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THE
OLYNTHIACS
AND THE
PHILIPPICS
OF
DEMOSTHENES
_Literally Translated, with Notes_
BY
CHARLES RANN KENNEDY
THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
* * * * *
THE FIRST OLYNTHIAC.
THE ARGUMENT.
Olynthus was a city in Macedonia, at the head of the Toronaic
gulf, and north of the peninsula of Pallene. It was colonized
by a people from Chalcis in Euboea, and commanded a large
district called Chalcidice, in which there were thirty-two
cities. Over all this tract the sway of Olynthus was
considerable, and she had waged wars anciently with Athens
and Sparta, and been formidable to Philip's predecessors on
the throne of Macedon. Soon after Philip's accession, the
Olynthians had disputes with him, which were at first
accommodated, and he gratified them by the cession of
Anthemus. They then joined him in a war against Athens, and
he gave up to them Potidaea, which had yielded to their
united arms. After the lapse of some years, during which
Philip had greatly increased his power, and acquired
considerable influence in Thessaly and Thrace, the Olynthians
became alarmed, and began to think him too dangerous a
neighbor. The immediate cause of rupture was an attack which
he made on one of the Chalcidian towns. An embassy was
instantly sent to Athens, to negotiate an alliance. Philip,
considering this as an infraction of their treaty with him,
declared war against them, and invaded their territory. A
second embassy was sent to Athens, pressing for assistance.
The question was debated in the popular assembly. Demades,
an orator of considerable ability, but profligate character,
opposed the alliance. Many speakers were heard; and at
length Demosthenes rose to support the prayer of the embassy,
delivering one of those clear and forcible speeches, which
seldom failed to make a strong impression on his audience.
The alliance was accepted, and succors voted.
The orator here delicately touches on the law of Eubulus,
which had made it capital to propose that the Theoric fund
should be applied to military service. This fund was in fact
the surplus revenue of the civil administration, which by the
ancient law was appropriated to the defense of the
commonwealth; but it had by various means been diverted from
that purpose, and expended in largesses to the people, to
enable them to attend the theatre, and other public shows and
amusements. The law of Eubulus perpetuated this abuse. (See my
article _Theorica_ in the Archaeological Dictionary.)
Demosthenes, seeing the necessity of a war supply, hints that
this absurd law ought to be abolished, but does not openly
propose it.
There has been much difference of opinion among the learned
as to the order of the three Olynthiac orations; nor is it
certain, whether they were spoken on the occasion of one
embassy, or several embassies. The curious may consult Bishop
Thirlwall's Appendix to the fifth volume of his Grecian
History, and Jacobs' Introduction to his translation. I have
followed the common order, as adopted by Bekker, whose edition
of Demosthenes is the text of this translation; and indeed my
opinion is, on the whole, in favor of preserving the common
order, though the plan of this work prevents my entering into
controversy on the question. To enable the reader more fully
to understand the following orations, I have in an Appendix
to this volume given a brief account of Olynthus, showing its
position with reference to Macedonia, and the importance of its
acquisition to Philip. The historical abstract prefixed to this
volume is intended chiefly to assist the reader in reference to
dates. Such occurrences only are noticed as may be useful to
illustrate Demosthenes.
I believe, men of Athens, you would give much to know, what is the true
policy to be adopted in the present matter of inquiry. This being the
case, you should be willing to hear with attention these who offer you
their counsel. Besides that you will have the benefit of all
preconsidered advice, I esteem it part of your good fortune, that many
fit suggestions will occur to some speakers at the moment, so that from
them all you may easily choose what is profitable.
The present juncture, Athenians, all but proclaims aloud, that you must
yourselves take these affairs in hand, if you care for their success. I
know not how we seem disposed in the matter. [Footnote: This is a
cautious way of hinting at the general reluctance to adopt a vigorous
policy. And the reader will observe the use of the first person, whereby
the orator includes himself in the same insinuation.] My own opinion is,
vote succor immediately, and make the speediest preparations for sending
it off from Athens, that you may not incur the same mishap as before;
send also embassadors, to announce this, and watch the proceedings. For
the danger is, that this man, being unscrupulous and clever at turning
events to account, making concessions when it suits him, threatening at
other times, (his threats may well be believed,) slandering us and
urging our absence against us, may convert and wrest to his use some of
our main resources. Though, strange to say, Athenians, the very cause of
Philip's strength is a circumstance favorable to you. [Footnote: After
alarming the people by showing the strength of their adversary, he turns
off skillfully to a topic of encouragement.] His having it in his sole
power to publish or conceal his designs, his being at the same time
general, sovereign, paymaster, and every where accompanying his army, is
a great advantage for quick and timely operations in war; but, for a
peace with the Olynthians, which he would gladly make, it has a contrary
effect. For it is plain to the Olynthians, that now they are fighting,
not for glory or a slice of territory, but to save their country from
destruction and servitude. They know how he treated those Amphipolitans
who surrendered to him their city, and those Pydneans who gave him
admittance. [Footnote: Amphipolis was a city at the head of the
Strymonic gulf, in that part of Macedonia which approaches western
Thrace. It had been built formerly by an Athenian colony, and was taken
by the Spartan general Brasidas in the Peloponnesian war. Ever since
Athens regained her character of an imperial state, she had desired to
recover Amphipolis, which was important for its maritime position, its
exportation of iron, and especially from the vicinity of the forests
near the Strymon, which afforded an inexhaustible supply of ship-timber.
But she had never been able to accomplish that object. Philip, who at
that time possessed no maritime town of importance, was for obvious
reasons anxious to win Amphipolis for himself; and he got possession of
it partly by force of arms, partly by the treachery of certain
Amphipolitans who were attached to his interest. It seems the Athenians
had been amused by a promise of Philip to give up the town to them. The
non-performance of this compact led to their first long war with him.
Immediately after the capture of Amphipolis, Philip marched against
Pydna, and was admitted into the town.] And generally, I believe, a
despotic power is mistrusted by free states, especially if their
dominions are adjoining. All this being known to you, Athenians, all
else of importance considered, I say, you must take heart and spirit,
and apply yourselves more than ever to the war, contributing promptly,
serving personally, leaving nothing undone. No plea or pretense is left
you for declining your duty. What you were all so clamorous about, that
the Olynthians should be pressed into a war with Philip, has of itself
come to pass, [Footnote: Compare Virgil, Aen. ix. 6.
Turne, quod optanti Divum promittere nemo
Auderet, volvenda dies en attulit ultro.]
and in a way most advantageous to you. For, had they undertaken the war
at your instance, they might have been slippery allies, with minds but
half resolved perhaps: but since they hate him on a quarrel of their
own, their enmity is like to endure on account of their fears and their
wrongs. You must not then, Athenians, forego this lucky opportunity, nor
commit the error which you have often done heretofore. For example, when
we returned from succoring the Euboeans, and Hierax and Stratocles of
Amphipolis came to this platform, [Footnote: The hustings from which the
speakers addressed the people. It was cut to the height of ten feet out
of the rock which formed the boundary wall of the assembly; and was
ascended by a flight of steps.] urging us to sail and receive possession
of their city, if we had shown the same zeal for ourselves as for the
safety of Euboea, you would have held Amphipolis then and been rid of
all the troubles that ensued. Again, when news came that Pydna,
[Footnote: Potidaea was in the peninsula of Pallene, near Olynthus, and
was therefore given by Philip to the Olynthians, as mentioned in the
argument. Methone and Pydna are on the Macedonian coast approaching
Thessaly. Pagasae is a Thessalian town in the Magnesian district. It was
the sea-port of Pherae, capital of the tyrant Lycophron, against whom
Philip was invited to assist the Thessalians. Philip overcame Lycophron,
and restored republican government at Pherae; but Pagasae he garrisoned
himself, and also Magnesia, a coast-town in the same district.]
Potidaea, Methone, Pagasae, and the other places (not to waste time in
enumerating them) were besieged, had we to any one of these in the first
instance carried prompt and reasonable succor, we should have found
Philip far more tractable and humble now. But, by always neglecting the
present, and imagining the future would shift for itself, we, O men of
Athens, have exalted Philip, and made him greater than any king of
Macedon ever was. Here then is come a crisis, this of Olynthus,
self-offered to the state, inferior to none of the former. And methinks,
men of Athens, any man fairly estimating what the gods have done for us,
notwithstanding many untoward circumstances, might with reason be
grateful to them. Our numerous losses in war may justly be charged to
our own negligence; but that they happened not long ago, and that an
alliance, to counterbalance them, is open to our acceptance, I must
regard as manifestations of divine favor. It is much the same as in
money matters. If a man keep what he gets, he is thankful to fortune; if
he lose it by imprudence, he loses withal his memory of the obligation.
So in political affairs, they who misuse their opportunities forget even
the good which the gods send them; for every prior event is judged
commonly by the last result. Wherefore, Athenians, we must be
exceedingly careful of our future measures, that by amendment therein we
may efface the shame of the past. Should we abandon these men [Footnote:
Here he points to the Olynthian embassadors.] too, and Philip reduce
Olynthus, let any one tell me, what is to prevent him marching where he
pleases? Does any one of you, Athenians, compute or consider the means,
by which Philip, originally weak, has become great? Having first taken
Amphipolis, then Pydna, Potidaea next, Methone afterward, he invaded
Thessaly. Having ordered matters at Pherae, Pagasae, Magnesia, every
where exactly as he pleased, he departed for Thrace; where, after
displacing some kings and establishing others, he fell sick; again
recovering, he lapsed not into indolence, but instantly attacked the
Olynthians. I omit his expeditions to Illyria and Paeonia, that against
Arymbas, [Footnote: Arymbas was a king of the Molossians in Epirus, and
uncle of Olympias, Philip's wife.] and some others.
Why, it may be said, do you mention all this now? That you, Athenians,
may feel and understand both the folly of continually abandoning one
thing after another, and the activity which forms part of Philip's habit
and existence, which makes it impossible for him to rest content with
his achievements. If it be his principle, ever to do more than he has
done, and yours, to apply yourselves vigorously to nothing, see what the
end promises to be. Heavens! which of you is so simple as not to know,
that the war yonder will soon be here, if we are careless? And should
this happen, I fear, O Athenians, that as men who thoughtlessly borrow
on large interest, after a brief accommodation, lose their estate, so
will it be with us; found to have paid dear for our idleness and
self-indulgence, we shall be reduced to many hard and unpleasant shifts,
and struggle for the salvation of our country.
To censure, I may be told, is easy for any man; to show what measures
the case requires, is the part of a counselor. I am not ignorant,
Athenians, that frequently, when any disappointment happens, you are
angry, not with the parties in fault, but with the last speakers on the
subject; yet never, with a view to self-protection, would I suppress
what I deem for your interest. I say then, you must give a two-fold
assistance here; first, save the Olynthians their towns, [Footnote: The
Chalcidian towns. See the Argument. Philip commenced his aggressions
upon the Olynthians by reducing several of these.] and send out troops
for that purpose; secondly, annoy the enemy's country with ships and
other troops; omit either of these courses, and I doubt the expedition
will be fruitless. For should he, suffering your incursion, reduce
Olynthus, he will easily march to the defense of his kingdom; or, should
you only throw succor into Olynthus, and he, seeing things out of danger
at home, keep up a close and vigilant blockade, he must in time prevail
over the besieged. Your assistance therefore must be effective, and
two-fold.
