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Dominican Republic
a country study
Federal Research Division
Library of Congress
Edited by
Richard A. Haggerty
Research Completed December 1989
Data as of December 1989
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Foreword
This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program sponsored by the Department of the Army. The last two pages of this book list the other published studies.
Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural factors. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their common interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and political order.
The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not be construed as an expression of an official United States government position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be welcomed for use in future editions.
Louis R. Mortimer
Chief
Federal Research Division
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. 20540-5220
Data as of December 1989
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Acknowledgements
The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of Jan Knippers Black, Howard I. Blutstein, Kathryn T. Johnston, David S. McMorris, Frederick P. Munson, and Thomas E. Weil, who wrote the 1973 editions of Dominican Republic: A Country Study and Haiti: A Country Study. Their work lent perspective to several chapters of the present volume. The authors also are grateful to individuals in various agencies of the United States government and international and private institutions who gave their time, research materials, and special knowledge to provide information and perspective. These individuals include Ralph K. Benesch, who oversees the Country Studies-Areas Handbook Program for the Department of the Army.
The authors also wish to thank those who contributed directly to the preparation of the manuscript. These include Richard F. Nyrop, who reviewed all drafts and served as liaison with the sponsoring agency; Sandra W. Meditz, who reviewed drafts and provided valuable advice at all stages of production; Dennis M. Hanratty, who contributed useful and substantive comments on several chapter drafts; Vincent Ercolano, who edited the Dominican Republic chapters, Richard Kollodge, who edited the Haiti chapters; Martha E. Hopkins, who edited portions of the manuscript and managed editing; Marilyn Majeska, who also edited portions of the manuscript and managed production; Barbara Edgerton, Janie L. Gilchrist, and Izella Watson, who did the word processing; who compiled the index; and Linda Peterson, of the Printing and Processing Section, Library of Congress, who prepared the camera-ready copy under the supervision of Peggy Pixley.
David P. Cabitto, Sandra K. Ferrell, and Kimberly A. Lord provided invaluable graphics support. David P. Cabitto designed the cover illustration, and Kimberly A. Lord prepared the illustrations for the title page of the chapters on Haiti. Map drafts were prepared by Harriett R. Blood, David P. Cabitto, and Kimberly A. Lord. Various individuals, libraries, and public agencies provided photographs.
Finally, the authors would like to thank several individuals who provided research support. Arvies J. Staton supplied information on ranks and insignia, and Karen Sturges-Vera wrote the geography sections in chapters 2 and 7.
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Table of Contents
Please note: The current Country Study was previously in a multi-country volume.
Chapter numbers reflect those used in the printed book.
* Dominican Republic
* Foreword
* Acknowledgements
* Preface
* INTRODUCTION
* COUNTRY PROFILE: Dominican Republic
o COUNTRY
o GEOGRAPHY
o SOCIETY
o ECONOMY
o TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
o GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
o NATIONAL SECURITY
* Chapter 1. Dominican Republic: Historical Setting
o THE FIRST COLONY
o HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO
o SANTANA AND BAEZ: THE CAUDILLOS TAKE CHARGE
* The Infant Republic
* Annexation by Spain, 1861-65
* The Contest for Power, 1865-82
o ULISES HEUREAUX, 1882-99
o RENEWED CONFLICT, 1899-1916
o OCCUPATION BY THE UNITED STATES, 1916-24
o THE ERA OF TRUJILLO
o THE POST-TRUJILLO ERA
* Transition to Elected Government
* Civil War and United States Intervention, 1965
* Joaquín Balaguer, 1966-78
* Antonio Guzmán, 1978-82
* Chapter 2. Dominican Republic: The Society and Its Environment
o GEOGRAPHY
* Natural Regions
* Drainage
* Climate
o POPULATION
* Size and Growth
* Migration
* Urbanization
o RACIAL AND ETHNIC GROUPS
* Ethnic Heritage
* Modern Immigration
* Haitians
o URBAN SOCIETY
* The Elite
* The Middle Sector
* The Urban Poor
o RURAL SOCIETY
* Sugar Plantations
* Mixed Farming
o FAMILY AND KIN
o RELIGION
o SOCIAL WELFARE
* Education
* Health and Social Security
* Chapter 3. Dominican Republic: The Economy
o GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY
o ECONOMIC POLICY
* Fiscal Policy
* Expenditures
* Revenues
* Monetary and Exchange-Rate Policies
o LABOR
* Formal Sector
* Informal Sector
o AGRICULTURE
* Land Tenure and Land Policy
* Land Use
* Farming Technology
* Crops
* Cash Crops
* Food Crops
* Livestock
* Forestry and Fishing
o INDUSTRY
* Manufacturing
* Traditional Manufacturing
* Free-Zone Manufacturing
* Mining
* Construction
* Energy
o SERVICES
* Tourism
* Banking and Financial Services
* Transportation
* Communications
o FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
* Foreign Trade
* Balance of Payments
* Foreign Debt
* Foreign Assistance
* Chapter 4. Dominican Republic: Government and Politics
o THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
* Constitutional Development
* The Executive
* The Legislature
* The Judiciary
* Public Administration
* Local Government
* The Electoral System
o POLITICAL DYNAMICS
* The System of Dominican Politics
* Political Developments since 1978
* Interest Groups
* The Armed Forces
* The Roman Catholic Church
* Economic Elites
* Trade Unions
* Student Politics
* Peasants
* Middle Class
* The Bureaucracy
* Outside Actors
* Political Parties
* The Mass Media
o FOREIGN RELATIONS
* Chapter 5. Dominican Republic: National Security
o HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES
o THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN PUBLIC LIFE
* Missions
* Manpower
* Defense Spending
o ARMED FORCES ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND EQUIPMENT
* The Army
* The Navy
* The Air Force
* Ranks, Uniforms, and Insignia
o INTERNAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC ORDER
* Crime
* The National Police
* The Criminal Justice System
* Penal Law and Procedure
* The Prison System
* Appendices
o Appendix A. Tables
o Appendix B. Caribbean Basin Initiative
* Bibliography
* Glossary
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Preface
Like its predecessors, these studies represent an attempt to treat in a compact and objective manner the dominant contemporary social, political, economic, and military aspects of the Dominican Republic and Haiti. Sources of information included scholarly books, journals, monographs; official reports of governments and international organizations; numerous periodicals; the authors' previous research and observations; and interviews with individuals who have special competence in Dominican, Haitian, and Latin American affairs. Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book; brief comments on sources recommended for further reading appear at the end of each chapter. To the extent possible, place-names conform with the system used by the United States Board on Geographic Names (BGN). Measurements are given in the metric system; a conversion table is provided to assist readers unfamiliar with metric measurements (see table 1, Appendix A). A glossary is also included.
Although there are numerous variations, Spanish surnames generally consist of two parts: the patrilineal name followed by the matrilineal one. In the instance of Joaquín Balaguer Ricardo, for example, Balaguer is his father's surname and Ricardo, his mother's maiden name. In nonformal use, the matrilineal name is often dropped. Thus, after the first mention, just Balaguer is used. A minority of individuals use only the patrilineal name.
Creole words used in the text may be presented in forms that are unfamiliar to readers who have done previous research on Haiti. The Creole orthography employed in this volume is that developed by the Institut Pédagogique National (IPN--National Pedagogic Institute), which has been the standard in Haiti since 1978.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the signing of the Treaty of Ryswick between the kingdoms of Spain and France in 1697, the island of Hispaniola (La Isla Española) has played host to two separate and distinct societies that we now know as the nations of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. At first encounter, and without the benefit of historical background and context, most students or observers find it incongruous that two such disparate nations--one speaking French and Creole, the other Spanish--should coexist within such limited confines. When viewed in light of the bitter struggle among European colonial powers for wealth and influence both on the continent and in the New World, however, the phenomenon becomes less puzzling. By the late seventeenth century, Spain was a declining power. Although that country would maintain its vast holdings in mainland North America and South America, Spain found itself hard pressed by British, Dutch, and French forces in the Caribbean. The Treaty of Ryswick was but one result of this competition, as the British eventually took Jamaica and established a foothold in Central America. The French eventually proved the value of Caribbean colonization, in an economic as well as a maritime and strategic sense, by developing modern-day Haiti, then known as Saint-Domingue, into the most productive colony in the Western Hemisphere, if not the world.
Although the other European powers envied the French their island jewel, Saint-Domingue eventually was lost not to a colonial rival, but to an idea. That idea, inspired by the American Revolution and the French Revolution, was freedom; its power was such as to convince a bitterly oppressed population of African slaves that anything--reprisal, repression, even death-- was preferable to its denial. This positive impulse, liberally leavened with hatred for the white men, who had seized them, shipped them like cargo across the ocean, tortured and abused them, and forced women into concubinage and men into arduous labor, impelled the black population of Saint-Domingue to an achievement still unmatched in history: the overthrow of a slaveholding colonial power and the establishment of a revolutionary black republic.
The saga of the Haitian Revolution is so dramatic that it is surprising that it has never served as the scenario for a Hollywood production. Its images are varied and intense: the voodoo ceremony and pact sealed in the Bois Cayman (Alligator Woods) in anticipation of the slave revolt of 1791; the blazing, bloody revolt itself; foreign intervention by British and Spanish forces; the charismatic figure of François-Dominique Toussaint Louverture, his rise and fateful decision to switch his allegiance from Spain to France, his surprisingly effective command of troops in the field, the relative restraint with which he treated white survivors and prisoners, the competence of his brief stint as ruler; the French expedition of 1802, of which Toussaint exclaimed, "All France has come to invade us"; Toussaint's betrayal and seizure by the French; and the ensuing revolution led by Jean-Jacque Dessalines, Henri (Henry) Christophe, and Alexandre Pétion.
Given the distinctive and auspicious origins of the Haitian republic, there is some irony in that the Dominicans commemorate as their independence day the date of their overthrow of Haitian rule. The Dominican revolt, however, came as a response to annexation by a Haitian state that had passed from the promise of orderly administration under Toussaint to the hard-handed despotism of Dessalines and had then experienced division, both racial and political, between the forces of Christophe and Pétion. By the time of its conquest of Santo Domingo (later to become the Dominican Republic), Haiti had come under the comparatively stable, but uninspired, stewardship of Jean-Pierre Boyer. Although viewed, both at the time and today, by most Dominicans as a crude and oppressive state dominated by the military, the Haiti that occupied both eastern and western Hispaniola from 1822 to 1844 can itself be seen as a victim of international political and economic isolation. Because they either resented the existence of a black republic or feared a similar uprising in their own slave-owning regions, the European colonial powers and the United States shunned relations with Haiti; in the process, they contributed to the establishment of an impoverished society, ruled by the military, guided by the gun rather than the ballot, and controlled by a small, mostly mulatto, ruling group that lived well, while their countrymen either struggled to eke out a subsistence-level existence on small plots of land or flocked to the banners of regional strongmen in the seemingly never-ending contest for power. To be sure, the French colonial experience had left the Haitians completely unprepared for orderly democratic self-government, but the isolation of the post-independence period assured the exclusion of liberalizing influences that might have guided Haiti along a somewhat different path of political and economic development. By the same token, however, it may be that Western governments of the time, and even those of the early twentieth century, were incapable of dealing with a black republic on an equal basis. The United States occupation of Haiti (1915-34) certainly brought little of lasting value to the country's political culture or institutions, in part because the Americans saw the Haitians as uncivilized lackeys and treated them as such.
Both nations of Hispaniola share--along with much of the developing world--the strong tendency toward political organization built upon the personalistic followings of strongmen, or caudillos, rather than on more legalistic bases, such as constitutionalism. This similarity in political culture helps to explain the chronologically staggered parallels between the brutal regimes of Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina (1930-61) in the Dominican Republic and that of the Duvaliers--François Duvalier (1957-71) and his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier (1971-86)-- in Haiti. Both regimes lasted for approximately thirty years; both were headed by nonideological despots; both regimes sustained themselves in power by employing terror and ruthlessly suppressing dissent; both drew the ire of an international community that ultimately proved incapable of directly forcing them from power; and both left their countries mired in political chaos and internal conflict upon their demise. One may only hope that the unstable situation in Haiti after the fall of the Duvalier regime will resolve itself without further analogy to Dominican history--that is, without a civil war. As of late 1990, however, the outcome of the situation remained extremely unpredictable.
Lieutenant General Prosper Avril took power in Haiti in September 1988, ousting the highly unpopular military regime led by Lieutenant General Henri Namphy. Avril, a product of the Haitian military tradition and the Duvalierist system, initially gave assurances that he would serve only as a transitional figure on the road to representative democracy. Whatever his personal feelings or motivations, however, Avril by his actions proved himself to be simply another corrupt Haitian military strongman. Having scheduled elections for 1990, he arrested and expelled leading political figures and declared a state of siege in January of that year. These actions triggered demonstrations, protests, and rioting among a population weary of exploitation and insincere promises of reform. Despite his public rhetoric, Avril presided over a military institution that perpetuated the Duvalierist traditions of extortion, graft, and price-gouging through state-owned enterprises. At the same time, the military made no substantive effort to address the problem of political violence. By early 1990, Haitians had had enough of promises; many decided to take action on their own, much as they had during the uprising of 1985 that swept Jean-Claude Duvalier from power.
Violent demonstrations began in earnest in early March 1990, ostensibly in response to the army's fatal shooting of an eleven- year-old girl in Petit Goâve. Streets blazed across Haiti as demonstrators ignited tires and automobiles, chanted anti-Avril slogans, and fought with army troops. Avril soon recognized the untenable nature of his position; the United States ambassador reportedly influenced the general's decision to step down in a private meeting held on March 12. Avril's flight from Haiti on a United States Air Force transport added his name to a long list of failed Haitian strongmen, and it left the country under the guidance of yet another military officer, Major General (subsequently promoted to Lieutenant General) Hérard Abraham.
Consultations among civilian political figures produced a provisional government headed by a judge of the Court of Cassation (supreme court), Ertha Pascal-Trouillot, a woman little-known outside legal circles. Judge Pascal Trouillot reportedly accepted the post of provisional president after three other supreme court judges declined; she was sworn in on March 13. Appointed along with her was a nineteen-member Council of State, made up of prominent civic and political leaders. Although the new government announced no clear definitions of the powers of the council vis-à-vis the provisional president, some reports indicated that the president could exercise independent authority in some areas. The most compelling reality, however, was that all powers of the provisional government had been granted by the Haitian Armed Forces (Forces Armées d'Haïti--FAd'H), which would provide the government's only mandate--and perhaps its major political constituency--until valid popular elections could be held.
The Conseil Electoral Permanent (Permanent Electoral Council- -CEP) scheduled local, legislative, and presidential elections for sometime between November 4 and November 29, 1990. The prospects for their successful implementation, however, appeared highly problematical at best. Seemingly unchecked political violence, which conjured up for many the horrible images of the bloody election day of November 1987, presented the major obstacle to free and fair balloting. Negotiations between the FAd'H and the CEP sought to establish security mechanisms that would prevent a recurrence of the 1987 tragedy. Popular confidence in these efforts, however, did not appear to be very great.
In a larger sense, the utter absence of any democratic tradition, or framework, in Haiti stacked the odds heavily against a smooth governmental transition. Economist Mats Lundahl has referred to Haiti as a hysteretic state, "not simply one where the past has shaped the present, but also one where history constitutes one of the strongest obstacles to change." Several conditions prevailing in Haiti gave substance to this definition. Among the wide array of personalistic political parties, only three--Marc Bazin's Movement for the Installation of Democracy in Haiti (Mouvement pour l'Instouration de la Démocratie en Haïti-- MIDH), Serge Gilles's National Progressive Revolutionary Haitian Party (Parti Progressiste Révolutionnaire Haïtien--Ponpra), and Sylvio C. Claude's Christian Democrat Party of Haiti (Parti National Chrétien d'Haiti--PDCH)--displayed any semblance of coherent programs or disciplined party apparatus. The odyssey of the Haitian military, from dominant power before the Duvaliers to subordinate status under the dynastic dictatorship, left uncertain the intentions of the FAd'H under Abraham's leadership. The return of such infamous Duvalierist cronies as former interior minister Roger LaFontant and persistent rumors that Jean-Claude himself was contemplating a return to the nation he had bled dry for fifteen years provoked outrage among a population that wanted nothing so much as to rid itself of the remaining vestiges of that predatory regime. According to some observers, internal conditions had approached, by the late summer of 1990, a sort of critical mass, which, if not defused by way of fair and free elections, could explode into generalized and ultimately futile violence.
In July one of the more responsible political leaders, Sylvio Claude, exhorted Haitians to block the return of undesirables by seizing the international airport outside Port-au-Prince. In a speech on Radio Nationale, he declared, "Instead of letting [the army] go kill you later, make them kill you now." Among the figures targeted by Claude for such action was former president Leslie F. Manigat, not previously considered a controversial figure by most observers. Perhaps in response to such rabble- rousing, the provisional government announced on August 1 that Manigat would be barred from returning to his native Haiti.
In late July, the Council of State issued a communiqué, laying down four conditions that it deemed necessary for holding successful elections. First, effective legal action had to be initiated against those who had participated in the November 1987 attacks and other political murders; second, a general climate of public security needed to be established in order to encourage voters to go to the polls; third, the public administration should be purged of entrenched, corrupt bureaucrats; and fourth, some checks had to be established over the powers of the rural section chiefs (chefs de section), so that the rural population could vote in an atmosphere free of coercion and intimidation. It was not clear what action the Council would take if these conditions had not been met by November.
