at the time of creation.
106:3 Nature, which is the material cause from which all entities are produced;
the destruction of it results from true knowledge of the soul. See the third
note on p. 107 infra.
********************
CHAPTER XIV.
The Deity said:
Again I will declare (to you) the highest knowledge, the best of (all sorts of)
knowledge, having
p. 107
learnt which, all sages have reached perfection beyond (the bonds of) this
(body). Those who, resorting to this knowledge, reach assimilation with my
essence, are not born at the creation, and are not afflicted 1 at the
destruction (of the universe). The great Brahman 2 is a womb for me, in which I
cast the seed. From that, O descendant of Bharata! is the birth of all things.
Of the bodies, O son of Kuntî! which are born from all wombs, the (main) womb is
the great Brahman, and I (am) the father, the giver of the seed. Goodness,
passion, darkness, these qualities 3 born from nature, O you of mighty arms!
bind down the inexhaustible soul in the body. Of these, goodness, which, in
consequence of being untainted, is enlightening and free from (all) misery,
binds the soul, O sinless one! with the bond of pleasure and the bond of
knowledge 4. Know that passion consists in being enamoured, and is produced from
craving and attachment. That, O son of Kuntî! binds down the embodied (self)
with the
p. 108
bond of action. Darkness (you must) know to be born of ignorance, it deludes all
embodied (selfs). And that, O descendant of Bharata! binds down (the self) with
heedlessness 1, indolence, and sleep. Goodness unites (the self) with pleasure;
passion, O descendant of Bharata! with action; and darkness with heedlessness,
after shrouding up knowledge. Passion and darkness being repressed, goodness
stands, O descendant of Bharata! Passion and goodness (being repressed),
darkness; and likewise darkness and goodness (being repressed), passion 2. When
in this body at all portals 3 light (that is to say) knowledge prevails, then
should one know goodness to be developed. Avarice, activity 4, performance of
actions, want of tranquillity, desire, these are produced, O chief of the
descendants of Bharata! when passion is developed. Want of light, want of
activity 5, heedlessness, and delusion, these are produced, O descendant of
Kuru! when darkness is developed. When an embodied (self) encounters death,
while goodness is developed, then he reaches the untainted worlds of those who
know the highest 6. Encountering death during (the prevalence
p. 109
of) passion, he is born among those attached to action. Likewise, dying during
(the prevalence of) darkness, he is born in the wombs of the ignorant 1. The
fruit of meritorious action is said to be good, untainted; while the fruit of
passion is misery; and the fruit of darkness ignorance. From goodness is
produced knowledge, from passion avarice 2, and from darkness heedlessness and
delusion and ignorance also. Those who adhere to (the ways of) goodness go up 3;
the passionate remain in the middle; while those of the qualities of darkness,
adhering to the ways of the lowest quality, go down. When a right-seeing person
sees none but the qualities (to be) the doers (of all action), and knows what is
above the qualities 4, he enters into my essence. The embodied (self), who
transcends these three qualities, from which bodies are produced 5, attains
immortality, being freed from birth and death and old age and misery.
Arguna said:
What are the characteristics, O lord! of one who has transcended these three
qualities? What is his conduct, and how does he transcend these three qualities
6?
p. 110
The Deity said:
He is said to have transcended the qualities, O son of Pându! who is not averse
to light and activity and delusion (when they) prevail, and who does not desire
(them when they) cease 1; who sitting like one unconcerned is never perturbed by
the qualities 2; who remains steady and moves 3 not, (thinking) merely that the
qualities 4 exist; who is self-contained 5; to whom pain and pleasure are alike;
to whom a sod and a stone and gold are alike; to whom what is agreeable and what
is disagreeable are alike; who has discernment; to whom censure and praise of
himself are alike; who is alike in honour and dishonour; who is alike towards
the sides of friends and foes; and who abandons all action 6. And he who
worships me with an unswerving devotion, transcends these qualities, and becomes
fit for (entrance into) the essence of the Brahman. For I am the embodiment of
the Brahman 7, of indefeasible immortality, of eternal piety, and of unbroken
happiness.
p. 111
Footnotes
107:1 I. e. 'are not destroyed,' Madhusûdana; 'do not fall,' Sankara; are not
born,' Srîdhara, and apparently Râmânuga.
107:2 I. e. the 'nature' spoken of before.
107:3 These constitute nature. We must understand nature, with Professor
Bhândârkar, as the hypothetical cause of the soul's feeling itself limited and
conditioned. If nature is understood, as it usually is, to mean matter, its
being made up of the qualities is inexplicable. Interpreted idealistically, as
suggested by Professor Bhândârkar, the destruction of it spoken of at the close
of the last chapter also becomes intelligible. By means of knowledge of the
soul, the unreality of these manifestations is understood and nature is
destroyed.
107:4 Pleasure and knowledge appertain to the mind, not the self, hence they are
described as constituting bonds, when erroneously connected with the self,
Sankara and Srîdhara. They constitute 'bonds,' because the self when brought
into contact with them, strives to obtain them, Râmânuga.
108:1 Carelessness about duty, owing to being intent on something else. Cf.
Sutta Nipâta, pp. 51-91; Dhammapada. stanza 21; Kathopanishad, p. 152.
108:2 The effects of each quality assert themselves, when the other two are held
in check.
108:3 I. e. the senses of perception.
108:4 Activity = always doing something or another; performance, &c. = rearing
large mansions, &c. want of tranquillity = perpetual agitation of mind, 'this I
will do now, then, that, and next the other;' desire = to obtain everything that
one comes across.
108:5 I. e. doing absolutely nothing.
108:6 The highest manifestations of Brahman, viz. the Hiranyagarbha, &c., say
Srîdhara and Madhusûdana. Nîlakantha also suggests that 'those who know the
highest' means gods.
109:1 Lower creation, such as birds, beasts, &c.
109:2 Cf. Sutta Nipâta, p. 16.
109:3 I. e. are born as gods, &c., middle,' as men, &c.; 'down,' as brutes, &c.
109:4 I. e. what has been called Kshetragña before, the supervising principle
within one.
109:5 Bodies are developments of the qualities, say the commentators, which is
not incompatible with the explanation of qualities given above. As to
transcending qualities, cf. p. 48 supra.
109:6 Cf. as to what follows what is said in chapter II about 'one whose mind is
steady.'
110:1 I. e. who does not feel troubled, for instance, thinking now I am actuated
by a motive of passion or darkness, and so forth.
110:2 So as to lose all discrimination.
110:3 I. e. from his determination to pursue truth, by worldly pleasures or
pains.
110:4 Cf. p. 55 supra.
110:5 Intent on the self only.
110:6 For the whole passage, cf. p. 101 supra.
110:7 Nîlakantha interprets this to mean 'the ultimate object of the Vedas.' I
here Krishna. Srîdhara suggests this parallel, as light embodied is the sun, so
is the Brahman embodied identical with Vâsudeva.
***********************
CHAPTER XV.
The Deity said:
They say the inexhaustible Asvattha 1 has (its) roots above, (its) branches
below; the Khandas are its leaves. He who knows it knows the Vedas. Upwards and
downwards extend its branches, which are enlarged by the qualities, and the
sprouts of which are sensuous objects. And downwards to this human world are
continued its roots which lead on to action. Its form is not thus known here,
nor (its) end, nor beginning, nor support. But having with the firm weapon of
unconcern, cut this Asvattha, whose roots are firmly fixed, then should one seek
for that seat from which those that go there never return, (thinking) that one
rests on that same primal being from whom the ancient course (of worldly life)
emanated. Those who are free from pride and delusion, who have overcome the
evils of attachment, who are constant in (contemplating) the relation of the
supreme and individual self, from whom desire has departed, who are free from
the pairs (of opposites) called pleasure and pain, go undeluded to that
imperishable seat 2. The
p. 112
sun does not light it, nor the moon, nor fire 1. That is my highest abode, going
to which none returns. An eternal portion of me it is, which, becoming an
individual soul in the mortal world, draws (to itself) the senses with the mind
as the sixth 2. Whenever the ruler (of the bodily frame) obtains or quits a
body, he goes taking these (with him) as the wind (takes) perfumes from (their)
seats 3. And presiding over the senses of hearing and seeing, and touch, and
taste, and smell, and the mind, he enjoys sensuous objects. Those who are
deluded do not see (him) remaining in or quitting (a body), enjoying or joined
to the qualities 4; they see, who have eyes of knowledge. Devotees making
efforts perceive him abiding within their selfs 5. But those whose selfs have
not been refined, and who have no discernment, do not perceive him even (after)
making efforts. Know that glory (to be) mine which, dwelling in the sun, lights
up the whole world, or in the moon or fire 6.
p. 113
Entering the earth 1, I by my power support all things; and becoming the juicy
moon, I nourish all herbs. I becoming the fire, and dwelling in the bodies of
(all) creatures, and united with the upward and downward life-breaths, cause
digestion of the fourfold food 2. And I am placed in the heart of all 3; from me
(come) memory, knowledge, and their removal; I alone am to be learnt from all
the Vedas; I am the author of the Vedântas 4; and I alone know the Vedas. There
are these two beings in the world, the destructible and the indestructible 5.
The destructible (includes) all things. The unconcerned one is (what is) called
the indestructible. But the being supreme is yet another, called the highest
self, who as the inexhaustible lord, pervading the three worlds, supports
(them). And since I transcend the destructible, and since I am higher also than
the indestructible 6, therefore
p. 114
am I celebrated in the world and in the Vedas as the best of beings. He who,
undeluded, thus knows me the best of beings, worships me every way 1, O
descendant of Bharata! knowing everything. Thus, O sinless one! have I
proclaimed this most mysterious science. He who knows this, has done all he need
do, and he becomes possessed of discernment.
Footnotes
111:1 Cf. Kathopanishad, p. 70, and Sutta Nipâta, p. 76.
111:2 Asvattha stands here for the course of worldly life. Its roots are above,
viz. the supreme being; its boughs are Hiranyagarbha and others of the higher
beings. The Vedas are its leaves, preserving it as leaves preserve trees
(another interpretation is that they are the causes of the fruit which the tree
bears, i. e. salvation, &c.) Upwards and downwards, from the highest to the
lowest of created things. Enlarged = the qualities manifesting themselves, as
body, senses, &c.; objects of sense are sprouts as they are attached to the
senses, which are the tips of the branches above stated. The roots which extend
downwards are the desires for various p. 112 enjoyments. Its form not thus known
here, i.e. to those who live and move in this world, thus viz. as above
described. The man who knows the tree thus is said to know the Vedas, because
knowledge of it is knowledge of the substance of the Vedas, which is, that the
course of worldly life springs from the supreme, is kept up by Vedic rites, and
destroyed by knowledge of the supreme. As to freedom from pride, cf. Sutta
Nipâta, p. 4.
112:1 Cf. Kathopanishad, p. 142; Mundaka, p. 304; Nrisimhatâpinî, p. 106;
Svetâsvatara, p. 110.
112:2 Five senses and the mind issue from nature, in which they are absorbed
during sleep or at a dissolution of the world. Cf. Sutta Nipâta, p. 44.
112:3 Cf. Kaushîtaki-upanishad, pp. 86, 87.
112:4 Perceiving objects of sense, or feeling pleasure, pain, &c.
112:5 'Selfs' = bodies, Râmânuga and Srîdhara; 'understandings,' Sankara. In the
next sentence 'self' means mind.
112:6 Cf. Maitrî-upanishad, p. 142. This sentence continues what has been stated
at the top of the page. The intervening p. 113 portion explains how souls do
come back in some cases. As a general rule, 'all going ends in returning.' But
the soul is an exception in some cases, as the 'going' to the Brahman is going
to the fountain-head. Then the question arises, How does the severance come off
at all? And that is what the lines up to this explain.
113:1 'Entering in the form of the goddess earth,' say Ânandagiri and
Madhusûdana. Support, i. e. by keeping the earth from falling or crumbling away.
The moon is said to nourish herbs by communicating to them some of her 'juice.'
The moon, it may be noted, is called 'watery star' by Shakespeare. As to her
relation to the vegetable kingdom, see Matsya-purâna XXIII, stanza 10 seq.
113:2 I. e. what is drunk, what is licked, what is powdered with the teeth, and
what is eaten without such powdering.
113:3 Cf. p. 104 supra.
113:4 See Introduction, p. 17.
113:5 Cf. Svetâsvatara, p. 294.
113:6 The two are the whole collection of things as they appear and their
material cause. The supreme being is a third principle.
114:1 Cf. p. 129 infra. Here Sankara paraphrases it by 'thinking me to be the
soul of everything.'
****************
CHAPTER XVI.
Freedom from fear, purity of heart, perseverance in (pursuit of) knowledge and
abstraction of mind, gifts 2, self-restraint 2, and sacrifice, study of the
Vedas, penance, straightforwardness, harmlessness, truth 2, freedom from anger,
renunciation 3, tranquillity, freedom from the habit of backbiting 4, compassion
for (all) beings, freedom from avarice, gentleness, modesty, absence of vain
activity, noblemindedness, forgiveness, courage, purity, freedom from a desire
to injure others, absence of vanity, (these), O descendant of Bharata! are his
who is born to godlike endowments. Ostentatiousness, pride, vanity 5, anger, and
also harshness and ignorance (are) his, O son of Prithâ! who is born to demoniac
6 endowments. Godlike endowments are deemed to be (means) for
p. 115
final emancipation, demoniac for bondage 1. Grieve not, O descendant of Bharata!
you are born to godlike endowments. (There are) two classes of created beings in
this world, the godlike and the demoniac; the godlike (class) has been described
at length; now hear from me, O son of Prithâ! about the demoniac. Demoniac
persons know not action or inaction 2, neither purity nor yet (correct) conduct
nor veracity are in them. They say the universe is devoid of truth 3, devoid of
fixed principle 4, and devoid of a ruler, produced by union (of male and female)
caused by lust 5, and nothing else. Holding this view, (these) enemies of the
world, of ruined 6 selfs, of little knowledge, and of ferocious actions, are
born for the destruction (of the world). Entertaining insatiable desire, full of
vanity, ostentatiousness, and frenzy, they adopt false notions 7 through
delusion, and engage in unholy observances. Indulging in boundless thoughts
ending with death 8, given up to the enjoyment of objects of desire, being
resolved that that is all, bound down by nets of hopes in hundreds, given up to
anger and desire, they wish
p. 116
to obtain heaps of wealth unfairly for enjoying objects of desire. 'This have I
obtained to-day; this wish I will obtain; this wealth is mine; and this also
shall be mine; this foe I have killed; others too I will destroy; I am lord, I
am the enjoyer, I am perfect 1, strong, happy; I have wealth; I am of noble
birth; who else is like me? I will sacrifice 2; I will make gifts; I will
rejoice.' Thus deluded by ignorance, tossed about by numerous thoughts,
surrounded by the net of delusion, and attached to the enjoyment of objects of
desire, they fall down into impure hell. Honoured (only) by themselves, void of
humility, and full of the pride and frenzy of wealth, these calumniators (of the
virtuous) perform sacrifices, which are sacrifices only in name, with
ostentatiousness and against prescribed rules 3; indulging (their) vanity, brute
force, arrogance, lust, and anger; and hating me in their own bodies and in
those of others 4. These enemies 5, ferocious, meanest of men, and unholy, I
continually hurl down, to these worlds 6, only into demoniac wombs. Coming into
demoniac wombs, deluded in every birth, they go down to the vilest state, O son
of Kuntî! without ever coming to me. Threefold is this way, to hell,--
p. 117
ruinous to the self 1,--lust, anger, and likewise avarice; therefore one should
abandon this triad. Released from these three ways to darkness, O son of Kuntî!
a man works out his own welfare, and then proceeds to the highest goal. He 2 who
abandoning scripture ordinances, acts under the impulse of desire, does not
attain perfection 3, nor happiness, nor the highest goal. Therefore in
discriminating between w hat should be done and what should not be done, your
authority (must. be) scripture. And knowing what is declared by the ordinances
of scripture, you should perform action in this world.
Footnotes
114:2 Cf. Sutta Nipâta, p. 49.
114:3 See next chapter.
114:4 Sutta Nipâta, pp. 15, 101.
114:5 Ostentatiousness = making a show of piety; pride = scil. of wealth and
learning; vanity = esteeming oneself too highly; harshness =mercilessness.
114:6 Cf. Khândogya-upanishad, p. 585, and Müller's Hibbert Lectures, p. 322.
115:1 Scil, to birth and death in this world.
115:2 What should be done for the attainment of real good, and what should not
be done as productive of mischief. See too p. 125.
115:3 I. e. contains nothing that is entitled to belief, as the Vedas, &c.
115:4 No principle based on virtue and vice in the government of the world.
115:5 They do not believe in any unseen cause, out say the lust of mankind is
the cause of the universe.
115:6 I. e. who have none of the means of reaching the next world.
115:7 Such as that by propitiating a certain divinity by a certain rite they may
obtain treasure and so forth.
115:8 Till their last moments, thinking of making new acquisitions and
preserving old ones.
116:1 Blessed with children, &c. Srîdhara takes it to mean, I one who has done
all he need do,' and Râmânuga 'sufficient in himself.'
116:2 I. e. get higher renown for sacrifices than others.
116:3 That is, because of indulgence in vanity, &c. Vanity = believing oneself
to have virtues which one has not; arrogance = proud disdain of others.
116:4 There is trouble to oneself in sacrifices and to the animals killed for
them.
116:5 I. e. of God.
116:6 The commentators render the original here by 'the paths of life and
death,' or 'path to hell.'
117:1 I. e. rendering the self unfit for any of the highest ends of man.
117:2 Here, says Srîdhara, it is laid down that the triad is not to be got rid
of save by following scripture rules.
117:3 I. e. fitness for the attainment of the summum bonum. As to acting from
desire, see also p. 65.
*********************
CHAPTER XVII.
Arguna said:
What is the state of those, O Krishna! who worship with faith, (but) abandoning
scripture ordinances--goodness, passion, or darkness?
The Deity said:
Faith is of three kinds in embodied (beings), it is produced from dispositions
4. It is of the quality of goodness, of the quality of passion, and of the
quality of darkness. Hear about it. The faith of all, O descendant of Bharata!
is conformable to the
p. 118
heart 1. A being here is full of faith, and whatever is a man's faith, that is a
man himself 2. Those of the quality of goodness worship the gods; those of the
quality of passion the Yakshas and Rakshases 3; and the others, the people of
the quality of darkness, worship departed (spirits) and the multitudes of
Bhûtas. Know those to be of demoniac convictions, who practise fierce penance 4
not ordained by scripture; who are full of ostentatiousness and egoism, and of
desire, attachment, and stubbornness; who are without discernment; and who
torment the groups of organs in (their) bodies, and me also seated within
(those) bodies. The food also, which is liked by all, and likewise the
sacrifice, the penance, and gifts, are of three kinds. Listen to the
distinctions regarding them as follows. The kinds of food which increase life,
energy, strength, health, comfort, and relish, which are savoury, oleaginous,
full of nutrition, and agreeable, are liked by the good. The kinds of food which
are bitter, acid, saltish, too hot, sharp, rough, and. burning, and which cause
pain. grief, and disease, are desired by the passionate. And the food 5 which is
cold, tasteless, stinking, stale, impure, and even leavings, are liked by the
dark. That sacrifice is good which, being prescribed in (scripture) ordinances,
is performed by persons
p. 119
not wishing for the fruit (of it), and after determining (in their) mind that
the sacrifice must needs be performed. But when a sacrifice is performed, O
highest of the descendants of Bharata! with an expectation of fruit (from it),
and for the purpose of ostentation, know that sacrifice (to be) passionate. They
call that sacrifice dark, which is against the ordinances (of scripture), in
which no food is dealt out (to Brâhmanas, &c.), which is devoid of Mantras 1,
devoid of Dakshinâ presents, and which is without faith. Paying reverence to
gods, Brâhmanas, preceptors, and men of knowledge; purity 2,
straightforwardness, life as Brahmakârin, and harmlessness, (this) is called the
penance bodily. The speech which causes no sorrow, which is true, agreeable, and
beneficial, and the study 3 of the Vedas, (this) is called the penance vocal.
Calmness of mind, mildness, taciturnity 4, self-restraint, and purity of heart,
this is called the penance mental. This threefold penance, practised with
perfect faith, by men who do not wish for the fruit, and who are possessed of
devotion is called good. The penance which is done for respect, honour, and
reverence 5, and with ostentatiousness,
p. 120
and which is uncertain and transient 1, is here called passionate. And that
penance is described as dark, which is performed under a misguided conviction,
with pain to oneself, or for the destruction of another. That gift is said (to
be) good, which is given, because it ought to be given, to one who (can) do no
service (in return), at a (proper) place and time, an d to a (proper) person.
But that gift which is given with much difficulty, for a return of services, or
even with an expectation of fruit 2, is said to be passionate. And that gift, is
described as dark, which is given to unfit persons, at an unfit place and time,
without respect, and with contempt. Om, Tad, and Sat, this is said (to be) the
threefold designation of the Brahman. By that 3, the Brâhmanas and the Vedas and
sacrifices were created in olden times. Hence, the performance by those who
study the Brahman, of sacrifices, gifts, and penances, prescribed by the
ordinances (of scripture), always commence after saying 'Om 4.' Those who desire
final emancipation perform the various acts of sacrifice and penance, and the
various acts of gift, without expectation of fruit, after (saying) 'Tad 5.'
'Sat' is employed to express existence and goodness; and likewise, O son of
Prithâ! the word 'Sat' is used to express an auspicious act. Constancy in
p. 121
(making) sacrifices. penances, and gifts, is called 'Sat;' and (all) action,
too, of which that 1 is the object, is also called 'Sat.' Whatever oblation is
offered, whatever is given, whatever penance is performed, and whatever is done,
without faith 2, that, O son of Prithâ! is called 'Asat,' and that is nought,
both after death and here 3.
Footnotes
117:4 I. e. the result of the actions in a former birth, cf. p. 56 supra.
118:1 The hearts of gods are said to be good, those of Yakshas &c. passionate,
those of men mixed, and so forth.
118:2 Faith is the dominant principle in man, and he is good, passionate, or
dark, as his faith is.
118:3 Goldstücker, Remains, I, 154.
118:4 Troublesome to oneself and others, as standing on heated stones, &c.
'Egoism' (Ahankâra) = the feeling that one is worthy of honour, Nîlakantha.
118:5 Cf. Sutta Nipâta, p. 109, and Âpastamba, p. 31 (p. 62 in this series).
119:1 Texts from the Vedas which ought to be recited on such occasions. Presents
(Dakshinâ) to Brâhmanas are insisted on in Brihad-âranyaka-upanishad, p. 661;
Âsvalâyana Grihya I, 23, 14.
119:2 Cleanliness of body; straightforwardness = not doing prohibited acts;
harmlessness = not injuring any living beings. These are 'bodily,' because the
body is the main instrument in these actions.
119:3 I. e. recitation of the Vedas.
119:4 This is part of the 'mental penance,' because the government of the tongue
is a consequence of mental restraint; the effect being, according to Sankara,
put here for the cause.
119:5 Respect = people rising to receive one, &c.; honour = people saying 'this
is a holy man,' &c.; reverence = people washing one's feet. &c.
120:1 The fruit of which is uncertain or perishable.
120:2 Heaven &c. as a reward for liberality.
120:3 I. e. the Brahman, according to Srîdhara.
120:4 Cf. Âpastamba, p. 21 (p. 49 in this series). Nîlakantha cites texts to
show that this and the other two words are used to designate the Brahman. The
texts are from the Taittirîya, Aitareya, and Khândogya-upanishads.
120:5 Nîlakantha says, 'after "Tad"' means considering the act and all are
Brahman, and cites p. 61 supra.
121:1 I. e. either the Brahman itself, or sacrifice, penance, and gift.
121:2 Cf. Sutta Nipâta, p. 69.
121:3 The meaning of this whole passage seems to be that these three words,
which designate the Brahman, have distinct uses, as specified. 'Om,' says
Nîlakantha, is employed whether the action is done with any special desire or
not. Those who study the Brahman there means 'study the Vedas.' 'Tad' is
employed in case of actions without desires only. 'Sat' is employed, according
to Sankara, in case of existence, such as the birth of a first son; I goodness,'
the reclamation of a bad man; 'auspicious acts,' marriage, &c. The intelligent
use of these terms as here specified is said to cure any defects in the actions,
the various classes of which are mentioned before.
********************
CHAPTER XVIII.
Arguna said:
O you of mighty arms! O Hrishîkesa! O destroyer of Kesin! I wish to know the
truth about renunciation and abandonment distinctly.
The Deity said:
By renunciation the sages understand the rejection of actions done with desires.
The wise call the abandonment of the fruit of all actions (by the name)
abandonment. Some wise men say, that action should be abandoned as being full of
evil; and others, that the actions of sacrifice, gift, and penance
p. 122
should not be abandoned. As to that abandonment, O best of the descendants of
Bharata! listen to my decision; for abandonment, O bravest of men! is described
(to be) threefold. The actions of sacrifice, gift, and penance should not be
abandoned; they must needs be performed; for sacrifices, gifts, and penances are
means of sanctification to the wise. But even these actions, O son of Prithâ!
should be performed, abandoning attachment and fruit; such is my excellent and
decided opinion. The renunciation of prescribed action is not proper. Its
abandonment through delusion 1 is described as of the quality of darkness. When
a man abandons action, merely as being troublesome, through fear of bodily
affliction, he does not obtain the fruit 2 of abandonment by making (such)
passionate abandonment. When prescribed action is performed, O Arguna!
abandoning attachment and fruit also, merely because it ought to be performed,
that is deemed (to be) a good abandonment. He who is possessed of abandonment 3,
being full of goodness, and talented, and having, his doubts destroyed, is not
averse from unpleasant actions, is not attached to pleasant 4 (ones). Since no
embodied (being) can abandon actions without exception 5, he is said to be
possessed of abandonment, who abandons the fruit of action. The threefold fruit
of action, agreeable, disagreeable, and mixed, accrues after death to those who
are not possessed of abandonment, but never to
p. 123
renouncers 1. Learn from me, O you of mighty arms! these five causes of the
completion of all actions, declared in the Sânkhya system 2. The substratum, the
agent likewise, the various sorts of organs, and the various and distinct
movements, and with these the deities, too, as the fifth. Whatever action, just
or otherwise, a man performs with his body, speech, and mind, these five are its
causes. That being so, the undiscerning man, who being of an unrefined
understanding, sees the agent in the immaculate self, sees not (rightly) 3. He
who has no feeling of egoism 4, and whose mind is not tainted, even though he
kills (all) these people, kills not, is not fettered, 5 (by the action).
Knowledge 6, the object of knowledge, the knower--threefold is the prompting to
action. The instrument, the action, the agent, thus in brief is action
threefold. Knowledge and action and agent
p. 124
are declared in the enumeration of qualities 1 (to be) of three classes only,
according to the difference of qualities. Hear about these also as they really
are. Know that knowledge to be good, by which (a man) sees one entity,
inexhaustible, and not different in all things (apparently) different 2 (from
one another). Know that knowledge to be passionate, which is (based) on
distinctions 3 (between different entities), which sees in all things various
entities of different kinds. And that is described as dark, which clings to one
created (thing) only as everything, which is devoid of reason, devoid of real
principle, and insignificant 4. That action is called good, which is prescribed,
which is devoid of attachment, which is not done from (motives of) affection or
aversion, (and which is done) by one not wishing for the fruit. That is
described as passionate, which (occasions) much trouble, is performed by one who
wishes for objects of desire, or one who is full of egotism 5. The action is
called dark, which is commenced through delusion, without regard to
consequences, loss, injury, or strength 6. That agent is called good, who has
cast off attachment, who is free from egotistic talk, who is possessed of
courage and energy, and unaffected by success or ill-success. That agent is
called passionate, who is full of affections 7,
p. 125
who wishes for the fruit of actions, who is covetous, cruel, and impure, and
feels joy and sorrow. That agent is called dark, who is without application 1,
void of discernment, headstrong, crafty, malicious, lazy, melancholy, and slow.
Now hear, O Dhanañgaya! the threefold division of intelligence 2 and courage,
according to qualities, which I am about to declare exhaustively and distinctly.