Such are the operations I advise. As to a supply of money: you have
money, Athenians; you have a larger military fund than any people; and
you receive it just as you please. If ye will assign this to your
troops, ye need no further supply; otherwise ye need a further, or
rather ye have none at all. How then? some man may exclaim: do you move
that this be a military fund? Verily, not I. [Footnote: There is some
studied obscurity in this passage, owing to the necessity under which
the speaker lay of avoiding the penalty of the law and a little quiet
satire on his countrymen, who seemed desirous of eating their pudding
and having it too. The logic of the argument runs thus--My opinion is,
that we ought to have a military fund, and that no man should receive
public money, without performing public service. However, as you prefer
taking the public money to pay for your places at the festivals, I will
not break the law by moving to apply that money to another purpose. Only
you gain nothing by it; for, as the troops must be paid, there must be
an extraordinary contribution, or property tax, to meet the exigency of
the case.] My opinion indeed is, that there should be soldiers raised,
and a military fund, and one and the same regulation for receiving and
performing what is due; only you just without trouble take your
allowance for the festivals. It remains then, I imagine, that all must
contribute, if much be wanted, much, if little, little. Money must be
had; without it nothing proper can be done. Other persons propose other
ways and means. Choose which ye think expedient; and put hands to the
work, while it is yet time.
It may be well to consider and calculate how Philip's affairs now stand.
They are not, as they appear, or as an inattentive observer might
pronounce, in very good trim, or in the most favorable position. He
would never have commenced this war, had he imagined he must fight. He
expected to carry every thing on the first advance, and has been
mistaken. This disappointment is one thing that troubles and dispirits
him; another is, the state of Thessaly. [Footnote: Philip's influence in
Thessaly was of material assistance to him in his ambitious projects. It
was acquired in this way. The power established by Jason of Pherae, who
raised himself to a sort of royal authority under the title of Tagus,
had devolved upon Lycophron. His sway extended more or less over the
whole of Thessaly; but was, if not generally unpopular, at least
unacceptable to the great families in the northern towns, among whom the
Aleuadae of Larissa held a prominent place. They invoked Philip's aid,
while Lycophron was assisted by the Phocian Onomarchus. After various
success, Onomarchus was defeated and slain, and Lycophron expelled from
Pherae. This established Philip's influence, and led to his being
afterward called in to terminate the Sacred war. How far the assertions
of Demosthenes, respecting the discontent of the Thessalians, are true,
can not exactly be told. They are confirmed, however, in some degree by
the fact, that at the close of the Sacred war Philip restored to them
Magnesia. A new attempt by the regnant family caused Philip again to be
invited, and Thessaly became virtually a province of Macedonia. Among
other advantages therefrom was the aid of a numerous cavalry, for which
Thessaly was famous.] That people were always, you know, treacherous to
all men; and just as they ever have been, they are to Philip. They have
resolved to demand the restitution of Pagasae, and have prevented his
fortifying Magnesia; and I was told, they would no longer allow him to
take the revenue of their harbors and markets, which they say should be
applied to the public business of Thessaly, not received by Philip. Now,
if he be deprived of this fund, his means will be much straitened for
paying his mercenaries. And surely we must suppose, that Paeonians and
Illyrians, and all such people, would rather be free and independent
than under subjection; for they are unused to obedience, and the man is
a tyrant. So report says, and I can well believe it; for undeserved
success leads weak-minded men into folly; and thus it appears often,
that to maintain prosperity is harder than to acquire it. Therefore must
you, Athenians, looking on his difficulty as your opportunity, assist
cheerfully in the war, sending embassies where required, taking arms
yourselves, exciting all other people; for if Philip got such an
opportunity against us, and there was a war on our frontier, how eagerly
think ye he would attack you! Then are you not ashamed, that the very
damage which you would suffer, if he had the power, you dare not seize
the moment to inflict on him?
And let not this escape you, Athenians, that you have now the choice,
whether you shall fight there, or he in your country. If Olynthus hold
out, you will fight there and distress his dominions, enjoying your own
home in peace. If Philip take that city, who shall then prevent his
marching here? Thebans? I wish it be not too harsh to say, they will be
ready to join in the invasion. Phocians? who can not defend their own
country without your assistance. Or some other ally? But, good sir, he
will not desire! Strange indeed, if, what he is thought fool-hardy for
prating now, this he would not accomplish if he might. As to the vast
difference between a war here or there, I fancy there needs no argument.
If you were obliged to be out yourselves for thirty days only, and take
the necessaries for camp-service from the land, (I mean, without an
enemy therein,) your agricultural population would sustain, I believe,
greater damage than what the whole expense of the late war [Footnote:
The Amphipolitan war, said to have cost fifteen hundred talents.]
amounted to. But if a war should come, what damage must be expected?
There is the insult too, and the disgrace of the thing, worse than any
damage to right-thinking men.
On all these accounts, then, we must unite to lend our succor, and drive
off the war yonder; the rich, that, spending a little for the abundance
which they happily possess, they may enjoy the residue in security; the
young, [Footnote: Strictly, _those of the military age_, which was
from eighteen years to sixty. Youths between eighteen and twenty were
liable only to serve in Attica, and were chiefly employed to garrison
the walls. Afterward they were compellable to perform any military
service, under the penalty of losing their privileges as citizens. The
expression in the text, it will be seen, is not rendered with full
accuracy; as those of the military age can only be called _young_
by comparison. But a short and apt antithesis was needed. Sometimes I
have "the service-able" or "the able-bodied." Jacobs: _die
waffenfahigen Junglinge_, and elsewhere, _die Rustige_.] that,
gaining military experience in Philip's territory, they may become
redoubtable champions to preserve their own; the orators, that they may
pass a good account [Footnote: Every man, who is required to justify the
acts for which he is responsible, may be said to be "called to account."
But Demosthenes spoke with peculiar reference to those accounts, which
men in official situations at Athens were required to render at the
close of their administration.] of their statesmanship; for on the
result of measures will depend your judgment of their conduct. May it
for every cause be prosperous.
THE SECOND OLYNTHIAC.
THE ARGUMENT.
The Athenians had voted an alliance with the Olynthians, and
resolved to send succors. But the sending of them was delayed,
partly by the contrivance of the opposite faction, partly
from the reluctance of the people themselves to engage in a
war with Philip. Demosthenes stimulates them to exertion, and
encourages them, by showing that Philip's power is not so
great as it appears.
On many occasions, men of Athens, one may see the kindness of the gods
to this country manifested, but most signally, I think, on the present.
That here are men prepared for a war with Philip, possessed of a
neighboring territory and some power, and (what is most important) so
fixed in their hostility, as to regard any accommodation with him as
insecure, and even ruinous to their country; this really appears like an
extraordinary act of divine beneficence. It must then be our care,
Athenians, that we are not more unkind to ourselves than circumstances
have been; as it would be a foul, a most foul reproach, to have
abandoned not only cities and places that once belonged to us, but also
the allies and advantages provided by fortune.
To dilate, Athenians, on Philip's power, and by such discourse to incite
you to your duty, I think improper: and why? Because all that may be
said on that score involves matter of glory for him, and misconduct on
our part. The more he has transcended his repute, [Footnote: Jacobs
otherwise: uber sein Verdienst gelungen.] the more is he universally
admired; you, as you have used your advantages unworthily, have incurred
the greater disgrace. This topic, then, I shall pass over. Indeed,
Athenians, a correct observer will find the source of his greatness
here, [Footnote: In this assembly, by the contrivance of venal orators,
or through the supineness of the people. In the first Philippic there is
a more pointed allusion to the practices of Philip's adherents, who are
charged with sending him secret intelligence of what passed at home.
Such men as Aristodemus, Neoptolemus, perhaps Demades and others are
referred to. Aeschines had not yet begun to be a friend of Philip.] and
not in himself. But of measures, for which Philip's partisans deserve
his gratitude and your vengeance, I see no occasion to speak now. Other
things are open to me, which it concerns you all to know, and which
must, on a due examination, Athenians, reflect great disgrace on Philip.
To these will I address myself.
To call him perjured and treacherous, without showing what he has done,
might justly be termed idle abuse. But to go through all his actions and
convict him in detail, will take, as it happens, but a short time, and
is expedient, I think, for two reasons: first, that his baseness may
appear in its true light; secondly, that they, whose terror imagines
Philip to be invincible, may see he has run through all the artifices by
which he rose to greatness, and his career is just come to an end. I
myself, men of Athens, should most assuredly have regarded Philip as an
object of fear and admiration, had I seen him exalted by honorable
conduct; but observing and considering I find, that in the beginning,
when certain persons drove away the Olynthians who desired a conference
with us, he gained over our simplicity by engaging to surrender
Amphipolis, and to execute the secret article [Footnote: A secret
intrigue was carried on between Philip and the Athenians, by which he
engaged to put Amphipolis in their hands, but on the understanding that
they would deliver up Pydna to him. Demosthenes only mentions the former
part of the arrangement, the latter not being honorable to his
countrymen.] once so famous; afterward he got the friendship of the
Olynthians, by taking Potidaea from you, wronging you his former allies,
and delivering it to them; and lastly now the Thessalians, by promising
to surrender Magnesia, and undertake the Phocian war on their behalf. In
short, none who have dealt with him has he not deceived. He has risen by
conciliating and cajoling the weakness of every people in turn who knew
him not. As, therefore, by such means he rose, when every people
imagined he would advance their interest, so ought he by the same means
to be pulled down again, when the selfish aim of his whole policy is
exposed. To this crisis, O Athenians, are Philip's affairs come; or let
any man stand forward and prove to me, or rather to you, that my
assertions, are false, or that men whom Philip has once overreached will
trust him hereafter, or that the Thessalians who have been degraded into
servitude would not gladly become free.
But if any among you, though agreeing in these statements, thinks that
Philip will maintain his power by having occupied forts and havens and
the like, this is a mistake. True, when a confederacy subsists by
good-will, and all parties to the war have a common interest, men are
willing to co-operate and bear hardships and persevere. But when one has
grown strong, like Philip, by rapacity and artifice, on the first
pretext, the slightest reverse, all is overturned and broken up.
[Footnote: The original [Greek: _anechaitise_] is "shakes off," or
"throws off," as a horse does his rider, when he rears and tosses up his
neck. It will be observed that Demosthenes is very high-flown in his
language here, passing from one metaphor to another. Leland translates
these words, "overthrows him, and all his greatness is dashed at once to
the ground." Francis: "hath already shaken off the yoke and dissolved
their alliance." Wilson: "turneth all things upside down and layeth it
flat in the end." Auger, better: _suffisent pour l' ebranler et la
dissoudre_. Jacobs: _reicht Alles umzusturzen, und aufzulosen_.
Pabst, very nearly the same.] Impossible is it,--impossible,
Athenians,--to acquire a solid power by injustice and perjury and
falsehood. Such things last for once, or for a short period; maybe, they
blossom fairly with hope; [Footnote: So in Henry VIII. Act iii. Sc. 2.
Such is the state of man: to-day he puts forth
The tender leaves of hope, to-morrow blossoms,
And wears his blushing honors thick upon him.]
but in time they are discovered and drop away. [Footnote: Like the
leaves of a flower; pursuing the last metaphor. So says Moore, in _The
Last Rose of Summer_: "the gems drop away." Jacobs: _fallt sie von
selbst zusammen_. Pabst: _sturet in sich selbst zusammen_.] As a
house, a ship, or the like, ought to have the lower parts firmest, so in
human conduct, I ween, the principle and foundation should be just and
true. But this is not so in Philip's conduct.
I say, then, we should at once aid the Olynthians, (the best and
quickest way that can be suggested will please me most,) and send an
embassy to the Thessalians, to inform some of our measures, and to stir
up the rest; for they have now resolved to demand Pagasae, and
remonstrate about Magnesia. But look to this, Athenians, that our envoys
shall not only make speeches, but have some real proof that we have gone
forth as becomes our country, and are engaged in action. All speech
without action appears vain and idle, but especially that of our
commonwealth; as the more we are thought to excel therein, the more is
our speaking distrusted by all. You must show yourselves greatly
reformed, greatly changed, contributing, serving personally, acting
promptly, before any one will pay attention to you. And if ye will
perform these duties properly and becomingly, Athenians, not only will
it appear that Philip's alliances are weak and precarious, but the poor
state of his native empire and power will be revealed.