In the Dominican Republic, events unfolded along a much more predictable path. Although Dominican politics were boisterous, and physical clashes--occasionally punctuated by gunfire--between the members of contending political parties were not unusual, the democratic system established after the 1965 civil war and the United States intervention continued to function with comparative efficiency (especially when compared with that of Haiti). The elections of May 16, 1990, however, demonstrated the manifold weaknesses of this system. The most glaring example of the lack of institutionalization in Dominican politics was that the major contenders for the presidency were the same two men who had opposed each other in the elections of 1966, namely, Juan Bosch Gaviño and incumbent Joaquín Balaguer Ricardo. Despite almost a quarter of a century of relatively free political organization and competition, the two modern-day caudillos, both octogenarians, still sallied into the arena flying their own personalistic banners rather than those of truly established parties. The one party that had displayed some level of institutionalization, the Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano--PRD), had split into antagonistic factions--each with its own caudillo--and never presented a serious challenge to the two elder statesmen.
The elections themselves, like most during the post-civil war era, were lively, controversial, and bitterly contested. Despite debilitating national problems, such as a chronic shortage of electricity, rising inflation, and persistent poverty, President Balaguer retained enough support in a presidential race contested by sixteen political parties (some running in coalition) to eke out a narrow victory over Bosch. The final tally showed Balaguer with 678,268 votes against Bosch's 653,423. Like most Dominican politicians before him, Bosch did not accept defeat with magnanimity; he lashed out at Balaguer and the Central Electoral Board, accusing both of fraud during balloting that impartial observers had judged to be fair and orderly. Bosch's early public statements exhorted his followers to stage public protests against the alleged electoral fraud. Early fears of widespread street violence initiated by disgruntled Bosch supporters proved unfounded, however, and Balaguer's reelection was confirmed by the Board on June 12, 1990.
Although it traditionally bends a little around election time, the Dominican democratic system showed few signs of breaking completely. Economic developments, however, will exercise a decisive impact on the nation's future stability. In that regard, Balaguer's reelection could prove to be a storm warning for the republic. At eighty-one years of age, Balaguer reportedly retained his enthusiasm for hands-on administration of government policy. The major economic aspects of that policy, however, did not promise a significant degree of improvement in the short term. Balaguer, since his days as a protégé of Trujillo, has believed in the liberal application of funds to public works projects--the construction of schools, housing, public buildings--in order to boost employment and purchase political support. Such gratuitous expenditures, however, largely served to exacerbate the government's fiscal problems, while masking to only a limited degree the consistently high levels of unemployment prevailing in the republic. Another tenet of Balaguer's economic creed was a refusal to submit to an economic adjustment program dictated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF--see Glossary). By ruling out an IMF-mandated program, Balaguer avoided further short-term austerity measures, such as devaluation and price increases on subsidized items; this enabled him to stand on a platform of economic nationalism and to proclaim his opposition to economic hardship imposed from abroad (that is, from the United States, which is strongly identified with the IMF throughout Latin America). In the long run, however, his obstinacy diminished Dominican standing with foreign creditors, and it limited any new infusions of capital needed to sustain the impressive growth of nontraditional exports achieved during the latter 1980s. This, in turn, would hinder the accumulation of foreign exchange needed to finance the imports required to sustain industrial development. Moreover, although an austerity program undoubtedly would pinch still further an already hard-pressed population, it might also help to balance the budget, to stabilize domestic prices, and to boost exports, all highly desirable potential results.
If the Dominican situation demonstrated anything to Haitians, it was that democracy is not a panacea for domestic turmoil. As Winston Churchill observed, it is the worst political system "except for all the others." Since Trujillo's death, Dominicans have struggled to adjust to an imperfect system, under less than ideal conditions; the final outcome of this process is still in doubt. For Haitians, the small step represented by valid elections could be their first lurch along a much longer road to peace and stability.
August 21, 1990
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In the months following completion of research and writing of this book, significant political developments occurred in Haiti. On December 16, 1990, over 60 percent of registered voters turned out to elect political neophyte Jean-Bertrand Aristide president of Haiti. Aristide, a Roman Catholic priest and an advocate of liberation theology (see Glossary), registered an overwhelming first-round victory against a number of opponents. His popular identification as an outspoken opponent of the regime of Jean- Claude Duvalier apparently moved some 67 percent of voters to select Aristide as their leader. More traditional politicians such as Marc Bazin, Louis Dejoie, and Silvio Claude trailed badly, reflecting their lack of appeal beyond the upper and middle classes. Aristide's victory came as a result of what was arguably the first free and fair election in Haitian history.
Right-wing backlash against the election of the radical leftist Aristide expressed itself in a coup attempt led by Duvalierist Roger Lafontant on January 6, 1991. Assisted by a small contingent of army personnel, Lafontant seized the National Palace, took prisoner Provisional President Pascal-Trouillot, and announced his control of the government over the state-run television station. Lafontant's pronouncement turned out to be decidedly premature, however, as loyalist army forces stormed the palace twelve hours later on the orders of FAd'H commander Abraham. Lafontant and those of his fellow conspirators who survived the fighting were captured and incarcerated. The coup also ignited violent street demonstrations in which mobs lynched at least seven people they accused of Duvalierist ties or sympathies. Violence continued in the interim between the elections and the presidential inauguration on February 7, 1991. Particularly intense anti-Duvalierist demonstrations took place on the night of January 26, leaving more than a dozen dead. On the night of February 1, 1991, suspected Duvalierists set fire to an orphanage in Port-au-Prince administered by Aristide.
Aristide's inauguration on February 7, 1991, was a gala event, befitting its historic nature. As expected, the new president delivered a spellbinding inaugural address. In it, he renounced his US$10,000 a month salary as a "scandal in a country where people cannot eat." Although the address was short on specifics of policy, its tone was one of gratitude and support for the poverty-afflicted constituency that had provided such a striking electoral mandate. The address was also conciliatory with regard to the military. Aristide described a "wedding between the army and the people," and hinted that the army would henceforth function as a public security force in order to lessen the threat emanating from right-wing forces such as those directed by Lafontant.
Beyond his rhetorical outreach to the rank and file, Aristide moved quickly to shore up his rule in the face of possible opposition from within the officer corps of the FAd'H.In his inaugural address, he called on General Abraham to retire six of the eight highest-ranking generals as well as the colonel who commanded the Presidential Guard. The appeal reflected Aristide's surprisingly powerful position, based on his overwhelming electoral victory and his demonstrated popular support, which extended even to the ranks of the military. The fact that Abraham complied with the request confirmed the already rather obvious disarray of the FAd'H and the general unwillingness of the institution to reassume political power in Haiti.
On February 9, Aristide proposed René Préval as Haiti's prime minister. Préval, a Belgian-trained agronomist and close associate of the president, was subsequently approved by the National Assembly. Although Aristide won a smashing personal victory in his presidential race, no one party or movement achieved a majority in the assembly. This fact promised a certain degree of stalemate and inertia in the legislative process under the Aristide administration. Such a situation did not seem conducive to the development of programs to deal effectively with the country's many severe problems. At the same time, however, an assembly based on coalition and compromise should serve to check any temptation by the new government toward heavy-handed or even authoritarian rule. In any case, the assembly was a new institution in a new government in what many hoped would be a new and democratic Haiti.
March 14, 1991
Richard A. Haggerty
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COUNTRY PROFILE: Dominican Republic
COUNTRY
Formal Name: Dominican Republic
Short Form: Dominican Republic
Term for Citizens: Dominicans
Capital: Santo Domingo
GEOGRAPHY
Size: Approximately 48,442 square kilometers.
Topography: Mountain ranges divide country into three regions: northern, central, and southwestern. Seven major drainage basins, most important that of Yaque del Norte River. Largest body of water Lago Enriquillo (Lake Enriquillo), in southwest. Highest mountain peak, Pico Duarte, rises in Cordillera Central (Central Range) to height of 3,087 meters.
Climate: Primarily tropical, with temperatures varying according to altitude. Seasons defined more by rainfall than by temperature. For most of country, rainy season runs roughly from May through November; dry season, from November through April. Rainfall not uniform throughout country because of mountain ranges. Tropical cyclones strike country on average of once every two years and usually have greatest impact along southern coast.
SOCIETY
Population: Annual rate of increase thought to be approximately 2.5 percent in mid-1980s. Projected total population to be just over 7 million by mid-1990.
Language: Spanish.
Ethnic Groups: Majority of mid-1980s population (approximately 73 percent) mulatto, a legacy of black slavery during colonial period. Approximately 16 percent of Dominicans white; 11 percent black.
Education and Literacy: An estimated 74 percent of population literate in 1986. Education system included six years of compulsory primary education, an additional six years of secondary education, and higher education at one of more than twenty-six postsecondary institutions. Major university and sole public institution was Autonomous University of Santo Domingo (Universidad Autónoma de Santa Domingo--UASD).
Health: State-funded health programs reached 78 to 89 percent of population. Facilities concentrated in Santo Domingo and Santiago de los Caballeros (Santiago); service in rural areas suffered accordingly. Main causes of death pulmonary circulatory diseases and intestinal diseases. Average life expectancy 62.6 years for 1980-84 period.
Religion: More than 90 percent Roman Catholic. Protestant groups also active; Evangelicals most successful in attracting converts.
ECONOMY
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): Approximately US$5.6 billion in 1987, roughly US$800 per capita.
Agriculture: Accounted for about 15 percent of GDP, employed some 35 percent of labor force, and generated approximately half of all exports in 1988. Sugar traditionally the major crop, although its importance declined steadily during 1970s and 1980s. Coffee, cacao, and tobacco also produced for export. Exports of nontraditional agricultural products, particularly pineapple and citrus fruit, expanded in 1980s.
Industry: Manufacturing, mining, and construction combined to contribute over 31 percent of GDP in 1988. These industries also employed almost 10 percent of labor force and accounted for two-thirds of country's exports. Assembly manufacturing subsector achieved fastest growth in 1980s as a result of government expansion of Industrial Free Zones throughout country. Major mineral exports gold, silver, bauxite, and nickel, all of which had low prices on world markets during 1980s. Construction benefited greatly from government public works projects and expansion of tourist industry.
Services: Tourism leading service industry; replaced sugar as country's leading foreign-exchange earner in 1984. Government supported development of tourist industry, but economic shortcomings such as inadequate water and energy supply and shortages of construction materials slowed expansion of facilities and adversely affected service to visitors. Financial services contributed 7 percent to GDP in 1988; transportation and communications accounted for additional 6 percent.
Currency: Dominican Republic peso (RD$), consisting of 100 centavos. Peso maintained on a par with United States dollar until 1985, when it was allowed to float against dollar. Value of peso plunged, reaching a low of US$1=RD$8 in mid-1988, but had rebounded slightly to US$1=RD$6.35 by 1989.
Imports: Approximately US$1.5 million in 1987, highest level ever recorded. Oil imports declined on a percentage basis from 1980 to 1987, but imports of intermediate goods, consumer goods, and capital goods increased over same period, contributing to negative trade balance.
Exports: Approximately US$718 million in 1987, a tenyear low. Decline in export value mainly attributable to low sugar prices on world market from 1984-87.
Balance of Payments: Overall deficit reached US$593 million in 1987, roughly 11 percent of GDP. Effect of deficit cushioned somewhat by cash remittances from Dominicans living abroad, tourism, a draw down of reserves, and rescheduling of country's foreign debt.
Fiscal year (FY--see Glossary): Calendar year, except in case of State Sugar Council (Consejo Estatal de Azúcar--CEA), which runs on cycle October 1 to September 30.
Fiscal Policy: Fiscal deficits mounted in 1980s, mainly as result of dwindling revenues. Revenues fell from 16 percent of GDP in 1970 to 10 percent in 1982, as Dominican governments provided tax incentives to business without securing sufficient alternate sources of revenue. Although not exorbitant relative to GDP, expenditures continued to rise throughout 1980s as government maintained subsidies on imported foodstuffs, gasoline, public utilities, and transportation in order to keep prices artificially low for low-income consumers. Debt service accounted for 22 percent of total expenditures in 1988 budget. Under President Joaquín Balaguer Ricardo, expanded public works programs boosted capital expenditures from 30 percent to over 40 percent of budget.
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
Roads: Most common means of travel; in 1989 road network approximately 17,000 kilometers, 70 percent of it paved.
Ports: As result of improvements to facilities during 1980s, Haina replaced Santo Domingo and Boca Chica as country's leading port. Other major shipping ports included Cabo Rojo and Barahona. Cruise ships stopped either at Santo Domingo or Puerto Plata.
Railroads: Rail system existed mainly to transport sugarcane. Its 1,725 kilometers of rail made it one of longest in Caribbean.
Airports: Four international airports. Major facilities Las Américas, near capital, and La Unión, near Puerto Plata. Smaller airports at La Romana and Santiago.
Telecommunications: Country boasted most technologically advanced telecommunications industry in Latin America and Caribbean, offering wide range of services to consumers. Service concentrated in urban areas, however.
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
Government: Republic with elected representative governmental system. Executive was dominant branch. Presidents served four-year terms and could be reelected. Legislature, known formally as Congress of the Republic, consisted of Senate and Chamber of Deputies. Judicial power exercised by Supreme Court of Justice and by other courts created by 1966 Constitution and by law. All judges chosen by Senate, not by president. Provincial (state) governors appointed by president; municipalities (counties) governed by elected mayors and municipal councils.
Politics: Following independence from Haiti in 1844, country characterized by political instability for almost a century. Dictator Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina took power in 1930 and ruled in repressive authoritarian fashion until his assassination in 1961. Brief civil war broke out in 1965 between liberal Constitutionalists--supporters of 1963 constitution promulgated during short-lived presidency of Juan Bosch Gaviño-- and conservative Loyalist military factions. Conflict aborted by direct military intervention by United States. Subsequent elections brought Trujillo protégé Balaguer to presidency, an office he held for twelve years. Balaguer's attempt to nullify 1978 elections thwarted by pressure from Washington, allowing Silvestre Antonio Guzmán Fernandez of social democratic Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano--PRD) to assume nation's leadership. PRD also won 1982 elections with lawyer Salvador Jorge Blanco as its standard bearer. Both PRD governments plagued by economic difficulties that forced them to institute austerity measures instead of social reforms they initially advocated. Declining popularity of Jorge government contributed to Balaguer's election for a fourth term beginning in 1986.
International Relations: Diplomatic activities concentrated on Caribbean, Latin America, United States, and Western Europe. Relations with neighboring Haiti traditionally strained, owing to numerous cultural divergences and long history of Dominicans' and Haitians' meddling in each other's affairs. Most important international relationship with United States, on which Dominican Republic has political, economic, and strategic dependence.
International Agreements and Membership: Signatory of Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) and all major inter-American conventions. Member of United Nations and its specialized agencies, Organization of American States, International Monetary Fund (see Glossary), Inter-American Development Bank, and other multilateral financial institutions. Also adhered to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
NATIONAL SECURITY
Armed Forces: Dominican armed forces consisted of army, navy, and air force. Total personnel in 1989 about 20,800.
Organization: President constitutional commander in chief. Chain of command extended downward to secretary of state for the armed forces, then to deputy secretaries of state for individual branches of service, each of whom administered through a chief of staff and a general staff. Chiefs of staff exercised operational control, except in emergencies. Country divided into three defense zones: Southern Defense Zone, Western Defense Zone, and Northern Defense Zone.
Equipment: Army's equipment, mostly of United States manufacture, largely outmoded or poorly maintained. Dominican Navy in 1989 consisted of only one offshore and seventeen inshore vessels, mostly United States-made craft of World War II vintage. Dominican Air Force assets somewhat more modern and included Cessna A-37B Dragonfly jets and C-47 transports.
Police: National Police only police organization in country. Total manpower in 1989 about 10,000. Commanded by director general, subordinate to secretary of state for interior and police.
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Chapter 1. Dominican Republic: Historical Setting
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC EXPERIENCED many setbacks on the road to the democratic system under which it functioned in the late 1980s. The nation did not enjoy full independence until 1844, when it emerged from twenty-two years of occupation by Haiti; this liberation came later than that of most Latin American countries. Reacceptance of Spanish rule from 1861 to 1865 demonstrated the republic's insecurity and dependence on larger powers to protect it and to define its status. Dominican vulnerability to intervention from abroad was also made evident by the United States military occupation of 1916-24 and by a more limited action by United States forces during a brief civil war in 1965.
Politically, Dominican history has been defined by an almost continuous competition for supremacy among caudillos of authoritarian ideological convictions. Political and regional competition overlapped to a great extent because mainly conservative leaders from the south and the east pitted themselves against generally more liberal figures from the northern part of the Valle del Cibao (the Cibao Valley, commonly called the Cibao). Traditions of personalism, militarism, and social and economic elitism locked the country into decades of debilitating wars, conspiracies, and despotism that drained its resources and undermined its efforts to establish liberal constitutional rule.
In the late 1980s, the republic was still struggling to emerge from the shadow of the ultimate Dominican caudillo, Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina (1930-61), who emerged from the military and held nearly absolute power throughout his rule. The apparent establishment of a democratic process in 1978 was a promising development; however, the survival of democracy appeared to be closely linked to the country's economic fortunes, which had declined steadily since the mid-1970s. As it had throughout its history, the republic continued to struggle with the nature of its domestic politics and with the definition of its economic and political role in the wider world.
THE FIRST COLONY
The island of Hispaniola (La Isla Española) was the first New World colony settled by Spain. As such, it served as the logistical base for the conquest of most of the Western Hemisphere. Christopher Columbus first sighted the island in 1492 toward the end of his first voyage to "the Indies." Columbus and his crew found the island inhabited by a large population of friendly Taino Indians (Arawaks), who made the explorers welcome. The land was fertile, but of greater importance to the Spaniards was the discovery that gold could be obtained either by barter with the natives, who adorned themselves with golden jewelry, or by extraction from alluvial deposits on the island.