That intelligence, O son of Prithâ! is good which understands action and
inaction 3, what ought to be done and what ought not to be done, danger and the
absence of danger, emancipation and bondage. That intelligence, O son of Prithâ!
is passionate, by which one imperfectly understands piety and impiety, what
ought to be done and also what ought not to be done. That intelligence, O son of
Prithâ! is dark, which shrouded by darkness, understands impiety (to be) piety,
and all things incorrectly. That courage, O son of Prithâ! is good courage,
which is unswerving 4, and by which one controls the operations of the mind,
breath, and senses, through abstraction. But, O Arguna! that courage is
passionate, by which one adheres to piety, lust, and wealth 5, and through
attachment 6 wishes,
p. 126
O son of Prithâ! for the fruit, That courage is dark, O son of Prithâ! by which
an undiscerning man does not give up sleep, fear, sorrow, despondency, and
folly. Now, O chief of the descendants of Bharata! bear from me about the three
sorts of happiness. That happiness is called good, in which one is pleased after
repetition 1 (of enjoyment), and reaches the close of all misery, which is like
poison first and comparable to nectar in the long run, and which is produced
from a clear knowledge of the self 2. That happiness is called passionate, which
(flows) from contact between the senses and their objects, and which is at first
comparable to nectar and in the long run like poison. That happiness is
described as dark, which arises from sleep, laziness, heedlessness, which
deludes the self, both at first and in its consequences. There is no entity
either on earth or in heaven among the gods, which is free from these three
qualities born of nature. The duties of Brâhmanas, Kshatriyas, and Vaisyas, and
of Sûdras, too, O terror of your foes! are distinguished according to the
qualities born of nature 3. Tranquillity 4, restraint of the senses, penance,
purity, forgiveness, straightforwardness, also knowledge, experience, and belief
(in a future world), this is the natural duty of Brâhmanas. Valour, glory,
Courage,
p. 127
dexterity 1, not slinking away from battle, gifts, exercise of lordly power 2,
this is the natural duty of Kshatriyas. Agriculture, tending cattle, trade,
(this) is the natural duty of Vaisyas, And the natural duty of Sûdras, too,
consists in service. (Every) man intent on his own respective duties obtains
perfection 3. Listen, now, how one intent on one's own duty obtains perfection.
Worshipping, by (the performance of) his own duty, him from whom all things
proceed, and by whom all this is permeated, a man obtains perfection. One's
duty, though defective, is better than another's duty well performed 4.
Performing the duty prescribed by nature, one does not incur sin. O son of
Kuntî! one should not abandon a natural duty though tainted with evil; for all
actions are enveloped by evil, as fire by smoke 5. One who is self-restrained,
whose understanding is unattached everywhere, from whom affections have
departed, obtains the supreme perfection of freedom from action 6 by
renunciation. Learn from me, only in brief, O son of Kuntî! how one who has
obtained perfection attains the Brahman, which is the highest culmination of
knowledge. A man possessed of a pure understanding, controlling his self by
courage, discarding sound and other objects of sense, casting off affection
p. 128
and aversion; who frequents clean places, who eats little, whose speech, body,
and mind are restrained, who is always intent on meditation and mental
abstraction 1, and has recourse to unconcern, who abandoning egoism 2,
stubbornness, arrogance, desire, anger, and (all) belongings, has no (thought
that this or that is) mine, and who is tranquil, becomes fit for assimilation
with the Brahman. Thus reaching the Brahman 3, and with a tranquil self, he
grieves not, wishes not; but being alike to all beings, obtains the highest
devotion to me. By (that) devotion he truly understands who I am and how great.
And then understanding me truly, he forthwith enters into my (essence). Even
performing all actions, always depending on me, he, through my favour, obtains
the imperishable and eternal seat. Dedicating in thought 4 all actions to me, be
constantly given up to me, (placing) your thoughts on me, through recourse to
mental abstraction. (Placing) your thoughts on me, you will cross over all
difficulties by my favour. But if you will not listen through egotism 5, you
will be ruined. If entertaining egotism, you think that you may not fight, vain,
indeed, is that resolution of yours. Nature 6 will constrain you. That, O son of
Kuntî! which through delusion you do not wish to do, you will do involuntarily,
p. 129
tied down by your own duty, flowing from your nature. The lord, O Arguna! is
seated in the region of the heart 1 of all beings, turning round all beings (as
though) mounted on a machine, by his delusion. With him, O descendant of
Bharata! seek shelter in every way 2; by his favour you will obtain the highest
tranquillity, the eternal seat. Thus have I declared to you the knowledge more
mysterious than any mystery. Ponder over it thoroughly, and then act as you
like. Once more, listen to my excellent words-most mysterious of all. Strongly I
like you, therefore I will declare what is for your welfare. On me (place) your
mind, become my devotee, sacrifice to me, reverence me, you will certainly come
to me. I declare to you truly, you are dear to me. Forsaking all duties 3, come
to me as (your) sole refuge. I will release you from all sins. Be not grieved.
This 4 you should never declare to one who performs no penance 5, who is not a
devotee 6, nor to one who does not wait on (some preceptor) 7, nor yet to one
who calumniates me. He who, with the highest devotion 8 to me, will proclaim
this supreme mystery among my devotees, will come to me, freed from (all) doubt.
No one
p. 130
amongst men is superior to him in doing what is dear to me. And there will never
be another on earth dearer to me than he. And he who will study this holy
dialogue of ours, will, such is my opinion, have offered to me the sacrifice of
knowledge 1. And the man, also, who with faith and without carping will listen
(to this), will be freed (from sin), and attain to the holy regions of those who
perform pious acts 2. Have you listened to this, O son of Prithâ! with a mind
(fixed) on (this) one point only? Has your delusion (caused) by ignorance been
destroyed, O Dhanañgaya?
Arguna said:
Destroyed is my delusion; by your favour, O undegraded one! I (now) recollect 3
myself. I stand freed from doubts 4. I will do your bidding.
Sañgaya said:
Thus did I hear this dialogue between Vâsudeva and the high-minded son of
Prithâ, (a dialogue) wonderful and causing the hair to stand on end. By the
favour of Vyâsa, I heard this highest mystery, (this) devotion 5, from Krishna
himself, the lord of the possessors of mystic power, who proclaimed it in
person. O king! remembering and (again) remembering this wonderful and holy
dialogue of Kesava and Arguna, I rejoice over and over again. And remembering
and (again) remembering that
p. 131
excessively wonderful form of Hari also, great is my amazement, O king! and I
rejoice over and over again. Wherever (is) Krishna, the lord of the possessors
of mystic power, wherever (is the (great) archer, the son of Prithâ, there in my
opinion (are) fortune, victory, prosperity 1, and eternal justice.
p. 135
Footnotes
122:1 Without delusion no such abandonment will occur.
122:2 Namely, final emancipation, by means of purity of heart.
122:3 I. e. who has the frame of mind necessary for a good abandonment.
122:4 Such as bathing at midday in summer.
122:5 Cf. p. 53 supra.
123:1 The original is sannyâsi, but Srîdhara is probably right in taking it to
mean one who has command of 'abandonment.' Sankara and Madhusûdana, however,
take the word in its ordinary sense of 'ascetic.' What follows explains, says
Srîdhara, why 'the fruit does not accrue to renouncers.'
123:2 Sankara and Madhusûdana say this means Vedânta-sâstra. Srîdhara suggests
also the alternative Sânkhya-sâstra. Substratum =the body, in which desire,
aversion, &c. are manifested; agent = one who egoistically thinks himself the
doer of actions; organs = senses of perception, action, &c.; movements = of the
vital breaths in the body; deities = the deities which preside over the eye and
other senses (as to this cf. Aitareya-upanishad, p. 45; Prasna, pp. 216, 217;
Mundaka, p. 314; Aitareya-âranyaka. pp. 88-270: and Max Müller's Hibbert
Lectures, p. 204, note).
123:3 Cf. p. 106.
123:4 Egoism = the feeling that he is the doer of the action; taint = the
feeling that the fruit of the action must accrue to him.
123:5 Cf. p. 45, and Dhammapada, stanza 294.
123:6 Knowledge, i.e. that something is a means to what is desired; object is
the means; the knower is he who has this knowledge. When these-co-exist we have
action. The instrument = senses, &c.
124:1 The system of Kapila.
124:2 Cf. p. 104.
124:3 Cf. Kathopanishad, p. 129.
124:4 Reason = argument in support; real principle = truth, view of things as
they are; insignificant, i. e. in comprehensiveness.
124:5 I. e. 'pride of learning,' &c., Sankara; 'egoism,' Râmânuga.
124:6 Consequences = good or evil resulting; loss = of wealth or strength;
injury = to others; strength = one's own capacity.
124:7 I. e. 'for children,' &c., according to Srîdhara; 'for the action,'
according to others.
125:1 I. e. attention to work; melancholy = always desponding and wanting in
energy.
125:2 The nature of the faculty of understanding; and courage is the firmness of
that faculty.
125:3 See p. 115. Sankara takes these to mean the 'paths' of action and
knowledge, and Nîlakantha takes the next expression to mean that which is
constant and that which is not constant--nitya, anitya.
125:4 Always co-existing with mental abstraction and supporting it.
125:5 Three of the aims of mankind, the highest being final emancipation. In the
view of the Gîtâ, piety, leading only to heaven, is of doubtful benefit.
125:6 I. e. to the action for attaining them, in the belief that one is p. 126
the doer of it; the 'fruit' scil. of the action performed with an eye to the
three things named.
126:1 Not at once, as in the case of sensuous pleasures.
126:2 Cf. p. 51. The original has also been rendered by 'tranquillity of one's
own mind.'
126:3 Cf. p. 59.
126:4 I. e. resulting from control of the mind, purity here is both external and
internal. And see p. 119.
127:1 I. e. in battle, Nîlakantha seems to say. Sankara says it means ready
resource whenever occasion arises.
127:2 I. e. 'power to restrain people from going astray.' Nîlakantha.
127:3 Eligibility for the path of knowledge.
127:4 Cf. p. 56.
127:5 Cf. p. 121; the evil appears to be the quality of 'fettering' the soul.
127:6 Srîdhara compares p. 65 (V. 13) and distinguishes this from p. 64 (V, 8
seq.) Sankara says the perfection here spoken of is emancipation, and it is
obtained by true knowledge.
128:1 Abstraction is concentrated and exclusive meditation, Sankara. The other
commentators take dhyânayoga as meditation simply,--as treated of in chapter VI,
says Nîlakantha.
128:2 See p. 52.
128:3 I. e. comprehending his identity with the Brahman.
128:4 Cf. p. 55.
128:5 Pride of learning and cleverness, or of piety. See p. 124, note .
128:6 The nature of a Kshatriya, Sankara.
129:1 Svetâsvatara-upanishad, pp. 333-345; Kathopanishad, p. 157.
129:2 Cf. p. 114; by thought, word, and deed.
129:3 Of caste or order, such as Agnihotra and so forth.
129:4 All that has been taught in the Gîtâ.
129:5 Srîdhara renders this to mean, 'who performs no pious acts.'
129:6 I. e. of God and a preceptor. Cf. last stanza of Svetâsvataropanishad.
129:7 Cf. p. 62. Sankara says all these elements must co-exist to give
eligibility.
129:8 I. e. belief that in disseminating it, he is serving me. Cf.
Kathopanishad, p. 120.
130:1 Which is the best of sacrifices; see p. 62.
130:2 Cf. p. 72.
130:3 I. e. understand my real essence, what I am, &c.
130:4 As to whether the battle was right or not.
130:5 The work is so called, as it refers to devotion.
131:1 Prosperity is the greater development of fortune.
End of Bhagavadgita
**********************
INTRODUCTION TO SANATSUGÂTÎYA.
THE Sanatsugâtîya, is, like the Bhagavadgîtâ, one of the numerous episodes of
the Mahâbhârata 1. It is true, that it, has never commanded anything like that
unbounded veneration which has always been paid in India to the Bhagavadgîtâ.
Still it is sometimes studied even in our days, and it has had the high
distinction of being commented on by the great leader of the modern Vedântic
school--Sankarâkârya 2. The Dhritarâshtra purports to be a dialogue mainly
between Sanatsugâta on the one side and Dhritarâshtra on the other. Sanatsugâta,
from whom it takes its name, is said to be identical with Sanatkumâra, a name
not unfamiliar to students of our Upanishad literature. And Dhritarâshtra is the
old father of those Kauravas who formed one of the belligerent parties in the
bellum plusquam civile which is recorded in the Mahâbhârata. The connexion of
this particular episode with the main current of the narrative of that epos is
one of the loosest possible character--much looser, for instance, than that of
the Bhagavadgîtâ. As regards the latter, it can fairly be contended that it is
in accordance with poetical justice for Arguna to feel despondent and unwilling
to engage in battle, after actual sight of 'teachers, fathers, sons,' and all
the rest of them, arrayed in opposition to him; and that therefore it was
necessary for the poet to adduce some specific explanation as to how Arguna was
ultimately enabled to get over such natural scruples. But as regards the
Sanatsugâtîya, even such a contention as this can have
p. 136
no place. For this is how the matter stands. In the course of the negotiations
for an amicable arrangement 1 between the Pândavas and the Kauravas, Sañgaya, on
one occasion, came back to Dhritarâshtra with a message from the Pândavas. When
he saw Dhritarâshtra, however, he said that he would deliver the message in the
public assembly of the Kauravas the next morning, and went away after
pronouncing a severe censure on Dhritarâshtra for his conduct. The suspense thus
caused was a source of much vexation to the old man, and so he sent for Vidura,
in order, as he expresses it, that Vidura might by his discourse assuage the
fire that was raging within him. Vidura accordingly appears, and enters upon an
elaborate prelection concerning matters spiritual, or, perhaps, more accurately
quasi-spiritual, and at the outset of the Sanatsugâtîya he is supposed to have
reached a stage where, as being born a Sûdra, he hesitates to proceed. After
some discussion of this point, between Vidura and Dhritarâshtra, it is
determined to call in the aid of Sanatsugâta, to explain the spiritual topics
which Vidura felt a delicacy in dealing with; and Sanatsugâta is accordingly
introduced on the scene in a way not unusual in our epic and purânic literature,
viz. by Vidura engaging in some mystic process of meditation, in response to
which Sanatsugâta appears. He is received then with all due formalities, and
after he has had some rest, as our poem takes care to note, he is catechised by
Dhritarâshtra; and with one or two exceptions, all the verses which constitute
the Sanatsugâtîya are Sanatsugâta's answers to Dhritarâshtra's questions 2.
This brief statement of the scheme of this part of the Mahâbhârata shows, as
already pointed out, that the connexion of the Sanatsugâtîya with the central
story of that epic is very loose indeed; and that it might have been entirely
omitted without occasioning any æsthetical or other defect. And therefore,
although there is nothing positive
p. 137
tending to prove the Sanatsugâtîya to be a later addition to the original epos,
still the misgivings which are often entertained upon such points may well, in
this case, be stronger than in the case of the Bhagavadgîtâ. The text, too, of
the Sanatsugâtîya is not preserved in nearly so satisfactory a condition as that
of the Gîtâ. I have had before me, in settling my text, the editions of the
Mahâbhârata respectively printed and published at Bombay 1, Calcutta, and
Madras, and three MSS., one of which was most kindly and readily placed at my
disposal by my friend Professor Râmkrishna Gopâl Bhândârkar; the second by
another friend, Professor Âbâgî Vishnu Kâthavate; and the third was a copy made
for me at Sâgar in the Central Provinces, through the good offices of a third
friend, Mr. Vâman Mahâdeva Kolhatkar. The copy lent me by Professor Bhândârkar
comes from Puna, and that lent by Professor Kâthavate also from Puna. This last,
as well as the Sâgar copy, and the edition printed at Madras, contains the
commentary of Sankarâkârya. And the text I have adopted is that which is
indicated by the commentary as the text which its author had before him. But the
several copies of the commentary differ so, much from one another, that it is
still a matter of some doubt with me, whether I have got accurately the text
which Sankara commented upon. For instance, the Sâgar copy entirely omits
chapter V, while the other copies not only give the text of that chapter, but
also a commentary upon it which calls itself Sankarâkârya's commentary 2. Again,
take the stanzas which stand within brackets at pp. 167, 168 3 of our
translation. There is in none of the copies we have, any commentary of
Sankarâkârya on them. And yet the stanzas exist in the text of the Mahâbhârata
as given in those copies which do contain Sankara's commentary. The matter is
evidently one for further investigation. I have not, however, thought it
absolutely
p. 138
necessary to make such an investigation for the purposes of the present
translation. But to be on the safe side, I have retained in the translation
everything which is to be found in those copies of the Sanatsugâtîya which also
contain Sankara's commentary. As to other stanzas--and there are some of this
description--which other MSS. or commentators vouch for, but of which no trace
is to be found in the MSS. containing Sankara's commentary 1, I have simply
omitted them.
These facts show that, in the case of the Sanatsugâtîya, the materials for a
trustworthy historical account of the work are not of a very satisfactory
character. The materials for ascertaining its date and position in Sanskrit
literature are, indeed, so scanty, that poor as we have seen the materials for
the Bhagavadgîtâ to be, they must be called superlatively rich as compared with
those we have now to deal with. As regards external evidence on the points now
alluded to, the first and almost the last fact falling under that head, is the
fact of the work being quoted from and commented upon by Sankarâkârya. In his
commentary on the Svetâsvatara-upanishad 2, Sankara cites the passage about the
flamingo at p. 189, introducing it with the words, 'And in the Sanatsugâta
also.' In the same 3 commentary, some other passages from the Sanatsugâtîya are
also quoted, but without naming the work except as a Smriti, and mixing up
together verses from different parts of the work.
This is really all the external evidence, that I am aware of, touching the date
of the Sanatsugâtîya. There is, however, one other point, which it is desirable
to notice, though not, perhaps, so much because it is of any very great value in
itself, as because it may hereafter become useful, should further research into
the Mahâbhârata and other works yield the requisite. information. There are,
then, eight stanzas in the thirty-sixth, thirty-seventh, thirty-ninth, and
fortieth chapters of the Udyoga Parvan of the Mahâbhârata (the Sanatsugâtîya
commencing at the forty-first
p. 139
chapter), seven of which are quoted in the Pañkatantra 1, and the eighth in the
Mahâbhâshya 2 of Patañgali. Of course, it almost goes without saying, that
neither the Pañkatantra nor the Mahâbhâshya mentions the source from which they
derive the verses in question. But I do not think it unallowable to make the
provisional assumption, that they were derived from the Mahâbhârata, so long as
we cannot produce any other, and more likely, source. It is true, that Professor
Weber has, in another connexion, impugned the cogency of this argument. He seems
to think, that the probability--in the case he was actually dealing with--of the
Râmâyana having borrowed from the Mahâbhâshya, is quite as strong as the
probability of the Mahâbhâshya having borrowed from the Râmâyana 3. And
doubtless, he would by parity of reason contend, in the case before us, that the
probabilities, as between the Mahâbhârata on the one hand, and the Mahâbhâshya
and the Pañkatantra on the other, bear the same mutual relation. I cannot accept
this view. I am not now concerned to discuss the merits of the conclusion in
support of which Professor Weber has advanced this argument 4. I am only
considering, how far it affects the question now before us. And as to that
question, I may say, that the Pañkatantra expressly introduces the stanzas now
under consideration with some such expression as, 'For it has been said,'
indicating clearly that it was there quoting the words of another. And so, too,
does the Mahâbhâshya, where the passage we refer to runs as follows: '(It is)
laid down, (that there is) a sin in one of tender age not rising to
p. 140
receive (an elderly person), and (that there is) merit in rising to receive.
How? Thus, "The life-winds of a youth depart upwards, when an elderly man
approaches (him). By rising to receive (him), and salutation, he obtains them
again."' It appears to me, that the indications of this being a quotation in the
Bhâshya are very strong. But apart from that, I do demur to the proposition,
that the probabilities are equal, of a work like the Mahâbhârata or Râmâyana
borrowing a verse from the Mahâbhâshya, and vice versa. It appears to me
perfectly plain, I own, that the probability of a grammatical work like the
Bhâshya borrowing a verse from a standard work like the Bhârata or Râmâyana for
purposes of illustration is very much the stronger of the two. And this, quite
independently of any inquiry as to whether the Bhâshya does or does not show
other indications of acquaintance with the Bhârata or the Râmâyana.
If these arguments are correct, it seems to me that they carry us thus far in
our present investigation--namely, that we may now say, that we have reason to
believe some parts, at all events, of the thirty-sixth, thirty-seventh,
thirty-eighth, and fortieth chapters of the Udyoga Parvan of the Mahâbhârata to
have probably been in existence prior to the sixth century A. C. 1; and that
some parts of the thirty-seventh chapter were probably extant in the time of
Patañgali, viz. the second century B. C. 2 Now, internal evidence does not yield
any indications tending to show that the several chapters here referred to must
have been prior in time to the chapters composing the Sanatsugâtîya, which come
so soon after them in the Mahâbhârata. On the contrary, it is, not too much to
maintain, that to a certain extent the style and language of the Sanatsugâtîya
is, if anything, rather indicative of its priority in time over the five
chapters immediately preceding it. And, therefore, so far as this argument goes,
it enables us--provisionally only, it must be remembered--to fix the second
century B.C. as a terminus ad quem for the date of the Sanatsugâtîya.
This is all the external evidence available for a discussion
p. 141
of the question--when the Sanatsugâtîya was composed. We now turn to the
internal evidence. Standing by itself, internal evidence is not, in my opinion,
of much cogency in any case. Still in ascertaining, as best we can, the history
of our ancient literature, even this species of evidence is not to be despised;
it must only be used and received with caution. Under this head, then, we may
note first the persons who are supposed to take part in the dialogue.
Sanatsugâta 1--or Sanatkumâra--as already pointed out, is a name already
familiar to the readers of one of our older Upanishads--the Khândogya.
Dhritarâshtra is not known in the Upanishads, but he is an important personage
in the epic literature. And it is to be remarked, that his character as
disclosed in the Sanatsugâtîya is not at all similar to that which has attached
itself to his name, alike in the later literature of our country, and in that
popular opinion which was probably formed by this later literature. In the
dialogue before us, he figures as an earnest inquirer after truth; he is
described as the 'talented king Dhritarâshtra;' and is addressed by Sanatsugâta
as, 'O acute sir!' 'O learned person!' True it is, that Nîlakantha in one place,
as we have noticed in our note there 2, endeavours to bring out the later view
of Dhritarâshtra's character 3; but it seems to me that that endeavour, based as
it is on a forced and farfetched interpretation of a single word in our poem, is
an unsuccessful one. None of the questions, which Dhritarâshtra puts to
Sanatsugâta in the course of their dialogue, indicates the avaricious old man
who wished to deprive his innocent nephews of their just rights in the interests
of his own wicked and misguided sons. They rather indicate the bona fide student
of spiritual lore, and thus point to what is, perhaps, an earlier view of
Dhritarâshtra's character.
If we look next to the general style of this poem, we find that it has none of
that elaboration which marks what I
p. 142
have called the age of Kâvyas and Nâtakas. The remarks on this topic in the
Introduction to the Gîtâ apply pretty accurately to this work also. We observe
here the same paucity of long-drawn compounds, the same absence of merely
ornamental adjectives, the same absence of figures and tropes 1; in one word,
the same directness and simplicity of style. Furthermore, there is a somewhat
greater want of finish about the syntax of our poem than there is even in the
Gîtâ. Such constructions as we find inter alia at chapter II, stanza 2, or 25,
or at chapter III, stanza 14, or chapter IV, stanza 12, or in the early verses
of the last chapter, indicate a period in the history of the language, when
probably the regulations of syntax were not quite thoroughly established in
practice.
If we turn to the metre of the poem, an analogous phenomenon strikes us there.
Similar irregularities in the collocation of long and short syllables, similar
superfluities and deficiencies of syllables, meet us in the Sanatsugâtîya and
the Bhagavadgîtâ. And in the former work, as in the latter, the irregularities
are less observable in the Anushtubh 2 than in the other metres used. Probably
the explanation, apart from the great elasticity of that metre, is that the
Anushtubh had been more used, and had in consequence become comparatively more
settled in its scheme even in practical composition.
Looking now more particularly to the language of the work before us, we find one
word to be of most frequent occurrence, namely, the word vai, which we have
rendered 'verily.' It is not a common word in the later literature, while in the
Upanishad literature we meet with great frequency, not merely vai, but the
words, which I think are cognate with it, vâ and vâva. The former word, indeed,
appears to me to stand in some passages of the Upanishads for vai by euphonic
alterations. Thus in the passage tvam
p. 143
vâ aham asmi bhagavo devate, aham vai tvam asi, it is difficult not to suppose
that the vâ of the first part of the sentence is the same word as the vai of the
second part, only altered according to the rules of Sandhi in Sanskrit.
A second point of similarity between the language of the Upanishads and that of
the Sanatsugâtîya is to be found in the phrase, 'He who knows this becomes
immortal.' This sentence, or one of like signification, is, as is well known, of
common occurrence in the Upanishads and in the Brâhmanas. In the Bhagavadgîtâ,
the verses towards the end, which come after Krishna's summing-up of his
instruction, seem to be of a somewhat analogous, though in some respects
different, nature. And in the Purânas we meet sometimes with elaborate passages
extolling the merits of a particular rite, or a particular pilgrimage, and so
forth. This form of the Phalasruti, as it is called, appears to have been
developed in process of time from the minute germ existing in the Brâhmanas and
the Upanishads. In the Sanatsugâtîya, however, we are almost at the beginning of
those developments; indeed, the form before us is identically the same as that
which we see in the works where it is first met with. It is a short sentence,
which, though complete in itself, still appears merely at the end of another
passage, and almost as a part of such other passage.
There is one other point of a kindred nature which it may be well to notice
here. As in the Gîtâ, so in the Sanatsugâtîya, we meet with a considerable
number of words used in senses not familiar in the later literature. They are
collected in the Index of Sanskrit words in this volume; but a few remarks on
some of them will not, it is thought, be entirely out of place here. The word
mârga 1--in the sense of 'worldly life'--is rather remarkable. Sankara renders
it by 'the path of samsâra' or worldly life, And he quotes as a parallel the
passage from the Khândogya-upanishad which speaks of returning to the 'path.'
There, however, Sankara explains it to mean the 'path by which
p. 144
the self returns to worldly life,' namely, from space to the wind and so forth
into vegetables, and food, ultimately appearing as a fœtus. Another remarkable
word is 'varga,' which occurs twice in the Sanatsugâtîya. Sankara and Nîlakantha
differ in their explanations of it, and Nîlakantha indeed gives two different
meanings to the word in the two passages where it occurs. We may also refer here
specially to utsa, ritvig, and matvâ. In Boehtlingk and Roth's Lexicon the only
passages cited under 'utsa' are from Vedic works, except two respectively from
Susruta and the Dasakumârakarita. One passage, however, there cited, viz.
Vishnoh pade parame madhva utsah, is plainly the original of the passage we are
now considering. As to ritvig in the sense it bears here, we see, I think, what
was the earlier signification of that word before it settled down into the
somewhat technical meaning in which it is now familiar. And matvâ in the sense
of 'meditating upon' is to be found in the Upanishads, but not, I think, in any
work of the classical literature. These words, therefore, seem to indicate that
the Sanatsugâtîya was composed at a stage in the development of the Sanskrit
language which is a good deal earlier than the stage which we see completely
reached in the classical literature.
Coming now to the matter of the Sanatsugâtîya, it appears to me, that we there
see indications pointing in a general way to the same conclusion as that which
we have here arrived at. There is, in the first place, a looseness and want of
rigid system in the mode of handling the subject, similar to that which we have
already observed upon as characterising the Bhagavadgîtâ. There is no obvious
bond of connexion joining together the various subjects discussed, nor are those
subjects themselves treated after any very scientific or rigorous method. Again,
if the fourth chapter is a genuine part of the Sanatsugâtîya, we have an
elaborate repetition, in one part, of what has been said in another part of the
work, with only a few variations in words, and perhaps fewer still in
signification. As, however, I am not at present prepared to stand finally by the
genuineness of that chapter I do not consider it desirable to further labour
this argument
p. 145
than to point out, that similar repetitions, on a smaller scale, perhaps, are
not uncommon in our older literature 1.
Coming now to the manner in which the Vedas are spoken of in the work before us,
there are, we find, one or two noteworthy circumstances proper to be considered
here. In the first place, we have the reference to the four Vedas together with
Âkhyânas as the fifth Veda. This is in conformity with the old tradition
recorded in the various works to which we have referred in our note on the
passage. The mention of the Atharva-veda, which is implied in this passage, and
expressly contained in another, might be regarded as some mark of a modern age.