To speak roundly, the Macedonian power and empire is very well as a
help, as it was for you in Timotheus' time against the Olynthians;
likewise for them against Potidaea the conjunction was important; and
lately it aided the Thessalians in their broils and troubles against the
regnant house: and the accession of any power, however small, is
undoubtedly useful. But the Macedonian is feeble of itself, and full of
defects. The very operations which seem to constitute Philip's
greatness, his wars and his expeditions, have made it more insecure than
it was originally. Think not, Athenians, that Philip and his subjects
have the same likings. He desires glory, makes that his passion, is
ready for any consequence of adventure and peril, preferring to a life
of safety the honor of achieving what no Macedonian king ever did
before. They have no share in the glorious result; ever harassed by
these excursions up and down, they suffer and toil incessantly, allowed
no leisure for their employments or private concerns, unable even to
dispose of their hard earnings, the markets of the country being closed
on account of the war. By this then may easily be seen, how the
Macedonians in general are disposed to Philip. His mercenaries and
guards, indeed, have the reputation of admirable and well-trained
soldiers, but, as I heard from one who had been in the country, a man
incapable of falsehood, they are no better than others. For if there be
any among them experienced in battles and campaigns, Philip is jealous
of such men and drives them away, he says, wishing to keep the glory of
all actions to himself; his jealousy (among other failings) being
excessive. Or if any man be generally good and virtuous, unable to bear
Philip's daily intemperances, drunkenness, and indecencies, [Footnote:
The original signifies a certain lascivious dance, which formed a part
of riotous festivities. We gather from history that the orator's
description here is not wholly untrue, though exaggerated. Thirlwall
thus writes of Philip: "There seem to have been two features in his
character which, in another station, or under different circumstances,
might have gone near to lower him to an ordinary person, but which were
so controlled by his fortune as to contribute not a little to his
success. He appears to have been by his temperament prone to almost
every kind of sensual pleasure; but as his life was too busy to allow
him often to indulge his bias, his occasional excesses wore the air of
an amiable condescension. So his natural humor would perhaps have led
him too often to forget his dignity in his intercourse with his
inferiors; but to Philip, the great king, the conqueror, the restless
politician, these intervals of relaxation occurred so rarely, that they
might strengthen his influence with the vulgar, and could never expose
him to contempt." It has been observed, that Philips partiality for
drinking and dancing, his drollery, and a dash of scurrility in his
character, endeared him especially to the Thessalians. See Jacobs' note
on this passage.] he is pushed aside and accounted as nobody. The rest
about him are brigands and parasites, and men of that character, who
will get drunk and perform dances which I scruple to name before you. My
information is undoubtedly true; for persons whom all scouted here as
worse rascals than mountebanks, Callias the town-slave and the like of
him, antic-jesters, [Footnote: [Greek: _Mimous geloion_], players
of drolls, mimes, or farces. Our ancient word _droll_ signifies,
like [Greek: _mimos_], both the actor and the thing acted.] and
composers of ribald songs to lampoon their companions, such persons
Philip caresses and keeps about him. Small matters these may be thought,
Athenians, but to the wise they are strong indications of his character
and wrong-headedness. Success perhaps throws a shade over them now;
prosperity is a famous hider of such blemishes; but, on any miscarriage,
they will be fully exposed. And this (trust me, Athenians) will appear
in no long time, if the gods so will and you determine. For as in the
human body, a man in health feels not partial ailments, but, when
illness occurs, all are in motion, whether it be a rupture or a sprain
or any thing else unsound; so with states and monarchs, while they wage
eternal war, their weaknesses are undiscerned by most men, but the tug
of a frontier war betrays all.
If any of you think Philip a formidable opponent, because they see he is
fortunate, such reasoning is prudent, Athenians. Fortune has indeed a
great preponderance--nay, is every thing, in human affairs. Not but
that, if I had the choice, I should prefer our fortune to Philip's,
would you but moderately perform your duty. For I see you have many more
claims to the divine favor than he has. But we sit doing nothing; and a
man idle himself can not require even his friends to act for him, much
less the gods. No wonder then that he, marching and toiling in person,
present on all occasions, neglecting no time or season, prevails over us
delaying and voting and inquiring. I marvel not at that; the contrary
would have been marvelous, if we doing none of the duties of war had
beaten one doing all. But this surprises me, that formerly, Athenians,
you resisted the Lacedaemonians for the rights of Greece, and rejecting
many opportunities of selfish gain, to secure the rights of others,
expended your property in contributions, and bore the brunt of the
battle; yet now you are both to serve, slow to contribute, in defense of
your own possessions, and, though you have often saved the other nations
of Greece collectively and individually, under your own losses you sit
still. This surprises me, and one thing more, Athenians; that not one of
you can reckon, how long your war with Philip has lasted, and what you
have been doing while the time has passed. You surely know, that while
you have been delaying, expecting others to act, accusing, trying one
another, expecting again, doing much the same as ye do now, all the time
has passed away. Then are ye so senseless, Athenians, as to imagine,
that the same measures, which have brought the country from a prosperous
to a poor condition, will bring it from a poor to a prosperous?
Unreasonable were this and unnatural; for all things are easier kept
than gotten. The war now has left us nothing to keep; we have all to
get, and the work must be done by ourselves. I say then, you must
contribute money, serve in person with alacrity, accuse no one, till you
have gained your objects; then, judging from facts, honor the deserving,
punish offenders; let there be no pretenses or defaults on your own part
for you can not harshly scrutinize the conduct of others, unless you
have done what is right yourselves. Why, think you, do all the generals
[Footnote: A system of employing mercenary troops sprang up at the close
of the Peloponnesian war, when there were numerous Grecian bands
accustomed to warfare and seeking employment. Such troops were eagerly
sought for by the Persian satraps and their king, by such men as Jason
of Pherae, Dionysius of Syracuse, or Philomelus of Phocis. Athens, which
had partially employed mercenaries before, began to make use of them on
a large scale, while her citizens preferred staying at home, to attend
to commerce, politics, and idle amusements. The ill effects however were
soon apparent. Athenian generals, ill supplied with money, and having
little control over their followers, were tempted or obliged to engage
in enterprises unconnected with, and often adverse to, the interests of
their country. Sometimes the general, as well as the troops, was an
alien, and could be very little depended on. Such a person was
Charidemus, a native of Oreus in Euboea, who commenced his career as
captain of a pirate vessel. He was often in the service of Athens, but
did her more harm than good. See my article _Mercenarii_, Arch.
Dict.] whom you commission avoid this war, and seek wars of their own?
(for of the generals too must a little truth be told.) Because here the
prizes of the war are yours; for example, if Amphipolis be taken, you
will immediately recover it; the commanders have all the risk and no
reward. But in the other case the risks are less, and the gains belong
to the commanders and soldiers; Lampsacus, [Footnote: Chares, the
Athenian general, was said to have received these Asiatic cities from
Artabazus, the Persian satrap, in return for the service he had
performed. Probably it was some authority or privileges in those cities,
not the actual dominion, that was conferred upon him. Sigeum, which is
near the mouth of the Hellespont, and was a convenient situation for his
adventures, was the ordinary residence of Chares.] Sigeum, the vessels
which they plunder. So they proceed to secure their several interests:
you, when you look at the bad state of your affairs, bring the generals
to trial; but when they get a hearing and plead these necessities, you
dismiss them. The result is that, while you are quarreling and divided,
some holding one opinion, some another, the commonwealth goes wrong.
Formerly, Athenians, you had boards [Footnote: This refers to the
institution of the [Greek: _summoriai_], or boards for management
of the property-tax at Athens, as to which see Appendix IV. The argument
of Demosthenes is as follows--The three hundred wealthier citizens, who
were associated by law for purposes of taxation, had become a clique for
political purposes, with an orator at their head, (he intentionally uses
the term [Greek: _haegemon_], _chairman of the board_,) to
conduct the business of the assembly, while they stood to shout and
applaud his speeches. The general, who held a judicial court to decide
disputes about the property-tax, and who in matters of state ought to be
independent, was subservient to the orator, who defended him in the
popular assembly.] for taxes; now you have boards for politics. There is
an orator presiding on either side, a general under him, and three
hundred men to shout; the rest of you are attached to the one party or
the other. This you must leave off; be yourselves again; establish a
general liberty of speech, deliberation, and action. If some are
appointed to command as with royal authority, some to be ship-captains,
tax-payers, soldiers by compulsion, others only to vote against them,
and help in nothing besides, no duty will be seasonably performed; the
aggrieved parties will still fail you, and you will have to punish them
instead of your enemies. I say, in short; you must all fairly
contribute, according to each man's ability; take your turns of service
till you have all been afield; give every speaker a hearing, and adopt
the best counsel, not what this or that person advises. If ye act thus,
not only will ye praise the speaker at the moment, but yourselves
afterward, when the condition of the country is improved.
THE THIRD OLYNTHIAC.
THE ARGUMENT.
The Athenians had dispatched succors to Olynthus, and
received, as Libanius says, some favorable intelligence; more
probably, however, some vague rumors, which led them to
imagine the danger was for the time averted. They began, very
prematurely, as the result showed, to be confident of success,
and talked of punishing Philip for his presumption. In this
they were encouraged by certain foolish orators, who sought to
flatter the national prejudices. Demosthenes in this oration
strives to check the arrogance of the people; reminds them of
the necessity of defensive rather than offensive measures, and
especially of the importance of preserving their allies.
He again adverts (and this time more boldly) to the law of
Eubulus, which he intimates ought to be repealed; and he
exhorts the Athenians generally to make strenuous exertions
against Philip,
Not the same ideas, men of Athens, are presented to me, when I look at
our condition and when at the speeches which are delivered. The
speeches, I find, are about punishing Philip; but our condition is come
to this, that we must mind we are not first damaged ourselves.
Therefore, it seems to me, these orators commit the simple error of not
laying before you the true subject of debate. That once we might safely
have held our own and punished Philip too, I know well enough; both have
been possible in my own time, not very long ago. But now, I am
persuaded, it is sufficient in the first instance to effect the
preservation of our allies. When this has been secured, one may look out
for revenge on Philip; but before we lay the foundation right, I deem it
idle to talk about the end.
The present crisis, O Athenians, requires, if any ever did, much thought
and counsel. Not that I am puzzled, what advice to give in the matter; I
am only doubtful, in what way, Athenians, to address you thereupon. For
I have been taught both by hearsay and experience, that most of your
advantages have escaped you, from unwillingness to do your duty, not
from ignorance. I request you, if I speak my mind, to be patient, and
consider only, whether I speak the truth, and with a view to future
amendment. You see to what wretched plight we are reduced by some men
haranguing for popularity.