After several attempts to plant colonies along the north coast of Hispaniola, Spain's first permanent settlement in the New World was established on the southern coast at the present site of Santo Domingo. Under Spanish sovereignty, the entire island bore the name Santo Domingo. Indications of the presence of gold--the life's blood of the nascent mercantilist system--and a population of tractable natives who could be used as laborers combined to attract many Spanish newcomers during the early years. Most were adventurers who, at least initially, were more interested in acquiring sudden wealth than they were in settling the land. Their relations with the Taino Indians, whom they ruthlessly maltreated, deteriorated from the beginning. Aroused by continued seizures of their food supplies, other exactions, and abuse of their women, the formerly peaceful Indians rebelled- -only to be crushed decisively in 1495.
Columbus, who ruled the colony as royal governor until 1499, attempted to put an end to the more serious abuses to which the Indians were subjected by prohibiting foraging expeditions against them and by regulating the informal taxation imposed by the settlers. Being limited to this milder form of exploitation engendered active opposition among the settlers. To meet their demands, Columbus devised the repartimiento system of land settlement and native labor under which a settler, without assuming any obligation to the authorities, could be granted in perpetuity a large tract of land together with the services of the Indians living on it.
The repartimiento system did nothing to improve the lot of the Indians, and the Spanish crown changed it by instituting the system of encomienda in 1503. Under the encomienda system, all land became in theory the property of the crown, and the Indians thus were considered tenants on royal land. The crown's right to service from the tenants could be transferred in trust to individual Spanish settlers (encomenderos) by formal grant and the regular payment of tribute. The encomenderos were entitled to certain days of labor from the Indians, who became their charges. Encomenderos thus assumed the responsibility of providing for the physical well-being of the Indians and for their instruction in Christianity. An encomienda theoretically did not involve ownership of land; in practice, however, possession was gained through other means.
The hard work demanded of the Indians and the privations that they suffered demonstrated the unrealistic nature of the encomienda system, which effectively operated on a honor system as a result of the absence of enforcement efforts by Spanish authorities. The Indian population died off rapidly from exhaustion, starvation, disease, and other causes. By 1548 the Taino population, estimated at 1 million in 1492, had been reduced to approximately 500. The consequences were profound. The need for a new labor force to meet the growing demands of sugarcane cultivation prompted the importation of African slaves beginning in 1503. By 1520, black African labor was used almost exclusively.
The early grants of land without obligation under the repartimiento system resulted in a rapid decentralization of power. Each landowner possessed virtually sovereign authority. Power was diffused because of the tendency of the capital city, Santo Domingo (which also served as the seat of government for the entire Spanish Indies), to orient itself toward the continental Americas, which provided gold for the crown, and toward Spain, which provided administrators, supplies, and immigrants for the colonies. Local government was doomed to ineffectiveness because there was little contact between the capital and the hinterland; for practical purposes, the countryside fell under the sway of the large landowners. Throughout Dominican history, this sociopolitical order was a major factor in the development of some of the distinctive characteristics of the nation's political culture such as paternalism, personalism, and the tendency toward strong, even authoritarian, leadership (see The System of Dominican Politics , ch. 4).
As early as the 1490s, the landowners demonstrated their power by successfully conspiring against Columbus. His successor, Francisco de Bobadilla, was appointed chief justice and royal commissioner by the Spanish crown in 1499. Bobadilla sent Columbus back to Spain in irons, but Queen Isabella soon ordered him released. Bobadilla proved an inept administrator, and he was replaced in 1503 by the more efficient Nicolás de Ovando, who assumed the titles of governor and supreme justice. Because of his success in initiating reforms desired by the crown--the encomienda system among them--de Ovando received the title of Founder of Spain's Empire in the Indies.
In 1509 Columbus's son, Diego Columbus, was appointed governor of the colony of Santo Domingo. Diego's ambition and the splendid surroundings he provided for himself aroused the suspicions of the crown. As a resulted, in 1511 of the crown established the audiencia, a new political institution intended to check the power of the governor. The first audiencia was simply a tribunal composed of three judges whose jurisdiction extended over all the West Indies. In this region, it formed the highest court of appeal. Employment of the audiencia eventually spread throughout Spanish America.
The tribunal's influence grew, and in 1524 it was designated the Royal Audiencia of Santo Domingo, with jurisdiction in the Caribbean, the Atlantic coast of Central America and Mexico, and the northern coast of South America, including all of what is now Venezuela and part of present-day Colombia. As a court representing the crown, the audiencia was given expanded powers that encompassed administrative, legislative, and consultative functions; the number of judges increased correspondingly. In criminal cases the audiencia's decisions were final, but important civil suits could be appealed to the Royal and Supreme Council of the Indies (Real y Supremo Consejo de las Indias) in Spain.
The Council of the Indies, created by Charles V in 1524, was the Spanish crown's main agency for directing colonial affairs. During most of its existence, the council exercised almost absolute power in making laws, administering justice, controlling finance and trade, supervising the church, and directing armies.
The arm of the Council of the Indies that dealt with all matters concerning commerce between Spain and its colonies in the Americas was the House of Trade (Casa de Contratación), organized in 1503. Control of commerce in general, and of tax collection in particular, was facilitated by the designation of monopoly seaports on either side of the Atlantic Ocean. During most of the colonial period, overseas trade consisted largely of annual convoys between monopoly ports. Trade between the colonies and countries other than Spain was prohibited. The crown also restricted trade among the colonies. These restrictions hampered economic activity in the New World and encouraged contraband traffic.
The Roman Catholic Church became the primary agent in spreading Spanish culture in the Americas. The ecclesiastical organization developed for Santo Domingo and later extended throughout Spanish America reflected a union of church and state actually closer than that prevailing in Spain itself. The Royal Patronage of the Indies (Real Patronato de las Indias, or, as it was called later, the Patronato Real) served as the organizational agent of this affiliation of the church and the Spanish crown.
Santo Domingo's prestige began to decline in the first part of the sixteenth century with the conquest of Mexico by Hernán Cortés in 1521 and the discovery there, and later in Peru, of great wealth in gold and silver. These events coincided with the exhaustion of the alluvial deposits of gold and the dying off of the Indian labor force in Santo Domingo. Large numbers of colonists left for Mexico and Peru; new immigrants from Spain largely bypassed Santo Domingo for the greater wealth to be found in lands to the west. The population of Santo Domingo dwindled, agriculture languished, and Spain soon became preoccupied with its richer and vaster mainland colonies.
The stagnation that prevailed in Santo Domingo for the next 250 years was interrupted on several occasions by armed engagements, as the French and the English attempted to weaken Spain's economic and political dominance in the New World. In 1586 the English admiral, Sir Francis Drake, captured the city of Santo Domingo and collected a ransom for its return to Spanish control. In 1655 Oliver Cromwell dispatched an English fleet, commanded by Sir William Penn, to take Santo Domingo. After meeting heavy resistance, the English sailed farther west and took Jamaica instead.
The withdrawal of the colonial government from the northern coastal region opened the way for French buccaneers, who had a base on Tortuga Island (Ile de la Tortue), off the northwest coast of present-day Haiti, to settle on Hispaniola in the mid- seventeenth century. Although the Spanish destroyed the buccaneers' settlements several times, the determined French would not be deterred or expelled. The creation of the French West India Company in 1664 signalled France's intention to colonize western Hispaniola. Intermittent warfare went on between French and Spanish settlers over the next three decades; however, Spain, hard-pressed by warfare in Europe, could not maintain a garrison in Santo Domingo sufficient to secure the entire island against encroachment. In 1697, under the Treaty of Ryswick, Spain ceded the western third of the island to France. The exact boundary of this territory (Saint-Domingue--now Haiti) was not established at the time of cession and remained in question until 1929 (see fig. 1).
During the first years of the eighteenth century, landowners in the Spanish colony did little with their huge holdings, and the sugar plantations along the southern coast were abandoned because of harassment by pirates. Foreign trade all but ceased, and almost all domestic commerce took place in the capital city.
The Bourbon dynasty replaced the Habsburgs in Spain in 1700. The new regime introduced innovations--especially economic reforms--that gradually began to revive trade in Santo Domingo. The crown progressively relaxed the rigid controls and restrictions on commerce between the mother country and the colonies and among the colonies. The last convoys sailed in 1737; the monopoly port system was abolished shortly thereafter. By the middle of the century, both immigration and the importation of slaves had increased.
In 1765 the Caribbean islands received authorization for almost unlimited trade with Spanish ports; permission for the Spanish colonies in the Americas to trade among themselves followed in 1774. Duties on many commodities were greatly reduced or were removed altogether. By 1790 traders from any port in Spain could buy and sell anywhere in Spanish America, and by 1800 Spain had opened colonial trade to all neutral vessels.
As a result of the stimulus provided by the trade reforms, the population of the colony of Santo Domingo increased from about 6,000 in 1737 to approximately 125,000 in 1790. Of this number, about 40,000 were white landowners, about 25,000 were black or mulatto freedmen, and some 60,000 were slaves. The composition of Santo Domingo's population contrasted sharply with that of the neighboring French colony of Saint-Domingue, where some 30,000 whites and 27,000 freedmen extracted labor from at least 500,000 black slaves. To the Spanish colonists, Saint- Domingue represented a powder keg, the eventual explosion of which would echo throughout the island.
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HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO
Although they shared the island of Hispaniola, the colonies of Saint-Domingue and Santo Domingo followed disparate paths. Cultural differences explained the contrast to some extent, but the primary divergence was economic. Saint-Domingue was the most productive agricultural colony in the Western Hemisphere, and its output contributed heavily to the economy of France. By contrast, Santo Domingo was a small colony with little impact on the economy of Spain. Prosperous French plantation owners sought to maximize their gain through increased production for a growing world market. Thus, they imported great numbers of slaves from Africa and drove this captive work force ruthlessly.
Although by the end of the eighteenth century economic conditions were improving, landowners in Santo Domingo did not enjoy the same level of wealth attained by their French counterparts in Saint-Domingue. The absence of market-driven pressure to increase production enabled the domestic labor force to practice subsistence agriculture and to export at low levels. For this reason, Santo Domingo imported far fewer slaves than did Saint-Domingue. Spanish law also allowed a slave to purchase his freedom and that of his family for a relatively small sum. This contributed to the higher proportion of freedmen in the Spanish colony; by the turn of the century, freedmen actually constituted the majority of the population. Also in contrast to conditions in the French colony, this population profile contributed to a somewhat more egalitarian society, plagued much less by the schisms of race.
Stimulated to some degree by a revolution against the monarchy that was well underway in France, the inevitable explosion took place in Saint-Domingue in August 1791 (see The Slave Rebellion of 1791 , ch. 6). The initial reaction of many Spanish colonists to news of the slaughter of Frenchmen by armies of rebellious black slaves was to flee Hispaniola entirely. Spain, however, saw in the unrest an opportunity to seize all, or part, of the western third of the island through an alliance of convenience with the British. These intentions, however, did not survive encounters in the field with forces led by the former slave, François-Dominique Toussaint Louverture (see Toussaint Louverture , ch. 6). In recognition of his leadership against the Spanish (under whose banner he had begun his military career), the British, and rebellious royalists and mulattoes, Toussaint was named governor general of Saint-Domingue by the French Republic in 1796. By the next year, Spain had surrendered the entire island to his rule. This action reflected not only Spain's growing disengagement from its colony, but also its setbacks in Europe and its relative decline as a world power.
Although France nominally enjoyed sovereignty over the entire island of Hispaniola, it was prevented from establishing an effective presence or administration in the east by continuing conflict between the indigenous forces led by Toussaint--and later by Jean-Jacques Dessalines--and an expeditionary force dispatched to Hispaniola by Napoléon Bonaparte in 1802 in an effort to bring the island more firmly under French control. Upon defeating the French, Dessalines and his followers established the independent nation of Haiti in January 1804. A small French presence, however, remained in the former Spanish colony. Dessalines attempted to take the city of Santo Domingo in March 1805, but he turned back after receiving reports of the approach of a French naval squadron.
By 1808 a number of émigré Spanish landowners had returned to Santo Domingo. These royalists had no intention of living under French rule, however, and they sought foreign assistance for a rebellion that would restore Spanish sovereignty. Help came from the Haitians, who provided arms, and from the British, who occupied Samaná and blockaded the port of Santo Domingo. The remaining French representatives fled the island in July 1809.
The 1809 restoration of Spanish rule ushered in an era referred to by some historians as España Boba (Foolish Spain). Under the despotic rule of Ferdinand VII, the colony's economy deteriorated severely. Some Dominicans began to wonder if their interests would not best be served by the sort of independence movement that was sweeping the South American colonies. In keeping with this sentiment, Spanish lieutenant governor José Núñez de Cáceres announced the colony's independence as the state of Spanish Haiti on November 30, 1821. Cáceres requested admission to the Republic of Gran Colombia (consisting of what later became Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela), recently proclaimed established by Simón Bolívar and his followers. While the request was in transit, however, the president of Haiti, Jean-Pierre Boyer, decided to invade Santo Domingo and to reunite the island under the Haitian flag.
The twenty-two years of Haitian occupation witnessed a steady economic decline and a growing resentment of Haiti among Dominicans. The agricultural pattern in the former Spanish colony came to resemble the one prevailing in all of Haiti at the time-- that is, mainly subsistence cultivation with little or no production of export crops. Boyer attempted to enforce in the new territory the Rural Code (Code Rural) he had decreed in an effort to improve productivity among the Haitian yeomanry, but the Dominicans proved no more willing to adhere to its provisions than the Haitians had been (see Boyer: Expansion and Decline , ch. 6). Increasing numbers of Dominican landowners chose to flee the island rather than to live under Haitian rule; in many cases, Haitian administrators encouraged such emigration, confiscated the holdings of the émigrés, and redistributed them to Haitian officials. Aside from such bureaucratic machinations, most of the Dominicans' resentment of Haitian rule developed because Boyer, the ruler of an impoverished country, did not (or could not) provision his army. The occupying Haitian forces lived off the land in Santo Domingo, commandeering or confiscating what they needed to perform their duties or to fill their stomachs. Dominicans saw this as tribute demanded by petty conquerors, or as simple theft. Racial animosities also affected attitudes on both sides; black Haitian troops reacted with reflexive resentment against lighter-skinned Dominicans, while Dominicans came to associate the Haitians' dark skin with the oppression and the abuses of occupation.
Religious and cultural life also suffered under the Haitian occupation. The Haitians, who associated the Roman Catholic Church with the French colonists who had so cruelly exploited and abused them before independence, confiscated all church property in the east, deported all foreign clergy, and severed the ties of the remaining clergy to the Vatican. For Dominicans, who were much more strongly Roman Catholic and less oriented toward folk religion than the Haitians, such actions seemed insulting and nihilistic. In addition, upper-class Haitians considered French culture superior to Spanish culture, while Haitian soldiers and others from the lower class simply disregarded Hispanic mores and customs.
The emigration of upper-class Dominicans served to forestall rebellion and to prolong the period of Haitian occupation because most Dominicans reflexively looked to the upper class for leadership. Scattered unrest and isolated confrontations between Haitians and Dominicans undoubtedly occurred; it was not until 1838, however, that any significant organized movement against Haitian domination began. Crucial to these stirrings was a twenty-year-old Dominican, of a prominent Santo Domingo family, who had returned home five years earlier after seven years of study in Europe. The young student's name was Juan Pablo Duarte.
Dominican history can in many ways be encompassed by a series of biographies. The personality and attributes of Duarte, however, ran counter to those of most of the country's caudillos. Duarte was an idealist, an ascetic, a genuine nationalist, a man of principle, and a romantic in a romantic age. Although he played no significant part in its rule, he is considered the father of his country. He certainly provided the inspiration and impetus for the achievement of independence from Haiti. Shocked, when he returned from Europe, by the deteriorated condition of Santo Domingo, the young student resolved to establish a resistance movement that would eventually throw off the Haitian yoke. He dubbed his movement La Trinitaria (The Trinity) because its original nine members had organized themselves into cells of three; the cells went on to recruit as separate organizations, maintaining strict secrecy, with little or no direct contact among themselves in order to minimize the possibility of detection or betrayal to the Haitian authorities. Young recruits flocked to Duarte's banner (almost literally, for it was Duarte who designed the modern Dominican flag) as a result of the pent- up resentment under Haitian rule. Despite its elaborate codes and clandestine procedures, La Trinitaria was eventually betrayed to the Haitians. It survived largely intact, however, emerging under the new designation, La Filantrópica, to continue its work of anti-Haitian agitation.
Despite their numbers and their base of popular support, the Trinitarios (as the rebels still referred to themselves) required a political disruption in Haiti proper to boost their movement toward its ultimate success. The overthrow of Boyer in the Revolution of 1843 provided a catalyst for the Dominican rebels. Charles Rivière-Hérard replaced Boyer as president of Haiti. Like most Haitian leaders, he required a transition period in which to deal with competitors and to solidify his rule. Rivière-Herard apparently identified one disaffected Haitian faction in the administration of the eastern territory; his crackdown on this group extended to the Trinitarios as well, because apparently there had been some fruitless contacts between the Dominicans and some liberal Haitians. The increased pressure induced Duarte to leave the country temporarily in search of support in other Latin American states, mainly Colombia and Venezuela. In December 1843, a group of Duarte's followers urged him to return to Santo Domingo. They feared that their plans for an insurrection might be betrayed to the Haitians and had therefore resolved to carry them through quickly. Duarte sailed as far north from Caracas as the island of Curaçao, where he fell victim to a violent illness. When he had not arrived home by February 1844, the rebels, under the leadership of Francisco del Rosario Sánchez and Ramón Mella, agreed to launch their uprising without him.