But without dwelling upon the fact, that the Atharva-veda, though probably,
modern as compared with the other Vedas, is still old enough to date some
centuries before the Christian era 2, it must suffice to draw attention here to
the fact that the Khândogya-upanishad mentions that Veda, and it is not here
argued that the Sanatsugâtîya is older than the Khândogya-upanishad. We have
next to consider the reference to the Sâman hymns as 'vimala,' or pure. The
point involved in this reference has been already sufficiently discussed in the
Introduction to the Gîtâ 3; and it is not necessary here to say more than that,
of the two classes of works we have there made, the Sanatsugâtîya appears from
the passage under discussion to rank itself with. the class which is prior in
date.
The estimate of the value of the Vedas which is implied in the Sanatsugâtîya
appears to coincide very nearly with that which we have shown to be the estimate
implied in the Bhagavadgîtâ. The Vedas are not here cast aside as useless any
more than they are in the Bhagavadgîtâ. For, I do not think the word Anrikas
which occurs in one passage of the work can be regarded really as referring to
those who entirely reject the Vedic revelation. Without going as far as that,
the Sanatsugâtîya seems certainly to join the Bhagavadgîtâ in its protest
against those men of extreme views, who could see nothing beyond the rites and
ceremonies
p. 146
taught in the Vedas. A study of the Vedas is, indeed, insisted on in sundry
passages of the Sanatsugâtîya. But it is equally maintained, that the
performance of the ceremonies laid down in the Vedas is not the true means of
final emancipation. It is maintained, that action done with any desire is a
cause of bondage to worldly life; that the gods themselves are ordinary
creatures who have reached a certain high position owing to the practice of the
duties of Brahmakârins, but that they are not only not superior to, but are
really under the control of, the man who has acquired the true knowledge of the
universal self. On all these points, we have opinions expressed in the
Sanatsugâtîya, which conclusively establish an identity of doctrine as between
the Upanishads and the Bhagavadgîtâ 1 on the one hand, and the Sanatsugâtîya on
the other. Lastly, we have an explicit statement, that the mere study of Vedic
texts avails nothing, and that sin is not to be got rid of by one who merely
'studies the Rik and the Yagus texts, and the Sâma-veda.' It is not necessary to
repeat here the chronological deductions which may be based upon this relation
between the Sanatsugâtîya and the Vedas. We have already argued in the
Introduction to the Bhagavadgîtâ, that such a relation points to a period of
Indian religious history prior to the great movement of Gautama Buddha 2.
There is, however, this difference, perhaps, to be noted between the Gîtâ and
the Sanatsugâtîya-namely, that the latter work seems to afford more certain
indications of the recognition, at the date of its composition, of a Gñânakânda
as distinguished from a Karmakânda in the Vedas, than, we have seen, are
contained in the Bhagavadgîtâ 3. The passage, for instance, which speaks of the
Khandas as referring 'of themselves' to the Brahman, and the passage which
refers to an understanding of the Brahman by means of the Vedas, according to
the principle of the moon and the branch--these seem rather to point to a
portion of the Vedas which was regarded as giving instruction in true
p. 147
knowledge, as distinguished from merely laying down various sacrifices and
ceremonials for special purposes. In fact, in one passage we have the germ of
the whole Vedântic theory as afterwards settled. For there we are told, that
sacrifices and penances are laid down as the preliminary steps towards the
acquisition of true knowledge. By those sacrifices one is purified of one's
sins, and then acquires a. knowledge of the supreme self as described in the
Vedas--which, I apprehend, must mean the Upanishads.
There is but one other point on which we need say anything further. And that is
connected with the definition of a Brâhmana. That definition appears to me, to
point to an earlier stage in religious progress than is indicated in Âpastamba
and Manu. The true Brâhmana is he who is attached to the Brahman. Perhaps, this
marks some little advance beyond the more general doctrine of the Gîtâ, but it
is still very far short of the petrified doctrine, if I may so call it, of the
later law-givers. The Brâhmana has not yet degenerated into the mere receiver of
fees and presents, but is still in possession of the truth.
We thus see, that the external and internal evidence bearing upon the question
of the position of the Sanatsugâtîya in Sanskrit literature, seems to point to
nearly the same period and place for it as for the Bhagavadgîtâ. It is plain
enough, that the evidence under both heads is extremely scanty and meagre. But
such as it is, it appears to us to justify a provisional conclusion, that the
Sanatsugâtîya dates from a period prior to the rise of Buddhism, and forms part
of that same movement in the religious history of ancient India of which the
Gîtâ is another embodiment. More than this, we are not at present in a position
to assert. To this extent, the evidence enables us, I think, to go. And we
accordingly hold, that unless other and further evidence requires a reversal of
this judgment, the Sanatsugâtîya may be treated as a work nearly contemporary
with the Bhagavadgîtâ, and occupying generally the same point of view.
One word, finally, about the translation. As stated already, the text adopted is
that which appears to have
p. 148
been before Sankarâkârya. And the translation follows mainly his interpretations
in his commentary. Sometimes we have followed Nîlakantha, whose commentary has
been consulted as well as a very incorrect copy of another commentary by one
Sarvagña Nârâyana, contained in the MS. from Puna lent me by Professor
Bhândârkar. In some places even the commentators have failed to clear up
obscurities, and there we have given the best translation we could suggest,
indicating the difficulties. There has been an endeavour made here, as in the
case of the Bhagavadgîtâ, to keep the translation as close and faithful to the
text as the exigencies of the English language permitted. 'The exegetical notes
are mostly taken from the commentaries, even where the name of the commentator
is not specified; while the references to parallel passages have been collected,
mostly by myself, in the same way as in the case of the Bhagavadgîtâ.
p. 149
Footnotes
135:1 Mahâbhârata, Udyoga Parvan, Adhyâya 41-46.
135:2 Mâdhavâkârya, in speaking of Sankara's works, describes him as having
commented on the Sanatsugâtîya, which is 'far from evil (persons)'
[asatsudûram]. Sankara-vigaya, chapter VI, stanza 62.
136:1 See p. 3 supra.
136:2 After this dialogue is over, the dawn breaks, and Dhritarâshtra and the
Kaurava princes meet in general assembly.
137:1 This contains Nîlakantha's commentary, but his text avowedly includes the
text of Sankara, and verses and readings contained in more modern copies.
137:2 The commentary on the sixth chapter, however, takes up the thread from the
end of the fourth chapter.
137:3 See p. 182, where one of the lines recurs.
138:1 See note , p. 137.
138:2 p. 283.
138:3 p. 252. See, too, Sârîraka Bhâshya, p. 828.
139:1 Cf. Kosegarten's Pañkatantra, p. 28 (I ,28, Bombay S. C. ed.), with Udyoga
Parvan, chap. XL, st. 7 (Bombay ed.); Pañkatantra, pp. 112 and 209 (II, 10; IV,
5, Bombay ed.), with Udyoga Parvan, chap. XXXVIII, 9; p. 35 (I, 37, Bombay ed.)
with chap. XXXVI, st. 34; p. 140 (II, 40, Bombay ed.) with chap. XXXVII, st. 15;
p. 160 (III, 62, Bombay ed.) with chap. XXXVII, st. 17, 18; p. 106 (II, 2,
Bombay ed.) with chap. XXXVI, st. 59.
139:2 Udyoga Parvan, chap. XXXVIII, st. 1, and Mahâbhâshya VI, 1-4, p. 35
(Banâras ed.).
139:3 See Indian Antiquary IV. 247. The parallel from Mâdhava which Professor
Weber adduces is quite inconclusive, and as far as it goes appears to me to
militate against the Professor's own view.
139:4 I may, however, admit at once, that I ought not to have expressed myself
as strongly as I did in the note which Professor Weber criticises.
140:1 See p. 29 supra.
140:2 See p. 32 supra.
141:1 See Hall's Sânkhyasâra, preface, pp. 14, 15.
141:2 P. p. 151, note .
141:3 Nîlakantha himself, however, treats Dhritarâshtra's question later on as
showing that he had attained indifference to worldly concerns. That question
does not occur in Sankara's text, but is given at p. 158 infra.
142:1 The five similes which occur, and which are nearly all that occur, in the
poem, are the very primitive ones--of the hunter, of water on grass, the tiger
of straw, death eating men like a tiger, dogs eating what is vomited, a branch
of a tree and the moon, and birds and their nests.
142:2 Cf. as to this the Nrisimha Tâpinî, p. 105.
143:1 I give no references here, as they can be found in the Index of Sanskrit
words at the end of this volume.
145:1 See p. 181, note infra.
145:2 P. p. 19 supra.
145:3 Pp. 19, 20.
146:1 Cf. p. 16 supra.
146:2 Cf. pp. 25, 26.
146:3 p. 17.
***************************
SANATSUGÂTÎYA.
CHAPTER I.
Dhritarâshtra said:
If, O Vidura! there is anything not (yet) said by you in (your) discourse, then
do impart it to me who wish to hear, for you have spoken marvellous (things).
Vidura said:
O Dhritarâshtra! the ancient youth Sanatsugâta, (otherwise called) Sanâtana 1,
who declared that death exists not--he, O descendant of Bharata! the best of all
talented men, will explain all the doubts of your mind, both those (which are)
secret 2, and those openly declared.
Dhritarâshtra said:
What, do you not yourself know more about this (subject), that Sanâtana should
explain (it) to me? Explain (it) yourself, O Vidura! if there is any remnant of
intelligence (left) in you.
p. 150
Vidura said:
1 am born of a Sûdra womb, and do not like to say more than what (I have said).
But the intelligence of that youth, I believe to be eternal 1. He who has come
of a Brâhmana womb, even though he may proclaim a great mystery, does not
thereby become liable to the censure of the gods. Therefore do I say this to
you.
Dhritarâshtra said:
Do you, O Vidura! speak to the ancient Sanâtana for me, so that there may be a
meeting even here, between (myself in) this body (and him).
Vaisampâyana 2 said:
(Then) Vidura meditated on that sage whose vows are laudable 3. And he, too, O
descendant of Bharata! knowing of such meditation, made his appearance. And he
4, too, received him with the ceremonies prescribed in the ordinances. After he
had been comfortably seated, and had taken rest, Vidura then spoke to him:
'Venerable sir! there is some doubt in Dhritarâshtra's mind, which cannot
p. 151
be explained by me. Do you be pleased to explain (it) to him. Hearing it
(explained), this lord of men may cross beyond all misery, so that gain and loss
1, (what is) agreeable and (what is) odious, old age and death, fear and
vindictiveness, hunger and thirst, frenzy and worldly greatness, disgust and
also laziness, desire and wrath, ruin and prosperity, may not trouble him.'
Footnotes
149:1 So Nîlakantha. Sankara says Sanatsugâta is Sanatkumâra, and the component
parts of the name he paraphrases by 'born from Brahman.' For Sanâtana, see
Brihadâranyaka, p. 506, and note 1, p. 141 supra.
149:2 I. e. relating to subjects which may be freely discussed by all, and those
which may not. Nîlakantha adopts a different reading, which he interprets to
mean 'doctrines exoteric and esoteric,' e. g. self-restraint, &c., and the
acquisition of mystic power, &c., respectively. The expression 'doubts of the
mind' occurs. however, further on.
150:1 I. e., I suppose, never-failing, and such as can deal with all sorts of
topics. Sanatkumâra, it need scarcely be stated, is the teacher of Nârada in the
famous dialogue in the Khândogyopanishad, p. 473.
150:2 Vaisampâyana is the narrator of the grand story of which pieces like the
present form parts.
150:3 The reading is sometimes different, so as to mean 'of rigid vows,' as at
Gîtâ, p. 61 supra.
150:4 The pronouns here are too numerous. Does 'he' here refer to Dhritarâshtra?
Vidura seems more likely, though the express mention of him in the next sentence
might be treated as pointing the other way.
151:1 Comp. Gîtâ passim; disgust, scil. that resulting from a general
dissatisfaction with everything. As to 'ruin and prosperity,' Nîlakantha adds,
'and their causes, sin and merit.'
********************
CHAPTER II.
Vaisampâyana said:
Then the talented king, Dhritarâshtra, bowed 2 to those words uttered by Vidura,
and, in a secluded place 3, interrogated Sanatsugâta regarding the highest
knowledge 4, wishing to become (a) high-souled (man) 5.
Dhritarâshtra said:
O Sanatsugâta! which of the two is correct, your teaching 6, about which I have
heard, that death exists not, or that 7 the gods and demons practised
p. 152
the life of Brahmakârins 1, for freedom from death?
Sanatsugâta said
Some (say), that freedom from death (results) from action 2; and others that
death exists not. Hear me explain (this), O king! have no misgiving about it 3.
Both truths, O Kshatriya! have been current from the beginning 4. The wise
maintain what (is called) delusion (to be) death. I 5 verily call heedlessness
death, and likewise I call freedom from heedlessness immortality. Through
heedlessness, verily, were the demons 6 vanquished; and through freedom
p. 153
from heedlessness the gods attained to the Brahman. Death, verily, does not
devour living creatures like a tiger; for, indeed, his form is not to be
perceived. Some 1 say that death is different from this, (named) Yama, who
dwells in the self 2 the (practice of the) life of Brahmakârins (being)
immortality. That god governs his kingdom in the world of the Pitris, (being)
good to the good, and not good to (those who are) not good. That death, (or)
heedlessness, develops in men as desire, and afterwards as wrath, and in the
shape of delusion 3. And then travelling in devious paths 4 through egoism, one
does not attain to union 5 with the self. Those who are deluded by it 6, and who
remain under its influence, depart from this (world), and there again fall down
7. Then, the deities 8 gather around them. And then he undergoes death after
death 9. Being attached to the fruit of action, on action presenting itself,
they follow after it 10, and do not cross
p. 154
beyond death. And the embodied (self), in consequence of not understanding union
1 with the real entity, proceeds on all hands 2 with attachment to enjoyments.
That 3, verily, is the great source of delusion to the senses; for by contact 4
with unreal entities, his migrations 5 are (rendered) inevitable; because having
his inner self contaminated by contact with unreal entities, he devotes himself
to objects of sense on all sides, pondering on them (only). (That) pondering,
verily, first. ruins 6 him; and soon afterwards desire and wrath, after
attacking him. These 7 lead children to death. But sensible men cross beyond
death by their good sense. He who pondering (on the self) destroys 8 (the)
fugitive (objects of sense), not even thinking of them through contempt (for
them), and who being possessed of knowledge destroys desires in this way,
becomes, as it were, the death of death (itself), and swallows (it) up 9. The
being who
p. 155
pursues desires, is destroyed (in pursuing) after the desires 1. But casting
away desires, a being gets rid of all taint 2 whatever, This body, void of
enlightenment 3, seems (to be) a hell for (all) beings. Those who are avaricious
run about 4, going headlong to a ditch. A man, O Kshatriya! who contemns
everything else 5 learns nothing. To him (the body is) like a tiger made of
straw 6. And this internal self (joined to) delusion and fear 7 in consequence
of wrath and avarice, within your body, that verily is death 8. Understanding
death 9 to be thus produced, and adhering to knowledge, one is not afraid of
death 10 in this (world). In his province death is destroyed, as a mortal (is
destroyed) on arriving in the province of death.
Dhritarâshtra said:
The good, eternal, and most holy worlds 11, which
p. 156
are mentioned (as attainable) by the twice-born by means of worship 1, those,
say the Vedas, are the highest aim 2. How is it, then, that one who understands
this does not resort to action?
Sanatsugâta said!
(Thinking) so, an ignorant man does resort to action. The Vedas likewise do lay
down various benefits 3 (for him). But that 4 (man) comes not hither 5.
(Becoming) the supreme self 6, he attains the supreme, by the (right) path
destroying the wrong paths 7.
Dhritarâshtra said:
Who 8 is it that constrains this unborn primeval (self), if it is (itself). all
this severally 9? And what
p. 157
has it to do, or what is its unhappiness 1? Tell me all that accurately, O
learned person!
Sanatsugâta said:
There is great danger 2 in attributing distinctions to it. The everlasting 3
(principles) exist by connexion with the beginningless 4 (principle). So that
his greatness is not lost at all 5, and beings exist by connexion with the
beginningless 4 (principle). That which is the real--the supreme Being 6--is
eternal. He creates the universe by means of changes 7, for such is his power
held to be; and for such connexions of things the Vedas are (authority) 8.
p. 158
Dhritarâshtra said:
Since some practise piety 1 in this world, and some likewise practise impiety in
this world; is the piety destroyed by the sin, or else. does the piety destroy
sin?
Sanatsugâta said:
Whichever 2 he adheres to, the man of understanding always destroys both by
means of knowledge; (that is) settled 3. Likewise, in the other case 4, the
embodied (self) obtains merit; and to such a one sin (also) accrues; (that too
is) settled 3. Departing (from this world), he enjoys by his actions both (kinds
of) fruit, which are not enduring 5--of actions (which are) pure, and of (those
which are) sinful. The man of understanding casts aside sin by piety in this
(world), for know that his piety is more powerful 6. Those Brâhmanas, in whom
there is emulation 7 about (their) piety, as there is in strong men about
(their) strength, after departing from this world, become glorious in heaven 8.
And
p. 159
to those in whom there is no emulation about (their) piety, that (piety) is a
means of (acquiring) knowledge 1. Such Brâhmanas released from this (world), go
to the heaven which is free from the threefold source of pain 2. People who
understand the Vedas call his conduct good. (But) people closely connected 3, as
well as strangers, do not pay much regard to him. Wherever he may believe food
and drink for a Brâhmana to exist in abundance, like water on grass in the
autumn, there would he live and not be vexed 4. (To him) only that person is
good, and no other (as a companion), who does nothing in excess, and who
occasions fear and injury to a taciturn man 5. And his food is acceptable to the
good, who does not vex the self of a taciturn man, and who does not destroy the
property of a Brâhmana 6. A Brâhmana should hold, that living in the midst of
kinsmen, his actions should be always unknown 7; and he should not
p. 160
think 1 (about them). What Brâhmana ought to think of the inner self, which is
void of symbols 2, immovable, pure, and free from all pairs of opposites, in
this way 3? What sin is not committed by that thief, who steals away his own
self 4, who regards his self as one thing, when it is a different thing. The
far-seeing Brâhmana, who knows the Brahman, is not wearied 5, he receives
nothing 6; he is honoured, free from trouble 7, and wise, but acts as if he was
not wise 8. As dogs eat what is vomited, so do they, enjoying their own bravery
9, eat what is vomited, always with disaster (to themselves). Those twice-born
persons, who are not
p. 161
first 1 in respect of human wealth, but who are first in the Vedas 2, are
unconquerable, not to be shaken 3; they should be understood to be forms of the
Brahman. Whosoever may in this (world) know all the gods 4---doers of
favours--he is not equal to a Brâhmana, (nor even) he, 5 for whom he exerts
himself. The man who makes no efforts 6, and is respected, does not, being
respected, think himself. respected 7, nor does he become vexed in consequence
of disrespect. One who is respected 8 should think it to be a natural operation
of people, like their opening or closing of the eyelids, that the learned
respect him in this world. One who is not respected should think, that the
deluded people who do not understand piety, and who are devoid of (knowledge of)
the world and the Sâstras, will never respect one who is worthy of respect.
Respect and taciturnity 9, verily, never dwell together; for this world is (the
field) for respect, the next for taciturnity, as is understood 10. For worldly
wealth dwells in the
p. 162
sphere of respect 1, and that, too, is an obstacle 2. While the Brahmic wealth
3, O Kshatriya! is difficult to be attained by any one devoid of knowledge. The
ways (to it) are stated by the good to be of various descriptions, and difficult
to reach--truth, straightforwardness, modesty 4, restraint (of senses), purity,
knowledge, which are the six impediments (in the way) of respect and delusion.
Footnotes
151:2 Literally 'respected.' Nîlakantha says it means rejoiced over, for
Dhritarâshtra thought, that, in spite of his treachery he was safe, as death was
taught by Sanatsugâta to have no existence.
151:3 I. e. free from the presence of ignorant and vulgar people. Cf. Gîtâ, p.
68 supra.
151:4 I. e. knowledge concerning the supreme Self.
151:5 Sankara's construction seems different, but is not quite clear. He says,
'wishing to become--Brahman--the meaning is wishing to acquire the self lost
through ignorance.'
151:6 I. e. imparted to your pupils, Sankara adds; 'heard,' scil. from Vidura.
151:7 The construction is imperfect, but the sense is clear: is your p. 152 view
correct, or the view involved in the practice of gods and demons?
152:1 See Gîtâ, p. 69 supra; Kathopanishad, p. 102; Prasna, p. 162. As to the
gods being afraid of death, see Khândogya, p. 50; and Nrisimha Tâpinî, p. 32;
and as to gods and demons practising the life of Brahmakârins, see Khândogya, p.
571; and cf. Brihadâranyaka, p. 964.
152:2 I. e. action prescribed in the Vedas.
152:3 I. e. as to how I shall be able to reconcile the seeming contradiction
between the 'two truths.'
152:4 I. e. of creation.
152:5 Sanatsugâta says he differs from 'the wise;' delusion = thinking the
not-self to be the self; heedlessness = falling off from one's natural condition
as the Brahman--which is the cause of delusion (Sankara). See p. 153 infra;
Katha, 152; and Taittirîya-upanishad, p. 80.
152:6 Sankara suggests that demons might mean creatures attached to worldly
objects; and gods those who are pleased in their own self; and he cites a stanza
in support of this suggestion. The allusion, however, seems to be plainly to the
story at Khândogya, p. 571 seq., where the idea and expression of 'being
vanquished' also occurs (p. 583). That word Sankara interprets in connexion with
his suggested interpretation to mean 'are born in lower species.' See Khândogya,
p. 585, and Maitrî, p. 211, about asuras or demons. It is interesting to note
that in the Introduction to the Mahâbhâshya, there is an allusion to a story of
the 'demons' being 'vanquished' in consequence of their grammatical blunders.
153:1 Those deluded by worldly objects; 'this' means 'heedlessness.'
153:2 Sankara cites a stanza from Manu, which says that king Yama Vaivasvata
dwells in the heart of every one. Cf. Aitareya-upanishad, p. 187. The following
clause he understands to contain two epithets of Yama, meaning 'immortal, and
intent on the Brahman.' I follow Nîlakantha, but not very confidently.
153:3 Here we have the developments, the varying forms, of death or
heedlessness.
153:4 Cf. Gîtâ, p. 57. I. e. paths contrary to Srutis and Smritis.
153:5 Concentration of mind on the self or Brahman.
153:6 I. e. the egoism spoken of before.
153:7 I. e. to this mortal world. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 84, and Brihadâranyaka, pp. 855,
856. There = from the next world. Sankara says, 'having lived there.'
153:8 I.e. the senses. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 123, and inter alia Îsopanishad, p. 10.
153:9 Cf. Katha, p. 129, and Brihadâranyaka, p. 889.
153:10 I. e. the fruit. Cf. Katha, p. 155, and Mundaka, p. 317.
154:1 I. e. its identity with the Brahman.
154:2 I. e. in various forms of life, Nîlakantha.
154:3 The going about in search of enjoyments.
154:4 The contact leads to pondering on them, and that to desire, &c., as
described further on.
154:5 Through various lives. Birth and death are certain for him.
154:6 I. e. causes oblivion of his real nature, Sankara. Cf. the whole train of
cause and effect at Gîtâ, p. 50 supra.
154:7 I. e. the pondering, desire, wrath, &c. As to I children,' cf. Katha, pp.
96 and 123, where bâla is contrasted with dhîra, as here. The 'good sense' is of
help in withstanding the temptations of worldly objects.
154:8 Destroys = abandons; pondering, just before this, is rendered by Sankara
to mean 'thinking of the objects as transient, impure,' &c.
154:9 Sankara cites on this a stanza of unknown authorship, which says, 'The
learned and clever man who knows the self, and by discrimination destroys all
objects of sense, is said to be the death of death.' See too p. 178 infra.
155:1 On this Nîlakantha quotes these lines, 'The antelope, elephant, butterfly,
bee, and fish--these five are destroyed by the five,' i. e. the five objects of
sense, sound, &c. See Sânti Parvan (Moksha Dharma), chap. 174, st. 45.
155:2 I. e. misery, Nîlakantha; merit or sin, Sankara.
155:3 I. e. void of discrimination between the real and unreal, Nîlakantha;
result of ignorance, Sankara. 'A hell, as being full of filth,' says Sankara,
'such as, phlegm, blood, excretions.' Cf. Maitrî, p. 48.
155:4 As blind men groping about fall into a ditch, so do these, Sankara.
155:5 I. e. other than the sensuous objects he loves; 'learns nothing' about the
supreme Self which he disregards.
155:6 Useless for any good purpose.
155:7 Cf. Taittirîya-upanishad, p. 102.
155:8 As being ruinous to oneself. Sankara compares Gîtâ, p. 68. Cf. also
Taittirîya-upanishad, p. 103, and see Brihadâranyaka, p. 61.
155:9 I. e. heedlessness and its developments as stated.
155:10 Sankara cites on this Taittirîya-upanishad, p. 78
155:11 Such as Satyaloka, &c.
156:1 Gyotishtoma, Asvamedha, and other rites.
156:2 As leading to final emancipation.
156:3 I. e. objects for which various ceremonies (or 'actions') should be
performed.
156:4 I. e. the man of knowledge.
156:5 I. e. into the sphere of action. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 48.
156:6 Knowing the supreme self is identical with becoming the supreme self,
Mundaka, p. 323.
156:7 I. e. getting rid of the paths which keep one away from the Brahman by
means of contemplation of the Brahman, &c. Nîlakantha renders 'right path' to
mean the Sushumnâ passage by which the soul proceeds to final emancipation, see
Khândogya, p. 570; Katha, p. 157.
156:8 Sankara says: 'Having shown that true death is heedlessness, and having
shown that heedlessness in its forms of anger &c. is the cause of all evil, and
having also shown that death is destroyed by true knowledge, and having shown
further that heaven &c. are really not man's highest goal; the author has also
implied the unity of the supreme and individual self. On that arises a doubt,
which is stated in this passage.'
156:9 All this = all the developments of the Brahman, i. e. space, wind, fire,
water, earth, vegetation, food, living creatures; see Taittirîyopanishad, p. 68.
157:1 What is the purpose of its existence, and what misery does it undergo on
entering the course of worldly life?
157:2 'The danger,' says Sankara, 'is that of contravening Vedic texts such as
"I am the Brahman," "Thou art that," &c.' May it not rather be that pointed out
at Kathopanishad, p. 129, viz. never attaining final emancipation? Cf. also
Nrisimha Tâpinî, p. 223.
157:3 The individual selfs, Sankara.
157:4 Nature or mâyâ.
157:5 The appearance of degradation to an inferior state being delusive.
157:6 The original word implies the possession of aisvarya, dharma, yasas, srî,
vairâgya, moksha. See Svetâsvatara, p. 329 (where the list is slightly
different). For another definition, see Maitrî, p. 6 (gloss).
157:7 See note , p. 156.
157:8 Sankara says: 'The question of Dhritarâshtra having suggested a difference
between two principles, one of which constrains, and the other of which is
constrained, the answer is--Such a difference ought not to be alleged, as it
involves "danger." Then the question arises, How is the difference, which does
appear to be explained? The reply is, It is due to the beginningless
principle--delusion or ignorance. The next sentence shows that the universe as
it appears is also a result of delusion.' Nîlakantha says expressly, changes =
delusion. He renders the original which we have translated by 'beginningless'
first, to mean 'collection of objects of enjoyments.' Sankara's explanation
seems tautological as regards the words 'connexion with the beginningless,'
which occur twice in the above. Nîlakantha's p. 158 is not quite clear. May the
expression on the second occasion mean, that the connexion by which beings are
stated before to exist has had no beginning--has existed from eternity? The
translation should then run thus: 'And beings exist by a connexion which had no
beginning;' (see Sâriraka Bhâshya, p. 494.) Connexions of things = creation of
universe by his power.
158:1 E. g. Agnishtoma, &c., Sankara.
158:2 I. e. impiety or piety, sin or merit.
158:3 In Srutis and Smritis, which Sankara quotes. Khândogya, p. 622; Mundaka,
p. 309; Brihadâranyaka, p. 911. See, too, Maitrî, p. 131.