I think it necessary, however, first to recall to your memory a few past
events. You remember, Athenians, when news came three or four years ago,
that Philip was in Thrace beieging Heraeum. [Footnote: A fortress on the
Propontis,(now Sea of Marmora,) near Perinthus. This was a post of
importance to the Athenians, who received large supplies of corn from
that district.] It was then the fifth month, [Footnote: Corresponding
nearly to our November. The Attic year began in July, and contained
twelve lunar months, of alternately 29 and 30 days. The Greeks attempted
to make the lunar and solar courses coincide by cycles of years, but
fell into great confusion. See _Calendarium_ in Arch. Dict.] and
after much discussion and tumult in the assembly you resolved to launch
forty galleys, that every citizen under forty-five [Footnote: This large
proportion of the serviceable citizens, [Greek: _ton en haelikia_],
shows the alarm at Athens. Philip's illness seems to have put a stop to
his progress in Thrace at this period. Immediately on his recovery he
began his aggression against Olynthus. See the Chronological Abstract
prefixed to this volume.] should embark, and a tax be raised of sixty
talents. That year passed; the first, second, third month arrived; in
that month, reluctantly, after the mysteries, [Footnote: The Eleusinian
Mysteries, in honor of Ceres and Proserpine, called The Mysteries from
their peculiar sanctity.] you dispatched Charidemus with ten empty ships
and five talents in money; for as Philip was reported to be sick or
dead, (both rumors came.) you thought there was no longer any occasion
for succors, and discontinued the armament. But that was the very
occasion; if we had then sent our succors quickly, as we resolved,
Philip would not have been saved to trouble us now.
Those events can not be altered. But here is the crisis of another war,
the cause why I mentioned the past, that you may not repeat your error.
How shall we deal with it, men of Athens? If you lend not the utmost
possible aid, see how you will have manoeuvred every thing for Philip's
benefit. There were the Olynthians, possessed of some power; and matters
stood thus: Philip distrusted them, and they Philip. We negotiated for
peace with them; this hampered (as it were) and annoyed Philip, that a
great city, reconciled to us, should be watching opportunities against
him. We thought it necessary by all means to make that people his
enemies; and lo, what erewhile you clamored for, has somehow or other
been accomplished. Then what remains, Athenians, but to assist them
vigorously and promptly? I know not. For besides the disgrace that would
fall upon us, if we sacrificed any of our interests, I am alarmed for
the consequences, seeing how the Thebans are affected toward us, the
Phocian treasury exhausted, nothing to prevent Philip, when he has
subdued what lies before him, from turning to matters here. Whoever
postpones until then the performance of his duty, wishes to see the
peril at hand, when he may hear of it elsewhere, and to seek auxiliaries
for himself, when he may be auxiliary to others; for that this will be
the issue, if we throw away our present advantage, we all know pretty
well.
But, it may be said, we have resolved that succors are necessary, and we
will send them; tell us only how. Marvel not then, Athenians, if I say
something to astonish the multitude. Appoint law-revisers: [Footnote: A
provision was made by Solon for a periodical revision, of the Athenian
laws by means of a legislative committee, called [Greek:
_Nomothetai_]. See my article _Nomothetes_, Arch. Dict.) They
were chosen by lot from the judicial body, on a reference to them by a
vote of the popular assembly, Demosthenes says, "enact no statutes,"
instead of saying, "let the committee enact no statutes." This is
because the committee would be taken from the people themselves, and the
part are treated as the whole. So in speeches to juries we shall
frequently observe that in mentioning the decision of some other jury he
says, "you did this or that," as if they were the same persons.] at
their session enact no statutes, for you have enough, but repeal those
which are at present injurious; I mean, just plainly, the laws
concerning our theatrical fund, and some concerning the troops, whereof
the former divide the military fund among stayers-at-home for theatrical
amusement, the latter indemnify deserters, and so dishearten men well
inclined to the service. When you have repealed these, and made the road
to good counsel safe, then find a man to propose what you all know to be
desirable. But before doing so, look not for one who will advise good
measures and be destroyed by you for his pains. Such a person you will
not find, especially as the only result would be, for the adviser and
mover to suffer wrongfully, and, without forwarding matters, to render
good counsel still more dangerous in future. Besides, Athenians, you
should require the same men to repeal these laws, who have introduced
them. It is unjust, that their authors should enjoy a popularity which
has injured the commonwealth, while the adviser of salutary measures
suffers by a displeasure that may lead to general improvement. Till this
is set right, Athenians, look not that any one should be so powerful
with you as to transgress these laws with impunity, or so senseless as
to plunge into ruin right before him.
Another thing, too, you should observe, Athenians, that a decree is
worth nothing, without a readiness on your part to do what you
determine. Could decrees of themselves compel you to perform your duty,
or execute what they prescribe, neither would you with many decrees have
accomplished little or nothing, nor would Philip have insulted you so
long. Had it depended on decrees, he would have been chastised long ago.
But the course of things is otherwise. Action, posterior in order of
time to speaking and voting, is in efficacy prior and superior. This
requisite you want; the others you possess. There are among you,
Athenians, men competent to advise what is needful, and you are
exceedingly quick at understanding it; ay, and you will be able now to
perform it, if you act rightly. For what time or season would you have
better than the present? When will you do your duty, if not now? Has not
the man got possession of all our strongholds? And if he become master
of this country, shall we not incur foul disgrace? Are not they, to whom
we promised sure protection in case of war, at this moment in
hostilities? Is he not an enemy, holding our possessions--a barbarian
[Footnote: _Barbarians_ (among the Greeks) designates persons who
were not of Hellenic origin. Alexander, an ancestor of Philip, had
obtained admission to the Olympic games by proving himself to be of
Argive descent. But the Macedonian people were scarcely considered as
Greeks till a much later period; and Demosthenes speaks rather with
reference to the nation than to Philip personally.]--anything you like
to call him? But, O heavens! after permitting, almost helping him to
accomplish these things, shall we inquire who were to blame for them? I
know we shall not take the blame to ourselves. For so in battles, no
runaway accuses himself, but his general, his neighbor, any one rather;
though, sure enough, the defeat is owing to all the runaways; for each
one who accuses the rest might have stood his ground, and had each done
so they would have conquered. Now then, does any man not give the best
advice? Let another rise and give it, but not censure the last speaker.
Does a second give better advice? Follow it, and success attend you!
Perhaps it is not pleasant: but that is not the speaker's fault, unless
he omits some needful prayer. [Footnote: Demosthenes sneers at the
custom of introducing into the debate sententious professions of
good-will, and prayers for prosperity; a poor substitute (he would say)
for good counsel. Compare Virg. Georg. III. 454.
Alitur vitium vivitque tegendo,
Dum medicas adhibere manus ad vulnera pastor
Abnegat, et meliora, Deos sedet omina poscens.]
To pray is simple enough, Athenians, collecting all that one desires in
a short petition: but to decide, when measures are the subject of
consideration, is not quite so easy; for we must choose the profitable
rather than the pleasant, where both are not compatible.
But if any one can let alone our theatrical fund, and suggest other
supplies for the military, is he not cleverer? it may be asked. I grant
it, if this were possible: but I wonder if any man ever was or will be
able, after wasting his means in useless expenses, to find means for
useful. The wishes of men are indeed a great help to such arguments, and
therefore the easiest thing in the world is self-deceit; for every man
believes what he wishes, though the reality is often different. See
then, Athenians, what the realities allow, and you will be able to serve
and have pay. It becomes not a wise or magnanimous people, to neglect
military operations for want of money, and bear disgraces like these;
or, while you snatch up arms to march against Corinthians and Megarians,
to let Philip enslave Greek cities for lack of provisions for your
troops.
I have not spoken for the idle purpose of giving offense: I am not so
foolish or perverse, as to provoke your displeasure without intending
your good: but I think an upright citizen should prefer the advancement
of the commonweal to the gratification of his audience. And I hear, as
perhaps you do, that the speakers in our ancestors' time, whom all that
address you praise, but not exactly imitate, were politicians after this
form and fashion;--Aristides, Nicias, my namesake, [Footnote:
Demosthenes, the general so distinguished in the Peloponnesian war, who
defeated the Spartans at Pylus, and afterward lost his life in Sicily.]
Pericles. But since these orators have appeared, who ask, What is your
pleasure? what shall I move? how can I oblige you? the public welfare is
complimented away for a moment's popularity, and these are the results;
the orators thrive, you are disgraced. Mark, O Athenians, what a summary
contrast may be drawn between the doings in our olden time and in yours.
It is a tale brief and familiar to all; for the examples by which you
may still be happy are found not abroad, men of Athens, but at home. Our
forefathers, whom the speakers humored not nor caressed, as these men
caress you, for five-and-forty years took the leadership of the Greeks
by general consent, and brought above ten thousand talents into the
citadel; and the king of this country was submissive to them, as a
barbarian should be to Greeks; and many glorious trophies they erected
for victories won by their own fighting on land and sea, and they are
the sole people in the world who have bequeathed a renown superior to
envy. Such were their merits in the affairs of Greece: see what they
were at home, both as citizens and as men. Their public works are
edifices and ornaments of such beauty and grandeur in temples and
consecrated furniture, that posterity have no power to surpass them. In
private they were so modest and attached to the principle of our
constitution, that whoever knows the style of house which Aristides had,
or Miltiades, and the illustrious of that day, perceives it to be no
grander than those of the neighbors. Their politics were not for
money-making; each felt it his duty to exalt the commonwealth.
[Footnote: As Horace says:--
Privatus illis census erat brevis,
Commune magnum.]
By a conduct honorable toward the Greeks, pious to the gods, brotherlike
among themselves, they justly attained a high prosperity.
So fared matters with them under the statesmen I have mentioned. How
fare they with you under the worthies of our time? Is there any likeness
or resemblance? I pass over other topics, on which I could expatiate;
but observe: in this utter absence of competitors, (Lacedaemonians
depressed, Thebans employed, none of the rest capable of disputing the
supremacy with us,) when we might hold our own securely and arbitrate
the claims of others, we have been deprived of our rightful territory,
and spent above fifteen hundred talents to no purpose; the allies, whom
we gained in war, these persons have lost in peace, and we have trained
up against ourselves an enemy thus formidable. Or let any one come
forward and tell me, by whose contrivance but ours Philip has grown
strong. Well, sir, this looks bad, but things at home are better. What
proof can be adduced? The parapets that are whitewashed? The roads that
are repaired? fountains, and fooleries? [Footnote: Jacobs: _und
solches Geschwatz_. The proceedings of Eubulus are here more
particularly referred to.] Look at the men of whose statesmanship these
are the fruits. They have risen from beggary to opulence, or from
obscurity to honor; some have made their private houses more splendid
than the public buildings; and in proportion as the state has declined,
their fortunes have been exalted.
What has produced these results? How is it that all went prosperously
then, and nowgoes wrong? Because anciently the people, having the
courage to be soldiers, controlled the statesmen, and disposed of all
emoluments; any of the rest was happy to receive from the people his
share of honor, office, or advantage. Now, contrariwise, the statesmen
dispose of emoluments; through them every thing is done; you the people,
enervated, stripped of treasure and allies, are become as underlings and
hangers-on, happy if these persons dole you out show-money or send you
paltry beeves; [Footnote: Entertainments were frequently given to the
people after sacrifices, at which a very small part of the victim was
devoted to the gods, such as the legs and intestines, the rest being
kept for more profane purposes. Tho Athenians were remarkably
extravagant in sacrifices. Demades, ridiculing the donations of public
meat, compared the republic to an old woman, sitting at home in slippers
and supping her broth. Demosthenes, using the diminutive [Greek:
_boidia_], charges the magistrates with supplying lean and poor
oxen, whereas the victims ought to be healthy and large, [Greek:
teleia]. See Virgil, Aen. xi. 739.
Hic amor, hoc studium; dum sacra secundus aruspex
Nuntiet, ac lucos vocet hostia pinguis in altos.]
and, the unmanliest part of all, you are grateful for receiving your
own. They, cooping you in the city, lead you to your pleasures, and make
you tame and submissive to their hands. It is impossible, I say, to have
a high and noble spirit, while you are engaged in petty and mean
employments: whatever be the pursuits of men, their characters must be
similar. By Ceres, I should not wonder, if I, for mentioning these
things, suffered more from your resentment than the men who have brought
them to pass. For even liberty of speech you allow not on all subjects;
I marvel indeed you have allowed it here.