On February 27, 1844--thereafter celebrated as Dominican Independence Day--the rebels seized the Ozama fortress in the capital. The Haitian garrison, taken by surprise and apparently betrayed by at least one of its sentries, retired in disarray. Within two days, all Haitian officials had left Santo Domingo. Mella headed the provisional governing junta of the new Dominican Republic. Duarte, finally recovered, returned to his country on March 14. The following day he entered the capital amidst great adulation and celebration. As is so often the case in such circumstances, the optimism generated by revolutionary triumph would eventually give way to the disillusion caused by the struggle for power.
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SANTANA AND BAEZ: THE CAUDILLOS TAKE CHARGE
Two leaders dominated the period between 1844 and 1864: General Pedro Santana Familias and Buenaventura Báez Méndez. Dissimilar in appearance and temperament, the two alternated in power by means of force, factionalism, and repeated efforts to secure their country's protection or annexation by a foreign power. Their unprincipled, self-serving dominance did much to entrench the tradition of caudillo rule in the Dominican Republic.
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SANTANA AND BAEZ: THE CAUDILLOS TAKE CHARGE
Two leaders dominated the period between 1844 and 1864: General Pedro Santana Familias and Buenaventura Báez Méndez. Dissimilar in appearance and temperament, the two alternated in power by means of force, factionalism, and repeated efforts to secure their country's protection or annexation by a foreign power. Their unprincipled, self-serving dominance did much to entrench the tradition of caudillo rule in the Dominican Republic.
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Annexation by Spain, 1861-65
On March 17, 1861, Santana announced the annexation of the Dominican Republic by Spain. A number of conditions had combined to bring about this reversion to colonialism. The Civil War in the United States had lessened the Spanish fear of retaliation from the north. In Spain itself, the ruling Liberal Union of General Leopoldo O'Donnell had been advocating renewed imperial expansion. And in the Dominican Republic, both the ruler and a portion of the ruled were sufficiently concerned about the possibility either of a renewed attack from Haiti or of domestic economic collapse to find the prospect of annexation attractive.
Support for annexation did not run as deep as Santana and his clique had represented to the Spanish, however. The first rebellion against Spanish rule broke out in May 1861, but it was quashed in short order. A better organized revolt, under the leadership of the baecista, General Sánchez, sprang up only a month later. Santana, now bearing the title of captain general of the Province of Santo Domingo, was forced to take to the field against his own countrymen as the representative of a foreign power. The wily Santana lured Sánchez into an ambush, where he was captured and executed. Despite this service, Santana found his personal power and his ability to dole out patronage to his followers greatly restricted under Spanish rule. In a fit of pique, he resigned the captaincy general in January 1862.
Resentment and rebellion continued, fed by racial tension, excessive taxation, the failure to stabilize the currency, the uncompensated requisition of supplies by the Spanish army, heavyhanded reform of local religious customs by an inflexible Spanish archbishop, and the restriction of trade to the benefit of the Spanish empire. The Spaniards quelled more uprisings in 1863, but guerrilla actions continued. In response to the continuing unrest, a state of siege was declared in February 1863.
Rebellious Dominicans set up a provisional government in Santiago, headed by General José Antonio Salcedo Ramírez, on September 14, 1863. Their proclamation of an Act of Independence launched what is known as the War of Restoration. For their part, the Spanish once again turned to Santana, who received command of a force made up largely of mercenaries; however, this campaign was the last for the old caudillo. By this time, his popularity had all but disappeared. Indeed, the provisional government had denounced Santana and had condemned him to death for his actions against his countrymen. On June 14, 1864, a broken and despondent Santana saved the rebels the trouble of carrying out their sentence. The timing of his death lent credence to speculation that he had committed suicide, although this belief was never proven.
Meanwhile, the guerrilla war against the Spanish ground on. The rebels further formalized their provisional rule by replacing Salcedo (who had advocated the return of Báez to rule a restored republic) and by then holding a national convention on February 27, 1865, which enacted a new constitution and elected Pedro Antonio Pimentel Chamorro president.
Circumstances began to favor a Spanish withdrawal. The conclusion of its Civil War promised that the United States would make new efforts to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, which barred European powers from the Western Hemisphere. Spanish military forces, unable to contain the spread of the insurrection, lost even greater numbers of troops to disease than they did to the guerrillas. The O'Donnell government had fallen, taking with it any dreams of a renewed Spanish empire. On March 3, 1865, the Queen of Spain approved a decree repealing the annexation of Santo Domingo.
The Spanish left political chaos in their wake. A power struggle began between the conservative, cacique-dominated south and the more liberal Cibao, where the prevalence of medium-sized landholdings contributed to a more egalitarian social structure. The two camps eventually coalesced under the banners of separate political parties. The Cibaeños (residents of the Cibao) adhered to the National Liberal Party (Partido Nacional Liberal), which became known as the Blue Party (Partido Azul). The southerners rallied to the Red Party (Partido Rojo).
The conservative Reds effectively employed their numerical superiority in the capital to force the restoration of Báez, who returned triumphantly from exile and assumed the presidency on December 8, 1865. Never again, however, would he exercise the sort of dictatorial control over the republic that he and Santana had once alternately enjoyed. The country's institutions had changed. Regional forces mustered during the War of Restoration had replaced the national army that previously had done battle with the Haitians. Political power had likewise been diffused, particularly between the opposing poles of the Cibao and the south. Under these conditions, it was difficult, if not impossible, for one man to dominate the entire nation.
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The Contest for Power, 1865-82
After a successful uprising that forced Báez to flee the country in May 1866, a triumvirate of Cibaeño military leaders, the most prominent of whom was Gregorio Luperón, assumed provisional power. General José María Cabral Luna, who had served briefly as president in 1865, was reelected to that post on September 29, 1866. The baecistas, however, were still a potent force in the republic; they forced Cabral out and reinstalled Báez on May 2, 1868. Once again, his rule was marked by peculation and efforts to sell or to lease portions of the country to foreign interests. These included an intermittent campaign to have the entire country annexed by the United States. He was once again overthrown by rebellious Blues in January 1874.
After a period of infighting among the Blues, backing from Luperón helped Ulises Francisco Espaillat Quiñones to win election as president on March 24, 1876. Espaillat, a political and economic liberal, apparently intended to broaden personal freedoms and to set the nation's economy on a firmer footing. He never had the opportunity to do either, however. Rebellions in the south and the east forced Espaillat to resign on December 20, 1876. Ever the opportunist, Báez returned once more to power. The most effective opposition to his rule came from guerrilla forces led by a politically active priest, Fernando Arturo de Meriño Ramírez. In February 1878, the unpopular Báez left his country for the last time; he died in exile in 1882.
Both Santana and Báez had now passed from the scene. They had helped to create a nation where violence prevailed in the quest for power, where economic growth and financial stability fell victim to a seemingly endless political contest, and where foreign interests still perceived parts of the national territory as available to the highest bidder. This divisive, chaotic situation invited the emergence of a Machiavellian figure who would "unite" the republic.
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ULISES HEUREAUX, 1882-99
Ulises Heureaux, Luperón's lieutenant, stood out among his fellow Dominicans both physically and temperamentally. The illegitimate son of a Haitian father and a mother who was originally from the island of St. Thomas, he was distinguished by his blackness from most other contenders for power, with the exception of Luperón. As events were to demonstrate, he also possessed a singular thirst for power and a willingness to take any measures necessary to attain and to hold it.
During the four years between Báez's final withdrawal and Heureaux's ascension to the presidency, seven individuals held or claimed national, regional, or interim leadership. Among them were Ignacio María González Santin, who held the presidency from June to September 1878; Luperón, who governed from Puerto Plata as provisional president from October 1879 to August 1880; and Meriño, who assumed office in September 1880 after apparently fraudulent general elections. Heureaux served as interior minister under Meriño; his behind-the-scenes influence on the rest of the cabinet apparently exceeded that of the president. Although Meriño briefly suspended constitutional procedures in response to unrest fomented by some remaining baecistas, he abided by the two-year term established under Luperón and turned the reins of government over to Heureaux on September 1, 1882.
Heureaux's first term as president was not particularly noteworthy. The administrations of Luperón and Meriño had achieved some financial stability for the country; political conditions had settled down to the point that Heureaux needed to suppress only one major uprising during his two-year tenure. By 1884, however, no single potential successor, among the various caciques who constituted the republic's ruling group, enjoyed widespread support. Luperón, still the leader of the ruling Blue Party, supported General Segundo Imbert for the post, while Heureaux backed the candidacy of General Francisco Gregorio Billini. A consummate dissembler, Heureaux assured Luperón that he would support Imbert should he win the election, but Heureaux also had ballot boxes in critical precincts stuffed in order to assure Billini's election.
Inaugurated president on September 1, 1884, Billini resisted Heureaux's efforts to manipulate him. Thus denied de facto rule, Heureaux undermined Billini by spreading rumors to the effect that the president had decreed a political amnesty so that he could conspire with ex-president Cesareo Guillermo Bastardo (February 27-December 6, 1879) against Luperón's leadership of the Blues. This precipitated a governmental crisis that resulted in Billini's resignation on May 16, 1885. Vice President Alejandro Woss y Gil succeeded Billini. Heureaux assumed a more prominent role under the new government; a number of his adherents were included in the cabinet, and the general himself assumed command of the national army in order to stem a rebellion led by Guillermo, whose suicide when he was faced with capture, removed another potential rival for power and further endeared Heureaux to Luperón, a longtime enemy of Guillermo.
Luperón accordingly supported Heureaux in the 1886 presidential elections. Opposed by Casimiro de Moya, Heureaux relied on his considerable popularity and his demonstrated skill at electoral manipulation to carry the balloting. The blatancy of the fraud in some areas, particularly the capital, inspired Moya's followers to launch an armed rebellion. Heureaux again benefited from Luperón's support in this struggle; it delayed his inauguration by four months, but it further narrowed the field of political contenders. Having again achieved power, Heureaux maintained his grip on it for the rest of his life.
Several moves served to lay the groundwork for Heureaux's dictatorship. Constitutional amendments requested by the president and effected by the Congress extended the presidential term from two to four years and eliminated direct elections in favor of the formerly employed electoral college system. To expand his informal power base, Heureaux (who became popularly known as General Lilís, thanks to a common mispronunciation of his first name) incorporated both Reds and Blues into his government. The president also established an extensive network of secret police and informants in order to avert incipient rebellions. The press, previously unhampered, came under new restrictions.
In the face of impending dictatorship, concerned Dominican liberals turned to the only remaining figure of stature, Luperón. The elections of 1888 therefore pitted Heureaux against his political mentor. If the dictator felt any respect for his former commander, he did not demonstrate it during the campaign. Heureaux's agents attacked Luperón's campaigners and supporters, arresting and incarcerating considerable numbers of them. Recognizing the impossibility of a free election under such circumstances, Luperón withdrew his candidacy, declined the entreaties of those of his followers who urged armed rebellion, and fled into exile in Puerto Rico.
Although plots, intrigue, and abortive insurrections continued under his rule, Heureaux faced no serious challenges until his assassination in 1899. He continued to govern in mockconstitutional fashion, achieving reelection through institutionalized fraud. Despite his relatively secure position, his repression of dissent became more severe, and the number of political prisoners expanded along with the dictator's paranoia. Like Santana and Báez before him, Heureaux sought the protection of a foreign power, principally the United States. Although annexation was no longer an option, the dictator did offer to lease the Samaná Peninsula to the United States. The deal was never consummated, however, because of opposition from the liberal wing of the Blue Party and a number of concerned European powers. In 1891 Washington and Santo Domingo did conclude a reciprocity treaty that allowed twenty-six United States products free entry into the Dominican market in exchange for similar duty-free access for certain Dominican goods. The governments of Germany, Britain, and France all filed official protests over the treaty, which they saw as detrimental to their most-favored- nation trading status.
Under Heureaux, the Dominican government considerably expanded its external debt. Although some improvements to infrastructure resulted, much of the money went to support the dictator's personal extravagances and the financial requirements of his police state. The failure to apply the funds productively exacerbated both domestic budget deficits and shortfalls in the external balance of payments. In an effort to head off complete bankruptcy, the government turned to the familiar expedient of printing paper money. The huge issuance of 1897, however, debased the currency to such an extent that even Dominicans refused to accept it.
Despite the dictator's comprehensive efforts to repress opposition--his network of spies and agents extended even to foreign countries--a revolutionary organization eventually emerged. Established in Puerto Rico by Horacio Vásquez Lajara, a young adherent of Luperón, the group called itself the Young Revolutionary Junta (Junta Revolucionaria de Jóvenes). Other prominent members of the group included Federico Velásquez and Ramón Cáceres Vásquez. The three returned to their plantations in the Cibao and began to lay the groundwork for a coordinated rebellion against the widely detested Heureaux. The impetuous Cáceres, however, opted for a revolution at a single stroke when the dictator passed through the town of Moca on July 26, 1899. He shot Heureaux several times and left the longtime ruler fatally wounded amid a startled crowd. Cáceres escaped unharmed.
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RENEWED CONFLICT, 1899-1916
After a brief period of armed conflict, the revolutionaries prevailed. Vásquez headed a provisional government established in September 1899. Free, direct elections brought to the presidency Juan Isidro Jiménez Pereyra on November 15. The Jiménez administration faced a fiscal crisis when European creditors, led by the French, began to call in loans that had been contracted by Heureaux. Customs fees represented the only significant source of government revenue at that time. When the Jiménez government pledged 40 percent of its customs revenue to repay its foreign debt, it provoked the ire of the San Domingo Improvement Company. A United States-based firm, the Improvement Company had lent large sums to the Heureaux regime. As a result, it had not only received a considerable percentage of customs revenue, but also had been granted the right to administer Dominican customs in order to ensure regular repayment. Stung by the Jiménez government's resumption of control over its customs receipts, the directors of the Improvement Company protested to the United States Department of State. The review of the case prompted a renewed interest in Washington in Dominican affairs.
The death of Heureaux, however, had by no means ushered in an era of political tranquility. Jiménez's various financial negotiations with foreign powers had aroused opposition among nationalists, particularly in the Cibao, who suspected the president of bargaining away Dominican sovereignty in return for financial settlements. Government forces led by Vásquez put down some early uprisings. Eventually, however, personal and political competition between Jiménez and Vásquez brought them into more serious conflict. Vásquez's forces proclaimed a revolution on April 26, 1902; with no real base of support, Jiménez fled his office and his country a few days later. Although highly principled, Vásquez was not a strong leader. Squabbles among his followers and opposition to his government from local caciques grew into general unrest that culminated in the seizure of power by ex-president Woss y Gil in April 1903.
Dominican politics had once again polarized into two largely nonideological camps. Where once the Blues and the Reds had contended for power, now the jimenistas (supporters of Jiménez; sing., jimenista) and the horacistas (supporters of Vásquez and Cáceres; sing., horacista) vied for control. Woss y Gil, a jimenista, made the mistake of seeking supporters among the horacista camp and he was overthrown by the jimenista general, Carlos F. Morales Languasco, in December 1903. Rather than restore the country's leadership to Jiménez, however, Morales set up a provisional government and announced his own candidacy for the presidency-- with Cáceres as his running mate. The renewed fraternization with the horacistas incited another jimenista rebellion. This uprising proved unsuccessful, and Morales and Cáceres were inaugurated on June 19, 1904.
Conflict within the Morales administration between supporters of the president and those of the vice president debilitated the government. By late 1905, it became clear that Morales had lost effective control to Cáceres and the cabinet. Morales resolved to lead a coup against his own government; his plan was discovered by the horacistas, however, and he was captured and dispatched into exile. Cáceres assumed the presidency on December 29, 1905.
The influence of the United States had increased considerably during the first few years of the twentieth century. United States military forces had intervened in a minor way to ensure the safety of United States citizens and to prevent the deployment of warships by European governments seeking immediate repayment of debt. By 1904 Washington had begun to take a greater interest in the stability of Caribbean nations, particularly those--like the Dominican Republic--situated along the approaches to the forthcoming Panama Canal. The administration of Theodore Roosevelt took a particular interest in resolving the republic's economic situation. It negotiated an agreement in June 1904 whereby the Dominican government bought out the holdings of the San Domingo Improvement Company. The Morales government also agreed to accept the appointment by the United States government of a financial agent to oversee the repayment of the outstanding debt to the Improvement Company from customs duties. This agreement was subsequently superseded by a financial accord signed between the two governments on February 7, 1905; under the provisions of this accord, the United States government assumed responsibility for all Dominican debt as well as for the collection of customs duties and the allocation of those revenues to the Dominican government and to the repayment of its domestic and foreign debt. Although parts of this agreement were rejected by the United States Senate, it formed the basis for the establishment in April 1905 of the General Customs Receivership, the office through which the United States government administered the finances of the Dominican Republic.
The Cáceres government became the financial beneficiary of this arrangement. Freed from the burden of dealing with creditors, Cáceres attempted to reform the political system. Constitutional reforms placed local ayuntamientos (town councils) under the power of the central government, extended the presidential term to six years, and eliminated the office of vice president. Cáceres also nationalized public utilities and established a bureau of public works to administer them. All of these actions engendered both opposition and support. The curtailment of local authority particularly irked those caciques who preferred to rule through compliant ayuntamientos. The continued financial sovereignty of the Yankees also outweighed the economic benefits of the receivership in the minds of many nationalistic Dominicans. Intrigues fomented in exile by Morales, Jiménez, and others beset Cáceres. On November 19, 1911, a small group headed by Luis Tejera assassinated Cáceres as he took his evening drive through the streets of Santo Domingo.