158:4 Of the man devoid of knowledge.
158:5 Cf. Gîtâ, p. 76, and Brihadâranyaka, p. 636.
158:6 See p. 164, note 9 infra.
158:7 The feeling of one's own superiority over others in piety.
158:8 In the shape of Nakshatras,' says Sankara, which is not quite
intelligible. See Khândogya, p. 258, and Anugîtâ infra, p. 240.
159:1 According to the Vedântic theory, the acts of piety purify the inner man,
and are thus a stepping-stone to knowledge. See Introduction, p. 147 supra. Cf.
Gîtâ, p. 122; and Brihadâranyaka, p. 899.
159:2 I. e. physical, mental, and such as is caused by superhuman agency. This
is Sankara's explanation. It is somewhat far fetched, but I can find none
better. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 49. And see also Brihadâranyaka, p. 876, and the commentary
of Sankara there with Ânandagiri's gloss.
159:3 E. g. wife, children, &c.
159:4 I. e. vexed as to how his livelihood is to be earned, &c.
159:5 Excess, e.g. too much obsequiousness towards a 'taciturn man,' owing to
his holiness, &c. Taciturn man = ascetic. Injury = disrespect, &c. Perhaps the
protest against worldliness is here carried to an extreme. Sankara cites Manu as
a parallel, 'A Brâhmana should be afraid of (worldly) respect as of poison.'
159:6 E.g. the Kusa grass, deerskin, &c., mentioned at Gîtâ, p. 68.
159:7 I. e. he should not parade his actions. Sankara compares Vasishtha and a
Vedic text. See, too, the quotation at Taitt. Âran. p. 902.
160:1 Cf. Gîtâ, p. 103. Sankara suggests an alternative explanation of this
stanza, which will make it mean that one performing the operations of the
senses, should devote oneself nevertheless to the unknown principle, and not
consider the senses to be the self.
160:2 I. e. beyond the reach of inference; 'subtle,' says Sankara. Cf.
Svetâsvatara, p. 364; Brihadâranyaka, p. 855; Maitrî, p. 182; and Katha, p. 149,
where Sankara suggests a somewhat different meaning. As to immovable, cf. Îsa,
p. 10, and Gîtâ, p. 104. Sankara renders it by 'void of activity;' and pure he
paraphrases by 'free from ignorance and other taints.'
160:3 It is difficult to say what 'in this way' refers to. Sankara renders it by
'as possessing qualities appertaining to the two kinds of body.' On Sankara's
suggested meaning of the stanza preceding (see note 1), it would refer to the
confusion of the senses with the self.
160:4 Such a person is called a destroyer of his own self at Îsopanishad, p. 9.
160:5 I. e. by the troubles of worldly life.
160:6 Cf. 'without belongings' at Gîtâ, p. 128.
160:7 Anger and other obstacles to concentration of mind.
160:8 I. e. unintelligent. The text of Vasishtha referred to in note 7, p. 159,
says he should act like an unintelligent man. Cf. also Gaudapâda-kârikâs, p.
443, and Sâriraka Bhâshya, p. 1041.
160:9 I. e. singing the praises of their own greatness and worth, instead of
keeping their 'conduct unknown.'
161:1 Highly esteemed for or strongly attached to, Sankara. Human wealth = wife,
offspring, property, &c. Cf. Khândogya, p. 319; Brihadâranyaka, p. 262.
161:2 I. e. veracity and other duties taught by the Vedas.
161:3 'They need fear nought,' says Nîlakantha.
161:4 I. e. may sacrifice to them, Sankara.
161:5 Not even the deity to whom the sacrifice is offered is equal to one who
knows the Brahman. Cf. Taittirîya, p. 23, and. Anugîtâ, p. 250.
161:6 I. e. one who is 'taciturn' and does not parade his greatness.
161:7 He does not care for the respect shown him.
161:8 Because he knows the Brahman.
161:9 I. e. restraint of all senses, not of speech only. For the contrast
compare that between sreya and preya at Katha, p. 92.
161:10 I. e. by all men of understanding. Sankara's rendering is different: 'The
next, which is known as Tad, is for taciturnity.' He cites for this Gîtâ, p.
120.
162:1 I. e. they both follow on devotion to worldly life.
162:2 I. e. in the way to final emancipation.
162:3 The enjoyment of supreme felicity, Brahmânanda (Sankara); the greatness
consisting of a knowledge of Rik, Yagus, Sâman, and the substance of their
teaching, which is worthy of a Brâhmana (Nîlakantha). See, too, Anugîtâ, p. 232.
162:4 Modesty = being ashamed of doing wrong; restraint (of senses) =mental
restraint; and purity is both internal and external,--Sankara; knowledge is, of
course, knowledge of the Brahman.
********************
CHAPTER III.
Dhritarâshtra said:
Who possesses this taciturnity 5, and which of the two 6 is taciturnity?
Describe, O learned person! the condition of taciturnity here. Does a learned
man reach taciturnity 7 by taciturnity? And how, O sage! do they practise
taciturnity in this world
p. 163
Sanatsugâta said:
Since the Vedas, together with the mind 1, fail to attain to him, hence (is he)
taciturnity 2--he about whom the words of the Vedas were uttered 3, and who, O
king! shines forth as consubstantial 4 with them.
Dhritarâshtra said:
Does 5 the twice-born person who studies the Rik and the Yagus texts, and the
Sâma-veda, committing sinful (acts), become tainted, or does he not become
tainted?
Sanatsugâta said
Not the Sâman texts, nor yet the Rik Texts, nor the Yagus texts 6 save him, O
acute sir! from sinful
p. 164
action. I do not tell you an untruth. The Khandas do not save a sinful deceitful
1 man who behaves deceitfully 2. At the time of the termination (of his life),
the Khandas abandon 3 him, as birds who have got wings (abandon their) nest.
Dhritarâshtra said
If, O acute sir! the Vedas are not able to save one who understands the Vedas,
then whence is this eternal talk 4 of the Brâhmanas?
Sanatsugâta said:
O you of great glory! this universe becomes manifest through his special
forms--names 5 and the rest. The Vedas proclaim (his form) after describing (it)
well 6, and (they 7 also) state his difference from the universe. For that 8 are
this penance and sacrifice prescribed. By these a learned man acquires merit,
and afterwards destroying sin by merit 9, he has his self illuminated by
knowledge. By knowledge the learned man attains
p. 165
the self 1. But, on the other hand, one who wishes for the fruit--heaven
2--takes with him 3 all that he has done in this (world), enjoys it in the next,
and then returns to the path 4 (of this world). Penance is performed in this
world; the fruit is enjoyed elsewhere. But the penance of Brâhmanas is further
developed 5; that of others remains only as much (as when first performed).
Dhritarâshtra said:
How does the pure penance become developed and well developed 6? O Sanatsugâta!
tell (me.) how I should understand that, O Lord!
Sanatsugâta said:
This penance, free from sin 7, is called pure 8; and this pure penance becomes
developed and well developed, not otherwise 9. All this 10, O Kshatriya!
p. 166
has for its root that penance about which you question me. By penance 1, those
conversant with the Vedas attained immortality, after departing from this world.
Dhritarâshtra said.
1 have heard about penance free from sin, O Sanatsugâta! Tell me what is the sin
(connected) with penance, so that I may understand the eternal mystery 2.
Sanatsugâta said:
The twelve beginning with wrath, and likewise the seven cruelties, are the
defects (connected) with it; and there are (stated) in the Sâstras twelve merits
(connected) with it, beginning with knowledge, which are known to the
twice-born, and may be developed. Wrath, desire 3, avarice, delusion 4, craving
5, mercilessness, censoriousness, vanity, grief 6, attachment 7, envy 8,
reviling others--these twelve should always be avoided by a man of high
p. 167
qualifications 1. These, O king of kings! attend each and every man, wishing to
find some opening 2, as a hunter (watches) animals. [Boastful, lustful, haughty,
irascible, unsteady 3, one who does not protect (those dependent 4 on him),
these six sinful acts are performed by sinful men who are not afraid (even) in
the midst of great danger 5.] One whose thoughts are (all) about enjoyments, who
prospers by injuring (others), who repents of generosity, who is miserly, who is
devoid of the power 6 (of knowledge), who esteems the group 7 (of the senses),
who hates his wife 8--these seven, different (from those previously mentioned),
are the seven forms of cruelty. Knowledge, truth, self-restraint, sacred
learning, freedom from animosity (towards living beings), modesty 9, endurance
10, freedom from censoriousness, sacrifice, gift, courage} 11, quiescence
12,these are the twelve great observances 13 of a Brâhmana. Whoever is not
devoid of these twelve can govern this whole world, and those who are
p. 168
possessed of three, two, or even one (of these) become, in (due) course,
distinguished (for knowledge) and identified with the Brahman 1.
[Self-restraint, abandonment 2, and freedom from heedlessness--on these depends
immortality. And the talented Brâhmanas say that truth is chief over them.]
Self-restraint has eighteen defects; if (any one of them is) committed, it is an
obstacle (to self-restraint), They are thus stated. 'Untruthfulness, backbiting,
thirst 3, antipathy (to all beings), darkness 4, repining 5, hatred 6 of people,
haughtiness, quarrelsomeness, injuring living creatures, reviling others,
garrulity, vexation 7, want of endurance 8, want of courage 9, imperfection 10,
sinful conduct, and slaughter. That is called self-restraint by the good, which
is free from these defects. Frenzy has eighteen defects 11; and abandonment is
of six kinds. The contraries of those which have been laid down 12 are stated to
be the defects of frenzy. Abandonment of six kinds is excellent. Of those six,
the third is hard to achieve. With it one certainly crosses
p. 169
beyond all misery without distinction 1. That being achieved, (everything) is
accomplished 2. The (first is the) giving away of sons and wealth to a deserving
man who asks (for them); the second is gifts at Vedic ceremonies, and gifts at
ceremonies laid down in the Smritis 3. The abandonment of desires, O king of
kings! by means of indifference (to worldly objects) is laid down as the third
4. With these one should become free from heedlessness. That freedom from
heedlessness, too, has eight characteristics, and is (a) great (merit).
Truthfulness, concentration, absorbed contemplation, reflexion 5, and also
indifference (to worldly objects), not stealing 6, living the life of a
Brahmakârin, and
p. 170
likewise freedom from all belongings 1. Thus have the defects of self-restraint
been stated; one should avoid those defects. Freedom from (those) defects is
freedom from heedlessness; and that, too, is deemed to have eight
characteristics 2. Let truth be your (very) self, O king of kings! On truth all
the worlds rest 3. Truth is said to be their main (principle). Immortality,
depends on truth 4. Getting rid of (these) defects, one should practise the
observance of penance. This is the conduct prescribed by the Creator. Truth is
the solemn vow of the good. The pure penance, which is free from these defects,
and possessed of these characteristics, becomes developed, and well developed 5.
I will state to you, in brief, O king of kings! what you ask of me. This
(observance) 6 is destructive of sin, and pure, and releases (one) from birth
and death and old age 7. If one is free from the five senses, and also from the
mind 8, O descendant of Bharata! also from (thoughts regarding) the past and the
future 9, one becomes happy.
Dhritarâshtra said:
Some people make great boasts in consequence of (their knowing) the Vedas with
the Âkhyânas as
p. 171
the fifth 1; others, likewise, are (masters) of four Vedas; others, too, of
three Vedas; others are (masters) of two Vedas, and of one Veda; and others of
no Veda 2. Tell me which of these is the greatest, whom I may know (to be) a
Brâhmana.
Sanatsugâta said:
Through ignorance of the one Veda 3--the one truth--O king of kings! numerous
Vedas came into existence. Some 4 only adhere to the truth. The fancies of those
who have fallen away from the truth are abortive, and through ignorance of the
truth, ceremonies become amplified 5. One should under stand a Brâhmana, who
(merely) reads much, to be a man of many words 6. Know him only to be the (true)
Brâhmana, who swerves not from the truth 7. O you who are the highest among men
8! the Khandas, indeed, refer of themselves 9 to it. Therefore,
p. 172
studying them, the learned persons who understand the Khandas, attain to the
Veda, not that which is to be known 1. Among the Vedas, there is none which
understands 2. By the unintelligent 3, one understands not the Veda, nor the
object of knowledge 4. He who knows the Veda knows the object of knowledge. He
who knows the object of knowledge 5 knows not the truth. He who understands the
Vedas understands also the object of knowledge; but that 6 is not understood by
the Vedas or by those who understand the Vedas. Still the Brâhmanas who
understand the Vedas, understand the Veda by means of the Vedas 7. As the branch
of a tree with regard to the part of a portion of the glorious 8 one, so, they
declare, are the Vedas with
p. 173
regard to the subject of understanding the supreme self. I understand him to be
a Brâhmana who is ingenious, and explains 1 (Vedic texts). He who apprehends
(those texts) thus 2, does verily know that supreme (principle). . One should
not go in search of it among (things) antagonistic 3 to it at all. Not looking
(for him there) one sees that Lord by means of the Veda 4. Remaining quiet, one
should practise devotion, and should not even form a wish in the mind 5. To him,
the Brahman presents 6 itself, and directly afterwards he attains to the perfect
7 (one). By taciturnity 8, verily, does one become a sage; (one does) not
(become) a sage by dwelling in a forest 9. And he is called the highest sage,
who understands that indestructible (principle). One is called an analyser 10
(also) in consequence of
p. 174
analysing all objects. The analysis (is) from that as the root; and as he makes
(such an) analysis, hence is he so (called). The man who sees the worlds
directly sees everything 1. A Brâhmana, verily, adhering to the truth,
understands it, and becomes omniscient. I say to you, O learned person! that
adhering to knowledge and the rest 2 in this way, one sees the Brahman, O
Kshatriya! by means of a course (of study) in the Vedas 3.
Footnotes
162:5 I. e. that spoken of in the last chapter.
162:6 Viz. mere silence, or the contemplation of the self after restraining all
the senses. In the Brihadâranyaka-upanishad, Sankara (p. 605) renders the
original word, mauna, to mean, 'The fruit of the destruction of the
consciousness of anything other than the self.' And his commentator makes it
clearer thus: 'The conviction in the mind that one is the self--the supreme
Brahman--and that there is nothing close existing but oneself.'
162:7 I. e. the highest seat--the Brahman; for mind, sense, &c. are all
non-existent there. Cf. Katha, p. 151, and Maitrî, p. 161
163:1 Cf. Kenopanishad, p. 39; Katha, p. 152; Taittirîya, p. 119.
163:2 'Taciturnity is his name,' says Nîlakantha.
163:3 Or, says Sankara, 'who is the author of the Vedas.'
163:4 I. e. 'with the Vedas,' says Nîlakantha, Om, the quintessence of the
Vedas, being a name of the Brahman (as to which cf. Gîtâ, p. 79, and Maitrî, p.
84). Sankara takes the whole expression to mean gyotirmaya, consisting of light.
Nîlakantha says this stanza answers the five following questions put in the
stanza preceding, viz. of what use is taciturnity? which of the two is
taciturnity? &c., as above. The first four questions are answered by the first
two lines of this stanza--the substance of the answer being, that the use of
taciturnity is to attain the seat which is not to be grasped even by the mind,
that taciturnity includes both restraint of mind and of the external senses. By
means of such restraint, the external and internal worlds cease to be perceived
as existing, and the highest goal is attained.
163:5 This question arises naturally enough on Nîlakantha's interpretation of
the preceding stanza, the meaning of which is in substance that the Vedas cannot
grasp the Brahman fully, but they are of use towards a rudimentary comprehension
of it, as is said further on, see p. 172 infra.
163:6 Cf. Svetâsvatara-upanishad, p. 339; see, too, Nrisimha Tâpinî, pp. 81-98.
164:1 I. e. one who parades his piety.
164:2 I. e. hypocritically.
164:3 I. e. do not rise to his memory--Nîlakantha, citing Gîtâ, p. 78 supra.
164:4 Scil. about the veneration due to one who has studied the
Vedas--Nîlakantha, citing one or two passages in point.
164:5 The universe consists of 'names and forms,' the reality being the Brahman
only. Cf. Khândogya, p. 407 seq.
164:6 Sankara refers to Taittirîya-upanishad, p. 68; Khândogya, p. 596 seq. &c.
164:7 Sankara takes this to mean 'sages,' who, according to him, state the
difference. He quotes Parâsara for this.
164:8 I.e. the Brahman, that is to say, for attaining to it. Penance =
kândrâyana and other observances; sacrifice = gyotishtoma, &c.
164:9 Cf. p. 158 supra, and Taittirîya-âranyaka, p. 888.
165:1 Cf. Svetâsvatara, p. 327; Mundaka, p. 323.
165:2 So Sankara. Nîlakantha takes the original word to mean 'the group of the
senses,' and the whole phrase to mean 'enjoyments of sense.' Nîlakantha is
supported by a passage further on, p. 167. But as to 'those who wish for
heaven,' cf. Gîtâ, pp. 48-84.
165:3 I. e. in the form of merit, &c.
165:4 Cf. Gîtâ, p. 84.
165:5 Cf. Khândogya, p. 23. Brâhmanas = those that know the Brahman. See p. 171
infra.
165:6 I am not quite sure about the meaning of the original here. Ridha, which I
have rendered 'developed,' Nîlakantha understands to mean 'what is performed
merely for show.' What has been rendered 'well developed' in the text,
Nîlakantha takes to mean performed from some desire,' &c.
165:7 Anger, desire, &c.
165:8 The original is kevala. Nîlakantha says it is so called as being a means
of kaivalya, 'final emancipation.'
165:9 I. e. not that which is not free from sin, which latter is not developed
at all.
165:10 All objects of enjoyment, Nîlakantha.
166:1 Cf. Brihadâranyaka, p. 899. Tapas is variously rendered. See inter alia,
Prasna, pp. 162-70; Svetâsvatara, p. 307; Mundaka, pp. 270-280, 311-314;
Khândogya, p. 136; Anugîtâ, pp. 247, 339.
166:2 I. e. Brahma-vidyâ, or science of the Brahman, Nîlakantha; the Brahman
itself, Sankara.
166:3 I. e. lust.
166:4 Want of discrimination between right and wrong.
166:5 Desire to taste worldly objects.
166:6 For the loss of anything desired.
166:7 Desire to enjoy worldly objects. The difference between this and craving,
according to Sankara, appears to be between merely tasting and continual
enjoyment. According to Nîlakantha, the former is a desire which is never
contented; the latter is merely a general liking.
166:8 Impatience of other people's prosperity; censoriousness being the pointing
out of flaws in other people's merits; and reviling being an ignoring of the
merits and merely abusing.
167:1 Scil. for attaining to the Brahman.
167:2 Some weak point by which they may attack a man.
167:3 Fickle in friendship, &c.
167:4 Such as a wife, &c.
167:5 Connected with this or the next world, Nîlakantha. This and a stanza
further on I place within brackets, as it is not quite certain whether Sankara's
copy had them, though they are now in some of our copies of the text with his
commentary. See Introduction.
167:6 Cf. Mundaka, p. 319; Khândogya, p. 494.
167:7 See note , at page 165.
167:8 The wife having no other protector.
167:9 See note , at page 162.
167:10 Of pairs of opposites, such as heat and cold, &c.
167:11 Restraint of senses in presence of their objects.
167:12 Cf. Gîtâ, pp. 69, 70.
167:13 Which are serviceable in attaining the highest goal.
168:1 The original is the word 'taciturnity' as at p. 162 supra.
168:2 Offering one's acts to God (Nîlakantha), as to which cf. Gîtâ, p. 64. See
also p. 182 infra for this stanza.
168:3 I. e. for objects of sense.
168:4 Ignorance.
168:5 Discontent even when one obtains much.
168:6 This is active; antipathy is passive only.
168:7 Of oneself, by brooding on evil. Cf. Taittirîya, p. 119. One copy of
Sankara's commentary says this means 'thinking ill of others without cause.'
168:8 Of pairs of opposites.
168:9 Restraint of senses in presence of their objects.
168:10 I. e. of piety, knowledge, and indifference to worldly objects.
168:11 I. e. qualities which destroy it.
168:12 Scil. as defects of self-restraint, viz. untruthfulness, &c.
169:1 Scil. any distinction as to physical, mental, or that which is caused by
superhuman agency.
169:2 Literally, 'all is conquered.' Everything that needs to be done is done.
Cf. Kathopanishad, p. 155; Mundaka, p. 317.
169:3 Another interpretation of ishtapûrta is 'offerings to gods, and 'offerings
to the manes;' a third 'sacrifices, &c., and works of charity, such as digging
tanks and wells;' for a fourth, see Sankara on Mundaka, p. 291.
169:4 Each of the three classes mentioned contains two sub-classes, and so the
six are made up. It is not quite easy to see the two heads under the third
class; but perhaps indifference, and the consequent abandonment of desire, may
be the two intended. To indicate that, I have adopted the construction which
takes the words 'by means of indifference' with abandonment, instead of with
'gifts at Vedic ceremonies,' &c. Sankara seems to understand 'giving away of
wealth' with the words 'by means of indifference,' and thus to constitute the
second head under the third class. But he is not quite clear.
169:5 Concentration = fixing the mind continuously on some object, such as the
being in the sun, &c.; contemplation is that in which one identifies oneself
with the Brahman; reflexion as to what one is, whence one comes, and so forth.
169:6 Sankara says this may refer to the 'stealing' mentioned at p. 160. The
life of a Brahmakârin is here taken to mean p. 170 continence by the
commentators, as also at Mundaka, p. 311 inter alia. See also Khândogya, p. 533.
170:1 Son, wife, home, &c.; as to which cf. Gîtâ, p. 103, and Nrisimha Tâpinî,
p. 198, commentary.
170:2 The eight mentioned already.
170:3 Cf. Taitt. Âran. p. 885.
170:4 Cf. Mundaka, p. 312; Sânti Parvan (Moksha), chap. 199, st. 64 seq.
Immortality = final emancipation.
170:5 p. 165 supra.
170:6 Of penance, that is to say.
170:7 Cf. Gîtâ, p. 109 for the collocation.
170:8 Kathopanishad, p. 151; Maitrî, p. 161. Sankara, seems to take the five and
the senses separately; the five meaning the five classes of sensuous objects.
170:9 Past losses and future gains, Nîlakantha.
171:1 Cf., as to this, Max Müller's Ancient Sanskrit Literature, p. 38 seq.; and
Khândogya, pp. 164, 474, 493; Brihadâranyaka, pp. 456, 687, 926; Maitrî, p. 171;
Nrisimha Tâpinî, p. 105.
171:2 The original is 'void of Riks.' The commentators give no explanation. Does
it mean those who abandon the karma-mârga? Heretics who reject all Vedas are
scarcely likely to be referred to in this way. Nîlakantha's interpretation of
all this is very different. See his gloss.
171:3 Sankara gives various interpretations of this. Perhaps the best is to take
it as meaning knowledge. 'The one knowledge--the one truth'--would then be like
the famous text--Taittirîya, p. 56--'The Brahman is truth, knowledge,' &c.
171:4 For this phrase cf. Gîtâ, p. 73.
171:5 Those who do not understand the Brahman lose their natural power of
obtaining what they wish, and so go in for various ceremonies for various
special benefits. Cf. Khândogya, p. 541; Gîtâ, p. 47; and p. 184 infra.
171:6 Cf. Brihadâranyaka, p. 893.
171:7 Ibid. p. 636.
171:8 Literally, 'highest among bipeds,' a rather unusual expression.
171:9 Nîlakantha says, 'The part of the Vedas which teaches the p. 172 knowledge
of the supreme is enough by itself for its purpose; it is not like the part
about rites, &c., which rites must be performed before they serve any useful
purpose.' The Gñânakânda is enough by itself for understanding the Brahman.
Sankara compares Gîtâ, p. 113, and Katha, p. 102.
172:1 The Veda = the Brahman, as above, cf. Svetâsvatara, p. 372 and commentary;
that which is to be known = the material world, which is a subject for human
knowledge.
172:2 Scil. understands the Veda--the Brahman.
172:3 'The mind,' says Nîlakantha; literally, 'that which is to be understood.'
172:4 Because a real knowledge of it requires a knowledge of the Brahman. As to
the next clause cf. inter alia Khândogya, p. 384; Brihadâranyaka, p. 450.
172:5 This is the converse of the last sentence, as to which cf. Brihadâranyaka,
p. 925.
172:6 The supreme.
172:7 The apparent contradiction is explained in the next sentence.
172:8 I. e. the moon. This refers to the well-known sâkhâkandranyâya. As the
small digit of the moon, which cannot be perceived by itself, is pointed out as
being at the tip of a branch of a tree pointing towards the moon, so the Vedas
are of use as pointing towards the Brahman, though inaccurately and imperfectly.
173:1 Scil. in the manner just indicated.
173:2 As giving an idea of the Brahman. The first step to a knowledge of the
Brahman is to 'hear' about it from Vedic texts. Cf. Brihadâranyaka, p. 925.
173:3 Such as the body, the senses, &c., which must be distinguished as quite
distinct from the self, though most often confounded with it.
173:4 Such passages, namely, as 'Thou art that, I am the Brahman,' &c.
173:5 About the objects of the senses.
173:6 Cf. Katha, p. 55.
173:7 Cf. Khândogya, p. 516. The Bhûman there is the same as the Bahu here, viz.
the Brahman. Sankara says expressly in his comment on the Upanishad text, that
Bahu and Bhûman, among other words, are synonyms.
173:8 Self-restraint, as explained before at p. 163.
173:9 Though this is not unimportant, as may be seen from the contrast between
town and forest at Khândogya, p. 340. See also Maitrî, p. 100; Mundaka, p. 240.
As to the 'highest sage,' see Brihadâranyaka, p. 899, where the passage about
'sacrifice, gift, penance' should be compared with Gîtâ, p. 122.
173:10 The construction in the original is not quite clear. I understand the
sense to be as follows: In the science of the soul, the p. 174 analyser (the
word is the same as the word for grammarian) is he who analyses objects, not
words merely. Now the true analysis of objects reduces them all to the Brahman
(cf. Khândogya, p. 407; Brihadâranyaka, p. 152); and the sage understands this,
and makes the analysis accordingly, so he is rightly called an analyser.
174:1 This again is not clear, and the discrepancies of the MSS. make it more
perplexing. The meaning, I take to be, that a man may perceive all material
things, such as the worlds, Bhûr, &c. (as the commentators put it), but to be
really omniscient, you must have knowledge of the truth--the Brahman. See Sabhâ
Parvan, chapter V, stanza 7. And see, too, Brihadâranyaka, p. 613.
174:2 P. p. 167 supra.
174:3 Hearing the Vedântas--Upanishads,' &c,, says Sankara. See note supra, p.
173.
****************
CHAPTER IV.
Dhritarâshtra said.
O Sanatsugâta! since you have spoken these words of highest significance,
relating to the Brahman, and of numerous forms 4, give me that advice which is
excellent, and difficult to obtain in the
p. 175
midst of these created objects 1. Such is my request, O youth!
Sanatsugâta said:
This Brahman, O king! about which you question me with such perseverance, is not
to be attained by anybody who is in a hurry. When the mind is absorbed in the
understanding 2, then can that knowledge, which must be deeply pondered over, be
attained by living the life of a Brahmakârin 3. For you are speaking of that
primordial knowledge 4, which consists in the truth; which is obtained by the
good by living the life of Brahmakârins 5; which being obtained, men cast off
this mortal world; and which knowledge, verily, is to be invariably (found) in
those who have been brought up under preceptors 6.
Dhritarâshtra said
Since that knowledge is capable of being truly acquired by living the life of a
Brahmakârin, therefore tell me, O Brâhmana! of what description the life of a
Brahmakârin is 7.
Sanatsugâta said:
Those who entering (as it were) the womb 8 of a
p. 176
preceptor, and becoming (as it were) a fœtus, practise the life of Brahmakârins,
become even in this world authors of Sâstras 1, and they repair to the highest
truth 2 after casting off (this) body. They subjugate desires here in this
world, practising forbearance in pursuit of the Brahmic state 3; and with
courage, they even here remove the self out of the body 4, like the soft fibres
from the Muñga. Father and mother, O descendant of Bharata! only form the body.