Would you but even now, renouncing these practices, perform military
service and act worthily of yourselves; would you employ these domestic
superfluities as a means to gain advantage abroad; perhaps, Athenians,
perhaps you might gain some solid and important advantage, and be rid of
these perquisites, which are like the diet ordered by physicians for the
sick. As that neither imparts strength, nor suffers the patient to die,
so your allowances are not enough to be of substantial benefit, nor yet
permit you to reject them and turn to something else. Thus do they
increase the general apathy. What? I shall be asked: mean you
stipendiary service? Yes, and forthwith the same arrangement for all,
Athenians, that each, taking his dividend from the public, may be what
the state requires. Is peace to be had? You are better at home, under no
compulsion to act dishonorably from indigence. Is there such an
emergency as the present? Better to be a soldier, as you ought, in your
country's cause, maintained by those very allowances. Is any one of you
beyond the military age? What he now irregularly takes without doing
service, let him take by just regulation, superintending and transacting
needful business. Thus, without derogating from or adding to our
political system, only removing some irregularity, I bring it into
order, establishing a uniform rule for receiving money, for serving in
war, for sitting on juries, for doing what each according to his age can
do, and what occasion requires. I never advise we should give to idlers
the wages of the diligent, or sit at leisure, passive and helpless, to
hear that such a one's mercenaries are victorious; as we now do. Not
that I blame any one who does you a service: I only call upon you,
Athenians, to perform on your own account those duties for which you
honor strangers, and not to surrender that post of dignity which, won
through many glorious dangers, your ancestors have bequeathed.
I have said nearly all that I think necessary. I trust you will adopt
that course which is best for the country and yourselves.
THE FIRST PHILIPPIC.
THE ARGUMENT.
Philip, after the defeat of Onomarchus, had marched toward
the pass of Thermopylae, which, however, he found occupied by
the Athenians, who had sent a force for the purpose of
preventing his advance. Being baffled there, he directed his
march into Thrace, and alarmed the Athenians for the safety
of their dominions in the Chersonese. At the same time he sent
a fleet to attack the islands of Lemnos and Imbrus, infested
the commerce of Athens with his cruisers, and even insulted
her coast. In Thrace he became involved in the disputes
between the rival kings Amadocus and Cersobleptes, espousing
the cause of the former; and for some time he was engaged in
the interior of that country, either at war with Cersobleptes,
or extending his own influence over other parts of Thrace,
where he established or expelled the rulers, as it suited him.
It was just at that time that Demosthenes spoke the following
oration, the first in which he called the attention of his
countrymen to the dangerous increase of Philip's power. He had
become convinced by the course of events, and by observing the
restless activity of Philip, that Athens had more to fear from
him than from Thebes, or from any new combination of the
Grecian republics. The orator himself, perhaps, hardly
appreciated the extent of Philip's resources, strengthened as
he was now by the friendship of Thessaly, possessed of a navy
and maritime towns, and relieved from the presence of any
powerful neighbors. What were the precise views of Demosthenes
as to the extent of the impending danger, we can not say. It
was not for him to frighten the Athenians too much, but to
awaken them from their lethargy. This he does in a speech,
which, without idle declamation or useless ornament, is
essentially practical. He alarms, but encourages, his
countrymen; points out both their weakness and their strength;
rouses them to a sense of danger, and shows the way to meet it;
recommends not any extraordinary efforts, for which at the
moment there was no urgent necessity, and to make which would
have exceeded their power, but unfolds a scheme, simple and
feasible, suiting the occasion, and calculated (if Athenians
had not been too degenerate) to lay the foundation of better things.
Had the question for debate been any thing new, Athenians, I should have
waited till most of the usual speakers [Footnote: By an ancient
ordinance of Solon, those who were above fifty years of age were first
called on to deliver their opinion. The law had ceased to be in force;
but, as a decent custom, the older men usually commenced the debate.
There would be frequent occasions for departing from such a custom, and
Demosthenes, who was now thirty-three, assigns his reason for speaking
first.] had been heard; if any of their counsels had been to my liking,
I had remained silent, else proceeded to impart my own. But as the
subjects of discussion is one upon which they have spoken oft before, I
imagine, though I rise the first, I am entitled to indulgence. For if
these men had advised properly in time past, there would be no necessity
for deliberating now.
First I say, you must not despond, Athenians, under your present
circumstances, wretched as they are; for that which is worst in them as
regards the past, is best for the future. What do I mean? That our
affairs are amiss, men of Athens, because you do nothing which is
needful; if, notwithstanding you performed your duties, it were the
same, there would be no hope of amendment.
Consider next, what you know by report, and men of experience remember;
how vast a power the Lacedaemonians had not long ago, yet how nobly and
becomingly you consulted the dignity of Athens, and undertook the war
[Footnote: He refers to the war in which Athens assisted the Thebans
against Lacedaemon, and in which Chabrias won the naval battle of Naxos.
That war commenced twenty-six years before the speaking of the first
Philippic, and would be well remembered by many of the hearers. See the
Historical Abstract in this volume.] against them for the rights of
Greece. Why do I mention this? To show and convince you, Athenians, that
nothing, if you take precaution, is to be feared, nothing, if you are
negligent, goes as you desire. Take for examples the strength of the
Lacedaemonians then, which you overcame by attention to your duties, and
the insolence of this man now, by which through neglect of our interests
we are confounded. But if any among you, Athenians, deem Philip hard to
be conquered, looking at the magnitude of his existing power, and the
loss by us of all our strongholds, they reason rightly, but should
reflect, that once we held Pydna and Potidaea and Methone and all the
region round about as our own, and many of the nations now leagued with
him were independent and free, and preferred our friendship to his. Had
Philip then taken it into his head, that it was difficult to contend
with Athens, when she had so many fortresses to infest his country, and
he was destitute of allies, nothing that he has accomplished would he
have undertaken, and never would he have acquired so large a dominion.
But he saw well, Athenians, that all these places are the open prizes of
war, that the possessions of the absent naturally belong to the present,
those of the remiss to them that will venture and toil. Acting on such
principle, he has won every thing and keeps it, either by way of
conquest, or by friendly attachment and alliance; for all men will side
with and respect those, whom they see prepared and willing to make
proper exertion. If you, Athenians, will adopt this principle now,
though you did not before, and every man, where he can and ought to give
his service to the, state, be ready to give it without excuse, the
wealthy to contribute, the able-bodied to enlist; in a word, plainly, if
you will become your own masters, and cease each expecting to do nothing
himself, while his neighbor does every thing for him, you shall then
with heaven's permission recover your own, and get back what has been
frittered away, and chastise Philip. Do not imagine, that his empire is
everlastingly secured to him as a god. There are who hate and fear and
envy him, Athenians, even among those that seem most friendly; and all
feelings that are in other men belong, we may assume, to his
confederates. But now they are all cowed, having no refuge through your
tardiness and indolence, which I say you must abandon forthwith. For you
see, Athenians, the case, to what pitch of arrogance the man has
advanced, who leaves you not even the choice of action or inaction, but
threatens and uses (they say) outrageous language, and, unable to rest
in possession of his conquests, continually widens their circle, and,
while we dally and delay, throws his net all around us. When then,
Athenians, when will ye act as becomes you? In what event? In that of
necessity, I suppose. And how should we regard the events happening now?
Methinks, to freemen the strongest necessity is the disgrace of their
condition. Or tell me, do ye like walking about and asking one
another:--is there any news? Why, could there be greater news than a man
of Macedonia subduing Athenians, and directing the affairs of Greece? Is
Philip dead? No, but he is sick. And what matters it to you? Should any
thing befall this man, you will soon create another Philip, if you
attend to business thus. For even he has been exalted not so much by his
own strength, as by our negligence. And again; should any thing happen
to him; should fortune, which still takes better care of us than we of
ourselves, be good enough to accomplish this; observe that, being on the
spot, you would step in while things were in confusion, and manage them
as you pleased; but as you now are, though occasion offered Amphipolis,
you would not be in a position to accept it, with neither forces nor
counsels at hand. [Footnote: Important advice this, to men in all
relations of life. Good luck is for those who are in a position to avail
themselves of it.
Illi poma cadunt qui poma sub arbore quaerit.]
However, as to the importance of a general zeal in the discharge of
duty, believing you are convinced and satisfied, I say no more.
As to the kind of force which I think may extricate you from your
difficulties, the amount, the supplies of money, the best and speediest
method (in my judgment) of providing all the necessaries, I shall
endeavor to inform you forthwith, making only one request, men of
Athens. When, you have heard all, determine; prejudge not before. And
let none think I delay our operations, because I recommend an entirely
new force. Not those that cry, quickly! to-day! speak most to the
purpose; (for what has already happened we shall not be able to prevent
by our present armament;) but he that shows what and how great and
whence procured must be the force capable of enduring, till either we
have advisedly terminated the war, or overcome our enemies: for so shall
we escape annoyance in future. This I think I am able to show, without
offense to any other man who has a plan to offer. My promise indeed is
large; it shall be tested by the performance; and you shall be my
judges.
First, then, Athenians, I say we must provide fifty warships, [Footnote:
The Athenian ship of war at this time was the Trireme, or galley with
three ranks of oars. It had at the prow a beak ([Greek:
_embolon_]), with a sharp iron head, which, in a charge, (generally
made at the broadside,) was able to shatter the planks of the enemy's
vessel. An ordinary trireme carried two hundred men, including the crew
and marines. These last ([Greek: _epibatai_]) were usually ten for
each ship, but the number was often increased. The transports and
vessels of burden, whether merchant vessels or boats for the carriage of
military stores, were round-bottomed, more bulky in construction, and
moved rather with sails than oars. Hence the fighting ship is called
[Greek: _tacheia_], _swift_. It carried a sail, to be used
upon occasion, though it was mainly worked with oars.] and hold
ourselves prepared, in case of emergency, to embark and sail. I require
also an equipment of transports for half the cavalry [Footnote: The
total number was one thousand, each tribe furnishing one hundred.] and
sufficient boats. This we must have ready against his sudden, marches
from his own country to Thermopylae, the Chersonese, Olynthus, and any
where he likes. For he should entertain the belief, that possibly you
may rouse from this over-carelessness, and start off, as you did to
Euboea, [Footnote: The expedition about five years before, when the
Thebans had sent an army to Euboea, and Timotheus roused his countrymen
to expel them from the island. Of this, Demosthenes gives an animated
account at the close of tho oration on the Chersonese.] and formerly
(they say) to Haliartus, [Footnote: B. C. 395, when the war between
Thebes and Sparta had begun and Lysander besieged Haliartus. He was
slain in a sally by the Thebans and Athenians.] and very lately to
Thermopylae. And although you should not pursue just the course I would
advise, it is no slight matter, that Philip, knowing you to be in
readiness--know it he will for certain; there are too many among our own
people who report every thing to him--may either keep quiet from
apprehension, or, not heeding your arrangements, be taken off his guard,
there being nothing to prevent your sailing, if he give you a chance, to
attack his territories. Such an armament, I say, ought instantly to be
agreed upon and provided. But besides, men of Athens, you should keep in
hand some force, that will incessantly make war and annoy him: none of
your ten or twenty thousand mercenaries, not your forces on paper,
[Footnote: Literally "written in letters," that is, promised to the
generals or allies, but never sent. Jacobs: _eine Macht die auf dem
Blatte steht_. Compare Shakspeare, Henry IV, Second Part, Act i.
We fortify in paper and in figures.