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OCCUPATION BY THE UNITED STATES, 1916-24
The assassination of Cáceres turned out to be but the first act of a frenzied drama that culminated in the republic's occupation by the United States. The fiscal stability that had resulted from the 1905 receivership eroded under Cáceres's successor, Eladio Victoria y Victoria; most of the increased outlays went to support military campaigns against rebellious partisans, mainly in the Cibao. The continued violence and instability prompted the administration of President William H. Taft to dispatch a commission to Santo Domingo on September 24, 1912, to mediate among the warring factions. The presence of a 750-member force of United States Marines apparently convinced the Dominicans of the seriousness of Washington's threats to intervene directly in the conflict; Victoria agreed to step down in favor of a neutral figure, Roman Catholic archbishop Adolfo Alejandro Nouel Bobadilla. The archbishop assumed office as provisional president on November 30.
Nouel proved unequal to the burden of national leadership. Unable to mediate successfully between the ambitions of rival horacistas and jimenistas, he stepped down on March 31, 1913. His successor, José Bordas Valdés, was equally unable to restrain the renewed outbreak of hostilities. Once again, Washington took a direct hand and mediated a resolution. The rebellious horacistas agreed to a cease-fire based on a pledge of United States oversight of elections for members of local ayuntamientos and a constituent assembly that would draft the procedures for presidential balloting. The process, however, was flagrantly manipulated and resulted in Bordas's reelection on June 15, 1914. Both horacistas and jimenistas took offense at this blatant maneuver and rose up against Bordas.
The United States government, this time under President Woodrow Wilson, again intervened. Where Taft had cajoled the combatants with a clear intimation of military action, Wilson delivered an ultimatum: elect a president or the United States will impose one. The Dominicans accordingly selected Ramón Báez Machado as provisional president on August 27, 1914. Comparatively fair presidential elections held on October 25 returned Jiménez to the presidency. Despite his victory, however, Jiménez felt impelled to appoint leaders and prominent members of the various political factions to positions in his government in an effort to broaden its support. The internecine conflicts that resulted had quite the opposite effect, weakening the government and the president and emboldening Secretary of War Desiderio Arias to take control of both the armed forces and the Congress, which he compelled to impeach Jiménez for violation of the constitution and the laws. Although the United States ambassador offered military support to his government, Jiménez opted to step down on May 7, 1916.
Arias never formally assumed the presidency. The United States government had apparently tired of its recurring role as mediator and had decided to take more direct action. United States forces had already occupied Haiti by this time (see The United States Occupation, 1915-34 , ch. 6). The initial military administrator of Haiti, Rear Admiral William Caperton, had actually forced Arias to retreat from Santo Domingo by threatening the city with naval bombardment on May 13. The first Marines landed three days later. Although they established effective control of the country within two months, the United States forces did not proclaim a military government until November. Most Dominican laws and institutions remained intact under military rule, although the shortage of Dominicans willing to serve in the cabinet forced the military governor, Rear Admiral Harry S. Knapp, to fill a number of portfolios with United States naval officers. The press and radio were censored for most of the occupation, and public speech was limited.
The surface effects of the occupation were largely positive. The Marines restored order throughout most of the republic (with the exception of the eastern region); the country's budget was balanced, its debt was diminished, and economic growth resumed; infrastructure projects produced new roads that linked all the country's regions for the first time in its history; a professional military organization, the Dominican Constabulary Guard, replaced the partisan forces that had waged a seemingly endless struggle for power (see History and Development of the Armed Forces , ch. 5). Most Dominicans, however, greatly resented the loss of their sovereignty to foreigners, few of whom spoke Spanish or displayed much real concern for the welfare of the republic.
The most intense opposition to the occupation arose in the eastern provinces of El Seibo and San Pedro de Macorís. From 1917 to 1921, the United States forces battled a guerrilla movement in that area known as the gavilleros. The guerrillas enjoyed considerable support among the population, and they benefited from a superior knowledge of the terrain. The movement survived the capture and the execution of its leader, Vicente Evangelista, and some initially fierce encounters with the Marines. However, the gavilleros eventually yielded to the occupying forces' superior firepower, air power (a squadron of six Curtis Jennies), and determined (often brutal) counterinsurgent methods.
After World War I, public opinion in the United States began to run against the occupation. Warren G. Harding, who succeeded Wilson in March 1921, had campaigned against the occupations of both Haiti and the Dominican Republic. In June 1921, United States representatives presented a withdrawal proposal, known as the Harding Plan, which called for Dominican ratification of all acts of the military government, approval of a loan of US$2.5 million for public works and other expenses, the acceptance of United States officers for the constabulary--now known as the National Guard (Guardia Nacional)--and the holding of elections under United States supervision. Popular reaction to the plan was overwhelmingly negative. Moderate Dominican leaders, however, used the plan as the basis for further negotiations that resulted in an agreement allowing for the selection of a provisional president to rule until elections could be organized. Under the supervision of High Commissioner Sumner Welles, Juan Bautista Vicini Burgos assumed the provisional presidency on October 21, 1922. In the presidential election of March 15, 1924, Horacio Vásquez Lajara handily defeated Francisco J. Peynado. Vásquez's Alliance Party (Partido Alianza) also won a comfortable majority in both houses of Congress. With his inauguration on July 13, control of the republic returned to Dominican hands.
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THE ERA OF TRUJILLO
The Vásquez administration shines in Dominican history like a star amid a gathering storm. After the country's eight years of subjugation, Vásquez took care to respect the political and civil rights of the population. An upswing in the price of export commodities, combined with increased government borrowing, buoyed the economy. Public works projects proliferated. Santo Domingo expanded and modernized. This brief period of progress, however, ended in the resurgent maelstrom of Dominican political instability. The man who would come to occupy the eye of this political cyclone was Rafael Trujillo.
Although a principled man by Dominican standards, Vásquez was also a product of long years of political infighting. In an effort to undercut his primary rival, Federico Velásquez, and to preserve power for his own followers, the president agreed in 1927 to a prolongation of his term from four to six years. There was some debatable legal basis for the move, which was approved by the Congress, but its enactment effectively invalidated the constitution of 1924 that Vásquez had previously sworn to uphold. Once the president had demonstrated his willingness to disregard constitutional procedures in the pursuit of power, some ambitious opponents decided that those procedures were no longer binding. Dominican politics returned to their pre-occupation status; the struggle among competing caudillos resumed.
Trujillo occupied a strong position in this contest. The commander of the National Army (Ejército Nacional, the new designation of the armed force created under the occupation), Trujillo came from a humble background. He had enlisted in the National Police in 1918, a time when the upper-class Dominicans, who had formerly filled the officer corps, largely refused to collaborate with the occupying forces. Trujillo harbored no such scruples. He rose quickly in the officer corps, while at the same time he built a network of allies and supporters. Unlike the more idealistic North American sponsors of the constabulary, Trujillo saw the armed force not for what it should have been--an apolitical domestic security force--but for what it was: the main source of concentrated power in the republic.
Having established his power base behind the scenes, Trujillo was ready by 1930 to assume control of the country. Although elections were scheduled for May, Vásquez's extension in office cast doubt on their potential fairness. (Vásquez had also eliminated from the constitution the prohibition against presidential reelection.) This uncertainty prompted Rafael Estrella Ureña, a political leader from Santiago, to proclaim a revolution in February. Having already struck a deal with Trujillo, Estrella marched on the capital; army forces remained in their barracks as Trujillo declared his "neutrality" in the situation. The ailing Vásquez, a victim of duplicity and betrayal, fled the capital. Estrella assumed the provisional presidency.
Part of the arrangement between Estrella and Trujillo apparently involved the army commander's candidacy for president in the May elections. As events unfolded, it became clear that Trujillo would be the only candidate that the army would permit to participate; army personnel harassed and intimidated electoral officials and eliminated potential opponents. A dazed nation stood by as the new dictator announced his election with 95 percent of the vote. After his inauguration in August, and at his express request, the Congress issued an official proclamation announcing the commencement of "the Era of Trujillo."
The dictator proceeded to rule the country like a feudal lord for thirty-one years. He held the office of president from 1930 to 1938 and from 1942 to 1952. During the interim periods, he exercised absolute power, while leaving the ceremonial affairs of state to puppet presidents such as his brother, Héctor Bienvenido Trujillo Molina, who occupied the National Palace from 1952 to 1960, and Joaquín Balaguer Ricardo, an intellectual and scholar who served from 1960 to 1961. Although cast in the mold of old- time caudillos such as Santana and Heureaux, Trujillo surpassed them in efficiency, rapacity, and utter ruthlessness. Like Heureaux, he maintained a highly effective secret police force that monitored (and eliminated, in some instances) opponents both at home and abroad. Like Santana, he relied on the military as his primary support. Armed forces personnel received generous pay and perquisites under his rule, and their ranks and equipment inventories expanded. Trujillo maintained control over the officer corps through fear, patronage, and the frequent rotation of assignments, which inhibited the development of strong personal followings (see History and Development of the Armed Forces , ch. 5). The other leading beneficiaries of the dictatorship--aside from Trujillo himself and his family--were those who associated themselves with the regime both politically and economically. The establishment of state monopolies over all major enterprises in the country brought riches to the Trujillos and their cronies through the manipulation of prices and inventories as well as the outright embezzlement of funds.
Generally speaking, the quality of life improved for the average Dominican under Trujillo. Poverty persisted, but the economy expanded, the foreign debt disappeared, the currency remained stable, and the middle class expanded. Public works projects enhanced the road system and improved port facilities; airports and public buildings were constructed, the public education system grew, and illiteracy declined. These advances might well have been achieved in even greater measure under a responsive democratic government, but to Dominicans, who had no experience with such a government, the results under Trujillo were impressive. Although he never tested his personal popularity in a free election, some observers feel that Trujillo could have won a majority of the popular vote up until the final years of his dictatorship.
Ideologically, Trujillo leaned toward fascism. The trappings of his personality cult (Santo Domingo was renamed Ciudad Trujillo under his rule), the size and architectural mediocrity of his building projects, and the level of repressive control exercised by the state all invited comparison with the style of his contemporaries, Hitler in Germany and Mussolini in Italy. Basically, however, Trujillo was not an ideologue, but a Dominican caudillo expanded to monstrous proportions by his absolute control of the nation's resources. His attitude toward communism tended toward peaceful coexistence until 1947, when the Cold War winds from Washington persuaded him to crack down and to outlaw the Dominican Communist Party (Partido Comunista Dominicano--PCD). As always, self-interest and the need to maintain his personal power guided Trujillo's actions.
Although conspiracies--both real and imagined--against his rule preoccupied Trujillo throughout his reign, it was his adventurous foreign policy that drew the ire of other governments and led directly to his downfall. Paradoxically, his most heinous action in this arena cost him the least in terms of influence and support. In October 1937, Trujillo ordered the massacre of Haitians living in the Dominican Republic in retaliation for the discovery and execution by the Haitian government of his most valued covert agents in that country. The Dominican army slaughtered as many as 20,000 largely unarmed men, women, and children, mostly in border areas, but also in the western Cibao. News of the atrocity filtered out of the country slowly; when it reached the previously supportive administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the United States, Secretary of State Cordell Hull demanded internationally mediated negotiations for a settlement and indemnity. Trujillo finally agreed. The negotiations, however, fixed a ludicrously low indemnity of US$750,000, which was later reduced to US$525,000 by agreement between the two governments. Although the affair damaged Trujillo's international image, it did not result in any direct efforts by the United States or by other countries to force him from power.
In later years, the Trujillo regime became increasingly isolated from the governments of other nations. This isolation compounded the dictator's paranoia, prompting him to increase his foreign interventionism. To be sure, Trujillo did have cause to resent the leaders of certain foreign nations, such as Cuba's Fidel Castro Ruz, who aided a small, abortive invasion attempt by dissident Dominicans in 1959. Trujillo, however, expressed greater concern over Venezuela's President Rómulo Betancourt (1959-64). An established and outspoken opponent of Trujillo, Betancourt had been associated with some individual Dominicans who had plotted against the dictator. Trujillo developed an obsessive personal hatred of Betancourt and supported numerous plots of Venezuelan exiles to overthrow him. This pattern of intervention led the Venezuelan government to take its case against Trujillo to the Organization of American States (OAS). This development infuriated Trujillo, who ordered his foreign agents to assassinate Betancourt. The attempt, on June 24, 1960, injured, but did not kill, the Venezuelan president. The incident inflamed world opinion against Trujillo. The members of the OAS, expressing this outrage, voted unanimously to sever diplomatic relations and to impose economic sanctions on the Dominican Republic.
The firestorm surrounding the Betancourt incident provoked a review of United States policy toward the Dominican Republic by the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The United States had long tolerated Trujillo as a bulwark of stability in the Caribbean; some in Washington still saw him as a desirable counterforce to the Castro regime. Others, however, saw in Trujillo another Fulgencio Batista--the dictator Castro deposed in 1959--ripe for overthrow by radical, potentially communist, forces. Public opinion in the United States also began to run strongly against the Dominican dictatorship. In August 1960, the United States embassy in Santo Domingo was downgraded to consular level. According to journalist Bernard Diederich, Eisenhower also asked the National Security Council's Special Group (the organization responsible for approving covert operations) to consider the initiation of operations aimed at Trujillo's ouster. On May 30, 1961, Trujillo was assassinated. According to Diederich, the United States Central Intelligence Agency supplied the weapons used by the assassins.
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THE POST-TRUJILLO ERA
Transition to Elected Government
At the time of his assassination, Trujillo was seventy years old. He had left no designated successor. It soon became clear that the conspirators had planned his assassination more thoroughly than the subsequent seizure of government, which never took place. Puppet President Balaguer remained in office, allowing the late dictator's son, Rafael Trujillo Lovatón (also called Rafael, Jr., or Ramfis), to return from Paris and assume de facto control. Ramfis lacked the dynamism of his father, however, and he eventually fell into a dispute with his two uncles over potential liberalization of the regime. The "wicked uncles"--Héctor and José Arismendi Trujillo Molina--returned to the republic from exile in November 1961. Ramfis, having little enthusiasm for a power struggle, fled the country.
Opposition from Washington, made very plain by the deployment of United States warships off the Dominican coast, blunted the ambitions of the uncles and forced them to resume their exile only days later. Balaguer retained the presidency. As a protégé of the fallen dictator, however, he had neither a power base nor a popular following. Popular unrest, punctuated by a general strike, forced Balaguer to share power with a seven-member Council of State, established on January 1, 1962. The council included Balaguer and the two surviving assassins of Trujillo, Antonio Imbert Barrera and Luis Amiama Tío (the others having been slain by Trujillo's security service). The council lasted only sixteen days, however, before air force general Pedro Rodríguez Echavarría overthrew it in a coup d'état. Rodríguez's attempt at rule also foundered on the rocks of popular protest and opposition from the United States. Less senior officers seized the general, deported him, and restored the council minus Balaguer, who had also been exiled.
The restored Council of State guided the country until elections could be organized. The leading candidates were Juan Bosch Gaviño, a scholar and poet, who had organized the opposition Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano--PRD) in exile, and Viriato Fiallo of the National Civic Union (Unión Cívica Nacional--UCN). In the balloting of December 20, 1963, the conservative image of the UCN and its association with the country's economic elite benefited Bosch, whose support came mainly from the urban lower class. Bosch won the election with 64 percent of the vote; the PRD also captured two-thirds majorities in both houses of the legislature.
The Bosch administration was very much an oddity in Dominican history up to that point: a freely elected, liberal, democratic government that expressed concern for the welfare of all Dominicans, particularly those of modest circumstances, those whose voices had never really been heard before in the National Palace. The 1963 constitution separated church and state, guaranteed civil and individual rights, and endorsed civilian control of the military. These and other changes, such as land reform, struck conservative landholders and military officers as radical and threatening, particularly when juxtaposed against three decades of somnolent authoritarianism under Trujillo. The hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church also resented the secular nature of the new constitution, in particular its provision for legalized divorce. The hierarchy, along with the military leadership and the economic elite, also feared communist influence in the republic, and they warned of the potential for "another Cuba." The result of this concern and opposition was a military coup on September 25, 1963.
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Civil War and United States Intervention, 1965
The coup effectively negated the 1962 elections by installing a civilian junta, known as the Triumvirate, dominated by the UCN. The initial head of the Triumvirate, Emilio de los Santos, resigned on December 23 and was replaced by Donald Reid Cabral. The Triumvirate never succeeded in establishing its authority over competing conservative factions both inside and outside the military; it also never convinced the majority of the population of its legitimacy. The widespread dissatisfaction with Reid and his government, coupled with lingering loyalties to Bosch, produced a revolution in April 1965.
The vanguard of the 1965 revolution, the perredeistas (members of the PRD) and other supporters of Bosch, called themselves Constitutionalists (a reference to their support for the 1963 constitution). The movement counted some junior military officers among its ranks. A combination of reformist military and aroused civilian combatants took to the streets on April 24, seized the National Palace, and installed Rafael Molina Ureña as provisional president. The revolution took on the dimensions of a civil war when conservative military forces, led by army general Elías Wessín y Wessín, struck back against the Constitutionalists on April 25. These conservative forces called themselves Loyalists. Despite tank assaults and bombing runs by Loyalist forces, however, the Constitutionalists held their positions in the capital; they appeared poised to branch out and to secure control of the entire country.