But the birth 5 obtained from the preceptor, that verily is true 6, and likewise
immortal. He perfects 7 (one), giving (one) immortality. Recognising what he has
done (for one), one should not injure him. The disciple should always make
obeisance to the preceptor 8; and, free from heedlessness, should always desire
sacred instruction. When the pure man obtains knowledge by this same course of
discipleship 9, that is the first quarter of his life as a Brahmakârin. As (is)
his conduct
p. 177
always towards his preceptor, so likewise should he behave towards the
preceptor's wife, and so likewise should he act towards the preceptor's
son--(that) is said to be the second quarter. What one, recognising what the
preceptor has done for one, and understanding the matter 1 (taught), feels with
a delighted heart regarding the preceptor--believing that one has been brought
into existence 2 by him--that is the third quarter of life as a Brahmakârin. One
should do what is agreeable to the preceptor, by means of one's life and riches,
and in deed, thought, and word 3--that is said to be the fourth quarter. (A
disciple) obtains a quarter by time 4, so likewise a quarter by associating with
the preceptor, he also obtains a quarter by means of his own energy; and then he
attains to a quarter by means of the Sâstras. The life as a Brahmakârin of that
man, whose beauty 5 consists in the twelve beginning with knowledge, and whose
limbs are the other (qualifications mentioned), and who has
p. 178
strength 1, bears fruit, they say, by association with a preceptor, in (the
shape of) contact with that entity--the Brahman. Whatever wealth may come to man
who lives in this way, he should even pay that over to the preceptor. He would
thus be adopting the conduct of the good which is of many merits; and the same
conduct is (to be adopted) towards the preceptor's son. Living thus, he prospers
greatly 2 on all sides in this world; he obtains sons and position; the quarters
3 and sub-quarters shower (benefits 4) on him, and men pass their lives as
Brahmakârins under him. By this life as a Brahmakârin, the divinities obtained
their divinity. And the sages, too, became great by living the life of
Brahmakârins. By this same (means), too, the Apsarasas, together with the
Gandharvas, achieved for themselves beautiful forms. And by this life as a
Brahmakârin, the sun illuminates (the universe). That man of knowledge, O king!
who practising penance, may by penance pierce through or tear off his body,
crosses beyond childhood 5 by means of this (life as a Brahmakârin), and at the
time of the termination (of life) obstructs death 6. Those who understand this
(life as a Brahmakârin) attain to a
p. 179
condition like that of those who as (for what they want) from the wish-giving
stone 1, when they obtain the thing desired. By performing action, O Kshatriya!
people conquer (for themselves only) perishable worlds 2. (But) the man of
understanding attains by knowledge to the everlasting glory--for there is no
other way to it 3.
Dhritarâshtra said:
Where a Brâhmana possessed of knowledge, perceives it, does it appear as white
4, as red, or again as black, or again as grey or tawny? What is the colour of
that immortal, indestructible goal?
Sanatsugâta said:
It appears not as white, as red, nor again as black, nor again as grey, nor
tawny 5. It dwells not on earth, nor in the sky; nor does it bear a body in this
ocean 6 (-like world). It is not in the stars, nor does it dwell in the
lightning; nor is its form 7 to be seen in the clouds, nor even in the air, nor
in the deities; it is not to be seen in the moon, nor in the sun. It is not to
be seen in Rik texts, nor in
p. 180
Yagus texts; nor yet in the Atharvan texts, nor in the pure Sâman texts; nor
yet, O king, in the Rathantara or Brihadratha 1 hymns. It is seen in the self of
a man of high vows 2. It is invincible, beyond darkness 3, it comes forth from
within 4 at the time of destruction. Its form is minuter than the minutest
(things), its form is larger even than the mountains 5. That is the support 6
(of the universe); that is immortal; (that is) all things perceptible 7. That is
the Brahman, that is glory 8. From that all entities were produced 9, in that
they are dissolved. All this shines forth as dwelling in it in the form of light
10. And it is perceived by means of knowledge 11 by one who understands the
self; on it depends this whole universe. Those who understand this become
immortal.
p. 181
*******************
CHAPTER V. 1
Grief and wrath, and avarice, desire, delusion, laziness, want of forgiveness,
vanity, craving, friendship 2, censoriousness, and reviling others--these twelve
great enormities are destructive of a man's life. These, O king of kings! attend
on each and every man. Beset by these, a man, deluded in his understanding, acts
sinfully. A man full of attachments, merciless, harsh (of speech), talkative,
cherishing wrath in his heart, and boastful--these are the men of cruel
qualities; (such) persons, even obtaining wealth, do not always enjoy (it) 3.
p. 182
One whose thoughts are fixed on enjoyments, who is partial 1, proud 2, boastful
when he makes a gift, miserly, and devoid of power 3, who esteems the group (of
the senses), and who hates (his) wife--thus have been stated the seven (classes
of) cruel persons of sinful dispositions. Piety, and truthfulness, and penance,
and self-restraint, freedom from animosity, modesty, endurance, freedom from
censoriousness, liberality, sacred learning, courage, forgiveness--these are the
twelve great observances of a Brâhmana. Whoever does not swerve from these
twelve may govern this whole world. And one who is possessed of three, two, or
even one, of these, must be understood to have nothing of his own 4.
Self-restraint, abandonment, freedom from delusion, on these immortality depends
5. These are possessed by those talented Brâhmanas to whom the Brahman is the
principal 6 (thing). A Brâhmana's speaking ill of others, whether true or false,
is not commended.
p. 183
The men who act thus have their places in hell. Frenzy has eighteen defects--as
already described here--hatred of men, factiousness 1, censoriousness,
untruthful speech, lust, wrath, wand of self-control 2, speaking ill of others,
backbiting, mismanagement in business 3, quarrelsomeness, animosity, troubling
living creatures, want of forgiveness, delusion, flippancy, loss of reason 4,
censoriousness 5; therefore a wise man should not be subject to frenzy, for it
is always censured. Six characteristics should be understood as (belonging) to
friendship--that one should rejoice at (anything) agreeable, and feel grieved at
(anything) disagreeable; that with a pure heart one, when asked by a deserving
(man), should give to him who asks what can 6 certainly be given, (though it)
may be beneficial to oneself, and even though it ought not to be asked, (namely)
ones favourites, sons, wealth, and one's own wife; that one should not dwell
there where one has bestowed (all one's) wealth, through a desire (to get a
return for one's liberality); that one should enjoy (the
p. 184
fruit of one's 1 own) toils (only); and that one should forego one's own profit
2. Such a man, possessed of wealth, and possessed of merits, is a liberal man of
the quality of goodness 3; such a one diverts the five elements from the five 4
(senses). This 5 pure penance, acquired out of desire 6 by those who are. fallen
off from the truth, even though developed, leads upwards 7; since sacrifices are
performed owing to a misapprehension of the truth 8. (The
p. 185
sacrifices) of some are by the mind, of others by speech, and also by deed. The
man void of fancies takes precedence over the man perfected by
fancies,--especially among Brâhmanas 1. And hear this further from me. One
should teach this great and glorious 2 (doctrine); (other doctrines) the wise
call mere arrangements of words. On this, concentration of mind 3, all this 4
depends. Those who know this become immortal. Not by meritorious action only, O
king! does one conquer the truth 5. One may offer offerings, or sacrifice. By
that the child(-like man) does not cross beyond death; nor, O king! does he
obtain happiness in his last moments 6. One should practise devotion quietly,
and should not be active even in the mind 7; and then one should avoid delight
and wrath (resulting) from praise and censure 8. I say to you, O learned person!
that adhering to this 9, one attains the Brahman and perceives it, O Kshatriya!
by a course (of study) of the Vedas.
p. 186
Footnotes
174:4 Does this mean referring to many aspects of the Brahman? Sankara merely
says nânârûpâ. Nîlakantha takes it differently, and as meaning that in which
everything is elucidated; 'relating to the Brahman' Nîlakantha takes to mean
'leading to the Brahman,' or 'instrument for attaining to the Brahman.'
175:1 In this material world, the highest knowledge is not to be got. Cf. Katha,
p. 96.
175:2 I. e. withdrawn from objects and fixed on the self only. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 79,
and Maitrî, p. 179, where, however, we have hrid for buddhi.
175:3 Virokana and Indra do so according to the Khândogya, p. 570 See also
Mundaka, p. 311.
175:4 The object of which is the primal Brahman.
175:5 Cf. Khândogya, p. 534; and Gîtâ, pp. 78, 79, and the passage from the
Katha there cited.
175:6 Khândogya, pp. 264-459.
175:7 See Khândogya, p. 553 seq.
175:8 I. e. attending closely upon him; fœtus = pupil.
176:1 Learned, men of knowledge, Sankara.
176:2 The supreme, 'which is described as 'truth, knowledge,' &c. In our ancient
works the truth often means the real.
176:3 The state of being absorbed in the Brahman. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 52.
176:4 Cf. Katha, p. 158.
176:5 Sankara cites Âpastamba (p. 11) in support of this, and Prasna-upanishad,
p. 256. The consciousness of being one with the Brahman is a new birth. See,
too, Mundaka, p. 282.
176:6 That birth is not merely delusive, and does not result in death.
176:7 Immortality or final emancipation is not to be achieved without knowledge,
which can only be got from a preceptor. And one is not perfect without that
immortality; one is limited by the conditions of human existence. See Nirukta
(Roth's ed.), p. 41.
176:8 Sankara compares Svetâsvatara, p. 374. The necessity of having a Guru is
often insisted on even in the Upanishads. Cf. Mundaka, p. 282; Khândogya, p.
264.
176:9 Stated at the beginning of this speech, Sankara.
177:1 The meaning of the Vedic texts, &c., Sankara in one copy; the highest aim
of man, according to another copy.
177:2 See note on p. 176.
177:3 I keep the order of the original, though I do not translate quite
literally; 'thought and word' should be literally mind and speech.' See, on the
collocation, Gîtâ, p. 123 inter alia.
177:4 Time = maturity of understanding which comes by time; energy =
intellectual power; Sâstras = consultation about Sâstras with
fellow-students--Sankara, who adds that the order is not material as stated, and
quotes a stanza which may be thus rendered, 'The pupil receives a quarter from
the preceptor, a quarter by his own talent; he receives a quarter by time; and a
quarter through fellow-Brahmakârins.
177:5 The body being disregarded, these qualities are attributed to the self in
this way. For the twelve, see p. 167; the others are abandonment, truthfulness,
&c., p. 169.
178:1 To observe the duties referred to, Sankara. But see, too, p. 167, note .
178:2 Obtains wealth, learning, and greatness,' says a commentator. For similar
benefits, cf. Khândogya, p. 122.
178:3 Cf. Khândogya, p. 132.
178:4 'Wealth,' says Nîlakantha, as well as another commentator.
178:5 Ignorance; cf. note at p. 154 supra. Nîlakantha reads 'reaches' instead of
'crosses beyond,' and interprets 'bâlya' to mean 'freedom from affection,
aversion,' &c. Cf. Brihadâranyaka, p. 605. As to the divinity of divinities, cf.
Taitt. Âran. p. 886.
178:6 Nîlakantha reads 'vanquishes death.' The meaning is, he reaches final
emancipation. Cf. p. 154 supra.
179:1 Called Kintâmani. The effect of Brahmakarya is that those who practise it
can get what they desire.
179:2 Cf. Gîtâ, p. 76; Khândogya, p. 538; Mundaka, p. 279.
179:3 Cf. Svetâsvatara, p. 327.
179:4 Cf. Brihadâranyaka, p. 877.
179:5 Cf. Katha, p. 119; and Mundaka, p. 267. As to its not dwelling in earth,
sky, &c., Sankara refers to Khândogya, p. 518, as implying that.
179:6 Literally, 'it bears no water in the ocean.' 'Water' is said by the
commentators to mean the five elements of which the body is composed. See Manu
I, 5, and Khândogya, p. 330. In the Svetâsvatara it signifies mind (See p. 388).
For ocean meaning world, or samsâra; cf. Aitareya-upanishad, p. 182.
179:7 Here I do not render rûpa by colour, as before.
180:1 See Muir, Sanskrit Texts, vol. i, p. 16; Tândya-brâhmana, p. 838; Gîtâ, p.
90; and Kaushîtaki, p. 21. Brihadratha = Brihat-sâman (?).
180:2 The twelve great vows--knowledge, &c., mentioned above, see p. 167.
Nîlakantha takes Mahâvrata to refer to the sacrifice of that name. It is
described in the Aitareya Âranyaka.
180:3 See Gîtâ, p. 78, note .
180:4 Cf. Gîtâ, p. 82, and Îsopanishad, p. 12.
180:5 See Gîtâ, p. 78, note .
180:6 Cf. Gîtâ, p. 113; Katha p. 99.
180:7 So Nîlakantha. The original word ordinarily means 'worlds.'
180:8 Cf. Svetâsvatara, p. 347.
180:9 Cf. the famous passage in the Taittirîya, p. 123: and also Mundaka, p.
289.
180:10 The explanations of the commentators are not quite clear as to the word
ahnâ, 'in the form of light.' Probably the meaning is: The universe depends on
the Brahman, and is, as it were, the light of the Brahman. Sankara compares the
passages referred to at Gîtâ, p. 112, note .
180:11 'Not by means of action,' says Sankara.
181:1 The whole of this chapter is wanting in one of our copies of Sankara's
commentary. In the copy published in the Mahâbhârata (Madras edition) there is,
however, this passage: 'Wrath &c. have been already explained, still there are
some differences here and there, and those only are now explained.' The chapter
is for the most part a repetition of what we have already had. For such
repetitions cf. Brihadâranyaka, pp. 317-1016; 444-930. The same copy of
Sankara's commentary gives this general statement of the object of this and the
next chapter: 'The course of study of the science of the Brahman, in which
knowledge is the principal thing, and concentration of mind &c. are subsidiary,
has been. described. Now is described the course of study in which concentration
of mind is principal, and knowledge subsidiary. The first mode consists in
understanding the meaning of the word "you" by means of concentration of mind,
and then identifying it with the Brahman by means of a study of the Upanishads;
the second, in first intellectually understanding the identity of the individual
self and Brahman, by such study of the Upanishads, and then realising the
identity to consciousness by contemplation, &c. In both modes the fruit is the
same, and the means are the same; and to show this, the merits and defects
already stated are here again declared.' This explanation is verbatim the same
in Nîlakantha's commentary.
181:2 The original is 'pity,' which is explained to mean 'friendship' by Sankara
and Nîlakantha.
181:3 'Owing to there being in it no enjoyment for the self,' says one p. 182
copy of Sankara's commentary. Another reading, which is in the Madras edition
and in Nîlakantha, may be rendered, 'even obtaining benefits, they do not
respect one (from whom they obtain them).'
182:1 The commentary says the meaning is the same as that of the expression used
in the corresponding place before, viz. one who prospers by injuring others.
182:2 One copy of Sankara's commentary takes this to mean one who thinks the
not-self to be the self. I adopt the other meaning, however, as agreeing, with
that of atimânî, which is the reading of some copies instead of abhimânî.
182:3 Nîlakantha reads durbala and does not explain it. See p. 167.
182:4 One commentator says this means that he should not be supposed to have
incurred the demerit of having any attachment to this world. Nîlakantha says, he
gives up everything in the pursuit of even one of these observances.
182:5 See p. 168.
182:6 I. e. the goal to be reached. The commentary takes Brahman to mean the
Vedas, and the whole, phrase to mean those who devote themselves to the
performance of actions stated in the Vedas.
183:1 One copy of Sankara's commentary says this means 'obstructing other
people's acts of piety,' &c.
183:2 One copy of Sankara's commentary says this means 'being given up to
intoxicating drinks,' &c.; another copy says, doing another's bidding without
thought.'
183:3 One copy says this means 'inattention to any work undertaken.,' another
renders the original by 'destruction of property, i.e. squandering it on
dancers,' &c.
183:4 I. e. discrimination between right and wrong.
183:5 This seems to be some error, for censoriousness' has occurred before. But
neither the texts nor the commentaries give any help to correct the error.
Perhaps the latter is to be distinguished as referring to the habit, and the
former only to sporadic acts, of censoriousness. These qualities, I presume,
constitute frenzy; they are not the 'defects.'
183:6 I. e. where the power to give exists.
184:1 Not a friend's.
184:2 For a friend.
184:3 See Gîtâ, p. 120.
184:4 The commentators take this to mean objects of sense, and they interpret
'elements' before to mean senses.
184:5 'Viz. the turning away of the senses from their objects,' says one copy of
Sankara.
184:6 Scil. to enjoy the higher enjoyments of superior worlds.
184:7 I. e. to the higher worlds; it does not lead to emancipation here.
184:8 Cf. Mundaka, p. 277. I must own that I do not quite understand this
passage, nor its explanation as given in the commentaries. I do not quite see
what the penance here mentioned has to do with sacrifice, and yet the
commentators seem to take the words 'since sacrifices,' &c., with what precedes
them, not with what follows. Taking them,. however, with what follows, it is
difficult to explain the word 'since.' As far as I can understand the passage I
take the sense of it to be as follows: The author having said that penance
performed out of a particular motive does not lead to final emancipation, he
then proceeds to point out that all 'action' or 'sacrifice' is due to an
imperfect understanding of the truth (cf. p. 171 supra), being mostly due to
some particular motive. Then he goes on to show the different classes of
sacrifice, and finally points out that he who is free from desires as superior
to one who is actuated by desires. The original for 'misapprehension' is
avabodha, which commonly means 'apprehension,' but Sankara finally makes it mean
moha or 'delusion.' The original for truth is rendered by Nîlakantha to mean
'fancies.' Nîlakantha says that the sacrifice by the mind is the highest; that
by speech, viz. Brahmayagña, Gapa, &c., is middling; and that by deed, viz. with
clarified butter and other offerings, of the lowest class. 'Perfected by
fancies' = one whose fancies are always fulfilled 'through a knowledge,' says
Nîlakantha, 'of the Brahma as possessing qualities.'
185:1 This also is far from clear. Should it be, 'and a Brâhmana more
especially?' This might be taken as referring to one who knows the Brahman as
devoid of qualities, as Nîlakantha does take it. But his construction is not
quite clear.
185:2 As serviceable in attaining to 'the glory,' the Brahman; see p. 180.
185:3 See note at p. 181. As to 'arrangements of words,' cf. Maitrî, p. 179.
185:4 'Everything,' says one copy of Sankara's commentary; 'all that is good and
desirable,' says another.
185:5 Cf. inter alia, Mundaka, pp. 281-314.
185:6 For he has got to undergo migration from one life to another as the result
of the action. Cf. Brihadâranyaka, p. 856; Mundaka. p. 278.
185:7 Cf. Gîtâ, p. 70.
185:8 Ibid. pp. 101-110.
185:9 I. e. the yoga or concentration of mind here described. This stanza, like
many others in this chapter, occurs in chapter III with slight variations.
********************
CHAPTER VI.
That pure 1, great light 2, which is radiant; that great glory 3; that, verily,
which the gods worship 4; that by means of which the sun shines forth 5--that
eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. From (that) pure (principle) the
Brahman 6 is produced; by (that) pure (principle) the Brahman is developed 7;
that pure (principle), not illumined among all radiant (bodies), is (itself)
luminous and illuminates (them) 8. That eternal divine being is perceived by
devotees. The perfect is raised out of the perfect. It (being raised) out of the
perfect is called the perfect. The perfect is withdrawn from the perfect, and
the perfect only remains 9. That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees.
p. 187
(From the Brahman), the waters 1 (are produced); and then from the waters, the
gross body. In the space within that 2, dwelt the two divine (principles). Both
enveloping the quarters and sub-quarters, support earth and heaven 3. That
eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. The horse 4(-like senses) lead
towards heaven him, who is possessed of knowledge and divine, (who is) free from
old age, and who stands on the wheel of this chariot(-like body), which is
transient, but the operations of which are imperishable 5. That eternal divine
being 6 is perceived by devotees. His form has no parallel 7; no one sees him
with the eye 8. Those who apprehend him by means, of the understanding, and also
the mind and heart, become immortal 9. That eternal
p. 188
divine being is perceived by devotees. The currents of twelve collections 1,
supported by the Deity, regulate the honey 2; and those who follow after it move
about in (this) dangerous (world). That eternal divine being 3 is perceived by
devotees. The bee 4 drinks that accumulated honey for half a month 5. The Lord
created the oblation for all beings 6. That eternal divine being is perceived by
devotees. Those who are devoid of wings 7, coming
p. 189
to the Asvattha of golden leaves 1, there become possessed of wings, and fly
away happily 2. That eternal divine being 3 is perceived by devotees. The upward
life-wind swallows up the downward life-wind; the moon swallows up the upward
life-wind; the sun swallows up the moon 4; and another 5, swallows up the sun.
Moving about above the waters, the supreme self 6 does not raise one leg 7.
(Should he raise) that, which is always performing sacrifices 8, there will be
no death, no immortality 9. That eternal divine being 10 is perceived by
devotees.
p. 190
The being which is the inner self, and which is of the size of a thumb 1, is
always migrating in consequence of the connexion with the subtle body 2. The
deluded ones do not perceive that praiseworthy lord, primeval and radiant, and
possessed of creative power 3. That eternal divine being is perceived by
devotees. Leading mortals to destruction by their own action 4, they conceal
themselves like serpents in secret recesses, 5. The deluded men then become more
deluded 6. The enjoyments afforded by them cause delusion, and lead to worldly
life 7. That eternal divine being 8 is perceived by devotees. This 9 seems to be
common to all mankind--whether possessed of resources 10 or not possessed of
resources--it is common to immortality and the other 11. Those who are possessed
(of them) 12 attain there to the source of the honey 13. That eternal divine
being is perceived by devotees. They go,
p. 191
pervading both worlds by knowledge 1. Then the Agnihotra though not performed is
(as good as) performed 2. Your (knowledge) of the Brahman, therefore, will not
lead you to littleness 3. Knowledge is (his) 4 name. To that the talented ones
attain. That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. The self of this
description absorbing the material cause 5 becomes great. And the self of him
who understands that being is not degraded here 6. That eternal divine being is
perceived by devotees. One should ever and always be doing good. (There is) no
death, whence (can there be) immortality 7? The real and the unreal have both
the same real (entity) as their basis. The source of the existent and the
non-existent is but one 8. That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees.
The
p. 192
being who is the inner self, and who is of the size of a thumb, is not seen,
being placed in the heart 1. He is unborn, is moving about day and night,
without sloth. Meditating on him, a wise man remains placid 2. That eternal
divine being is perceived by devotees. From him comes the wind 3; in him,
likewise, is (everything) dissolved. From him (come) the fire and the moon; and
from him comes life 4. That is the support (of the universe); that is immortal;
that is all things perceptible 5; that is the Brahman, that glory. From that all
entities were produced; and in that (they) are dissolved 6. That eternal divine
being is perceived by devotees. The brilliant (Brahman) supports the two divine
principles 7 and the universe, earth and heaven, and the quarters. He from whom
the rivers flow in (various) directions, from him were created the great oceans
8. That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. Should one fly, even
after furnishing oneself with thousands upon thousands of wings, and even though
one should have the velocity of thought 9, one would never reach the end of the
(great) cause 10. That eternal divine
p. 193
being is perceived by devotees. His form dwells in the unperceived 1; and those
whose understandings are very well refined 2 perceive him. The talented man who
has got rid (of affection and aversion) perceives (him) by the mind. Those who
understand him 3 become immortal. When one sees this self in all beings
stationed in various places 4, what should one grieve for after that 5? The
Brâhmana has (as much interest) in all beings, as in a big reservoir of water,
to which waters flow from all sides 6. I alone am your mother 7, father,
p. 194
and I too am the son. And I am the self of all this--that which exists and that
which does not exist 1. (I am) the aged grandfather of this, the father, and the
son, O descendant of Bharata! You dwell in my self only 2. You are not mine, nor
I (yours). The self only is my seat 3; the self too is (the source of) my birth
4. I am woven through and through 5 (everything). And my seat is free from (the
attacks of) old age 6. I am unborn, moving about day and night, without sloth.
Knowing (me), verily, a wise man remains placid 7. Minuter than an atom 8,
possessed of a good mind 9, I am stationed within all beings 10. (The wise) know
the father of all beings to be placed in the lotus 11(-like heart of every one).
p. 197
Footnotes
186:1 Free from ignorance and other taints. See Katha, p. 144.
186:2 Sankara compares Katha, p. 142. See, too, Mundaka, p. 303; and note infra.
186:3 Svetâsvatara, p. 347, and p. 180 supra.
186:4 Sankara refers to Brihadâranyaka, p. 887.
186:5 Cf. Gîtâ, p. 112, note .
186:6 'Named Hiranyagarbha,' Sankara. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 107; Svetâsvatara, p. 354;
Mundaka, p. 309; Maitrî, p. 130; Taitt. Âran. p. 894.
186:7 'In the form of Virâg,' says Sankara. As to these two, cf. Mundaka, pp.
270-272; and Sankara's and Ânandagiri's notes there. See also Svetâsvatara, pp.
324, 325; and Nrisimha Tâpinî, pp. 233, 234; Colebrooke, Essays, pp. 344, 368
(Madras reprint). The Virâg corresponds rather to the gross material world
viewed as a whole; the Hiranyagarbha to the subtle elements similarly viewed, an
earlier stage in the development. Cf. the Vedântasâra.
186:8 Cf. Mundaka, p. 303, and Gîtâ, p. 112.
186:9 The individual self is part of the supreme (Gîtâ, p. 112); perfect = not
limited by space, time, &c.; as being part of a thing perfect in its essence,
the individual soul also is perfect. The individual self is withdrawn from the
perfect, viz. the whole aggregate of body, senses, &c. presided over by the
self, and when so withdrawn it appears to be the pure self only. Cf.
Brihadâranyaka, p. 948.
187:1 'The five elements,' says Sankara, cf. Aitareya, p. 189; and for 'gross
body,' the original is literally 'water;' see supra, p. 179, note 6; and see,
too, Îsopanishad, p. 11, and Svetâsvatara, p. 368, for different but kindred
meanings.
187:2 Viz. the lotus-like heart. Cf. Khândogya,. p. 528.
187:3 The two principles between them pervade the universe, the individual self
being connected with the material world, the other with heaven; 'divine' is,
literally, 'the brilliant,' says Sankara, who quotes Katha, p. 305, as a
parallel for the whole passage.
187:4 Cf. Katha, p. 111; Maitrî, pp. 19-34; and Mahâbhârata Strî Parvan, chap.
VII, St. 13. Heaven = the Brahman here (see Brihadâranyaka, p. 876); divine =
not vulgar, or unrefined-Sankara, who adds that though the senses generally lead
one to sensuous objects, they do not do so when under the guidance of true
knowledge.
187:5 The body is perishable, but action done by the self while in the body
leaves its effect.
187:6 To whom, namely, the man of knowledge goes, as before stated.
187:7 Cf. Svetâsvatara, p. 347.
187:8 Cf. Katha, p. 152, and comment there, where the eye is said to stand for
all the senses.
187:9 Katha, p. 149; Svetâsvatara, pp. 346-348, also p. 330 (should it be
manîshâ there instead of manviso ?). The meanings of the three words are
difficult to fix accurately. Sankara varies in his interpretations. p. 188
Probably the meaning he gives here is the best. Mind and understanding have been
explained at Gîtâ, p. 57. The heart is the place within, where the self is said
to be, and it may be taken as indicating the self, the meaning would then be--a
direct consciousness in the self of its unity with the Supreme. See, too, Taitt
Âran. p.896.
188:1 The five organs of action, the five senses of perception, the mind and
understanding make the twelve.
188:2 Each current has its own honey regularly distributed to it under the
supervision of the Deity, the Supreme. Honey = material enjoyment. Cf. Katha, p.
126, where Sankara renders it by karmaphala, 'fruit of action.'
188:3 Who supervises the distribution as stated. Cf. Vedânta-sûtra III, 2,
28-31.
188:4 Bhramara, which the commentators interpret to mean 'one who is given to
flying about--the individual self.'
188:5 I. e. in one life in respect of actions done in a previous life.
188:6 Sankara says this is in answer to a possible difficulty that action
performed here cannot have its fruit in the next world, as the fruit is so far
removed in time from the action. The answer is, The Lord, the Supreme, can
effect this, and taking his existence into account there is no difficulty.
Oblation = food, &c., Sankara. The meaning of the whole passage, which is not
very clear, seems to be that the Lord has arranged things so that each being
receives some of this honey, this food, which is the fruit of his own action.
Then the question arises, Do these beings always continue taking the honey and
'migrating,' or are they ever released? That is answered by the following
sentence.