Using the names of men instead of men.]
but one that shall belong to the state, and, whether you appoint one or
more generals, or this or that man or any other, shall obey and follow
him. Subsistence too I require for it. What the force shall be, how
large, from what source maintained, how rendered efficient, I will show
you, stating every particular. Mercenaries I recommend--and beware of
doing what has often been injurious--thinking all measures below the
occasion, adopting the strongest in your decrees, you fail to accomplish
the least--rather, I say, perform and procure a little, add to it
afterward, if it prove insufficient. I advise then two thousand soldiers
in all, five hundred to be Athenians, of whatever age you think right,
serving a limited time, not long, but such time as you think right, so
as to relieve one another; the rest should be mercenaries. And with them
two hundred horse, fifty at least Athenians, like the foot, on the same
terms of service; and transports for them. Well; what besides? Ten swift
galleys: for, as Philip has a navy, we must have swift galleys also, to
convoy our power. How shall subsistence for these troops be provided? I
will state and explain; but first let me tell you why I consider a force
of this amount sufficient, and why I wish the men to be citizens.
Of that amount, Athenians, because it is impossible for us now to raise
an army capable of meeting him in the field: we must plunder [Footnote:
Make predatory incursions, as Livy says, "popula bundi magis quam justo
more belli." Jacobs: _den Krieg als Freibeuter fahren_. Another
German: _Streifzuge zu machen_ (guerilla warfare). Leland: "harass
him with depredations." Wilson, an old English translator: "rob and
spoil upon him."] and adopt such kind of warfare at first: our force,
therefore, must not be over-large, (for there is not pay or
subsistence,) nor altogether mean. Citizens I wish to attend and go on
board, because I hear that formerly the state maintained mercenary
troops at Corinth, [Footnote: He alludes to the time when Corinth,
Athens, Thebes, and Argos, were allied against Sparta, and held a
congress at Corinth, B. C. 394. The allies were at first defeated, but
Iphicrates gained some successes, and acquired considerable reputation
by cutting off a small division (_mora_) of Spartan infantry.]
commanded by Polystratus and Iphicrates and Chabrias and some others,
and that you served with them yourselves; and I am told, that these
mercenaries fighting by your side and you by theirs defeated the
Lacedaemonians. But ever since your hirelings have served by themselves,
they have been vanquishing your friends and allies, while your enemies
have become unduly great. Just glancing at the war of our state, they go
off to Artabazus [Footnote: Diodorus relates that Chares, in the Social
war, having no money to pay his troops, was forced to lend them to
Artabazus, then in rebellion against the king of Persia. Chares gained a
victory for the satrap, and received a supply of money. But this led to
a complaint and menace of war by the king, which brought serious
consequences. See the Historical Abstract.] or any where rather, and the
general follows, naturally; for it is impossible to command without
giving pay. What therefore ask I? To remove the excuses both of general
and soldiers, by supplying pay, and attaching native soldiers, as
inspectors of the general's conduct. The way we manage things now is a
mockery. For if you were asked: Are you at peace, Athenians? No, indeed,
you would say; we are at war with Philip. Did you not choose from
yourselves ten captains and generals, and also captains and two generals
[Footnote: There were chosen at Athens every year
Ten generals (one for each tribe), [Greek: _strataegoi_].
Ten captains (one for each tribe), [Greek: _taxiarchoi_].
Two generals of cavalry, [Greek: _ipparchoi_].
Ten cavalry officers (one for each tribe), [Greek: _phularchoi_].
In a regular army of citizens, when each tribe formed its own division,
both of horse and foot, all these generals and officers would he
present. Thus, there were ten generals at Marathon. A change took place
in later times, when the armies were more miscellaneous. Three Athenian
generals were frequently employed, and at a still later period only one.
Demosthenes here touches on a very important matter, which we can well
understand, viz. the necessity of officering the foreign mercenaries
from home.] of horse? How are they employed? Except one man, whom you
commission on service abroad, the rest conduct your processions with the
sacrificers. Like puppet-makers, you elect your infantry and cavalry
officers for the market-place, not for war. Consider, Athenians, should
there not be native captains, a native general of horse, your own
commanders, that the force might really be the state's? Or should your
general of horse sail to Lemnos, [Footnote: To assist at a religious
ceremony held annually at Lemnos, where many Athenians resided.] while
Menelaus commands the cavalry fighting for your possessions? I speak not
as objecting to the man, but he ought to be elected by you, whoever the
person be.
Perhaps you admit the justice of these statements, but wish principally
to hear about the supplies, what they must be and whence procured. I
will satisfy you. Supplies, then, for maintenance, mere rations for
these troops, come to ninety talents and a little more: for ten swift
galleys forty talents, twenty minas a month to every ship; for two
thousand soldiers forty more, that each soldier may receive for rations
ten drachms a month; and for two hundred horsemen, each receiving thirty
drachms a month, twelve talents. [Footnote: As to Athenian money, see
Appendix II.] Should any one think rations for the men a small
provision, he judges erroneously. Furnish that, and I am sure the army
itself will, without injuring any Greek or ally, procure every thing
else from the war, so as to make out their full pay. I am ready to join
the fleet as a volunteer, and submit to any thing, if this be not so.
Now for the ways and means of the supply, which I demand from you.
[_Statement of ways and means_.]
[Footnote: Here the clerk or secretary reads the scheme drawn up by
Demosthenes, in the preparing of which he was probably assisted by the
financial officers of the state. What follows was according to
Dionysius, spoken at a different time. The curious may consult Leland,
and Jacobs' introduction to his translation.]
This, Athenians, is what we have been able to devise. When you vote upon
the resolutions, pass what you [Footnote: _I. e._ some measure, if
not mine, whereby the war may be waged effectually. The reading of
[Greek: _poiaesate_], adopted by Jacobs after Schaefer, is not in
congruity with the sentence.] approve, that you may oppose Philip, not
only by decrees and letters, but by action also.
I think it will assist your deliberations about the war and the whole
arrangements, to regard the position, Athenians, of the hostile country,
and consider, that Philip by the winds and seasons of the year gets the
start in most of his operations, watching for the trade-winds [Footnote:
The Etesian winds blowing from the northwest in July, which would impede
a voyage from Athens to Macedonia and Thrace.] or the winter to commence
them, when we are unable (he thinks) to reach the spot. On this account,
we must carry on the war not with hasty levies, (or we shall be too late
for every thing,) but with a permanent force and power. You may use as
winter quarters for your troops Lemnos, and Thasus, and Sciathus, and
the islands [Footnote: As Scopelus, Halonnesus, Peparethus, which were
then subject to Athens.] in that neighborhood, which have harbors and
corn and all necessaries for an army. In the season of the year, when it
is easy to put ashore and there is no danger from the winds, they will
easily take their station off the coast itself and at the entrances of
the sea-ports.
How and when to employ the troops, the commander appointed by you will
determine as occasion requires. What you must find, is stated in my
bill. If, men of Athens, you will furnish the supplies which I mention,
and then, after completing your preparations of soldiers, ships,
cavalry, will oblige the entire force by law to remain in the service,
and, while you become your own paymasters and commissaries, demand from
your general an account of his conduct, you will cease to be always
discussing the same questions without forwarding them in the least, and
besides, Athenians, not only will you cut off his greatest revenue--What
is this? He maintains war against you through the resources of your
allies, by his piracies on their navigation--But what next? You will be
out of the reach of injury yourselves: he will not do as in time past,
when falling upon Lemnos and Imbrus he carried off your citizens
captive, seizing the vessels at Geraestus he levied an incalculable sum,
and lastly, made a descent at Marathon and carried off the sacred galley
[Footnote: A ship called Paralus generally used on religious missions or
to carry public dispatches.] from our coast, and you could neither
prevent these things nor send succors by the appointed time. But how is
it, think you, Athenians, that the Panathenaic and Dionysian festivals
[Footnote: The Panathenaic festivals were in honor of Pallas or Athene,
the protectress of Athens, and commemorated also the union of the old
Attic towns under one government. There were two, the greater held every
fourth year, the lesser annually. They were celebrated with sacrifices,
races, gymnastic and musical contests, and various other amusements and
solemnities, among which was the carrying the pictured robe of Pallas to
her temple. The Dionysia, or festival of Bacchus, will be spoken of more
fully hereafter.] take place always at the appointed time, whether
expert or unqualified persons be chosen to conduct either of them,
whereon you expend larger sums than upon any armament, and which are
more numerously attended and magnificent than almost any thing in the
world; while all your armaments are after the time, as that to Methone,
to Pagasae, to Potidaea? Because in the former case every thing is
ordered by law, and each of you knows long before-hand, who is the
choir-master [Footnote: The choregus, or choir-master, of each tribe,
had to defray the expense of the choruses, whether dramatic, lyric, or
musical, which formed part of the entertainment on solemn occasions.
This was one of the [Greek: _leitourgiai_], or burdensome offices,
to which men of property were liable at Athens, of which we shall see
more in other parts of our author.] of his tribe, who the gymnastic
[Footnote: The gymnasiarch, like the choregus, had a burden imposed on
him by his tribe, to make certain provisions for the gymnasium, public
place or school of exercise. Some of the contests at the festivals being
of a gymnastic nature, such as the Torch-race, it was his duty to make
arrangements for them, and more particularly to select the ablest youths
of the school for performers.] master, when, from whom, and what he is
to receive, and what to do. Nothing there is left unascertained or
undefined: whereas in the business of war and its preparations all is
irregular, unsettled, indefinite. Therefore, no sooner have we heard any
thing, than we appoint ship-captains, dispute with them on the
exchanges, [Footnote: For every ship of war a captain, or trierarch, was
appointed, whose duty it was, not merely to command, but take charge of
the vessel, keep it in repair, and bear the expense (partly or wholly)
of equipping it. In the Peloponnesian war we find the charge laid upon
two joint captains, and afterward it was borne by an association formed
like the Symmoriae of the Property Tax. Demosthenes, when he came to the
head of affairs, introduced some useful reforms in the system of the
Trierarchy.
The exchange, [Greek: _antidosis_], was a stringent but clumsy
contrivance, to enforce the performance of these public duties by
persons capable of bearing them. A party charged might call upon any
other person to take take the office, or exchange estates with him. If
he refused, complaint was made to the magistrate who had cognizance of
the business, and the dispute was judicially heard and decided.] and
consider about ways and means; then it is resolved that resident aliens
and householders [Footnote: Freedmen, who had quitted their masters'
house, and lived independently.] shall embark, then to put yourselves on
board instead: but during these days the objects of our expedition are
lost; for the time of action we waste in preparation, and favorable
moments wait not our evasions and delays. The forces that we imagine we
possess in the mean time, are found, when the crisis comes, utterly
insufficient. And Philip has arrived at such a pitch of arrogance, as to
send the following letter to the Euboeans:
[_The letter is read_.]
Of that which has been read, Athenians, most is true, unhappily true;
perhaps not agreeable to hear. And if what one passes over in speaking,
to avoid offense, one could pass over in reality, it is right to humor
the audience; but if graciousness of speech, where it is out of place,
does harm in action, shameful is it, Athenians, to delude ourselves, and
by putting off every thing unpleasant to miss the time for all
operations, and be unable even to understand, that skillful makers of
war should not follow circumstances, but be in advance of them; that
just as a general may be expected to lead his armies, so are men of
prudent counsel to guide circumstances, in order that their resolutions
may be accomplished, not their motions determined by the event. Yet you,
Athenians, with larger means than any people--ships, infantry, cavalry,
and revenue--have never up to this day made proper use of any of them;
and your war with Philip differs in no respect from the boxing of
barbarians. For among them the party struck feels always for the blow;
[Footnote: Compare Virgil, Aen. ix 577.