On April 28, the United States intervened in the civil war. President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered in forces that eventually totaled 20,000, to secure Santo Domingo and to restore order. Johnson had acted in the stated belief that the Constitutionalists were dominated by communists and that they therefore could not be allowed to come to power. The intervention was subsequently granted some measure of hemispheric approval by the creation of an OAS-sponsored peace force, which supplemented the United States military presence in the republic. An initial interim government was headed by Trujillo assassin Imbert; Héctor García Godoy assumed a provisional presidency on September 3, 1965. Violent skirmishes between Loyalists and Constitutionalists went on sporadically as, once again, elections were organized.
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Joaquín Balaguer, 1966-78
A fractious campaign ensued between the country's two leading political figures: Bosch and Balaguer. Bosch's appeal was tempered by fear; many Dominicans felt that his reelection would rekindle the violence of April 1965. This trepidation aided Balaguer, who also appealed to conservative voting sectors such as peasants, women (considered to be more religious than men), and businesspeople. Balaguer thus won handily, garnering 57 percent of the vote in balloting held July 1, 1966. His Reformist Party (Partido Reformista--PR) also captured majorities in the Congress.
Balaguer went on to serve as president for twelve years. A relative nonentity under Trujillo, he demonstrated, once in power, the astuteness with which he had studied the techniques of the late dictator. Even though as a conservative he theoretically was more secure against military machinations, he actively sought to head off opposition from the armed forces by rewarding officers loyal to him, purging those he suspected, and rotating everyone's assignments on a regular and frequent basis. He curtailed nonmilitary opposition through selective (compared to the Trujillo years) repression by the National Police. His reelection in 1970 and in 1974 was accomplished largely through intimidation. The PRD, the only viable, broad-based opposition party, boycotted both elections to safeguard the well-being of those who would have been their candidates.
The Dominican economy expanded at a record rate under Balaguer. Favorable international prices for sugar provided the basis for this so-called Dominican miracle. Foreign investment, foreign borrowing, foreign aid, the growth of tourism, and extensive public works programs also contributed to high levels of growth. By the late 1970s, however, the expansion had slowed considerably as sugar prices dipped and oil prices rose. Rising inflation and unemployment diminished support for the government, particularly among the middle class.
The PRD, feeling the mood of the population and sensing support from the administration of United States president Jimmy Carter, nominated Silvestre Antonio Guzmán Fernández to oppose Balaguer in the elections of May 16, 1978. A relatively heavy 70 percent turnout seemed to favor the PRD; early returns confirmed this as Guzmán built a sizable lead. Early in the morning of May 17, however, military units occupied the Central Electoral Board and impounded the ballots. Clearly, Balaguer was attempting to nullify the balloting or to falsify the results in his favor. Only forceful remonstrances by the Carter administration, backed up by a naval deployment, moved Balaguer to allow the resumption of the vote count. Two weeks later, Guzmán's victory was officially announced.
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Antonio Guzmán, 1978-82
Guzmán's assumption of office on August 16, 1978, presented many political challenges to both him and the republic. Mindful of the fate of Juan Bosch sixteen years before, Guzmán determined to move slowly in the area of social and economic reforms and to deal as directly as possible with the threat of political pressure from the armed forces. He attacked the latter problem first with a program of military depoliticization that included the removal or the reassignment of general officers of questionable loyalty or professionalism, the promotion of younger and more apolitical officers than those who had held sway under Balaguer, and the institution of a formal training course for officers and enlisted personnel that stressed the nonpolitical role of the armed forces in a democratic society. This campaign was largely successful, and it constituted the major legacy left by Guzmán to his successor, Salvador Jorge Blanco.
Politically, Guzmán was restrained to some extent by the unusual outcome of the 1978 elections. Although the Central Electoral Board acknowledged the PRD's victories in the races for the presidency and the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of Congress), it managed through some creative counting--apparently taking the number of ballots not used in some provinces and dividing them among the top two vote-getters--to give Balaguer's PR a sixteen to eleven majority in the Senate. This essentially granted the PR a legislative veto over any initiatives Guzmán might wish to launch, and it also became a factor in the president's cautious approach to reform.
Some observers felt that Guzmán's economic and social background--he was a wealthy cattle rancher from the Santiago area--influenced his economic policies as well. Despite his nationalization of public transportation and an increase in the minimum wage, more reform-minded politicians, even within his own party, criticized the president for his inadequate response to continued economic decline. Jorge was one of Guzmán's leading critics in this area; ironically, he too, would be confronted with the stark realities of the economy and the lack of acceptable options available to the president after his own election in 1982 (see Political Developments since 1978 , ch. 4). Faced with the continually rising oil prices and declining sugar prices, Guzmán opted for politically unpopular austerity policies, including a steep increase in the retail price of gasoline. Compounding to the general woes of a slowed economy was the extensive damage wreaked on the country by Hurricane David in August 1979.
In retrospect, the Guzmán administration represented a bridge between lingering post-Trujillo authoritarianism and a more liberal, democratic style of politics and government. Guzmán's professionalization of the military was a significant contribution to this process. Although the Dominican economic situation plagued him, Guzmán handled matters with sufficient competence to allow for the election of Jorge on the PRD ticket on May 16, 1982. (Guzmán had pledged not to seek reelection.) Jorge's leading opponents had been PR candidate Balaguer and Bosch, who had split from the PRD and had formed his own party, the Dominican Liberation Party (Partido de la Liberación Dominicana--PLD). For reasons never fully explained, Guzmán committed suicide in July 1982; he was said to have been depressed by allegations of corruption and nepotism in his administration. His vice president, Jacobo Majluta Azar, served out the remainder of the term. Guzmán's suicide prevented what would have been a historic event--the peaceful transfer of power from one freely and fairly elected president to another. Jorge's administration also fell victim to corruption and the effects of economic austerity. With the election and peaceful return to power of Balaguer in 1986, a tradition of fair electoral competition appeared to be developing; democracy seemed to be taking root in the Dominican Republic (see Political Developments since 1978 , ch. 4).
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Works in English dealing with the Dominican Republic have been produced by political scientists more often than by historians. Consequently, the student of the country's history is limited to works such as Selden Rodman's Quisqueya: A History of the Dominican Republic, which provides good background, but little detail; Rayford Logan's short volume, titled Haiti and the Dominican Republic; or Sumner Welles's voluminous, but dated, Naboth's Vineyard. A sense of the republic's history can also be culled from a number of volumes oriented toward politics or foreign relations. Among these, Howard Wiarda's The Dominican Republic: Nation in Transition provides a good general introduction to the country. The Dominican Republic: A Caribbean Crucible and The Politics of External Influence in the Dominican Republic, by Howard Wiarda and Michael Kryzanek, chart the republic's further political and economic progress. Bruce J. Calder's The Impact of Intervention is an excellent study of the United States occupation and its effects. Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator, by Robert D. Crassweller, provides a vivid portrait of the dominant figure in the nation's twentiethcentury history. A broader perspective can be obtained from G. Pope Atkins and Larman C. Wilson's The United States and the Trujillo Regime. The Dominican Republic: Politics and Development in an Unsovereign State, by Jan Knippers Black, deals effectively with the 1978 transition to democracy and subsequent developments. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
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Chapter 2. Dominican Republic: The Society and Its Environment
DOMINICAN SOCIETY OF THE LATE 1980s reflected the country's Spanish-Caribbean heritage. It manifested significant divisions along the lines of race and class. A small fraction of the populace controlled great wealth, while the vast majority struggled to get by. The middle stratum worked both to maintain and to extend its political and economic gains. Generally speaking, Dominican society offered relatively few avenues of advancement; most of those available allowed families of middling means to enhance or to consolidate their standing.
The majority of the population was mulatto, the offspring of Africans and Europeans. The indigenous Amerindian population had been virtually eliminated within half a century of initial contact. Immigrants--European, Middle Eastern, Asian, and Caribbean--arrived with each cycle of economic growth. In general, skin color followed the social hierarchy: lighter skin was associated with higher social and economic status. European immigrants and their offspring found more ready acceptance at the upper reaches of society than did darker-skinned Dominicans.
The decades following the end of the regime of Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina (1930-61) were a time of extensive changes as large-scale rural-urban and international migration blurred the gulf between city and countryside. Traditional attitudes persisted: peasants continued to regard urban dwellers with suspicion, and people in cities continued to think of rural Dominicans as unsophisticated and naive. Nonetheless, most families included several members who had migrated to the republic's larger cities or to the United States. Migration served to relieve some of the pressures of population growth. Moreover, cash remittances from abroad permitted families of moderate means to acquire assets and to maintain a standard of living far beyond what they might otherwise have enjoyed.
The alternatives available to poorer Dominicans were far more limited. Emigration required assets beyond the reach of most. Many rural dwellers migrated instead to one of the republic's cities. The financial resources and training of these newcomers, however, were far inferior to those among typical families of moderate means. For the vast majority of the republic's population, the twin constraints of limited land and limited employment opportunities defined the daily struggle for existence.
In the midst of far-reaching changes, the republic continued to be a profoundly family oriented society. Dominicans of every social stratum relied on family and kin for social identity and for interpersonal relationships of trust and confidence, particularly in the processes of migration and urbanization.
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GEOGRAPHY
The Dominican Republic is located on the island of Hispaniola (La Isla Española), which it shares with Haiti to the west. The 388-kilometer border between the two was established in a series of treaties, the most recent of which was the 1936 Protocol of Revision of the Frontier Treaty (Tratado Fronterizo) of 1929. The country is shaped in the form of an irregular triangle. The short side of the triangle is 388 kilometers long, while the two long sides form 1,575 kilometers of coastline along the Atlantic Ocean, the Caribbean Sea, and the Mona Passage. The total area of the country is approximately 48,442 square kilometers. Although it boasts the highest elevations in the Antilles, it also has a saltwater lake below sea level (see fig. 2).
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Natural Regions
The mountains and valleys of the Dominican Republic divide the country into the northern, the central, and the southwestern regions. The northern region, bordering the Atlantic Ocean, consists of the Atlantic coastal plain, the Cordillera Septentrional (or Northern Mountain Range), the Valle del Cibao (Cibao Valley), and the Samaná Peninsula. The Atlantic coastal plain is a narrow strip that extends from the northwestern coast at Monte Cristi to Nagua, northwest of the Samaná Peninsula. The Cordillera Septentrional is south of, and runs parallel to, the coastal plain. Its highest peaks rise to an elevation of over 1,000 meters. The Valle del Cibao lies south of the Cordillera Septentrional. It extends 240 kilometers from the northwest coast to the Bahía de Samaná in the east and ranges in width from 15 to 45 kilometers. To the west of the ridge lies the Valle de Santiago and to the east is the Valle de la Vega Real. The Samaná Peninsula is an eastward extension of the northern region, separated from the Cordillera Septentrional by an area of swampy lowlands. The peninsula is mountainous; its highest elevations reach 600 meters.
The central region is dominated by the Cordillera Central (Central Range); it runs eastward from the Haitian border and turns southward at the Valle de Constanza (or Constanza Valley) to end in the Caribbean Sea. This southward branch is known as the Sierra de Ocoa. The Cordillera Central is 2,000 meters high near the Haitian border and reaches a height of 3,087 meters at Pico Duarte, the highest point in the country. An eastern branch of the Cordillera Central extends through the Sierra de Yamasá to the Cordillera Oriental (Eastern Range). The main peaks of these two mountain groups are not higher than 880 meters. The Cordillera Oriental is also known as the Sierra de Seibo.
Another significant feature of the central region is the Caribbean coastal plain, which lies south of the foothills of the Sierra de Yamasá and the Cordillera Oriental. It extends 240 kilometers from the mouth of the Ocoa River to the extreme eastern end of the island. The Caribbean coastal plain is 10 to 40 kilometers wide and consists of a series of limestone terraces that gradually rise to a height of 100 to 120 meters at the northern edge of the coastal plains at the foothills of the Cordillera Oriental. Finally, the central region includes the Valle de San Juan in the western part of the country; the valley extends 100 kilometers from the Haitian border to the Bahía de Ocoa.
The southwestern region lies south of the Valle de San Juan. It encompasses the Sierra de Neiba, which extends 100 kilometers from the Haitian border to the Yaque del Sur River. The main peaks are roughly 2,000 meters high, while other peaks range from 1,000 to 1,500 meters. On the eastern side of the Yaque del Sur lies the Sierra de Martín García, which extends twenty-five kilometers from the river to the Llanura de Azua (Plain of Azua).
The Hoya de Enriquillo, a structural basin that lies south of the Sierra de Neiba, is also within the southwestern region. The basin extends ninety-five kilometers from the Haitian border to the Bahía de Neiba and twenty kilometers from the Sierra de Neiba to the Sierra de Baoruco. The Sierra de Baoruco extends seventy kilometers from the Haitian border to the Caribbean Sea. Its three major peaks surpass 2,000 meters in height. TheProcurrente de Barahona (Cape of Barahona) extends southward from the Sierra de Baoruco and consists of a series of terraces.
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Drainage
The Dominican Republic has seven major drainage basins. Five of these rise in the Cordillera Central and a sixth, in the Sierra de Yamasá. The seventh drainage system flows into the Lago Enriquillo (Lake Enriquillo) from the Sierra de Neiba to the north and from the Sierra de Baoruco to the south. In general, other rivers are either short or intermittent.
The Yaque del Norte is the most significant river in the country. Some 296 kilometers long, with a basin area of 7,044 square kilometers, it rises near Pico Duarte at an altitude of 2,580 meters in the Cordillera Central. It empties into the Bahía de Monte Cristi on the northwest coast, where it forms a delta. The Yaque del Sur is the most important river on the southern coast. It rises at an altitude of 2,707 meters in the southern slopes of the Cordillera Central. Its upper course through the mountains constitutes 75 percent of its total length of some 183 kilometers. The basin area is 4,972 square kilometers. The river forms a delta near its mouth in the Bahía de Neiba.
The Lago Enriquillo lies in the western part of the Hoya de Enriquillo. Its drainage basin includes ten minor river systems and covers an area of more than 3,000 square kilometers. The northern rivers of the system rise in the Sierra de Neiba and are perennial, while the southern rivers rise in the Sierra de Baoruco and are intermittent, flowing only after heavy rainfall. The Lago Enriquillo itself covers some 265 square kilometers. Its water level varies because of the high evaporation rate, yet on the average it is forty meters below sea level. The water in the lake is saline.
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Climate
The Dominican Republic has primarily a tropical climate, with more diurnal and local variations in temperature than seasonal ones, and with seasonal variability in the abundance of rainfall. The average annual temperature is 25° C, ranging from 18° C at an altitude of over 1,200 meters to 28° C at an altitude of 10 meters. Highs of 40° C are common in protected valleys, as are lows of zero in mountainous areas. In general, August is the hottest month, and January and February are the coldest ones.
Seasons, however, vary more as a function of rainfall than of temperature. Along the northern coast, the rainy season lasts from November through January. In the rest of the country, it runs from May through November; May is the wettest month. The dry season lasts from November through April; March is the driest month. The average annual rainfall for the country as a whole is 150 centimeters. This varies, however, from region to region, and ranges from 35 centimeters in the Valle de Neiba to 274 centimeters in the Cordillera Oriental. In general, the western part of the country, including the interior valleys, receives the least rain.
Tropical cyclones--such as tropical depressions, tropical storms, and hurricanes--occur on the average of once every two years in the Dominican Republic. Over 65 percent of the storms strike the southern part of the country, especially along the Hoya de Enriquillo. The season for cyclones lasts from the beginning of June to the end of November; some cyclones occur in May and December, but most take place in September and October. Hurricanes usually occur from August through October. They may produce winds greater than 200 kilometers per hour and rainfall greater than 50 centimeters in a twenty-four-hour period.
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POPULATION
Size and Growth
It has been estimated that the country's total population in mid-1990 will total slightly more than 7 million (see fig. 3). Growth had been high since official census taking began in 1920. The rate peaked during the 1950s at 3.6 percent per year. During the 1960s and the 1970s, the population grew at 2.9 percent annually; by the mid-1980s, the rate was thought to be roughly 2.5 percent.
The total fertility rate, although still relatively high, declined substantially in the 1970s. Official estimates indicated that half of all married women used contraceptives. Both the Dominican Republic's continued high population growth rates and field studies belied this figure, however.
The government began supporting family planning in 1967, but clinics were concentrated in the cities and larger towns. Both the Secretariat of State for Public Health and Social Welfare (Secretaria de Estado de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social-- SESPAS) and the National Population and Family Council (Consejo Nacional de Población y Familia--CNPF) offered family planning services. By the 1980s, both organizations were trying to make their programs more responsive to the needs of rural families.
Birth control encountered strong resistance from both sexes, especially in the countryside and the smaller cities. Although women did use a variety of substances believed to be contraceptives or abortifacients, there was considerable misinformation about family planning. Many men believed birth control threatened their masculinity; some women refused to use contraception because some methods produced nausea and other side effects. International migrants were more aware of the available options, and some women migrants did use modern contraceptives.
The traditional (non-administrative) subregions of the country included Valdesia and Yuma in the southeast, Enriquillo and Del Valle in the southwest, and the Central Cibao, the Eastern Cibao, and the Western Cibao in the north. The subregion of densest settlement was Valdesia on the southern coast, which contained the nation's capital and more than 40 percent of the population. Roughly one-third of all Dominicans lived in the National District. The other major area of settlement was the Central Cibao, which accounted for more than 20 percent of total population (see table 2, Appendix A).