188:7 'The wings of knowledge,' says Sankara, citing a Brâhmana text, those,
verily, who have knowledge are possessed of wings, those who are not possessed
of knowledge are devoid of wings.'
189:1 So, literally; Sankara explains 'golden' to mean beneficial and pleasant,'
by a somewhat fanciful derivation of the word hiranya. He refers to Gîtâ, p.
111, about the leaves of the Asvattha. Nîlakantha takes the leaves to be son,
wife, &c., which are 'golden,' attractive at first sight. 'Coming to the
Asvattha,' Sankara says, means being born as a Brâhmana,' &c. 'Flying away' =
obtaining final emancipation.
189:2 The 'selfs' are compared to birds in the famous passage at Mundaka, p. 306
(also Svetâsvatara, p. 337). See also Brihadâranyaka, p. 499.
189:3 Knowledge of whom leads to 'flying away happily.'
189:4 Cf. Khândogya, p. 441. Sankara says that the author here explains the yoga
by which the Supreme is to be attained. As to the life-winds, cf. Gîtâ, p. 61.
'The moon,' says Sankara, 'means the mind, and the sun the understanding, as
they are the respective deities of those organs' (cf. Brihadâranyaka, pp.
521-542, and Aitareya, p. 187, where, however, the sun is said to appertain to
the eye).
189:5 I. e. the Brahman; the result is, one remains in the condition of being
identified with the Brahman.
189:6 Literally, flamingo. Cf. Svetâsvatara, pp. 332, 367; see also p. 289;
Maitrî, p. 99; and the commentary on Svetâsvatara, p. 283.
189:7 Viz. the individual self, Sankara; that is, as it were, the bond of
connexion between the Supreme and the world. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 112.
189:8 This is the meaning, though the word in the original is Ritvig, which in
the later literature only means priest.
189:9 As the whole of the material world is dissolved, when the self is
dissevered from the delusion which is the cause of it.
189:10 Viz. who moves about on the waters, as above stated.
190:1 Svetâsvatara, pp. 330-355; Taitt. Âran. p. 858, and comments there.
190:2 The life-winds, the ten organs or senses, mind, and understanding. See the
same word similarly interpreted at Svetâsvatara, p. 306, and Sankhya-sûtra III,
9.
190:3 According to Sankara, he who makes the distinct entities, after entering
into them; he alludes apparently to Khândogya, p. 407.
190:4 Namely, that of giving the poison of sensuous objects.
190:5 I. e. the eye, ear, &c., like the holes of serpents.
190:6 I. e. can appreciate nought but those sensuous objects.
190:7 One reading is, 'lead to danger' = which means 'to hell,' according to
Nîlakantha.
190:8 Scil. delusion about whom leads to 'danger' or 'worldly life.'
190:9 The quality of being one with the Brahman in essence.
190:10 Self-restraint, tranquillity, &c.
190:11 I. e. whether in the midst of worldly life, or in the state of perfect
emancipation.
190:12 Viz. the resources spoken of before.
190:13 Viz. the supreme Brahman. 'There' Sankara takes to mean 'in the supreme
abode of Vishnu.' See Introduction.
191:1 Sankara does not explain this. Nîlakantha says pervading = fully
understanding; both worlds = the self and the not-self. Is the meaning something
like that of the passage last cited by Sankara under Vedânta-sûtra IV, 2, 14?
191:2 He obtains the fruit of it, Sankara. See as to Agnihotra, Khândogya, p.
381 seq.; and Vedânta-sûtra IV, 1, 16.
191:3 I. e. this mortal world, as action &c. would do.
191:4 I. e. of one who understands himself to be the Brahman. See
Aitareya-upanishad, p. 246.
191:5 Sankara says, 'the cause in which all is absorbed.' Cf. a similar, but not
identical, meaning given to Vaisvânara at Khândogya, p. 264; and see
Vedânta-sûtra I, 2, 24. Becomes great = becomes the Brahman, Sankara.
191:6 Even in this body, Sankara; degradation he takes to mean departure from
the body, citing Brihadâranyaka, p. 540.
191:7 There is no worldly life with birth and death for one who does good, and
thinks his self to be the Brahman; hence no emancipation from such life either.
191:8 The Brahman is the real, and on that the unreal material world is
imagined. Cf. Taittirîya, p. 97, and Sankara's comments there, which are of use
in understanding this passage.
192:1 Cf. Katha, pp. 130, 157; and Brihadâranyaka, p. 360.
192:2 Cf. Svetâsvatara, p. 342; Katha, pp. 100, 107; Maitrî, p. 134.
192:3 Cf. Taittirîya, p. 67; Katha, p. 146; Mundaka, p. 293.
192:4 Katha, p. 298; Mundaka, p. 288.
192:5 See p. 180, note .
192:6 See p. 180 supra.
192:7 'The individual soul, and God,' say the commentators, the latter being
distinct from the supreme self. 'The universe,' says Nîlakantha, 'means earth,'
&c., by which I suppose he means earth, heaven, quarters, mentioned directly
afterwards.
192:8 Katha, p. 293.
192:9 This figure is implied in the Îsopanishad, p. 10.
192:10 'Therefore it is endless,' says Sankara; and as to this, cf. Taittirîya,
p. 51.
193:1 'In a sphere beyond the reach of perception,' says Sankara, who also
quotes Katha, p. 149, or Svetâsvatara, p. 347, where the same line also occurs.
193:2 The original for understandings is sattva, which Sankara renders to mean
antahkarana. 'Refined,' he says, 'by sacrifices and other sanctifying
operations.' In the Katha at p. 148 sattva is rendered by Sankara to mean
buddhi--a common use of the word.
193:3 'As being,' says Sankara, 'identical with themselves.' It will be noted
that the form of expression is slightly altered here. It is not 'those who
understand this.'
193:4 I. e. in different aggregates of body, senses, &c. Cf. Gîtâ, pp. 104 and
124; also Khândogya, pp. 475-551.
193:5 Cf. Brihadâranyaka, p. 882; Sankara, also refers to Îsopanishad, p. 14.
193:6 The words are pretty nearly the same as at Gîtâ, p. 48. Sankara says, the
Brâhmana 'who has done all he need do' has no interest whatever in any being, as
he has none in a big reservoir, and he cites Gîtâ, p. 54, in support of this.
One copy of Sankara, however, differs from this; that runs thus: 'As a person
who has done all he need do, has no interest in a big reservoir of water, so to
a Brâhmana who sees the self in all beings, there is no interest in all the
actions laid down in the Vedas, &c.; as he has obtained everything by mere
perception of the self.' Nîlakantha's reading is exactly the same as at Gîtâ, p.
48.
193:7 Sankara says that Sanatsugâta states here his own experiences, like
Vâmadeva, (about whom there is a reference at Brihadâranyaka, p. 216) and
others, to corroborate what he has already said. Cf. also Gîtâ, p. 83, as to the
whole passage.
194:1 See Gîtâ, p. 84. Nîlakantha takes what exists to mean 'present,' and what
does not exist to mean 'past and future.' Cf. Khândogya, p. 532.
194:2 See Gîtâ, p. 82, where there is also a similar apparent contradiction.
194:3 Cf. Khândogya, p. 518.
194:4 That is to say he is 'unborn,' says Nîlakantha. Sankara seems to take 'my'
with 'seat' only, and not with birth; for he says, 'everything has its birth
from the self.'
194:5 Cf. Mundaka, p. 298; Maitrî, p. 84, and comment there.
194:6 Cf. Gîtâ, pp. 77, 109, and Khândogya, pp. 535, 550.
194:7 See p. 192, note .
194:8 Cf. Gîtâ, p. 78, and note there.
194:9 I. e. a mind free from affection and aversion, hatred, &c., Sankara.
194:10 Cf. Gîtâ, p. 113, and note ; and also Îsopanishad, p. 12.
194:11 Khândogya, p. 528; and cf. Gîtâ, p. 113.
End of Sanatsugatiya
*****************
INTRODUCTION TO ANUGÎTÂ.
LIKE the Bhagavadgîtâ and the Sanatsugâtîya, the Anugîtâ, is one of the numerous
episodes of the Mahâbhârata. And like the Sanatsugâtîya, it appears here for the
first time in an English, or, indeed, it is believed, in any European garb. It
forms part of the Asvamedha Parvan of the Mahâbhârata, and is contained in
thirty-six chapters of that Parvan. These chapters--being chapters XVI to
LI--together with all the subsequent chapters of the Asvamedha Parvan, form by
themselves what in some of our copies is called the Anugîtâ Parvan-a title which
affords a parallel to the title Bhagavadgîtâ Parvan, which we have already
referred to. The Anugîtâ is not now a work of any very great or extensive
reputation. But we do find some few quotations from it in the Bhâshyas of
Sankarâkârya, and one or two in the Sankhya-sâra of Vigñâna Bhikshu, to which
reference will be made hereafter. And it is included in the present volume,
partly because it affords an interesting, glimpse of sundry old passages of the
Upanishad literature in a somewhat modified, and presumably later, form; and
partly, perhaps I may say more especially, because it professes to be a sort of
continuation, or rather recapitulation, of the Bhagavadgîtâ. At the very outset
of the work, we read, that, after the great fratricidal war of the Mahâbhârata
was over, and the Pândavas had become sole and complete masters of their
ancestral kingdom, Krishna and Arguna--the two interlocutors in the
Bhagavadgîtâ--happened to take a stroll together in the great magical palace
built for the Pândavas by the demon Maya. In the course of the conversation
which they held on the occasion, Krishna communicated to Arguna his wish to
return to his own people at Dvârakâ, now that the business which had called
p. 198
him away from them was happily terminated. Arguna, of course, was unable to
resist the execution of this wish; but he requested Krishna, before leaving for
Dvârakâ, to repeat the instruction which had been already conveyed to him on
'the holy field of Kurukshetra,' but which had gone out of his 'degenerate
mind.' Krishna thereupon protests that he is not equal to a verbatim
recapitulation of the Bhagavadgîtâ, but agrees, in lieu of that, to impart to
Arguna the same instruction in other words, through the medium of a certain
'ancient story'--or purâtana itihâsa. And the instruction thus conveyed
constitutes what is called the Anugîtâ, a name which is in itself an embodiment
of this anecdote.
Now the first question which challenges investigation with reference to this
work is, if we may so call it, the fundamental one-how much is properly included
under the name? The question is not one quite easy of settlement, as our
authorities upon it are not all reconcilable with one another. In the general
list of contents of the Asvamedha Parvan, which is given at the end of that
Parvan in the edition printed at Bombay, we read that the first section is the
Vyâsa Vâkya, the second the Samvartamaruttîya. With neither of these have we
aught to do here. The list then goes on thus: 'Anugîtâ, Vâsudevâgamana, Brâhmana
Gîtâ, Gurusishyasamvâda, Uttankopâkhyâna,' and so forth. With the later
sections, again, we arc not here concerned. Now let us compare this list with
the list which may be obtained from the titles of the chapters in the body of
the work itself. With the sixteenth chapter, then, of the Asvamedha Parvan,
begins what is here called the Anugîtâ Parvan; and that chapter and the three
following chapters are described as the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, and
nineteenth chapters respectively of the Anugîtâ Parvan, which forms part of the
Asvamedha Parvan. The title of the twentieth chapter contains a small, but
important, addition. It runs thus, 'Such is the twentieth chapter of the Anugîtâ
Parvan, forming part of the Asvamedha Parvan--being the Brahma Gîtâ' This form
is continued down to the thirty-fourth chapter, only Brâhmana
p. 199
Gîtâ being substituted for Brahma Gîtâ. At the close of the thirty-fifth
chapter, there is another alteration caused by the substitution of
Gurusishyasamvâda for Brâhmana Gîtâ; and this continues down to the fifty-first
chapter, where the thread of the narrative is again taken up--the philosophical
parenthesis, if I may so say, having come to an end. With the fifty-first
chapter our present translation also ends. Now it appears from the above
comparison., that the list of contents set out above is accurate, save in so far
as it mentions Vâsudevâgamana as a distinct section of the Asvamedha Parvan. No
such section seems to be in existence. And there appears to be nothing in the
Asvamedha Parvan to which that title could be appropriately allotted. The
edition printed at Madras agrees in all essential particulars with the Bombay
edition; with this difference, that even at the close of the twentieth chapter,
the name is Brâhmana Gîtâ, and not Brahma Gîtâ as it is in the Bombay edition.
The Calcutta edition also agrees in these readings. Turning now to a MS.
procured for me by my excellent friend Professor Âbâgî Vishnu Kâthavate at
Ahmedabad, and bearing date the 15th of Phâlguna Vadya 1823, Sunday, we find
there at the end of the Asvamedha Parvan a list of contents like that which we
have seen in the printed edition. The relevant portion of that list is as
follows: 'Samvartamaruttîya, Anugîtâ, Gurusishyasamvâda, and Uttankopâkhyâna.'
Here we find neither the erroneous entry of Vâsudevâgamana, nor the correct
entry of Brahma Gîtâ, which are both contained in the other list. In another MS.
which I have now before me, and which has been lent me by Professor Bhândârkar,
who purchased it in Puna for the Government of Bombay--in this MS., which
contains the commentary of Arguna Misra, the earlier chapters are described not
as chapters of the Anugîtâ Parvan, but of the Anugîtâ contained in the Asvamedha
Parvan, and they are numbered there as they are numbered in our translation, not
continuously with the numbering of the previous chapters of the Asvamedha
Parvan. At the close of chapter IV, we have an explicit statement that the
Anugîtâ ends there. Then the Brahma Gîtâ begins. And the first chapter is
p. 200
described as a chapter of the Brahma Gîtâ in the Asvamedha Parvan. The numbering
of each of these chapters of the Brahma Gîtâ is not given in. the copy before
us--the titles and descriptions of the various chapters being throughout
incomplete. Some of the later chapters are described as chapters of the Brâhma
Gîtâ, and some as chapters of the Brâhmana Gîtâ; but this discrepancy is
probably to be put to the account of the particular copyist who wrote out the
copy used by us. With what is chapter XX in our numbering the Gurusishyasamvâda
begins. This MS. omits all reference to any Anugîtâ Parvan, and fails to number
the various chapters. Its list of sections agrees with that in the Bombay
edition. It bears no date.
So much for what may be described as our primary sources of information on this
subject. Let us now glance at the secondary sources. And, first, Nîlakantha in
commenting on what is, according to his numbering, chapter XV, stanza 43,
apparently distinguishes that chapter from what he speaks of as the Brâhmana
Gîtâ and Gurusishyasamvâda, which he implies follow after that chapter--thus
indicating that he accepted in substance the tradition re corded in the passages
We have already set forth, viz. that the first four chapters of our translation
form the Anugîtâ, the next fifteen the Brâhmana Gîtâ, and the last seventeen the
Gurusishyasamvâda. This is also the view of Arguna Misra. At the close of his
gloss on chapter IV, he distinctly states that the Anugîtâ ends at that chapter;
and again at the close of the gloss on chapter XIX, he explicitly says that the
Brâhmana Gîtâ ends there. He also adds the following interesting observation:
'The feminine form (Gîtâ, namely) is used in consequence of (the word) Upanishad
being feminine.' The full title of that part of the Mahâbhârata would then be,
according to this remark of Arguna Misra, 'the Upanishads sung by the Brâhmana,'
a title parallel to that of the Bhagavadgîtâ, 'the Upanishads sung by the
Deity.' It is to be further remarked, that the last chapter of the
Gurusishyasamvâda is called in this commentary the eighteenth chapter of the
Gurusishyasamvâda, a fact which seems to indicate that Arguna Misra either found
p. 201
in the MS. which he used, or himself established, a separate numbering for the
chapters in the several sections 1 of which the Asvamedha Parvan is made up.
Although the information here set out from these various sources is not easily
to be harmonised in all its parts, the preponderance of testimony seems to he in
favour of regarding the portion of the Asvamedha Parvan embraced in our
translation as containing three distinct sections, viz. the Anugîtâ, the
Brâhmana Gîtâ, and the Gurusishyasamvâda. And some indirect support may be
derived for this conclusion, from one or two other circumstances. In the
Sânkhya-sâra of Vigñâna Bhikshu--a work which, as we shall see in the sequel,
expressly mentions the Anugîtâ--we have a passage cited as from the 'Bhârata 2'
which coincides almost precisely with a passage occurring at chapter XXVII of
our translation (see p. 335). And, in the Bhâshya of Sankarâkârya, on the
Bhagavadgîtâ, chapter XV, stanza 1, we have a citation as from a 'Purâna' of a
passage which coincides pretty closely with one which occurs at chapter XX of
our translation (see p. 313). If the discrepancies between the quotations as
given by Vigñâna Bhikshu and Sankara, and the passages occurring in our text,
may be treated merely as various readings-and there is nothing inherently
improbable in this being the case-it may be fairly contended, that neither
Sankara nor Vigñâna Bhikshu would have used the vague expressions, 'a Purâna,'
or even 'the Bhârata,' if they could have correctly substituted in lieu of them
the specific name Anugîtâ. And this, it may be said, is a contention of some
weight, when it is remembered, that both Sankara and Vigñâna show, in other
parts of their writings, an acquaintance with this very Anugîtâ. If this
reasoning is correct,
p. 202
the conclusion to be derived from it must be, that Sankara and Vigñâna must have
considered the chapters of the Asvamedha Parvan from which their respective
quotations are taken as not forming part of the Anugîtâ.
The testimony we have thus collected is apparently of considerable weight.
Against it, however, we have to weigh some testimony which appears to me to be
entitled, upon the whole, to even greater weight. In the Sânkhya-sâra of Vigñâna
Bhikshu, to which we have already referred, we have two quotations 1 from the
Anugîtâ which are distinctly stated to be taken from that work. The first occurs
in our translation at p. 332, the second at p. 313. Now, if we adopt the
conclusion above referred to, regarding the correct titles of the thirty-six
chapters which we have translated, it is a mistake to attribute the passages in
question to the Anugîtâ. They would, on that view, form part of the
Gurusishyasamvâda. Again, in his commentary on the Sanatsugâtîya, Sankara refers
to sundry passages which he expressly says are taken from the Anugîtâ, but which
are not contained in the Anugîtâ as limited by the evidence we have considered
above. One of the passages referred to is taken from chapter XI of our
translation, and others are contained in the comments on Sanatsugâtîya I, 6, and
on I, 20 and I, 41 2. It is difficult to resist the conclusion to which this
positive evidence leads. One cannot possibly explain this evidence upon the view
which we have first stated; while, on the other hand, the points which
apparently support that view are capable of some explanation on the theory that
the Anugîtâ includes all the chapters here translated. And that in this wise.
The passages which we have referred to as cited by Sankara and Vigñâna from a
Purâna and from the Bhârata may have been actually taken from some other work
than the Anugîtâ. Even waiving the fact that the readings are different,--though
in regard especially to the quotation given by Sankara it is not one to be
entirely lost sight of,--there is this fact which is of great and almost
conclusive weight on such a point as this, namely, that we
p. 203
have many instances of passages common, almost verbatim et literatim, to the
Mahâbhârata and other works. For one instance, take the very passage on which a
chronological argument has been founded by us in the Introduction to the
Sanatsugâtîya 1. It ought to have been there pointed out, that the stanza about
a young man being bound to rise to receive an elderly person, also occurs in the
Manu Smriti 2 in exactly the same words. The omission to note this circumstance
in its proper place in the Introduction to the Sanatsugâtîya was due to a mere
inadvertence. But the conclusion there hinted at was expressed in very, cautious
language, and with many qualifications, out of regard to circumstances such as
those which we are now considering. Similar repetitions may be pointed out in
other places. The passage about the Kshetragña and Sattva and their mutual
relations (see p. 374) occurs, as pointed out in the note there,. in at least
two other places in the Mahâbhârata. The passage likewise which occurs at Gîtâ,
p. 103, about the 'hands, feet, &c., on all sides,' is one which may be seen, to
my own knowledge, in about half a dozen places in the Mahâbhârata. Such cases, I
believe, may be easily multiplied; and they illustrate and are illustrated by
Mr. Freeman's proposition respecting the epic age in Greece, to which we have
already alluded. It follows, consequently, that the quotations from Sankara and
Vigñâna, to which we have referred above, do not militate very strongly against
the final conclusion at which we have arrived. The testimony of the MSS. and the
commentators is, no doubt, of considerably greater force. But Nîlakantha,
whatever his merits as an exegete--and even these are often marred by a
persistent effort to read his own foregone conclusions into the text he comments
on Nîlakantha is but an indifferent authority in the domain of historical
criticism. In his commentary on the Sanatsugâtîya, for instance, he tells us
that he has admitted into his text sundry verses which were not in the copy used
by Sankara, and for which he had none but a very modern voucher, and he very
naively adds that he has done so
p. 204
on the principle of collecting all good things to a focus. Arguna Misra is a
very much more satisfactory commentator. But he is not likely to be a writer of
much antiquity. I assume, that he must be more recent than Sankarâkârya, though
I cannot say that I have any very tenable ground for the assumption. But
assuming that, I think it more satisfactory to adopt Sankarâkârya's
nomenclature, and to treat the thirty-six chapters here translated as
constituting the Anugîtâ. It is not improbable, if our assumption is correct,
that the division of the thirty-six chapters in the manner we have seen may have
come into vogue after the date of Vigñâna Bhikshu, who, according to Dr. F. E.
Hall, 'lived in all probability in the sixteenth or seventeenth century, and
whom there is some slight reason for carrying back still further 1.'
Do these thirty-six chapters, then, form one integral work? Are they all the
work of one and the same author? These are the questions which next present
themselves for consideration. The evidence bearing upon them, however, is, as
might be expected, excessively scanty. Of external evidence, indeed, we have
really none, barring Sankara's statement in his commentary on the
Brihadâranyaka-upanishad 2 that the verse which he there quotes from the Anugîtâ
has Vyâsa for its author. That statement indicates that Sankara accepted the
current tradition of Vyâsa's authorship of the Anugîtâ; and such acceptance,
presumably, followed from his acceptance of the tradition of Vyâsa's authorship
of the entire Mahâbhârata. If that tradition is incorrect, and Vyâsa is not the
author of the Anugîtâ, we have no means of ascertaining who is the author. And
as to the tradition in question, it is difficult, in the present state of our
materials, to form any satisfactory judgment. We therefore proceed at once to
consider whether the Anugîtâ is really one work. And I must admit at the outset
that I find it difficult to answer this question. There are certainly some
circumstances connected with the work which might be regarded as indicating
p. 205
a different authorship of different parts of it. Thus in an early portion of the
work, we find the first personal pronoun is used, where the Supreme Being is
evidently intended to be signified, and yet the passage is not put into the
mouth of Krishna, but of the Brâhmana. A similar passage occurs a little later
on also. Now it must be taken to be a somewhat strained interpretation of the
words used in the passages in question to suppose that the speaker there used
the first personal pronoun, identifying himself for the nonce with the Supreme
Being 1. Again, in a passage still further on, we have the vocative O Pârtha!
where the person addressed is not Arguna at all, but the Brâhmana's wife. Now
these lapses are susceptible of two explanations--either we are to see in them
so many cases of 'Homer nodding,' or we may suppose that they are errors
occasioned by one writer making additions to the work of a previous writer,
without a vivid recollection of the framework of the original composition into
which his own work had to be set 2. I own, that on balancing the probabilities
on the one side and the other, my mind rather leans to the hypothesis of one
author making a slip in the plexus of his own story within story, rather than
the hypothesis of a deliberate interpolator forgetting the actual scheme of the
original work into which he was about to foist his own additions 3. And this the
rather, that we find a similar slip towards the very beginning of the work,
where we have the Brâhmana Kâsyapa addressed as Parantapa, or destroyer of
foes--an epithet which, I think, is exclusively reserved for Kshatriyas, and is,
in any case, a very inappropriate one to apply to a humble seeker for spiritual
light. This slip appears to me to be incapable of explanation on any theory of
interpolation 4. And hence the other slips above noted can hardly be regarded as
supporting any such theory. Another circumstance, not indeed bearing
p. 206
out that theory, but rendering interpolations possible, deserves to be noted.
The scheme of the Anugîtâ certainly lends itself to interpolations. A story
might without much difficulty be added to the series of story joined to story
which it contains. Against this, however, it must not be forgotten, that the
Sânti Parvan of the Mahâbhârata, and the Yogavâsishtha exhibit a precisely
similar framework of contents, and that the Pañkatantra and the
Kathâsaritsâgara, among other works, follow the same model. And from this fact
it may, be fairly argued, that while there is, doubtless, room for suspecting
interpolations in such cases, there is this to be remembered, that with respect
to any particular one of these cases, such suspicion can carry us but a very
short way. And further, it is to be observed, valeat quantum, that the connexion
of the several chapters of the Anugîtâ one with the other is not altogether a
loose one, save at one or two points only, while they are all linked on to the
main body of the narrative, only in what we have treated as the last chapter of
the Anugîtâ, without any trace of any other connecting link anywhere else. Upon
the whole, therefore, we here conclude, though not without doubt, that the whole
of the Anugîtâ is the work of one author.
The next question to be discussed is the important one of the age of the work.
The quotations already given above from Sankarâkârya's works, and one other
which is referred to in the note below 1, suffice to show that the Anugîtâ must
have been some few centuries old in the time of Sankarâkârya. For whether we
treat the Anugîtâ as a part of the original Mahâbhârata or not, it is not likely
that such a scholar as Sankara would have accepted the book as a genuine part of
the Mahâbhârata, and as a work of Vyâsa, if it had not been in his day of some
respectable antiquity, of antiquity sufficient to have thrown the real author
into oblivion, and to have substituted
p. 207
in his place Vyâsa, who lived at the junction of the Dvâpara and Kali ages 1,
upwards of thirty centuries before the Christian era. The calculation is
avowedly a very rough one, but I think we may, as the result of it, safely fix
the third century of the Christian era as the latest date at which the Anugîtâ
can have been composed. Let us now endeavour to find out whether we can fix the
date as lying within any better defined period. It is scarcely needful to say,
that the Anugîtâ dates from a period considerably subsequent to the age of the
Upanishads. The passages relating to the Prânasamvâda and so forth, which occur
originally in the Upanishads, are referred to in the Anugîtâ as 'ancient
stories'--an indication that the Upanishads had already come to be esteemed as
ancient compositions at the date of the latter work. It is not necessary,
therefore, to go through an elaborate examination of the versions of the ancient
stories alluded to above, as contained in the Upanishads and in the Anugîtâ,
more especially because it is possible for us to show that the Anugîtâ is later
than the Bhagavadgîtâ, which latter work, as we have seen, is later than the
Upanishads. And to this point we shall now address ourselves. We have already
observed upon the story referred to at the opening of this Introduction, which,
historically interpreted, indicates the priority of the Bhagavadgîtâ to the
Anugîtâ. This conclusion is confirmed by sundry other circumstances, which we
must now discuss in some detail, as they are also of use in helping to fix the
position of the work in the history of Sanskrit literature and philosophy.
First, then, it seems to me, that the state of society mirrored in the Anugîtâ
indicates a greater advance in social evolution than we have already seen is
disclosed in the Bhagavadgîtâ. Not to mention decorations of houses and so
forth, which are alluded to in one passage of the Anugîtâ, we are here told of
royal oppressions, of losses of wealth accumulated with great difficulty, and of
fierce captivities; we are told, to adapt the language of a modern English poet,
of laws grinding the weak, for strong men rule the
p. 208
law; we have references to the casting of images with liquefied iron, and to the
use of elephants as vehicles 1; and we meet with protests against the amusements
of music and dancing, and against the occupation of artisans 2. True it is, that
all these indications put together, fail to constitute according to the standard
of modern times, would be called a highly artificial state of society. But it
seems to me to mark a very perceptible and distinct advance beyond the social
condition in which mankind was divided into four castes or classes, with such a
division of duties, to put it briefly, as that of preparation for a future
world, government of this world, agriculture and trade, and service respectively
3. Artisans, it will be observed, are not even referred to in the Bhagavadgîtâ,
nor is there any trice of royal oppressions, or unequal laws. Then as regards
music, it may be noted, that there are references to it in the Brihadâranyaka
and Kaushîtaki-upanishads 4, without any indications of disapprobation. The
protest against music, therefore, and the sister art of dancing, is probably to
be explained as evoked by some abuses of the two arts which must have come into
prevalence about the time of the composition of the Anugîtâ. A similar protest
is found recorded in the Dharmasâstras of Manu and Âpastamba and Gautama 5. We
shall consider in the sequel the chronological positions of the Anugîtâ with
reference to those Dharmasâstras. But we have already pointed out that the Gîtâ
stands prior to them both 6.