Ille manum projecto tegmine demens
Ad vulnus tulit.]
strike him somewhere else, there go his hands again; ward or look in the
face he can not nor will. So you, if you hear of Philip in the
Chersonese, vote to send relief there if at Thermopylae, the same; if
any where else, you run after his heels up and down, and are commanded
by him; no plan have you devised for the war, no circumstance do you see
beforehand, only [Footnote: This loose mode of expression, which is
found in the original, I designedly retain.] when you learn that
something is done, or about to be done. Formerly perhaps this was
allowable: now it is come to a crisis, to be tolerable no longer. And it
seems, men of Athens, as if some god, ashamed for us at our proceedings,
has put this activity into Philip. For had he been willing to remain
quiet in possession of his conquests and prizes, and attempted nothing
further, some of you, I think, would be satisfied with a state of
things, which brands our nation with the shame of cowardice and the
foulest disgrace. But by continually encroaching and grasping after
more, he may possibly rouse you, if you have not altogether despaired. I
marvel, indeed, that none of you, Athenians, notices with concern and
anger, that the beginning of this war was to chastise Philip, the end is
to protect ourselves against his attacks. One thing is clear: he will
not stop, unless some one oppose him. And shall we wait for this? And if
you dispatch empty galleys and hopes from this or that person, think ye
all is well? Shall we not embark? Shall we not sail with at least a part
of our national forces, now though not before? Shall we not make a
descent upon his coast? Where, then, shall we land? some one asks. The
war itself, men of Athens, will discover the rotten parts of his empire,
if we make a trial; but if we sit at home, hearing the orators accuse
and malign one another, no good can ever be achieved. Methinks, where a
portion of our citizens, though not all, are commissioned with the rest,
Heaven blesses, and Fortune aids the struggle: but where you send out a
general and an empty decree and hopes from the hustings, nothing that
you desire is done; your enemies scoff, and your allies die for fear of
such an armament. For it is impossible--ay, impossible, for one man to
execute all your wishes: to promise, [Footnote: Chares is particularly
alluded to. The "promises of Chares" passed into a proverb.] and assert,
and accuse this or that person, is possible; but so your affairs are
ruined. The general commands wretched unpaid hirelings; here are persons
easily found, who tell you lies of his conduct; you vote at random from
what you hear: what then can be expected?
How is this to cease, Athenians? When you make the same persons
soldiers, and witnesses of the generals conduct, and judges when they
return home at his audit; [Footnote: The audit or scrutiny of his
conduct which every officer of the republic had to undergo, before a
jury, if necessary, at the end of his administration. In the case of a
general, the scrutiny would be like a court-martial. The Athenian
people, (says Demosthenes,) as represented by the citizen soldiers,
would themselves be witnesses of the general's conduct. These same
soldiers, when they came home, or at least a portion of them, might
serve on the jury; and so the people would be both witnesses and
judges.] so that you may not only hear of your own affairs, but be
present to see them. So disgraceful is our condition now, that every
general is twice or thrice tried [Footnote: Chares was tried several
times. Capital charges were preferred also against Autocles,
Cephisodotus, Leosthenes, Callisthenes.] before you for his life, though
none dares even once to hazard his life against the enemy: they prefer
the death of kidnappers and thieves to that which becomes them; for it
is a malefactor's part to die by sentence of the law, a general's to die
in battle. Among ourselves, some go about and say that Philip is
concerting with the Lacedaemonians the destruction of Thebes and the
dissolution of republics; some, that he has sent envoys to the king;
[Footnote: The king of Persia, generally called _the king_ by the
Greeks.] others, that he is fortifying cities in Illyria: so we wander
about, each inventing stories. For my part, Athenians, by the gods I
believe, that Philip is intoxicated with the magnitude of his exploits,
and has many such dreams in his imagination, seeing the absence of
opponents, and elated by success; but most certainly he has no such plan
of action, as to let the silliest people among us know what his
intentions are; for the silliest are these newsmongers. Let us dismiss
such talk, and remember only that Philip is an enemy, who robs us of our
own and has long insulted us; that wherever we have expected aid from
any quarter, it has been found hostile, and that the future depends on
ourselves, and unless we are willing to fight him there, we shall
perhaps be compelled to fight here. This let us remember, and then we
shall have determined wisely, and have done with idle conjectures. You
need not pry into the future, but assure yourselves it will be
disastrous, unless you attend to your duty, and are willing to act as
becomes you.
As for me, never before have I courted favor, by speaking what I am not
convinced is for your good, and now I have spoken my whole mind frankly
and unreservedly. I could have wished, knowing the advantage of good
counsel to you, I were equally certain of its advantage to the
counselor: so should I have spoken with more satisfaction. Now, with an
uncertainty of the consequence to myself, but with a conviction that you
will benefit by adopting it, I proffer my advice. I trust only, that
what is most for the common benefit will prevail.
THE SECOND PHILIPPIC.
THE ARGUMENT.
Soon after the close of the Phocian war, the attention of
Philip was called to Peloponnesus, where the dissensions
between Sparta and her old enemies afforded him an occasion
of interference. The Spartans had never abandoned their right
to the province of Messenia, which had been wrested from them
by Epaminondas; and since Thebes was no longer to be feared,
they seem to have conceived hopes of regaining their lost
power. The Argives and the Arcadians of Megalopolis were in
league with Messenia, but Sparta had her allies in the
Peloponnesus, and even Athens was suspected of favoring her
cause. It does not appear that any open hostilities had taken
place; but about this time the fears of the Messenians induced
them to solicit the alliance of Philip. He willingly promised
them his protection, and sent a body of troops into the
Peninsula. The progress which Macedonian influence was making
there having alarmed the Athenians, they sent Demosthenes with
an embassy to counteract it. He went to Messene and to Argos,
addressed the people, and pointed out the dangers, to which
all Greece was exposed by Philip's ambition. It seems that he
failed in rousing their suspicions, or they were too much
occupied by an immediate peril to heed one that appeared
remote. Philip however resented this proceeding on the part of
the Athenians, and sent an embassy to expostulate with them,
especially on the charge of bad faith and treachery which had
been preferred against him by Demosthenes. Embassadors from
Argos and Messene accompanied those of Macedon, and complained
of the connection that appeared to subsist between Athens
and Lacedaemon, hostile (they thought) to the liberties of
Peloponnesus. In answer to these complaints, Demosthenes
addressed his second Philippic to the Popular Assembly;
repeating the substance of what he had said to the
Peloponnesians, vindicating his own conduct, and denouncing
the Macedonian party at Athens. The embassy led to no immediate
result; but the influence of Demosthenes at home was increased.
In all the speeches, men of Athens, about Philip's measures and
infringements of the peace, I observe that statements made on our behalf
are thought just and generous, [Footnote: _Generous_, as regards
the Greek states, whose independence the Athenians stand up for. This
praise Demosthenes frequently claims for his countrymen, and, compared
with the rest of the Greeks, they deserved it. Leland understood the
word [Greek: _philanthropous_] in the same sense, though he
translates it _humane_. We use the term _philanthropic_ in a
sense not unlike that of the orator; but, as Leland truly observes, "the
distinction of Greek and barbarian precluded the rest of mankind from a
just share in Grecian philanthropy;" and he might have added, that their
notions of slavery were not in accordance with an enlarged humanity.
Therefore, I prefer a word of a less arrogant meaning. Jacobs:
_billig_. Francis: "filled with sentiments of exceeding
moderation."] and all who accuse Philip are heard with approbation; yet
nothing (I may say) that is proper, or for the sake of which the
speeches are worth hearing, is done. To this point are the affairs of
Athens brought, that the more fully and clearly one convicts Philip of
violating the peace with you, and plotting against the whole of Greece,
the more difficult it becomes to advise you how to act. The cause lies
in all of us, Athenians, that, when we ought to oppose an ambitious
power by deeds and actions, not by words, we men of the hustings
[Footnote: Auger has: "nous qui montons a la tribune."] shrink from our
duty of moving and advising, for fear of your displeasure, and only
declaim on the heinousness and atrocity of Philip's conduct; you of the
assembly, though better instructed than Philip to argue justly, or
comprehend the argument of another, to check him in the execution of his
designs are totally unprepared. The result is inevitable, I imagine, and
perhaps just. You each succeed better in what you are busy and earnest
about; Philip in actions, you in words. If you are still satisfied with
using the better arguments, it is an easy matter, and there is no
trouble: but if we are to take measures for the correction of these
evils, to prevent their insensible progress, and the rising up of a
mighty power, against which we could have no defense, then our course of
deliberation is not the same as formerly; the orators, and you that hear
them, must prefer good and salutary counsels to those which are easy and
agreeable.
First, men of Athens, if any one regards without uneasiness the might
and dominion of Philip, and imagines that it threatens no danger to the
state, or that all his preparations are not against you, I marvel, and
would entreat you every one to hear briefly from me the reasons, why I
am led to form a contrary expectation, and wherefore I deem Philip an
enemy; that, if I appear to have the clearer foresight, you may hearken
to me; if they, who have such confidence and trust in Philip, you may
give your adherence to them.
Thus then I reason, Athenians. What did Philip first make himself master
of after the peace? Thermopylae and the Phocian state. Well, and how
used he his power? He chose to act for the benefit of Thebes, not of
Athens. Why so? Because, I conceive, measuring his calculations by
ambition, by his desire of universal empire, without regard to peace,
quiet, or justice, he saw plainly, that to a people of our character and
principles nothing could he offer or give, that would induce you for
self-interest to sacrifice any of the Greeks to him. He sees that you,
having respect for justice, dreading the infamy of the thing, and
exercising proper forethought, would oppose him in any such attempt as
much as if you were at war: but the Thebans he expected (and events
prove him right) would, in return for the services done them, allow him
in every thing else to have his way, and, so far from thwarting or
impeding him, would fight on his side if he required it. From the same
persuasion he befriended lately the Messenians and Argives, which is the
highest panegyric upon you, Athenians; for you are adjudged by these
proceedings to be the only people incapable of betraying for lucre the
national rights of Greece, or bartering your attachment to her for any
obligation or benefit. And this opinion of you, that (so different) of
the Argives and Thebans, he has naturally formed, not only from a view
of present times, but by reflection on the past. For assuredly he finds
and hears that your ancestors, who might have governed the rest of
Greece on terms of submitting to Persia, not only spurned the proposal,
when Alexander, [Footnote: Alexander of Macedon, son of Amyntas, was
sent by Mardonius, the Persian commander, to offer the most favorable
terms to the Athenians, if they would desert the cause of the Greeks.
The Spartans at the same time sent an embassy, to remind them of their
duty. The spirited reply which the Athenians made to both embassies is
related by Herodotus. The Thebans submitted to Xerxes, and fought
against the Greeks at the battle of Plataea. The Argives were neutral,
chiefly from jealousy of Sparta. They demanded half the command of the
allied army, as a condition of their assistance, but this could not be
complied with.] this man's ancestor, came as herald to negotiate, but
preferred to abandon their country and endure any suffering, and
thereafter achieved such exploits as all the world loves to mention,
though none could ever speak them worthily, and therefore I must be
silent; for their deeds are too mighty to be uttered [Footnote: The
simple [Greek: _eipein_] in the original is more forcible than if
it had been [Greek: _epainein_], or the like. Compare Shakspeare,
Coriolanus, Act ii. sc. 2.
I shall lack voice: the deeds of Coriolanus
Should not be uttered feebly----
For this last
Before and in Corioli, let me say,
I can not speak him home.]
in words. But the forefathers of the Argives and Thebans, they either
joined the barbarian's army, or did not oppose it; and therefore he
knows that both will selfishly embrace their advantage, without
considering the common interest of the Greeks. He thought then, if he
chose your friendship, it must be on just principles; if he attached
himself to them he should find auxiliaries of his ambition. This is the
reason of his preferring them to you both then and now. For certainly he
does not see them with a larger navy than you, nor has he acquired an
inland empire and renounced that of the sea and the ports, nor does he
forget the professions and promises on which he obtained the peace.