Administrations had attempted to control both population growth and its distribution since the 1950s. The Trujillo regime fostered agricultural colonies scattered throughout the countryside and strung along the western frontier with Haiti. Some were coupled with irrigation projects.
Beginning in the late 1970s, the government also set up industrial free zones around the country. Although the desire to increase employment was the government's primary motivation, the establishment of free zones had as a secondary goal the dispersal of industrialization, and thus migration, away from Santo Domingo (see Manufacturing , ch. 3). Intercensal growth rates on the subregional and the provincial levels reflected these trends. Puerto Plata grew at more than twice the rate of the nation as a whole in the 1970s. The southeast, especially the National District, expanded much faster than most of the country, as did La Romana.
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Migration
The Dominican Republic was a country of migrants in the late 1980s; according to the 1981 census, nearly one-quarter of the population was living in a province other than that in which they had been born. Surveys in the mid-1970s found that nearly twothirds of city dwellers and half of those in the countryside had migrated at least once. Rural areas in general, especially in the Central Cibao, have experienced significant levels of outmigration . The movement of peasants and the landless into the republic's growing cities accounted for the lion's share of migration. Indeed, Dominicans had even coined a new word, campuno, to describe the rural-urban campesino migrant. The principal destinations for migrants were the National District followed by the provinces of La Romana, Independencia, and San Pedro de Macorís (see fig. 1). In the National District, 46 percent of the inhabitants were migrants. The industrial free zones were the other major destinations for migrants in the 1970s.
Women predominated in both rural-urban and urban-rural migration. Men, however, were more likely than women to move from city to city or from one rural area to another. In general, migrants earned more than non-migrants, and they suffered lower rates of unemployment, although underemployment was pervasive. Urban-rural migrants had the highest incomes. This category, however, consisted of a select group of educated and skilled workers, mostly government officials, teachers, and the like, who moved from cities to assume specific jobs in rural areas. They received higher wages as a recompense for the lack of urban amenities in villages.
Migrants spoke of the migration chain (cadena) that tied them to other migrants and to their home communities. Kin served as the links in the chain. They cared for family, lands, and businesses left behind, or, if they had migrated earlier, assisted the new arrivals with employment and housing.The actual degree of support families could, or were willing to, give a migrant varied widely.
The process of rural-urban migration typically involved a series of steps. The migrant gradually abandoned agriculture and sought more non-agricultural sources of income. Migrants rarely arrived in the largest, fastest growing cities "green" from the countryside. They acquired training and experience in intermediate-sized cities and in temporary nonfarm jobs en route.
International migration played a significant role in the livelihood of many Dominicans. Anywhere from 8 to 15 percent of the total population resided abroad. Estimates of those living and working in the United States in the mid-1980s ranged from 300,000 to as high as 800,000. Roughly 200,000 more were in San Juan, Puerto Rico, many of them presumably waiting to get into the United States. Most migrants went to New York; but by the mid-1980s, their destinations also included other cities of the eastern seaboard.
A sizable minority (about one-third) emigrated because they were unemployed, but most did so to attain higher income, to continue their educations, or to join other family members. In the early 1980s, most emigrants were relatively better educated and more skilled than the Dominican populace as a whole. Most came from cities, but the middling to large farms of the overpopulated Cibao also sent large numbers. Working in the United States has become almost an expected part of the lives of Dominicans from families of moderate means.
Cash remittances from Dominicans living abroad have become an integral part of the national economy. Migrants' remittances constituted a significant percentage of the country's foreign exchange earnings (see Balance of Payments , ch. 3). Remittances were used to finance businesses, to purchase land, and to bolster the family's standard of living. Most migrants saw sending money as an obligation. Although some refused to provide assistance, they came under severe criticism from both fellow migrants and those who remained behind. The extent to which a migrant's earnings were committed to family and kin was sometimes striking. Anthropologist Patricia Pessar has described a Dominican man in New York who earned less than US$500 per month. He sent US$150 of this to his wife and children and another US$100 to his parents and unmarried siblings.
Money from abroad had a multiplier effect; it spawned a veritable construction boom in migrants' hometowns and neighborhoods in the mid-1970s. Migrants also contributed significant sums for the church back home. Many parish priests made annual fund-raising trips to New York to seek donations for local parish needs.
The impact of out-migration was widely felt; in one Cibao village, for example, 85 percent of the households had at least one member living in New York in the mid-1970s. Where migration was common, it altered a community's age pyramid: eighteen to forty-five-year olds (especially males) were essentially missing. Emigration also eliminated many of the natural choices for leadership roles in the home community.
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Urbanization
For most of its history, the Dominican Republic was overwhelmingly rural; in 1920 over 80 percent of its populace lived in the countryside, and by 1950 more than 75 percent still did. Substantial urban expansion began in the 1950s, and it gained tremendous momentum in the 1960s and the 1970s. Urban growth rates far outdistanced those of the country as a whole. The urban population expanded at 6.1 percent annually during the 1950s, 5.7 percent annually during the 1960s-70s, and 4.7 percent annually through the mid-1980s.
In the early decades of the twentieth century, the country was not only largely rural, but the urban scene itself was dominated by smaller cities and provincial capitals. In 1920 nearly 80 percent of all city dwellers lived in cities with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants. Santo Domingo, with barely more than 30,000 residents, accounted for only 20 percent of those in cities. By contrast, in 1981 Santo Domingo alone accounted for nearly half of all city dwellers; it had more than double the total population of all cities of more than 20,000 inhabitants. Cities with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants--nearly 80 percent of the urban population in 1920--constituted less than 20 percent by 1981.
Santo Domingo approximately doubled its population every decade between 1920 and 1970. Its massive physical expansion, however, dated from the 1950s. The growth in industry and urban construction, coupled with Trujillo's expropriations of rural land, fueled rural-urban migration and the city's growth. The republic's second and third largest cities, Santiago de los Caballeros (Santiago) and La Romana, also experienced significant expansion in the 1960s and the 1970s. Santiago, the center of traditional Hispanic culture, drew migrants from the heavily populated Cibao. La Romana, in the southeast, grew as a center of employment in the sugar industry as well as a center of tourism and the site of the country's first industrial free zone (see Manufacturing , ch. 3).
Population growth and rural-urban migration strained cities' capacity to provide housing and amenities. Nevertheless, in 1981 nearly 80 percent of city dwellings had access to potable water; 90 percent had some type of sewage disposal; and roughly 90 percent had electricity. The proportion of homes with piped, or easy access to, potable water, however, actually declined by nearly ten percentage points in the 1970s. By the mid-1980s, there was an estimated housing deficit of some 400,000 units. The need was greatest in the National District. Squatter settlements grew in response to the scarcity of low-cost urban housing. In Santo Domingo these settlements were concentrated along the Ozama River and on the city's periphery.
Public housing initiatives dated from the late 1950s, when Trujillo built some housing for government employees of moderate means. Through the mid-1980s, a number of different government agencies played a role. The Technical Secretariat of the Presidency (Secretaria Técnica de la Presidencia) designed a variety of projects in Santo Domingo. The Aid and Housing Institute and the National Housing Institute bore primary responsibility for the financing and the construction of housing. In general, public efforts had been hampered by extreme decentralization in planning, coupled with equally extreme concentration in decision making. The primary beneficiaries of public projects were usually from lower income groups, although they were not the poorest urban dwellers. Projects targeted those making at least the minimum wage, i.e., the lower middle sector or the more stable segments of the working class.
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RACIAL AND ETHNIC GROUPS
Ethnic Heritage
The island's indigenous inhabitants were the Taino Indians (Arawaks) group and a small settlement of Caribs around the Bahía de Samaná. These Indians, estimated to number perhaps 1 million at the time of their initial contact with Europeans, had died off by the 1550s. The importation of African slaves began in 1503. By the nineteenth century, the population was roughly 150,000: 40,000 of Spanish descent, an equal number of black slaves, and the remainder of freed blacks or mulattoes. In the mid-1980s, approximately 16 percent of the population was considered white and 11 percent black; the remainder were mulattoes.
Contemporary Dominican society and culture are overwhelmingly Spanish in origin. Taino influence is limited to cultigens and to a few vocabulary words, such as huracán (hurricane) and hamaca (hammock). African influence has been largely ignored, although certain religious brotherhoods with significant black membership incorporated some Afro-American elements. Observers also have noted the presence of African influence in popular dance and music.
There was a preference in Dominican society for light skin and "white" racial features.Blackness in itself, however, did not restrict a person to a lower status position. Upward mobility was possible for the dark-skinned person who managed to acquire education or wealth. Social characteristics, focusing on family background, education, and economic standing, were in fact more prominent means of identifying and classifying individuals. Darker-skinned persons were concentrated in the east and the south. The population of the Cibao, especially in the countryside, consisted mainly of whites or mulattoes.
Dominicans traditionally preferred to think of themselves as descendants of the island's Indians and the Spanish, ignoring their African heritage. Thus, phenotypical African characteristics were disparaged. Emigrants to the United States brought a new level of racial consciousness to the republic, however, when they returned. Those who came back during the 1960s and the 1970s had experienced both racial prejudice and the black pride movement in North America. Returning migrants brought back Afro hairstyles and a variety of other Afro-North Americanisms.
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Modern Immigration
Although almost all migrants were assimilated into Dominican society (often with surprising speed and thoroughness), immigration had a pervasive influence on the ethnic and the racial configurations of the country. Within a generation or two, most immigrants were considered Dominican even though the family might well continue to maintain contact with relatives in the country of origin. Both the elite and the middle segments of society recruited new members with each economic expansion. The main impetus to immigration was the rise of sugar production in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. Nonetheless, some groups had earlier antecedents, while others arrived as late as the 1970s.
Nineteenth-century immigrants came from a number of places. Roughly 5,000 to 10,000 North American freedmen, principally Methodists, came in response to an offer of free land made during the period of Haitian domination (1822-44). Most, however, were city dwellers, and they quickly returned to the United States. A few small settlements remained around Santiago, Puerto Plata, and Samaná. They eventually were assimilated, although English was still widely used in the region of Samaná. Sephardic Jews arrived from Curaçao in the late eighteenth century and, in greater numbers, following independence from Haiti in 1844. They were assimilated rapidly; both their economic assets and their white ancestry made them desirable additions from the point of view of the Dominican criollos. Canary Islanders arrived during the late colonial period as well, in response to the improved economic conditions of the 1880s. Spaniards settled during the period of renewed Spanish occupation (1861-65); many Spanish soldiers stayed after the War of Restoration (see Annexation by Spain, 1861-65 , ch. 1). Germans established themselves--principally in Puerto Plata--primarily in the tobacco trade.
The expansion of the sugar industry in the late nineteenth century drew migrants from every social stratum. Cubans and Puerto Ricans, who began arriving in the 1870s, aided in the evolution of the sugar industry as well as in the country's intellectual development. In addition, significant numbers of laborers came from the British, the Dutch, and the Danish islands of the Caribbean. They also worked in railroad construction and on the docks. Initial reaction to their presence was negative, but their educational background (which was superior to that of most of the rural populace), their ability to speak English (which gave them an advantage in dealing with North American plantation owners), and their industriousness eventually won them a measure of acceptance. They founded Protestant churches, Masonic lodges, mutual aid societies, and a variety of other cultural organizations. Their descendants enjoyed a considerable measure of upward mobility through education and religion. They were well represented in the technical trades (especially those associated with the sugar industry) and on professional baseball teams.
Arabs--Lebanese and lesser numbers of Palestinians and Syrians--first arrived in the late nineteenth century, and they prospered. Their assimilation was slower, however, and many still maintained contacts with relatives in the Middle East. Italians also arrived during this period and were assimilated rapidly, as did a few immigrants from diverse South American countries. A few Chinese came from other Caribbean islands and established a reputation for diligence and industriousness. More followed with the United States occupation of the island (1916-24). They began as cooks and domestic servants; a number of their descendants were restaurateurs and hotel owners.
The most recent trickle of immigrants entered the country from the 1930s to the 1980s. Many founded agricultural colonies that suffered a high rate of attrition. Among the groups were German Jews (1930s), Japanese (after World War II), and Hungarians and Spaniards (both in the 1950s). More Chinese came from Taiwan and Hong Kong in the 1970s; by the 1980s, they were the second fastest growing immigrant group (Haitians being the first). Many had sufficient capital to set up manufacturing firms in the country's industrial free zones.
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Haitians
Modern Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic dates from the late nineteenth century, when increasing North American capital boosted sugar production. Dominicans have never welcomed these immigrants. Their presence resulted from economic necessity borne of the reluctance of Dominicans to perform the menial task of cane cutting. The 1920 census listed slightly under 28,000 Haitian nationals in the Dominican Republic. Successive governments attempted to control the numbers of Haitians entering the country; the border was periodically closed in the 1910s and the 1920s. By 1935, however, the number had increased to more than 50,000. Trujillo ordered a general roundup of Haitians along the border in 1937, during which an estimated 20,000 Haitians were killed (see The Era of Trujillo , ch. 1).
Since the 1950s, a series of bilateral agreements has regulated legal Haitian immigration. In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the government contracted for 10,000 to 20,000 temporary Haitian workers annually for the sugarcane harvest. Observers believed that an equal number of Haitians entered illegally. The 1960 census enumerated slightly under 30,000 Haitians. By 1980 estimates suggested the total number of Haitians residing permanently or semipermanently was on the order of 200,000, of whom 70,000 were workers.
During the 1970s and the early 1980s, some Haitians rose into higher positions in sugar production and in other areas of the economy. They continued to account for the vast majority of cane cutters, but roughly half of all labor recruiters and field inspectors also were Haitians. In addition, Haitians worked harvesting coffee, rice, and cacao and in construction in Santo Domingo. By 1980 nearly 30 percent of the paid laborers in the coffee harvest were Haitian; in the border region the proportion rose to 80 percent. A reasonably skilled coffee picker could nearly double the earnings of the average cane cutter. Overall, however, Haitians' earnings still lagged; their wages averaged less than 60 percent of those of Dominicans.
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URBAN SOCIETY
The Elite
The last 200 years transformed the composition and the configuration of the country's elite. Nonetheless, at the end of the 1980s, the Dominican Republic continued to be a country where a relatively small number of families controlled great wealth, while the majority of the population lived in poverty. The middle stratum struggled (at its lower end) to maintain economic standing and to expand its political participation and (at its upper reaches) to gain greater social acceptance and economic prosperity. Hispanic-Mediterranean ideals about the proper mode of life and livelihood continued to be significant. The primary social division was between two polar groups: the elite (la gente buena or la gente culta) and the masses.
The first half of the nineteenth century had eliminated many of the noteworthy families of the colonial era. During the period of Haitian domination, many prominent landowners liquidated their holdings and left. The War of Restoration against Spain permitted some social and economic upward mobility to members of the lower classes who had enjoyed military success. An increase in sugarcane production brought immigrants of European extraction who were assimilated rapidly. Poorer elite families saw a chance to improve their financial status through marriage to recently arrived and financially successful immigrants. Even more well-to- do families recognized the advantages of wedding their lineage and lands to the monied merchant-immigrant clans. Although the Chinese were generally excluded from this process, and the Arabs encountered resistance, virtually everyone else found ready acceptance.
This pattern has repeated itself over the years. Each political or economic wave has brought new families into the elite as it imperilled the economic standing of others. By the end of the 1980s, this privileged segment of society was hardly monolithic. The interests of the older elite families, whose wealth was based mostly on land (and whose prosperity diminished during the Trujillo years), did not always match those of families who had amassed their fortunes under Trujillo, or the interests of those whose money came from the expansion in industry during the 1960s and the 1970s. The 1965 civil war further polarized and fragmented many segments of the middle and the upper classes (see Civil War and United States Intervention, 1965 , ch. 1).
Although rural elite families were relatively monolithic, in Santo Domingo and Santiago there was a further distinction between families of the first and the second ranks (la gente de primera and la gente de segunda). Those of the first rank could claim to be a part of the 100 families referred to locally as the tutumpote (totem pole--implying family worship and excessive concern with ancestry). Those of the second rank had less illustrious antecedents; they included the descendants of successful immigrants and the nouveaux riches who had managed to intermarry with more established families.
Family loyalties were paramount, and the family represented the primary source of social identity. Elite families relied on an extensive network of kin to maintain their assets. In difficult times, the family offered a haven; as the situation improved, it provided the vehicle whereby one secured political position and economic assets. Siblings, uncles, aunts, cousins, and in-laws comprised the pool from which one selected trusted business partners and loyal political allies. This process of networking pervaded every level of society. The elite, however, profited to a much greater degree from kinship-based networking than did members of the lower classes.
The number of potential kin grew as an individual's net worth increased. The successful were obliged, as a matter of course, to bestow favors on a widely extended group of kin and confreres. Individual success in the political arena brought with it a host of hangers-on whose fortunes rose and fell with those of their patron. The well-to-do tried to limit the demands of less illustrious kin and to secure alliances with families of equal or greater status. These ties permitted the extended family to diversify its social and economic capital.