Look again at the views on caste which are embodied in the Anugîtâ, and the
Bhagavadgîtâ respectively. The reference to the Kshatriya as representing the
quality of passion, while the Brâhmana represents the quality of goodness 7,
seems to place a considerably larger distance between the Brâhmana, and the
Kshatriya than is suggested by the Bhagavadgîtâ, and thus marks an advance in
the direction of the later doctrine on the subject. And in connexion
p. 209
with this, perhaps, the discrepancy between the reading of the Bhagavadgîtâ at
p. 85, and that of the Anugîtâ at p. 255, is not entirely without significance,
though much weight would not be due to it, if it stood alone. The expression
'devoted royal sages,' which we find in- the one work, makes way for 'well-read
Kshatriyas who are intent on their own duties' in the other. Again, although the
passage at p. 353 is undoubtedly susceptible of a different interpretation, it
seems to me, that the word 'twice-born' there employed, was meant to be
interpreted as meaning the Brâhmanas, and not the three twice-born castes; and
if this interpretation is correct, we have here the very proposition upon the
absence of which in the Bhagavadgîtâ we have already made some observations 1.
That twice-born in the passage in question means Brâhmana only, is, of course,
not a proved fact. But-having regard to the passages noted above and to the
passage at p. 320, where reference is made to disparagement of Brâhmanas--it is
not twice-born there--and in the same clause with disparagement of gods and
Vedas, it seems to me that the interpretation we have suggested must be taken to
be the true one. And it is to be further noted, that this conclusion is
corroborated by a comparison of the passage now under consideration with a
passage occurring in the Sânti Parvan 2, in the Râgadharma section of it, where
we read that 'the cow is the first among quadrupeds, gold among metals, a mantra
among words, and the Brâhmana is the first among bipeds.' The cow and gold occur
in the passage in the Anugîtâ also, very near the clause we are now discussing.
And it is allowable to argue, that reading the two together, twice-born in the
Anugîtâ must be interpreted to be synonymous with Brâhmana in the Râgadharma.
And the same conclusion is, to my mind, confirmed indirectly by comparing the
clause 'the twice-born among men' of the Anugîtâ with 'the ruler of men among
men of that Bhagavadgîtâ, the teaching of which the former work professes to
recapitulate.
p. 210
A similar inference seems to be derivable from a comparison of the specific
doctrines as to the duties of Brâhmanas which are enunciated in the Gîtâ and the
Anugîtâ. In the latter work, the famous six duties are expressly mentioned. We
have already argued in our Introduction to the Gîtâ, that a comparison of the
teaching of that work upon this point with the teaching of Âpastamba and Manu
shows the former to have been older than the latter. The six duties mentioned in
the Anugîtâ are those also mentioned by Manu and Âpastamba. It follows,
therefore, that the Gîtâ is prior to the Anugîtâ also. Whether the Anugîtâ is
prior or subsequent to Manu and Âpastamba, is a question which will have to be
discussed in the sequel.
The net result of the whole of this comparison appears to me to clearly show the
Anugîtâ to be a work of considerably more recent date than the Bhagavadgîtâ.
What interval of time lay between the two, is a most interesting, but also a
most difficult, question. The differences we have noted appear to me to indicate
a pretty wide interval. If I am right in regarding the Gîtâ as a work of what
may be called, for practical purposes, the age of the older Upanishads, I am
inclined to think that the interval between the Gîtâ, and the Anugîtâ must have
been one of larger extent than even three or four centuries. For as we have
already pointed put, the description of the various 'Itihâsas' mentioned in the
Anugîtâ as 'purâtana'--ancient--points to at least three or four centuries
having elapsed between the close of the Upanishad period and the composition of
the Anugîtâ. It is obvious, however, that this result is not one with which we
can rest satisfied. Even if it were more precise and accurate, it would only fix
the age of the Anugîtâ with reference to the age of another work itself of
unknown and unascertained date. We must therefore endeavour to compare the
Anugîtâ with some other work, the date of which is better known. For this
purpose, it seems to be not of any great use to refer to the Sankhya and
Yoga-sûtras, although it is not improbable that some materials might be
forthcoming for a useful comparison between them and the Anugîtâ. Neither the
Sânkhya nor the Yoga-sûtras can
p. 211
be said to have their ages fixed with even any approach to accuracy. And in the
case of the Sânkhya-sûtras there is the further difficulty presented by the
circumstance, that there is room for very serious doubts as to whether the
current Sûtras are really of the authorship of Kapila, or whoever else was the
original founder of the system. With regard to the Yoga, one or two observations
from a different point of view may not, however, be entirely out of place. At p.
248 the Yoga Sâstra is referred to eo nomine. What Sâstra is here alluded to? Is
it Patañgali's, or some other Sâstra dealing with similar topics? Or, again, is
it an entirely different matter that is alluded to, and are we not to see in the
expression in question an allusion to any system formally propounded? I own, as
stated in the note on the passage, that my mind inclines to the last view. There
is not very much to say on either side of the question, as far as I am able to
understand it. But the view I incline to appears to have one small circumstance
in its favour. At p. 249 we have an allusion to persons who understand the Yoga,
and to a certain illustration propounded by them. Now who are these persons? My
limited knowledge of Yoga literature has not enabled me to trace the
illustration anywhere else than in the Kathopanishad, and in the Sanatsugâtîya.
It seems to me very unlikely, that the illustration can have been put forward in
any work older than the Kathopanishad. And we may, I think, assume it as most
probable that the Sanatsugâtîya borrowed it from that work. If so, it is not
likely that the Anugîtâ can have referred to any other master of the Yoga than,
the author of the Kathopanishad. And then it would seem to follow, that the
Anugîtâ must have been composed at a time when, although the Upanishads were
looked on with reverence and as works of authority, they were not yet regarded
as part and parcel of the Vedic revelation 1. It is impossible not to perceive,
that the train of reasoning here is at every stage hedged round with
difficulties and doubts. And the inference therefore to which we are led by it
must be accepted with proportionate
p. 212
caution. But if the reasoning is correct, it seems to be certain, that the
Anugîtâ belongs to some period prior to the second, and probable, that it
belongs to some period prior to the third century, before Christ. For in the
second century before Christ was composed the Mahâbhâshya of Patañgali, in which
Rahasyas--which is another name for Upanishads--are mentioned as forming part of
the Vedic literature. And in Âpastamba's Dharma-sûtras, which are older than
Patañgali, Upanishads 1 are mentioned in the same way. I am aware that it may be
said, that because Upanishads as a class of works are mentioned by Patañgali and
Âpastamba, it does not follow that any particular Upanishad, such as the Katha,
for instance, also existed at that time. This is quite true. But without going
now into the general question, it is sufficient to point out, that on. argument
here is concerned merely with the recognition of the Upanishads as a class of
works forming part of the Vedic canon. Such recognition must have come later
than the period at which the Anugîtâ could speak of a passage in the
Katha-upanishad as the utterance of Yogavids, or persons who understood the
Yoga.
Turning now to the materials available for ascertaining the relative
chronological positions of the Anugîtâ and the rise of Buddhism, we have again
to complain of their unsatisfactory character. We will briefly note the two or
three circumstances which appear to have a bearing upon this question. In the
first place, we have the word Nirvâna used in one passage of the Anugîtâ in the
sense of the highest tranquillity, and there the simile of the extinction of the
fire Is expressly adduced. On this it may be argued, that if the term Nirvâna
had become the well-understood property of Buddhism, such a use of it as we find
here would probably not have occurred. Again, we have the injunction that an
ascetic must dwell in a town only for one day and no more, while he may, stay at
one place during the rains. This is very similar to an injunction prescribed by
the Buddhistic teachers also. But
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this fact furnishes, I think, no safe ground for a chronological inference, more
especially because, as pointed out by Dr. Bühler, the Buddhistic injunction is
itself only borrowed from the Brahmanical rules on the subject 1. It is
impossible, therefore, to say that the Anugîtâ borrowed its doctrine from
Buddhism. It is, of course, equally impossible on the other hand to say, that
Buddhism borrowed its rule from the Anugîtâ. And, therefore, we can build no
safe inference upon this fact either. We have next the very remarkable passage
at chapter XXXIV, where various contradictory and mutually exclusive views of
piety are stated, or rather passingly and briefly indicated--a passage which one
most devoutly wishes had been clearer than it is. In that passage I can find no
reference to Buddhism. True it is that Nîlakantha's commentary refers some of
the doctrines there stated to Buddhistic schools 2. But that commentary,
unsatisfactory enough in other places, is particularly unsatisfactory here. And
its critical accuracy may be judged from its reference to Saugatas and Yogâkâras
apparently as two distinct schools, whereas in truth the Saugatas are Buddhists,
and Yogâkâras one of the four principal Buddhist sects. And it must be further
remembered, that the interpretations of Nîlakantha, upon which his
specifications of the different schools are based, are by no means such as
necessarily claim acceptance. If then we d o not find any reference to Buddhism
in this passage, that fact becomes certainly a remarkable one. Still, on the
other hand, I am not prepared to apply the 'negative argument' here, and to say
that inasmuch as Buddhism is not referred to where so many different opinions
are referred to, Buddhism cannot have come into existence at the date of the
Anugîtâ. It seems to me that the argument will here be a very hazardous one,
because if the author of the Anugîtâ was, as we may assume he was, an orthodox
Hindu, he might well have declined, although not unacquainted with Buddhism, to
put into the mouths of the-seven sages even as a possible view, that
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which was the view of a school esteemed heretical by the author and his
co-religionists. This passage, therefore, also fails to furnish any tangible
ground for a chronological inference, at all events in the present state of our
knowledge. Lastly, we come to the allusion to those who indulge in constant talk
in disparagement of Vedas and Brâhmanas, the two being thus bracketed together
in the original. That seems, at the first blush, to be a somewhat more distinct
allusion to Buddhism than any of those we have noted above. But even that is not
unambiguous. If the stanzas quoted by Mâdhavâkârya, in his Sarvadarsanasangraha
in its first section, are the composition of the original founder of the Kârvâka
school, or even if they correctly represent the earliest opinions of that
school, it is at least quite as likely that the Kârvâkas were the target for the
denunciations of the Anugîtâ in the passage in question as that the Buddhists
were so. To me, indeed, it appears to be more likely. For Buddha's opinion with
regard to the Vedas is, that they are inadequate; with regard to the Brâhmanas,
that they are in no sense the chosen of God as they claim to be. The opinion of
the Kârvâkas, on the other hand, is a far, more aggressive one, so to say.
According to Mâdhavâkârya, they taught that the Vedas were either simple fatuity
or imposture, and that the Brâhmanas were impostors. It seems to me much more
likely, that this, which I have called a comparatively aggressive attitude, was
the one at which the remarks of the Anugîtâ were levelled; and more especially
does this appear to be correct when we remember, that the view taught by Gautama
Buddha regarding the Vedas and the Brâhmanas was propounded by him only in its
strongest form; and that even before his time, the doctrine of the inadequacy of
the Vedas for the purpose of securing the summum bonum of humanity had been
taught by other teachers. It is further to be recollected, that we have evidence
showing that other thinkers also than Buddha, or Brihaspati, had in early days
attacked the authority of the Vedas. Kautsa is the name of one who was probably
the most distinguished among them. It is certainly possible that his followers
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were the people branded as of 'the dark quality' by the Anugîtâ in the passage
in question. We have, therefore, at least two different recognised bodies of
thinkers, and one individual thinker, to whom the words under discussion may
apply, and it is plainly unsafe, under these circumstances, to draw any
chronological inference based on the hypothesis of one particular body out of
those three being the one intended by the author. Before closing this part of
the investigation, it may be interesting to note, that the phrase 'turning the
wheel,' a phrase now so familiar to us as one of the household words of
Buddhism, is used in the Anugîtâ with respect to King Ganaka. I do not think,
however, that either alone, or even coupled with the word Nirvâna, that phrase
can be made the basis of any legitimate deduction in favour of the priority of
the Anugîtâ, to Buddhism. At the outside, the only deduction admissible, if any
deduction were admissible, would be, that the Anugîtâ was composed prior to the
recognition, of Nirvâna and Kakrapravartana as specially Buddhistic words. But
priority to such recognition is not, I apprehend, necessarily synonymous with
priority to the rise of Buddhism.
The net result of this part of the investigation appears to be, that we have
pretty strong grounds for holding the Anugîtâ to belong to a period very
considerably removed from the period of the Upanishads and the Bhagavadgîtâ; but
that we have no tangible grounds on which to base any deduction regarding its
priority or otherwise to the Sânkhya, and Yoga systems of philosophy, or to the
great movement of Gautama Buddha. There is only one other point, which we can
establish in a not entirely unsatisfactory way, and which enables us to draw
closer the limits within which the Anugîtâ must have been composed. That point
is the position of the Anugîtâ with reference to Âpastamba's Dharma-sûtra. I
need not say again, that I accept here the proposition about the age of
Âpastamba which has been laid down by Dr. Bühler, as a sufficiently satisfactory
working hypothesis. And accepting that proposition, I venture to suggest the
fourth century B.C. as a not unlikely date for the Anugîtâ. It appears to me,
that a comparison of
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the Anugîtâ and the rules of Âpastamba upon one important point which they both
deal with shows the priority of the former work. I allude to the rules and
regulations touching the four Âsramas or orders contained in the Anugîtâ and in
the Dharma-sûtra of Âpastamba. One circumstance strikes us at once on I
comparing the two works on this point. Âpastamba goes into a very great deal of
minute details more than the Anugîtâ, although the latter work does not deal
with the topic in any very summary mode. Taking all the differences between the
two works together, and the fact that the Anugîtâ sets about the discussion of
the topic in a manner which seems intended to be--not, indeed, absolutely
exhaustive, but still--very full, I am very strongly inclined to attribute the
differences. to an actual development and progress of doctrine. I will endeavour
to illustrate this view by means of a few detailed instances 1. And let us first
take the order of householders to which the Anugîtâ gives precedence over the
others. One of the injunctions laid down by the Anugîtâ is that the householder
should always be devoted to his wife. Against this simple precept, we have a
very minute series of rules prescribed by Âpastamba, which it is not necessary
to refer to specifically, but which may be seen in several of the Sûtras
contained in the first Khanda of the first Patala of the Second Prasna. Compare
again the excessive minuteness of the rules regarding the Bali-offering or the
reception of guests, as given by Âpastamba, with the simple statement of the
Anugîtâ that the five great sacrifices should be performed. There again, I
think, we are to see in this difference of treatment the result of a pretty long
course of ceremonial progress. Proceeding to the rules regarding the Brahmakârin
or student, an analogous phenomenon meets us there. Taking first the subject of
food, we have a considerable number of detailed injunctions in Âpastamba,
compared with the simple rule of the Anugîtâ, that the student should, with the
leave of his preceptor, eat his food without decrying it. Again with regard to
alms, whereas the Anugîtâ simply
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says that the student should take his food out of the alms received by him,
Âpastamba has an elaborate catena of rules as to how the alms are to be
collected, and from whom, and so forth. Take again the provisions in the two
works regarding the description of the cloth, staff, and girdle of the student.
Âpastamba refers to various opinions on this subject, of which there is not even
a trace in the Anugîtâ 1. It appears that even before Âpastamba's time,
distinctions had been laid down as to the description of girdle staff and cloth
to be used by the different castes--distinctions of which there is no hint in
the Anugîtâ, where all students, of whatever caste, are spoken of under the
generic name. These distinctions appear to me to point very strongly to that
ceremonial and doctrinal progress of which we have spoken above. The tendency is
visible in them to sever the Brâhmanas from the other castes--by external marks.
And that tendency, it seems to me, must have set in, as the merits which had
given the Brâhmana caste its original position at the head of Hindu society were
ceasing to be a living reality, and that caste was intrenching itself, so to
say, more behind the worth and work of the early founders of its greatness, than
the worth and work of their degenerating representatives. These comparisons,
taken together, appear to me to warrant the proposition we have already laid
down with regard to the priority of the Anugîtâ to Âpastamba. If we have not
referred to the rules relating to the two other orders of forester and ascetic,
it is because the scope for a comparison of those is very limited. Those rules
alone would scarcely authorise the inference drawn above; but I can perceive
nothing in them to countervail the effect of the comparisons already made. And
it must be remembered, that the rules as to foresters and ascetics would be less
apt to undergo change than chose as to students and householders.
It appears to me that the view we have now expressed may be also supported by a
comparison of the doctrines of the Anugîtâ and Âpastamba touching the duties of
Brâhmanas. According to Âpastamba, the occupations lawful
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to Brâhmanas are the famous six referred to in our Introduction to the
Bhagavadgîtâ, and two others superadded, namely, inheritance and gleaning corn
in the fields. These last are not mentioned in the Anugîtâ, or in Manu either,
and are, even according to Âpastamba, common to Brâhmanas with Kshatriyas and
Vaisyas. But as regards the six above referred to, it is worthy of note, that
the Anugîtâ apparently groups them into two distinct sets of three. The first
set of three consists of those which, in our Introduction to the Bhagavadgîtâ,
we have characterised as constituting rather the rights than the duties of
Brâhmanas, and which the Anugîtâ describes as 'means of livelihood for
Brâhmanas.' The other set of three consists of real duties, and these the
Anugîtâ speaks of as 'pious duties.' This grouping appears to me to furnish
powerful corroboration of the view put forward in our introduction to the
Bhagavadgîtâ. It would seem, that the possession of the moral and spiritual
merits which, according to the Gîtâ, constituted the duty of Brâhmanas, in the
simple and archaic society there disclosed, was developed, in a more advanced
and artificial state of society, into the performance of the 'pious duties' of
the Anugîtâ and the duties which are 'the means of livelihood.' Then in the
further social evolution, in the course of which the old spiritual view began to
be forgotten, and the actual facts of the past began to be transmuted into the
dogmatic rules of the future, the occupations of receiving presents, imparting
instruction, and officiating at sacrifices, became the special occupations of
the Brâhmanas, and the distinction between these occupations from their higher
duties was thrown into the background; and accordingly we find no allusion to
any such distinction in Âpastamba or Manu, or, as far as I know, in any other
later embodiment of the current ideas on the subject 1. If all this has been
correctly argued, the conclusion derivable from it is in entire accord with that
which we have already drawn, namely, that the Bhagavadgîtâ, the Anugîtâ, and the
Dharma-sûtra of Âpastamba, belong to different
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stages of ancient Indian history, and that the stage to which the Gîtâ belongs
is the earliest, and that to which Âpastamba belongs, the latest of such stages.
I am unable to find anything else in the way of internal evidence bearing upon
the date of the Anugîtâ. It appears to me, that the date to which the
investigation we have now gone through leads us, is one which, in the present
state of our information, may be fairly accepted as a provisional hypothesis. It
does not appear to me to conflict with any ascertained dates, while it is
pointed to as probable by the various lines of testimony which we have here
considered. We now proceed to discuss one or two other points which may have a
bearing upon this topic, but which at present cannot yield us any positive
guidance in our search for the date of the Anugîtâ. And first among these, let
us consider the various names of deities that occur in different parts of the
work. We have, then, Vishnu, Sambhu, Gishnu, Soma, Âditya, Surya, Mitra, Agni,
Kandra, Rudra, Siva, Varuna, Pragâpati, Maghavat, Purandara, Indra, Brahman,
Satakratu, Dharma, Nârâyana, Vâyu, Yama, Tvashtri, Hari, Îsvara, and lastly Umâ
under three different names, namely, Umâ, Mâhesvarî, and Pârvatî. Now, leaving
aside for the moment the three names of Umâ, which appear from the passage where
they are used to be all three the names of the same goddess, there is no doubt
that in the list above set out, some of the names are merely used in different
passages, but still to indicate the same being. Thus, Indra, Satakratu,
Purandara, and Maghavat are really the names of one and the same deity. But when
Soma is mentioned as the deity presiding over the tongue, and Kandramas as the
deity presiding over the mind, it becomes doubtful whether the two names do
really indicate the same deity, albeit in later Sanskrit Soma and Kandramas both
signify the moon. Similarly, when Arka is said to be the deity presiding over
the eye, and Mitra over another organ, it seems open to question whether Arka
and Mitra both signify the sun there, as they undoubtedly do in classical
Sanskrit. True it is, that even in such a recent work as the Sânkhya-sâra, this
mention
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of Arka and Mitra as presiding deities of two several organs does occur. But it
is plain, that that circumstance can have, no bearing on the inquiry before its,
for the Sânkhya-sâra is avowedly a compilation based on older authorities, and
in the particular part under consideration, really reproduces a passage from
some older work. It cannot, therefore, be argued, that because Arka and Mitra
were identified with one another at the time of the Sânkhya-sâra, and yet are
mentioned as deities of two separate organs, therefore, they must have also been
regarded as one in the older original work where they are also mentioned as
deities of two separate organs. And it may, perhaps, be remarked here in
passing, that the Vedânta Paribhâshâ has Mrityu instead of Mitra, which would
get rid of the difficulty here altogether; while as regards Soma and Kandramas,
the passage in the Sânkhya-sâra reads Praketas instead of Soma, which would get
rid of the other difficulty above pointed out. Whether these discrepancies are
owing to any tampering with the lists of organs and deities, at a time when the
later identifications between different deities took place, or whether they are
to be explained on some other theory, it is impossible at present to say. And,
therefore, it is also unnecessary to pursue the inquiry here any further. It
must suffice for the present to have drawn attention to the matter.
Akin to this point, though quite distinct from it, is one which arises on a
passage where the emancipated being is identified with Vishnu, Mitra, Agni,
Varuna, and Pragâpati 1. Now it is reasonable to suppose, that the deities thus
specified here must have been among those held in highest repute at the time,
the whole significance of the passage where they are mentioned requiring that
that should be so. But in our Pantheon as disclosed by our later literature,
Mitra and Agni and Varuna occupy but a very subordinate position. Even in
Kâlidâsa 2, the subordination of these deities to our celebrated Trinity seems
to be quite
p. 221
fully established. But, on the other hand, in the Vedic theogony they are among
the most prominent deities. In the Taittirîya-upanishad, we have in the very
first sentence Mitra, Varuna, Vishnu, and Brahman (who may be identified with
Pragâpati) all mentioned together, and their blessings invoked. This does not
help in fixing a date for the Anugîtâ; but it lends some support to the
conclusion already arrived at on that point, by showing that the theogony of the
Anugîtâ is not yet very far removed from the theogony of the Vedic times, while
it is separated by a considerable interval from the theogony disclosed in the
works of even such an early writer of the classical period' as Kâlidâsa.
Another point of similar bearing on our present investigation is the mode in
which the story of Parasurâma is dealt with in the Anugîtâ. There is in the
first place no allusion to his being an incarnation of Vishnu, nor to the
encounter between him and his namesake, the son of Dasaratha and the hero of the
Râmâyana. We have, on the contrary, an explicit statement, that after the advice
of the 'Pitris' he entirely abandons the slaughter of the Kshatriyas, and
resorting to penance thereby achieves final emancipation. We have elsewhere
argued 1, that the theory of Parasurâma being an incarnation of Vishnu, must
have probably originated prior to the time of Bhartrihari, but later than the
time of Kâlidâsa. The allusion to Parasurâma in the work before us does not,
however, enable us to judge of its chronological position with reference to
Kâlidâsa. But the last point discussed renders it unnecessary to consider this
question further. It may be noted, by the way, that the Anugîtâ represents
Parasurâma, although living in the Âsrama or hermitage of his father, who was a
Rishi, as mounting a chariot for the purpose of sweeping away the kinsmen of
Kârtavîrya. Whence he obtained a chariot in a hermitage, the Anugîtâ does not
explain.
In connexion with the episode of Parasurâma, may be noted the list which occurs
in the course of it, of the
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degraded Kshatriya tribes, of Dravidas, Sabaras, &c. I am unable to see that
those names can give us any further help in our present investigation than in so
far as they show that, at the time of the Anugîtâ, there must have been some
information about the south of India available in the districts where the author
of the Anugîtâ lived. Some of the tribes mentioned appear to have been located
far in the south of the Indian peninsula. But this is a point on which we shall
have to say something more in discussing, the next item of internal evidence to
which we shall refer. Here it is enough to point out that some of the tribes
mentioned in the Anugîtâ are also referred to in no less a work than the
Aitareya-brâhmana 1.
We come next to the enumeration of the principal mountains which is contained in
one passage of the Anugîtâ. Those mountains are the Himâlaya, the Pâriyâtra, the
Sahya, the Vindhya, the. Trikûtavat, the Sveta, the Nîla, the Bhâsa, the
Koshthavat, the Mahendra, the Mâlyavat, and perhaps the Guruskandha. I am not
sure whether the last name is intended to be taken as a proper name, or only as
an epithet of Mahendra. Now compared with the mountains mentioned in the
Bhagavadgîtâ, this is certainly a remarkable list. The Gîtâ mentions only Meru 2
and Himâlaya; while here we have in the Anugîtâ the Sahya,. and Malaya, and
Trikûtavat, and Nîla (the same, I presume, with the modem Nîlgiri, the
Sanatarium of the Madras Presidency), which take us far to the west and south of
the Indian peninsula; and the Mahendra and Mâlyavat, which, coupled with the
mention of the river Ganges, cover a considerable part of the eastern districts.
The Pariyâtra and Vindhya occupy the regions of Central India. The Anugîtâ,
therefore, seems to belong to that period in the history of India, when pretty
nearly the whole,
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if not absolutely the whole, of the Indian continent was known to the
Sanskrit-speaking population of the country. When was this knowledge reached? It
is difficult to fix the precise period; and even if it could be fixed, it would
not help us to fix satisfactorily any point of time to which the Anugîtâ could
be attributed. But it may be pointed out here, that in Patañgali's Mahâbhâshya
we have evidence of such knowledge having been possessed by the Âryas in the
second century B.C. In truth, the evidence available in the Mahâbhâshya is even
fuller than this in the Anugîtâ. For Patañgali tells us of a town or city in the
south named Kâñkipura 1; he speaks of the dominions of the Pândya kings, and of
the Kola and Kerala districts 2; he refers also to the large tanks of the south;
and he makes allusions to linguistic usages current in the southern and other
provinces 3. Before Patañgali's time there had taken place Mahendra's invasion
of Ceylon, and the invading army must have penetrated through the southern
provinces. And there had been also put up the great Inscriptions of Asoka, which
have attracted so much interest, and are proving such prolific sources of
information in various departments of knowledge. One of these inscriptions was
at Gañgam, which is not very far from the Mahendra mountain alluded to in the
Anugîtâ 4. All these facts support the conclusion drawn by General Cunningham
from the correctness of the information given to Alexander the Great by the
Hindus of his time, namely, that 'the Indians, even at that early date in their
history, had a very accurate knowledge of the form and extent of their native
land 5.' And not only do they support that conclusion, they show that the
knowledge covered other facts regarding
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their native land than its form and extent. It follows consequently that this
enumeration of mountains does not require the date of the Anugîtâ to be brought
down to a later period than the fourth century B.C., and leaves it open to us,
therefore, to accept whatever conclusion the other evidence available may seem
to justify. On the other hand, it is plain also, that it affords no positive
information as to when the Anugîtâ was composed, and therefore we need not dwell
any further upon the point on the present occasion.
There are a few other points which arise upon the contents of the Anugîtâ, but
which are not, in the present condition of our knowledge, capable of affording
any certain guidance in our present investigation. Thus we have the story of
Dharma appearing before king Ganaka disguised as a Brâhmana. I am not aware of
any case of such disguises occurring in any of the Upanishads, although there
are numerous parallel instances throughout the Purânik literature 1. It is,
however, difficult to draw any definite chronological inference from this fact.
There is further the reference to the attack of Râhu on the sun. It is
difficult, in the present state of our knowledge, to say for certain, when the
theory of eclipses there implied was prevalent. In the Khândogya-upanishad 2 we
have the emancipated self compared to the moon escaped from the mouth of Râhu.
And a text of the Rig-veda, quoted by Mr. Yagñesvara Sâstrin in his
Âryavidyâsudhâkara 3, speaks of the demon Râhu attacking the sun with darkness.