Well, it may be said, he knew all this, yet he so acted, not from
ambition or the motives which I charge, but because the demands of the
Thebans were more equitable than yours. Of all pleas, this now is the
least open to him. He that bids the Lacedaemonians resign Messene, how
can he pretend, when he delivered Orchomenos and Coronea to the Thebans,
to have acted on a conviction of justice?
But, forsooth, he was compelled,--this plea remains--he made concessions
against his will, being surrounded by Thessalian horse and Theban
infantry. Excellent! So of his intentions they talk; he will mistrust
the Thebans; and some carry news about, that he will fortify Elatea. All
this he intends and will intend I dare say; but to attack the
Lacedaemonians on behalf of Messene and Argos he does not intend; he
actually sends mercenaries and money into the country, and is expected
himself with a great force. The Lacedaemonians, who are enemies of
Thebes, he overthrows; the Phocians, whom he himself before destroyed,
will he now preserve?
And who can believe this? I can not think that Philip, either if he was
forced into his former measures, or if he were now giving up the
Thebans, would pertinaciously oppose their enemies; his present conduct
rather shows that he adopted those measures by choice. All things prove
to a correct observer, that his whole plan of action is against our
state. And this has now become to him a sort of necessity. Consider. He
desires empire: he conceives you to be his only opponents. He has been
for some time wronging you, as his own conscience best informs him,
since, by retaining what belongs to you, he secures the rest of his
dominion: had he given up Amphipolis and Potidaea, he deemed himself
unsafe at home. He knows therefore, both that he is plotting against
you, and that you are aware of it; and, supposing you to have
intelligence, he thinks you must hate him; he is alarmed, expecting some
disaster, if you get the chance, unless he hastes to prevent you.
Therefore he is awake, and on the watch against us; he courts certain
people, Thebans, and people in Peloponnesus of the like views, who from
cupidity, he thinks, will be satisfied with the present, and from
dullness of understanding will foresee none of the consequences. And yet
men of even moderate sense might notice striking facts, which I had
occasion to quote to the Messenians and Argives, and perhaps it is
better they should be repeated to you.
Ye, men of Messene, said I, how do ye think the Olynthians would have
brooked to hear any thing against Philip at those times, when he
surrendered to them Anthemus, which all former kings of Macedonia
claimed, when he cast out the Athenian colonists and gave them Potidaea,
taking on himself your enmity, and giving them the land to enjoy? Think
ye they expected such treatment as they got, or would have believed it
if they had been told? Nevertheless, said I, they, after enjoying for a
short time the land of others, are for a long time deprived by him of
their own, shamefully expelled, not only vanquished, but betrayed by one
another and sold. In truth, these too close connections with despots are
not safe for republics. The Thessalians, again, think ye, said I, when
he ejected their tyrants, and gave back Nicaea and Magnesia, they
expected to have the decemvirate [Footnote: Thessaly was anciently
divided into four districts, each called a _tetras_, and this, as
we learn from the third Philippic, was restored soon after the
termination of the Sacred war. The object of Philip in effecting this
arrangement was, no doubt, to weaken the influence of the great
Thessalian families by a division of power; otherwise the Pheraean
tyranny might have been exchanged for an oligarchy powerful enough to be
independent of Macedonia. The decemvirate here spoken of (if the text be
correct) was a further contrivance to forward Philip's views; whether we
adopt Leland's opinion, that each tetrarchy was governed by a council of
ten, or Schaefer's, that each city was placed under ten governors.
Jacobs understands the word _decemvirate_ not to refer to any
positive form of government, but generally to designate a
_tyranny_, such as that which the Lacedaemonians used to introduce
into conquered cities. So, for example, the Romans might have spoken of
a decemvirate after the time of Appius. However this be, Philip seems to
have contrived that the ruling body, whether in the tetrarchy or the
decadarchy, should be his own creatures. Two of them, Eudicus and Simus,
are particularly mentioned by Demosthenes as traitors.] which is now
established? or that he who restored the meeting at Pylae [Footnote:
_Pylae_, which signifies _gates_, was a name applied by the
Greeks to divers passes, or defiles, but especially to the pass of
_Thermopylae_, which opened through the ridges of Mount Oeta into
the country of the Epicnemidian Locrians, and was so called from the hot
sulphureous springs that gushed from the foot of the mountain.] would
take away their revenues? Surely not. And yet these things have
occurred, as all mankind may know. You behold Philip, I said, a
dispenser of gifts and promises: pray, if you are wise, that you may
never know him for a cheat and a deceiver. By Jupiter, I said, there are
manifold contrivances for the guarding and defending of cities, as
ramparts, walls, trenches, and the like: these are all made with hands,
and require expense; but there is one common safeguard in the nature of
prudent men, which is a good security for all, but especially for
democracies against despots. What do I mean? Mistrust. Keep this, hold
to this; preserve this only, and you can never be injured. What do ye
desire? Freedom. Then see ye not that Philip's very titles are at
variance therewith? Every king and despot is a foe to freedom, an
antagonist to laws. Will ye not beware, I said, lest, seeking
deliverance from war, you find a master?
They heard me with a tumult of approbation; and many other speeches they
heard from the ambassadors, both in my presence and afterward; yet none
the more, as it appears, will they keep aloof from Philip's friendship
and promises. And no wonder, that Messenians and certain Peloponnesians
should act contrary to what their reason approves; but you, who
understand yourselves, and by us orators are told, how you are plotted
against, how you are inclosed! you, I fear, to escape present exertion,
will come to ruin ere you are aware. So doth the moment's case and
indulgence prevail over distant advantage.
As to your measures, you will in prudence, I presume, consult hereafter
by yourselves. I will furnish you with such an answer as it becomes the
assembly to decide upon.
[_Here the proposed answer was read_]
[Footnote: Whether this was moved by the orator himself, or formally
read as his motion by the officer of the assembly, does not appear.]
It were just, men of Athens, to call the persons who brought those
promises, on the faith whereof you concluded peace. For I should never
have submitted to go as ambassador, and you would certainly not have
discontinued the war, had you supposed that Philip, on obtaining peace,
would act thus; but the statements then made were very different. Ay,
and others you should call. Whom? The men who declared--after the peace,
when I had returned from my second mission, that for the oaths, when,
perceiving your delusion, I gave warning, and protested, and opposed the
abandonment of Thermopylae and the Phocians--that I, being a
water-drinker, [Footnote: It was Philocrates who said this. There were
many jokes against Demosthenes as a water-drinker.] was naturally a
churlish and morose fellow, that Philip, if he passed the straits, would
do just as you desired, fortify Thespiae and Plataea, humble the
Thebans, cut through the Chersonese [Footnote: This peninsula being
exposed to incursions from Thrace, a plan was conceived of cutting
through the isthmus from Pteleon to Leuce-Acte, to protect the Athenian
settlements. See the Appendix to this volume, on the Thracian
Chersonese.] at his own expense, and give you Oropus and Euboea in
exchange for Amphipolis. All these declarations on the hustings I am
sure you remember, though you are not famous for remembering injuries.
And, the most disgraceful thing of all, you voted in your confidence,
that this same peace should descend to your posterity; so completely
were you misled. Why mention I this now, and desire these men to be
called? By the gods, I will tell you the truth frankly and without
reserve. Not that I may fall a-wrangling, to provoke recrimination
before you, [Footnote: Similarly Auger: "Ce n'est pas pour m'attirer les
invectives de mes anciens adversaires en les invectivant moi-meme."
Jacobs otherwise: _Nicht um durch Schmahungen mir auf gleiche Weise
Gehor bei Euch zu verschaffen_. But I do not think that [Greek:
_emauto logon poiaeso_] can bear the sense of [Greek: _logon
tuchoimi_], "get a hearing for myself." And the orator's object is,
not so much to sneer at the people by hinting that they are ready to
hear abuse, as to deter his opponents from retaliation, or weaken its
effect, by denouncing their opposition as corrupt. Leland saw the
meaning: "Not that, by breaking out into invectives, I may expose myself
to the like treatment."] and afford my old adversaries a fresh pretext
for getting more from Philip, nor for the purpose of idle garrulity. But
I imagine that what Philip is doing will grieve you hereafter more than
it does now. I see the thing progressing, and would that my surmises
were false; but I doubt it is too near already. So when you are able no
longer to disregard events, when, instead of hearing from me or others
that these measures are against Athens, you all see it yourselves, and
know it for certain, I expect you will be wrathful and exasperated. I
fear then, as your embassadors have concealed the purpose for which they
know they were corrupted, those who endeavor to repair what the others
have lost may chance to encounter your resentment; for I see it is a
practice with many to vent their anger, not upon the guilty, but on
persons most in their power. While therefore the mischief is only coming
and preparing, while we hear one another speak, I wish every man, though
he knows it well, to be reminded, who it was [Footnote: He means
Aeschines.] persuaded you to abandon Phocis and Thermopylae, by the
command of which Philip commands the road to Attica and Peloponnesus,
and has brought it to this, that your deliberation must be, not about
claims and interests abroad, but concerning the defense of your home and
a war in Attica, which will grieve every citizen when it comes, and
indeed it has commenced from that day. Had you not been then deceived,
there would be nothing to distress the state. Philip would certainly
never have prevailed at sea and come to Attica with a fleet, nor would
he have marched with a land-force by Phocis and Thermopylae: he must
either have acted honorably, observing the peace and keeping quiet, or
been immediately in a war similar to that which made him desire the
peace. Enough has been said to awaken recollection. Grant, O ye gods, it
be not all fully confirmed! I would have no man punished, though death
he may deserve, to the damage and danger of the country.
THE THIRD PHILIPPIC.
THE ARGUMENT.
This speech was delivered about three months after the last,
while Philip was advancing into Thrace, and threatening both
the Chersonese and the Propontine coast. No new event had
happened, which called for any special consultation; but
Demosthenes, alarmed by the formidable character of Philip's
enterprises and vast military preparations, felt the necessity
of rousing the Athenians to exertion. He repeats in substance
the arguments which he had used in the Oration on the
Chersonese; points out the danger to be apprehended from the
disunion among the Greek states, from their general apathy
and lack of patriotism, which he contrasts with the high and
noble spirit of ancient times. From the past conduct of Philip
he shows what is to be expected in future; explains the
difference between Philip's new method of warfare and that
adopted in the Peloponnesian war, and urges the necessity of
corresponding measures for defense. The peaceful professions
of Philip were not to be trusted; he was never more dangerous
than when he made overtures of peace and friendship. The most
powerful instruments that he employed for gaining ascendency
were the venal orators, who were to be found in every Grecian
city, and on whom it was necessary to inflict signal punishment,
before they had a chance of opposing foreign enemies. The advice
of Demosthenes now is, to dispatch reinforcements to the
Chersonese, to stir up the people of Greece, and even to solicit
the assistance of the Persian king, who had no less reason than
themselves to dread the ambition of Philip.
The events of the following year, when Philip attacked the
Propontine cities, fully justified the warning of Demosthenes.
And the extraordinary activity, which the Athenians displayed
in resisting him, shows that the exertions of the orator had
their due effect. Even Mitford confesses, with reference to the
operations of that period, that Athens found in Demosthenes an
able and effective minister.
Many speeches, men of Athens, are made in almost every assembly about
the hostilities of Philip, hostilities which ever since the treaty of
peace he has been committing as well against you as against the rest of
the Greeks; and all (I am sure) are ready to avow, though they forbear
to do so, that our counsels and our measures should be directed to his
humiliation and chastisement: nevertheless, so low have our affairs been
brought by inattention and negligence, I fear it is a harsh truth to
say, that if all the orators had sought to suggest, and you to pass
resolutions for the utter ruining of the commonwealth, we could not
methinks be worse off than we are. A variety of circumstanc |