Here again we have another matter of some interest; but I cannot see that any
safe deduction can be derived from it, without a more ample knowledge of other
relevant matters than is at present accessible. Take again the references to
certain practices which look very much like the practices of the Gainas of the
present day. Is the Anugîtâ, then, earlier or later than the rise of the Gaina
system? It is not safe, I think, to found an answer to this question upon the
very narrow basis afforded by the
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passage referred to. But it may be observed, that the precepts laid down in the
passage in question are laid down as precepts for orthodox Hindus, and not as
the doctrines of a heretical sect. They are also very general, and not so minute
as those which the Gainas of the present day observe as binding upon them. If,
therefore, any conclusion is to be drawn from these precepts, it must be that
the Anugîtâ must have been composed prior to the rise of Gainism; and that
Gainism must have appropriated and developed this doctrine which it obtained
from the current Brâhmanism 1. If this is so, the Anugîtâ must be a very ancient
work indeed. It is not, however, necessary to further work out this line of
argument, having regard to the opinions recently expressed by Mr. Thomas 2,
rehabilitating the views enunciated long ago by Colebrooke and others. If those
views are correct, and if Gainism was a dominant system in this country prior
even to the time of Gautama Buddha, and if, further, we are right in the
suggestion--for it is no more it must be remembered--that the Anugîtâ dates from
a period prior to the rise of Gainism, then it would seem to follow that the
Anugîtâ belongs to some period prior to the sixth century B.C. All this,
however, is at present very hypothetical, and we draw attention to it only that
the question may be hereafter considered when fuller materials for adjudicating
upon it become accessible. Meanwhile, having regard to the views above alluded
to as so elaborately put forward by Mr. Thomas, it is possible for us still to
hold that, in the present state of our knowledge, the third or fourth century
B.C. is not too early a date to, assign to the Anugîtâ, even on the assumption
that the precepts contained in that work regarding the care to be taken of worms
and insects were borrowed by it from the Gaina system. With this negative
result, we must for the present rest contented.
One other fact of similar nature to those we have now
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dealt with may, perhaps, be also noticed here. We allude to the stanzas which we
find in the Anugîtâ and also in the Sânti Parvan of the Mahâbhârata and in the
Manusmriti. There is also one which the Anugîtâ has in common with the
Parisishta of Yâska's Nirukta 1. It is not possible, I conceive, to say finally
whether one of these works borrowed these stanzas from the other of them; while,
on the other hand, it is quite possible, as already argued by us in the
Introduction to the Gîtâ, that all these works were only reproducing from some
entirely different work, or that the stanzas in question were the common
property of the thinkers of the time. We have no means available for deciding
between these conflicting hypotheses.
We have thus noticed all the salient points in the evidence, external and
internal, which is available for determining the position of the Anugîtâ in our
ancient literature. Nobody who has seen even a little of the history of that
literature will be surprised at the quantity or quality of that evidence, or the
nature of the conclusions legitimately yielded by it. We have endeavoured to
express those conclusions in language which should not indicate any greater
certainty as attaching to them than can fairly be claimed for them. The net
result appears to be this. The Anugîtâ may be taken with historical certainty to
have been some centuries old in the time of the great Sankarâkârya. It was very
probably older than the Dharma-sûtras of Âpastamba, but by what period of time
we are not in a position at present to define. It was, perhaps, older also than
the rise of Buddhism and Gainism, and of the Yoga philosophy; but on this it is
impossible to say anything with any approach to confidence. It is, on the other
hand, almost certain that it belongs to a period very considerably removed from
the older Upanishads.; probably removed by a distance of some centuries, during
which 'stories' not contained in the Upanishads had not only obtained currency,
but also come to be regarded as belonging to antiquity 2. And yet the period to
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which the work belongs was one in which the Upanishads were only reverenced as
the authoritative opinions of eminent men, not as the words of God himself 1. In
this respect, it may be said that the Anugîtâ seems rather to belong to an
earlier stratum of thought than even the Sanatsugâtîya, in which a Gñânakânda,
as forming a part of the Vedic canon, seems to be recognised 2. But it is
abundantly clear, that the Anugîtâ stands, at a very considerable chronological
distance from the Bhagavadgîtâ.
Such are the results of our investigation. We have not thought it necessary to
discuss the verse or the language of the work. But it must in fairness be
pointed out, that upon the whole, the verse and language are both pretty near
the classical model. There are, it is true, a few instances of the metrical
anomalies we have noticed elsewhere, but having regard to the extent of the
work, those instances are far from being very numerous. The language and style,
too, are not quite smooth and polished; though, judging from them alone, I
should rather be inclined to place the Sanatsugâtîya prior to the Anugîtâ. But
that suggests a question which we cannot now stop to discuss.
One word, in conclusion, about the translation. The text used has been chiefly
that adopted in the commentary of Arguna Misra, a commentary which on the whole
I prefer very much to that of Nîlakantha, which has been printed in the Bombay
edition of the Mahâbhârata. Arguna Misra, as a rule, affords some explanation
where explanation is wanted, and does not endeavour to suit his text to any
foregone conclusion. His comments have been of the greatest possible help to me;
and my only regret is that the only copy of his commentary which was available
to me, and the use of which I owe to the kindness of my friend Professor
Bhândârkar, was not as correct a one as could be desired. I have also looked
into the Vishamaslokî, a short work containing notes on difficult passages of
the Mahâbhârata.
p. 228
The MS. of it belonging to the Government Collection of MSS. deposited in Deccan
College was lent me also by Professor Bhândârkar. The principles adopted in the
translation and notes have been the same as those followed in the other pieces
contained in this volume.
P. S. I take this opportunity of stating that it is not at all certain that
Arguna Misra is the name of the author of the commentary which I have used. I
find that in supposing Arguna Misra to be the author, I confounded that
commentary, which does not mention its author's name, with the commentary on
another section of the Mahâbhârata which does give its author's name as Arguna
Misra, and which is also among the MSS. purchased by Professor Bhândârkar for
the Government of Bombay. (See with regard to these MSS. Professor Bhândârkar's
recently published Report on the search for Sanskrit MSS. Of 7th July, 1880.)
p. 229
Footnotes
201:1 In the beginning of his gloss on the Anugîtâ he says, that it proposes to
explain difficult passages in the Anugîtâ, &c.--Anugâtâdishu. And at the outset
of his gloss on the whole Parvan he says, that in the Anugîtâ we have a
statement of the miseries of birth, &c. as a protest against worldly life; in
the Brahma Gîtâ we have a recommendation of Prânâyâma, &c.; and in the
Gurusishyasamvâda we have a eulogium on the perception of the self as distinct
from Prakriti or nature, and incidentally a protest against Pravritti or action.
201:2 p. 21.
202:1 Pp. 15, 21. The latter corresponds to Sankara's quotation above referred
to.
202:2 See p. 206 note.
203:1 P. 739, and cf. p. 176 with Vishnu XXX, 44 seq.
203:2 See II, 120.
204:1 See Preface, Sânkhya-sâra, p. 37.
204:2 P. 234.
205:1 In fact the Brâhmana is not identified with the Supreme Being afterwards.
But that fact has not much bearing on the question here.
205:2 Cf. Wilson's Dasakumârakarita, Introd. p. 22.
205:3 The third alternative, that a work independently written was afterwards
bodily thrown into the Mahâbhârata, is one which in the circumstances here seems
to me improbable.
205:4 See also pp. 235, 252, 299.
206:1 See Sankara, Sârîraka Bhâshya, p. 726. That, however, may be a quotation
from some other work, It may be noted that the passages quoted in the Bhâshya on
Sanatsugâtîya I, 20 and I, 41 are not to be traced in our copies, though
expressly stated there to have been taken from the Anugîtâ.
207:1 Cf. Sârîraka Bhâshya, p. 913.
208:1 Cf. Lalita Vistara, p. 17.
208:2 See pp. 325-365.
208:3 See Gîtâ, p. 126.
208:4 See Brihadâranyaka, p. 454, and Kaushîtaki, p. 68.
208:5 See Bühler's Âpastamba I, 1, 3, ix, Gautama II. 13, and Manu II, 179.
208:6 p. 21 seq.
208:7 p. 329.
209:1 p. 24 supra.
209:2 See note at p. 353.
211:1 This seems to be also the implication of the passage at p. 309, where the
rules for final emancipation are alluded to.
212:1 They are also referred to in the Buddhistic Lalita Vistara, p. 65.
213:1 See Gautama, pp. lv and 191.
213:2 See also the gloss on chap. XXXIV, st. 14.
216:1 Cf. pp. 358. 360 infra with Âpastamba, pp. 9 seq., 103 seq., 114 seq.
217:1 Cf. also Bühler's Gautama, p. 175.
218:1 In Gautama X, 1-3, the 'pious duties' are called 'obligatory,' the others
'additional for Brâhmanas.' See the note on the passage in Bühler's edition, and
c.f. Gautama VIII, 9, 10.
220:1 See p. 345.
220:2 See inter alia, Kumâra II, 20 seq., and VII, 44 seq., and cf. our
Bhartrihâri (Bombay Sanskrit Classics), Introd. p. xix.
221:1 See 'Was the Râmâyana copied from Homer?' pp. 56, 51.
222:1 Haug's ed., p. 183. And see generally on these tribes, Wilson's Vishnu
Purâna (Hall's ed.), vol. ii, p. 170 seq., and Sânti Parvan (Moksha), chap. 207,
st. 42.
222:2 This is also mentioned in the Anugîtâ, but in a different passage. The
Nîla is said by Professor Wilson to be a mountain in Orissa. But our suggestion
has, I find, been already made by Dr. F. E. Hall also; see on this, and
generally, Wilson's Vishnu Palrâna, vol. ii, p.141 seq. (ed. Hall). See also
Indian Antiquary, VI, 133 seq.
223:1 Banâras ed., p. 74 (IV, 2, 2).
223:2 p. 60 (IV, I, 4). See also p. 65.
223:3 See Mahâbhâshya, p. 82 (I, 1, 5), p. 16 (I, 1, 1); and cf. Muir, Sanskrit
Texts, Vol. ii, pp. 152, 355.
223:4 See Cunningham's Corpus Inscriptionum, I, p. 1.
223:5 See Ancient Geography of India, p. 3. And compare also the information
collected in the Periplus of the Eurythryæan Sea (translated by Mr. McRindle),
pp. 112-136, where a large number of ports is mentioned as existing on the
Indian coasts. The Periplus seems to date from about 90 A. D. (see ibid. p. 5).
224:1 And see, too, Kâlidâsa Kumâra V, st. 84.
224:2 p. 622.
224:3 p. 26. In Kâlidâsa's Raghuvamsa the true explanation of eclipses is
alluded to. See Canto XIV, 40.
225:1 As the Buddhists did in sundry instances, Cf. inter alia Bühler's Gautama,
pp. lv and 191. And cf. also 'Was the Râmâyana copied from Homer?' pp. 48,49.
225:2 See Mr. Thomas's very elaborate discussion of the whole subject in the
journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (New Series), vol. ix, p. 156 seq.
226:1 Cf.. Anugîtâ I, 36 with Yâska (ed. Roth), p. 190.
226:2 Some of the Purâtana. Itihâsas, e. g. that of Nârada and Devamata, are not
traceable in any Vedic work known to us. Devamata's name I do not find referred
to anywhere else.
227:1 See p. 211 supra.
227:2 See p. 146 supra. The Buddhists seem to have borrowed the division of
Karma and Gñânakhândas. See Dr. Ragendralâla Mitra's Lalita Vistara (transl.),
p. 21. The division, therefore. was probably older than the first century B.C.
*****************
ANUGÎTA.
CHAPTER I.
Ganamegaya 1 said:
What conversation, O twice-born one 2 I took place between the high-souled
Kesava and Arguna, while they dwelt in that palace 3 after slaying their
enemies?
Vaisampâyana said:
The son of Prithâ, after becoming possessed of his kingdom (in an) undisturbed
(state), enjoyed himself in the company of Krishna, full of delight in that
heavenly palace. And once, O king! they happened to go, surrounded by their
people, and rejoicing, to a certain portion of the palace which resembled
heaven. Then Arguna, the son of Pându, having surveyed with delight that lovely
palace, in the company of Krishna, spoke these words: 'O you of mighty arms! O
you whose mother is Devakî 4! when the battle was about to commence, I became
aware of your greatness, and that divine
p. 230
form of yours 1. But that, O Kesava! which through affection (for me) you
explained before 2, has all disappeared, O tiger-like man! from my degenerate
mind. Again and again, however, I feel a curiosity about those topics. But
(now), O Mâdhava! you will be going at no distant date to Dvârakâ.
Vaisampâyana said
Thus addressed, that best of speakers, Krishna, possessed of great glory,
replied in these words after embracing Arguna.
Vâsudeva said:
From me, O son of Prithâ! you heard a mystery, and learnt about the eternal 3
(principle), about piety in (its true) form, and about all the everlasting
worlds 4. It is excessively disagreeable to me, that you should not have grasped
it through want of intelligence. And the recollection (of it) now again is not
possible (to me). Really, O son of Pându! you are devoid of faith and of a bad
intellect. And, O Dhanañgaya! it is not possible for me to repeat in full (what
I said before). For that doctrine was perfectly adequate for understanding the
seat, 5 of the Brahman. It is not possible for me to state it again in full in
that way. For then accompanied by my mystic power 6, I declared to you the
Supreme Brahman. But I shall relate an ancient story upon
p. 231
that subject, so that adhering to this knowledge, you may attain the highest
goal. O best of the supporters of piety! listen to all that I say. (Once), O
restrainer of foes! there came from the heavenly world and the world of Brahman
1, a Brâhmana difficult to withstand 2, and he was (duly) honoured by us. (Now)
listen, without entertaining any misgivings, O chief of the descendants of
Bharata! O son of Prithâ! to what he said on being interrogated by us according
to heavenly rules 3.
The Brâhmana said:
O Krishna! O destroyer of Madhu! I will explain to you accurately what you, out
of compassion for (all) beings 4, have asked me touching the duties (to be
Performed) for final emancipation. It is destructive of delusion, O Lord! Listen
to me with attention 5, as I relate it, O Mâdhava! A certain Brâhmana named
Kâsyapa, who had performed (much) penance, and who best understood piety,
approached a certain twice-born. (person) who had learnt the Scriptures relating
to (all) duties 6, having heard (of him, as one) who had over and over again
gone through all knowledge and experience about coming and going 7, who was well
versed in the true nature of all worlds 8,
p. 232
who knew about happiness and misery 1, who knew the truth about birth and death
2, who was conversant with merit and sin, who perceived the migrations of
embodied (souls) of high and low (degrees) in consequence of (their) actions,
who moved about like an emancipated being, who had reached perfection 3, who was
tranquil, whose senses were restrained, who was illumined with the Brahmic
splendour 4, who moved about in every direction, who understood concealed
movements 5, who was going in company of invisible Siddhas and celestial singers
6, and conversing and sitting together (with them) in secluded (places), who
went about as he pleased, and was unattached (anywhere) like the wind. Having
approached him, that talented ascetic possessed of concentration (of mind), that
best of the twice-born, wishing to acquire piety, fell at his feet, after seeing
that great marvel. And amazed on seeing that marvellous man, the best of the
twice-born, Kâsyapa, pleased the preceptor by his great devotion. That was all
appropriate 7, (being) joined to sacred learning and correct conduct. And, O
terror of your foes! he pleased that (being) by (his purity of) heart and
behaviour (suitable) towards a preceptor 8. Then being satisfied and pleased, he
spoke to the pupil these words, referring to the
p. 233
highest perfection: Hear (them) from me, O Ganârdana!
The Siddha said:
Mortals, O dear friend 1! by their actions which are (of) mixed (character), or
which are meritorious and pure, attain to this world as the goal, or to
residence in the world of the gods 2. Nowhere is there everlasting happiness;
nowhere eternal residence 3. Over and over again is there a downfall from a high
position attained with difficulty. Overcome by lust and anger, and deluded by
desire, I fell into uncomfortable and harassing states (of life), in-consequence
of (my) committing sin. Again and again death, and again and again birth 4. I
ate numerous (kinds of) food, sucked at various breasts, saw various mothers,
and fathers of different sorts; and, O sinless one! (I saw) strange pleasures
and miseries. Frequently (I suffered) separation from those I loved, association
with those I did not love. Loss of wealth also came on me, after I had acquired
that wealth with difficulty; ignominies full of affliction from princes and
likewise from kinsmen; excessively poignant pain, mental and bodily. I also
underwent frightful indignities, and fierce deaths and captivities; (I had a)
fall into hell, and torments in the house of Yama 5. I also suffered much from
old age, continual ailments, and numerous misfortunes flowing from the pairs of
opposites 6. Then on one occasion, being much afflicted with misery, I abandoned
the whole
p. 234
course of worldly life, through indifference (to worldly objects), al, taking
refuge with the formless (principle) 1. Having learnt about this path in this
world, I exercised myself (in it), and hence, through favour of the self 2, have
I acquired this perfection 3. I shall not come here again 4; I am surveying the
worlds, and the happy migrations 5 of (my) self from the creation of beings to
(my attaining) perfection. Thus, O best of the twice-born! have I obtained this
highest perfection. From here I go to the next 6 (world), and from there again
to the still higher (world)--the imperceptible seat of the Brahman. Have no
doubt on that, O terror of your foes 7! I shall not come back to this mortal
world. I am pleased with you, O you of great intelligence! Say, what can I do
for you? The time is now come for that which you desired in coming to me. I know
for what you have come to me. But I shall be going away in a short time, hence
have I given
p. 235
this hint to you. I am exceedingly pleased, O clever one! with your good
conduct. Put (your) questions without uneasiness, I will tell (you) whatever you
desire. I highly esteem your intelligence, and greatly respect it, inasmuch as
you have made me out 1; for, O Kâsyapa! you are (a) talented (man).
Footnotes
229:1 This is the prince to whom the Mahâbhârata, as we have it, purports to
have been related.
229:2 I. e. Vaisampâyana, who relates the Mahâbhârata to Ganamegaya.
229:3 This appears to have been situated at Indraprastha, and to have been the
one built for the Pândavas by the demon Maya, as related in the Sabhâ Parvan.
229:4 This is a rather unusual form of address.
230:1 Cf. Bhagavadgîtâ, chapters X and XI passim.
230:2 I. e. in the Bhagavadgîtâ.
230:3 This may also be taken with piety thus: 'and learnt about the eternal
piety in (its true) form.'
230:4 As to the plural, see Sankara on Mundaka, p. 320.
230:5 Cf. Gîtâ, p. 78. For 'understanding' here we might, perhaps, substitute
'attaining.' The original word means both understanding and attaining.
230:6 Cf. Gîtâ, p. 182.
231:1 This seems to mean not the Supreme Brahman, but the Creator.
231:2 Cf. Sanatsugâtîya, p. 161, 'not to be shaken.'
231:3 I suppose this to mean according to the forms proper in the case of such a
being as the one in question. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 62, and note there.
231:4 This is not easy to understand. Perhaps the allusion is to the doctrine at
Gîtâ, pp. 54, 55.
231:5 Cf. Brihadâranyaka, p. 447.
231:6 I. e. all prescribed acts of piety.
231:7 As to knowledge and experience, cf. Gîtâ, p. 57; and as to coming and
going, cf. ibid. p. 84.
231:8 I. e. as stated, for instance, at Gîtâ, p. 79, Brihadâranyaka, p. 613.
232:1 Cf. infra, p. 245.
232:2 Cf. Gîtâ, pp. 48, 103.
232:3 Cf. Gîtâ, passim.
232:4 Cf. Sanatsugâtîya, p. 162.
232:5 I. e. moving about so as not to be seen by everybody.
232:6 Literally, 'holders of wheels,' which Arguna Misra interprets to mean
'Kâranas.' At Sânti Parvan (Moksha Dharma) CCXLIV, 26 Nîlakantha renders
Kakradhara by Kakravartin or Emperor.
232:7 I. e. as Kâsyapa was possessed of Vedic lore, and behaved as he ought to
behave in his capacity of pupil, it was natural that the other should be
pleased.
232:8 See p. 176 seq. supra.
233:1 The same word as at Gîtâ, p. 72.
233:2 Cf. Khândogya-upanishad, pp. 356-359, and Gîtâ, p. 84.
233:3 See Gîtâ, p. 76, and cf. Katha, p. 90.
233:4 For the whole of this passage, c.f.; Maitrî-upanishad, p. 8.
233:5 See Manu VI, 61.
233:6 See Gîtâ, p. 48.
234:1 Taking refuge, says Nîlakantha, in the belief of my being identical with
the Brahman, which is to be comprehended by means of the profound contemplation
called Asampragñâta Samâdhi.
234:2 I. e., says Nîlakantha, the mind, and he cites Maitrî, p. 179. Cf. Katha,
p. 108. The rendering at p. 192 supra will also suit (through the self becoming
placid). This placidity is defined at Sânti Parvan (Moksha Dharma) CCXLVII, 11,
with which cf. Gîtâ, p. 69. See Gîtâ, p. 51.
234:3 As above described.
234:4 Cf. Khândogya, p. 628; see also ibid. p. 282.
234:5 He calls them happy because they have ended happily, I presume. 'Surveying
the worlds' Nîlakantha takes to be an index of omniscience. Cf. Sanatsugâtîya,
p. 174. See also Yoga-sûtras III, 25, and commentary there.
234:6 I. e. the world of Brahman, or the Satyaloka; and the next step is
assimilation into the Brahman.
234:7 So read all the copies I have seen, though Kâsyapa is the person
addressed.
235:1 This was difficult, as the Siddha possessed extraordinary powers, such as
that of concealed movement, &c.
******************
CHAPTER II.
Vâsudeva 2 said
Then grasping his feet, Kâsyapa, asked questions very difficult to explain, and
all of them that (being), the best of the supporters of piety, did explain.
Kâsyapa, said:
How does the body perish, and how, too, is it produced? How does one who moves
in this harassing course of worldly life become freed? And (how) does the self,
getting rid of nature, abandon the body (produced) from it 3? And how, being
freed from the body, does he attain to the other 4? How does this man enjoy the
good and evil acts done by himself? And where do the acts of one who is released
from the body remain?
The Brâhmana said:
Thus addressed, O descendant of Vrishni! that Siddha answered these questions in
order. Hear me relate what (he said).
p. 236
The Siddha said:
When those actions, productive of long life and fame 1, which a man performs
here, are entirely exhausted, after his assumption of another body, he performs
(actions of an) opposite character, his self being overcome at the exhaustion of
life 2. And his ruin being impending, his understanding goes astray. Not knowing
his own constitution, 3, and strength, and likewise the (proper) season, the man
not being self-controlled, does unseasonably what is injurious to himself When
he attaches himself to numerous very harassing (actions); eats too much 4, or
does not eat at all; when he takes bad food, or meat 5, or drinks, or (kinds of
food) incompatible with one another, or heavy food in immoderate quantities, or
without (previously taken food) being properly digested; or takes too much
exercise, or is incontinent; or constantly, through attachment to action, checks
the regular course (of the excretions 6); or takes juicy food 7; or sleeps by
day 8; or (takes food) not thoroughly prepared; (such a man) himself aggravates
the disorders
p. 237
orders (in the body) when the time comes 1. By aggravating the disorders (in)
his own (body), he contracts a disease which ends in death, or he even engages
in unreasonable (acts), such as hanging 2 (oneself). From these causes, the
living 3 body of that creature then perishes. Learn about that correctly as I am
about to state it. Heat being kindled in the body, and being urged by a sharp
wind 4, pervades the whole frame, and, verily, checks the (movements of all the)
life-winds. Know this truly, that excessively powerful heat, if kindled in the
body, bursts open the vital parts-the seats of the Soul 5. Then the soul, full
of torments, forthwith falls away from the perishable (body). Know, O best of
the twice-born! that (every) creature leaves the body, when the vital parts are
burst open, its self being overcome with torments. All beings are constantly
distracted with birth and death; and, O chief of the twice-born! are seen
abandoning (their) bodies; or entering the womb on the exhaustion of (their
previous) actions 6. Again, a man suffers similar torments, having his joints
broken and suffering from
p. 238
cold, in consequence of water 1. As the compact association of the five elements
is broken up, the wind in the body, distributed within the five elements 2,
between the upward and downward life-winds, being aggravated by cold, and urged
by a sharp wind 3, goes upwards 4, abandoning the embodied (self) in consequence
of pain. Thus it 5 leaves the body, which appears devoid of breath. Then devoid
of warmth, devoid of breath, devoid of beauty, and with consciousness destroyed,
the man, being abandoned by the Brahman 6, is said to be dead. (Then) he ceases
to perceive (anything) with those very currents 7 with which the supporter of
the body 8 perceives objects of sense. In the same way, it is the eternal soul
which preserves in the body the life-winds which are produced from food 9.
Whatever (part of the body) is employed in the collection 10 of that, know
p. 239
that to be a vital part, for thus it is seen (laid down) in the Scriptures.
Those vital parts being wounded, that (wind) directly comes out therefrom, and
entering the bosom of a creature obstructs the heart 1. Then the possessor of
consciousness knows nothing 2. Having his knowledge enveloped by darkness 3,
while the vitals are still enveloped, the soul 4, being without a fixed seat, is
shaken about by the wind. And then he heaves a very deep and alarming gasp, and
makes the unconscious body quiver as he goes out (of it). That soul, dropping
out of the body, is surrounded on both sides by his own actions 5, his own pure
and meritorious, as also his sinful (ones). Brâhmanas, possessed of knowledge,
whose convictions are correctly (formed) from sacred learning, know him by (his)
marks as one who has performed meritorious actions or the reverse. As those who
have eyes see a glow-worm disappear here and there in darkness, so likewise do
those who have eyes of knowledge. Such a soul, the Siddhas see with a divine
eye, departing (from the body), or coming to the birth, or entering into a womb
6. Its three descriptions 7 of seats are here learnt from the Scriptures. This
world is the world of actions 8, where
p. 240
creatures dwell. All embodied (selfs), having here performed good or evil
(actions), obtain (the fruit). It is here they obtain higher or lower enjoyments
by their own actions. And it is those whose actions here are evil, who by their
actions go to, hell. Harassing is that lower place where men are tormented.
Freedom from it is very difficult, and the self should be specially protected
from it. Learn from me now the seats in which creatures going up 1 dwell, and
which I shall describe truly. Hearing this, you will learn the highest
knowledge, and decision regarding action 2. All (the worlds in) the forms of
stars, and this lunar sphere 3, and also this solar sphere which shines in the
world by its own lustre, know these to be the seats of men who perform
meritorious actions. All these, verily, fall down again and again in consequence
of the exhaustion of their actions 4 . And there, too, in heaven, there are
differences of low, high, and middling, 5. Nor, even there, is there
satisfaction, (even) after a sight of most magnificent splendour. Thus have I
stated to you these seats distinctly. I will after this (proceed to) state to
you the production of the fœtus 6. And, O twice-born one! hear that attentively
from me as I state it.
p. 241
Footnotes
235:2 Sic in MSS.
235:3 Cf. as to getting rid of nature, Gîtâ, pp. 75-106. As to the body produced
from nature, cf. ibid. p. 112, and pp. 317-318 infra.
235:4 I. e. the Brahman, says Nîlakantha.
236:1 One reading omits 'fame,' as to which cf. Taittirîya-upanishad, p. 129;
Khândogya, pp. 122-227. As to long life, cf. Khândogya, p. 272; exhausted, i.e.
by enjoyment of fruit in another world.
236:2 Cf. Sârîraka Bhâshya, p. 753 seq., where we have a slightly different
view.
236:3 Arguna Misra renders the original, sattva, by svabhâva.
236:4 Cf. for all this, Gîtâ, pp. 62, 69, 118, which passages, however, are from
a slightly different point of view. See also Khândogya, p. 526.
236:5 A various reading here excludes meat. But cf. Âpastamba I, 1, 2, 23;
Gautama II, 13.
236:6 So says Nîlakantha.
236:7 I. e. which turns to juice in digestion, much juice being a cause of
indigestion, say the commentators.
236:8 This is doubtful. The sense may be, 'who takes juicy or not thoroughly
prepared food by day and night.' But see Âsvalâyana Grihya-sûtra, p. 90;
Âpastamba I, 1, 2, 24; Gautama II, 13.
237:1 The time of destruction, says Arguna Misra.
237:2 Which, say the commentators, leads to death, even without any disease | |