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The Middle Sector
The middle sector in the late 1980s represented roughly 30 to 35 percent of the population, concentrated in the ranks of salaried professionals in government and the private sector. They had virtually no independent sources of wealth, and so they were responsive to changes in the buying power of wages and to contractions in employment that accompanied economic cycles. The middle level followed the racial stratification of the society as a whole: generally lighter-skinned as one proceeded up the social scale. As a group, the middle sector differed in lifestyle, in marital stability, and in occupations from the poor urban masses. They firmly adhered to the Hispanic ideals of leisure and lifestyle espoused by the elite, and they considered themselves, at least in spirit, a part of la gente buena. As with the elite, economic expansion, based on the growth of sugar production in the late nineteenth century, broadened the middle reaches of the social ladder as well. Those of this new middle segment, however, were limited in their upward mobility by dark skin and/or limited finances. They were a diverse group, including small shopowners, teachers, clerical employees, and professionals. They lacked a class identity based on any sense of common social or economic interests; moreover, any sense of mutual interest was undermined by the pervasiveness of the patron-client system. Individuals improved their status by linking up with a more privileged protector, not by joint political action for a shared goal.
The life strategy of middle-class families was similar to that of the elite. Their goals were to diversify their economic assets and to extend their network of political and social influence. As with the elite, the middle-level family solidified its position through patronage. An influential family could offer jobs to loyal followers and supporters. People expected that those with power would use it for their own ends and for the advancement of their own and their family's interests. Ties to government were particularly important, because the government was the source of many coveted jobs (see Public Administration , ch. 4).
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The Urban Poor
The limited availability of adequately paid and steady employment defined life for most urban Dominicans. Unemployment in the 1980s ranged between 20 and 25 percent of the economically active population. In addition, another 25 percent of the work force was considered underemployed. In Santo Domingo and Santiago, the two largest cities, roughly 48 percent of the selfemployed , more than half of those paid piece rates, and 85 percent of temporary workers were underemployed. A late 1970s survey of five working-class neighborhoods in Santo Domingo found that 60 percent of household heads had no regular employment (see Labor , ch. 3). Under such conditions, those workers having regular employment constituted a relatively privileged segment of the urban populace.
Rural-urban migration made the situation of the urban poor even more desperate; however, the chances of earning a living were slightly better in cities than in rural areas, although the advantages of an urban job had to be weighed against the higher cost of foodstuffs. Landless, or nearly landless, agricultural laborers might find it difficult to work even a garden plot, but the rural family could generally get by on its own food production. For the urban poor, however, the struggle to eat was relentless.
Under conditions of chronically high unemployment, workers enjoyed little power or leverage. Protective labor laws were typically limited in their coverage to workers in private companies with more than ten employees. Organized labor made significant gains in the early 1960s, but by the late 1980s only a scant 12 to 15 percent of the labor force was unionized (see Labor , ch. 3). The legal code prohibited nearly half of all workers (public employees and utility workers) from strikes and job actions (see Interest Groups , ch. 4).
Roughly one-quarter of urban households surveyed in the mid1970s were headed by women. Even in families with a male breadwinner, a woman was frequently the more consistent income earner among poorer city dwellers. Women's economic activities were diverse--if poorly remunerated. They took in washing and ironing, and they did domestic work. The more prosperous sewed. Some bought cheap or used items and raffled them off. A few who could muster the necessary capital ran stalls selling groceries, cigarettes, and candy, but their trade was minimal. In smaller towns, women also performed a variety of agricultural processing tasks: grinding coffee, husking garlic, winnowing beans, and washing pig intestines.
Like more well-to-do city families, the poor tried, wherever possible, to maintain ties with their kin in the countryside. Aid and assistance flowed both ways. Farmers with relatives in the city stayed with them on trips to town and repaid this hospitality with foodstuffs from their fields. New rural-urban migrants were assisted by kin who had already made the transition. The poor were handicapped in these exchanges because they typically had fewer kin in a position to help. Nonetheless, the obligation to help was deeply felt. Women who migrated to cities returned to their families in the countryside as economic conditions and family needs dictated.
The small urban neighborhood functioned as the center of social life. Most sharing, mutual aid, and cooperative activity took place within the confines of a narrow circle of neighbors and kin. Most Dominicans shared a general belief that neighbors should assist each other in times of need.
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RURAL SOCIETY
Most small rural neighborhoods and villages were settled originally by one or two families. Extensive ties of kinship, intermarriage, and compadrazgo (coparenthood) developed among the descendants of the original settlers (see Family and Kin , this ch.). Most villagers married their near neighbors. First cousins frequently married, despite the formal legal prohibitions against this practice. The social life of the countryside likewise focused on near neighbors, who were frequently direct blood relations. The bonds of trust and cooperation among these relatives formed at an early age. Children wandered among the households of extended kin at will. Peasants distrusted those from beyond their own neighborhoods, and they were therefore leery of economic relations with outsiders. The development of community-wide activities and organizations was handicapped by this widespread distrust. People commonly assumed deceit in others, in the absence of strong, incontrovertible proof to the contrary.
Until the latter twentieth century, most joint activities were kin-based: a few related extended families joined together for whatever needed attention. The junta was the traditional cooperative work group. Friends, neighbors, and relatives gathered at a farmer's house for a day's work. There was no strict accounting of days given and received. As wage labor became more common, the junta gave way to smaller cooperative work groups, or it fell into disuse entirely.
In small towns, social life focused on the central park, or the plaza; in rural neighborhoods most social interaction among non-kin took place in the stores, the bars, and the pool rooms where men gathered to gossip. Six-day workweeks left little time for recreation or socializing. Many farm families came to town on Sundays to shop and to attend Mass. The women and children generally returned home earlier than the men to prepare Sunday dinner; the men stayed to visit, or to enjoy an afternoon cockfight or an important baseball or volleyball game.
Landholding in the late 1980s was both concentrated among large holders and fragmented at the lower end of the socioeconomic scale. All but the largest producers faced some constraints in terms of land and money. Indeed, a national survey conducted in 1985 found extensive rural poverty. More than 40 percent of the households surveyed owned no land; another 25 percent had less than half a hectare. Roughly 70 percent of all families relied on wage labor.
Land reform legislation had had little overall impact on landholding both because the reforms contained few provisions for land redistribution and because they were poorly enforced. Redistribution began in the 1960s with land accumulated by Trujillo and acquired by the state after his death. By the early 1980s, irrigated rice farms, which had been left intact and had been farmed collectively, were slated for division into small, privately owned plots. All told, by 1980 the Dominican Agrarian Institute (Instituto Agrario Dominicano--IAD) had distributed state land to approximately 67,000 families--less than 15 percent of the rural population.
Population growth over the past century had virtually eliminated the land reserves. Parents usually gave children plots of land as they reached maturity, so that they could marry and begin their own families.Over the generations, the process had led to extreme land fragmentation. Contemporary practices adapted to these constraints. Educating children, setting them up in business, or bankrolling their emigration limited the number of heirs competing for the family holdings and assured that the next generation would be able to maintain its standard of living. One or two siblings (usually the oldest and the youngest) remained with the parents and inherited the farm. In other cases, siblings and their spouses stayed on the parental lands; each couple farmed its own plot of land, but they pooled their labor for many agricultural and domestic tasks.
Migration served as a safety valve (see Migration , this ch.). Migrants' remittances represented an essential component in many household budgets. These timely infusions of cash permitted medium-sized landholders to meet expenses during the months before harvest; they also allowed families to purchase more land. In communities with a history of fifteen to twenty years of high levels of emigration, such emigration had an inflationary impact on the local land market. For those relying on wage labor to earn a living, the impact was more ambiguous. In some communities, the increase in migration meant more casual work was available as more family members migrated. In other instances, migrants' families switched to livestock raising to limit labor requirements, or they hired an overseer to handle the agricultural work. Both these practices limited the overall demand for casual labor.
The vast majority (84 percent) of farm women contributed to the family's earnings. Women devised means of earning income that meshed with their domestic tasks: they cultivated garden plots, raised small livestock, and/or helped to tend the family's fields. In addition, many rural women worked at diverse cottage industries and vending. They sold everything from lottery tickets to home-made sweets.
In the mid-1980s, approximately 20 percent of rural households were headed by women. The lack of services in rural areas increased women's working days with physically demanding and time-consuming domestic tasks. Single women were further handicapped by the traditional exclusion of women from mechanized or skilled agricultural work. Women worked during the laborintensive phases of harvesting and processed crops like cotton, coffee, tobacco, and tomatoes. They usually earned piece rates rather than daily wages, and their earnings lagged behind those of male agricultural laborers.
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Sugar Plantations
Most sugar mills and cane fields were concentrated in the southeast coastal plains. Three large groups owned 75 percent of the land: the State Sugar Council (Consejo Estatal del AzúcarCEA ), Casa Vicini (a family operation), and Central Romana (formerly owned by Gulf and Western Corporation). The government created CEA in 1966, largely from lands and facilities formerly held by the Trujillo family.
In the mid-1980s, there were roughly 4,500 colonos (sugar planters) who owned some 62,500 hectares. These small to middle-sized landholders were independent growers who sold their harvested cane to the sugar mills. Although the level of prosperity of the colonos varied significantly, some were prosperous enough to hire laborers to cut their cane and to buy cane from smaller producers. Their actual number fluctuated widely in response to the market for cane. There were only 3,200 in 1970; this number had more than doubled by 1980, but it had then declined by mid-decade.
Some colonos were descendants of former small mill owners driven out of business during the expansion of sugar production in the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century. The parents, or grandparents, of others were either subsistence farmers, who had switched to cane cultivation in response to rising demand for sugar, or successful field workers. Like virtually all Dominican farmers, colonos faced land fragmentation that increased geometrically with each generation.
Sugar mills continued to be a major source of work for rural Dominicans, although direct employment peaked at a high of roughly 100,000 workers in the early 1970s. By the mid-1980s, the mills employed approximately 65,000 workers. The sugar industry generated considerable indirect employment as well; some observers estimated that as much as 30 percent of the population was directly or indirectly affected by sugar production (see Crops , ch. 3). The 40,000 to 50,000 cane cutters constituted the bulk of the work force. Most were immigrant Haitians or their descendants (see Haitians , this ch.). In the sugar industry's highly stratified work force, there were clear divisions among cane cutters, more skilled workers (largely Dominicans), clerical staff, and managers. Workers' settlements (bateyes) dotted the mill and the surrounding fields; they usually included stores, schools, and a number of other facilities.
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Mixed Farming
Landholding was less concentrated in the north and the west; mixed crop and livestock raising dominated agricultural production. Much production was geared to subsistence, but growers also produced a number of cash crops such as cacao, tobacco, coffee, and vegetables. The twin constraints of land and money affected the various strata of rural society differently, depending on the precise configuration of resources a family could command, but hardship was widespread.
Those without land were the most hard pressed. Agricultural laborers rarely enjoyed opportunities for permanent employment. Most worked only sporadically throughout the year. During periods of high demand for labor, contractors formed semipermanent work groups that contracted their services out to farmers. As in much of social life, the individual stood a better chance if he could couch his request for work in terms of a personal link of kinship with the prospective employer.
Families that depended on wage labor had very limited resources at their disposal. Their diet lacked greens and protein; eggs and meat were luxury items. Such fare as boiled plantains, noodles, and broth often substituted for the staple beans and rice. Keeping children in school was difficult because their labor was needed to supplement the family's earnings.
Those with very little land (less than one hectare) also faced very severe constraints. Although members of this group had enough land to meet some of their families' subsistence needs and even sold crops occasionally, they also needed to resort to wage labor to make ends meet. Like wage laborers, smallholders had trouble leaving children in school. The children's prospects were extremely limited, moreover, because their parents could neither give them land nor educate them. The daily need for food also limited farmers' ability to work their own land. Those who were both land-poor and cash-poor faced a dilemma: they could not work their lands effectively because to do so meant foregoing wage labor needed to feed their families. A variety of sharecropping arrangements supplemented wage labor for those smallholders able to muster some cash or credit. These were of little use to the landless; only those who had land or money to finance a crop entered into these schemes. Smallholders and the landless lived enmeshed in a web of dependent relationships: they depended on their neighbors and kin for help and assistance, on store owners for credit, and on larger landholders for employment.
Families with middle-sized holdings (from one to three hectares) faced slightly different problems. They often had enough land and financial resources to meet most of their families' food needs and to earn cash from the sale of crops or livestock. They did not usually need to work for hire, and sometimes they could hire laborers themselves. They usually ate better than smallholders, and their children stayed in school longer. However, although middle holders earned more, they also had greater needs for cash during the year, particularly if they hired laborers before harvest.
Even relatively large holders faced seasonal shortages of cash. Their production costs--especially for hired labor--were typically higher.Their standard of living was notably higher than that of people with less land. They generally ate better and could afford meat or fish more frequently. Although their holdings supported their generation adequately, subdivision among the family's offspring would typically leave no heir with more than a hectare or two. Faced with this prospect, these farmers often encouraged their children to pursue nonagricultural careers and helped support them financially during their student years.
Almost all farmers depended to varying degrees on credit from local storekeepers. The landless and the land-poor needed credit simply to feed their families. Middling landholders used it to tide them over the lean months before harvest. Prevailing interest rates varied considerably, but the poorest farmers-- those who could not offer a harvest as collateral and who usually needed short-term credit--generally paid the highest rates.
Farmers often depended on storekeepers to market their crops because they were usually unable to accumulate sufficient produce to make direct marketing a viable option. Most farmers committed their crops to their merchant-creditor long before harvest. Store owners could not legally require that someone who owed them money sell his or her crops to them. Nonetheless, for the farm family, the possibility of being denied necessary credit at a time of future need acted as a powerful incentive. The cycle of debt, repayment, and renewed debt was constant for most.
Traditionally, the local storekeeper aided farmers in ways beyond the extension of credit. He often established a paternalistic relationship with his customers; farmers consulted him on matters ranging from land purchases to conflicts with neighbors. Such patronage carried a hefty price tag, however; farmers found it difficult to haggle about terms with a storekeeper who was also a friend or a relative. Studies of coffee growers in the mid-1970s found that the cost of credit could easily take one-third to one-half of a middling landholder's profits.
Cooperatives sometimes offered an alternative. The most successful drew their membership from groups of kin and neighbors already linked by ties of trust. Cooperatives provided a solution for farmers vexed by the problem of cash shortfalls. Consumer and savings and loan cooperatives thus expanded the options for some rural families. Cooperatives have not ameliorated appreciably the plight of the poorest rural dwellers, however. Cooperative loans were predicated on a family's ability to pay, which effectively excluded the landless and the land-poor.
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FAMILY AND KIN
Rural family
Courtesy Inter-American Development Bank
The family was the fundamental social unit. It provided a bulwark in the midst of political upheavals and economic reversals. People emphasized the trust, the assistance, and the solidarity that kin owed to one another. Family loyalty was an ingrained and unquestioned virtue; from early childhood, individuals learned that relatives were to be trusted and relied on, while those outside the family were, implicitly at least, suspect. In all areas of life and at every level of society, a person looked to family and kin for both social identity and succor.
Formal organizations succeeded best where they were able to mesh with pre-existing ties of kinship. Indeed, until the 1960s and the 1970s, most community activities were kin-based: a few related extended families joined together for joint endeavors. In the countryside, the core of extensively related families remained pivotal, despite large-scale migration and urbanization. If anything, the ties among kin extended more widely in contemporary society because modern transportation and communications allowed families to maintain ties over long distances and during lengthy absences.
In general, the extent to which families interacted, and the people with whom they interacted, depended on their degree of prosperity. Families with relatively equal resources shared and cooperated. Where there was marked disparity in families' wealth, the more prosperous branches tried to limit the demands made by the poorer ones. On the one hand, generosity was held in high esteem, and failure to care for kin in need was disparaged; but on the other hand, families wished to help their immediate relatives and to give favors to those who could reciprocate.
A needy relative might receive the loan of a piece of land, some wage labor, or occasional gifts of food. Another type of assistance was a form of adoption, by which poorer families gave a child to more affluent relatives to raise. The adopting family was expected to care for the child and to see that he or she received a proper upbringing. The children were frequently little better than unpaid domestic help. Implicit in the arrangement was the understanding that the child's biological family, too, would receive assistance from the adopting family.
Kinship served as a metaphor for relations of trust in general. Where a kin tie was lacking, or where individuals wished to reinforce one, a relationship of compadrazgo would often be established. Those so linked are compadres (coparents or godparents). In common with much of Latin America, strong emotional bonds linked compadres. Compadres used the formal usted instead of tu in addressing one another, even if they were kinsmen. Sexual relations between compadres were regarded as incestuous. Compadres were commonly chosen at baptism and marriage, but the relationship extended to the two sets of parents. The tie between the two sets of parents was expected to be strong and enduring. Any breach of trust merited the strongest community censure.
There were three accepted forms of marriage: civil, religious, and free unions. Both serial monogamy and polygamous unions were socially accepted. Annulment was difficult to obtain through the Roman Catholic Church; this fact, in addition to the expense involved, made couples reluctant to undertake a religious marriage. Civil marriage was relatively common. Divorce in this case was relatively easy and uncomplicated. Marriage forms also reflected the individual's life cycle. Most opted for free unions when they were younger, then settled into more formal marriages as they grew older and enjoyed more economic security. Class also played a role: religious marriage was favored by middle-class and upper-class groups, and it thus indicated higher socioeconomic status. The ideal marriage involved a formal engagement and a religious wedding followed by an elaborate fiesta.
No shame accrued to the man who fathered many children and maintained several women as concubines. Public disapproval followed only if the man failed to assume the role of "head of the family" and to support his children. When a free union dissolved, a woman typically received only the house she and her mate inhabited. The children received support only if they had been legally recognized by their father.
Families were usually more stable in the countryside. Since the partners were usually residing in the midst of their kin, a man could not desert his wife without disrupting his work relationship with her family. A woman enjoyed greater leverage when she could rely on her family to assist if a union failed or when she owned her own land and thus had a measure of financial independence.
In keeping with the doctrine of machismo, males usually played a dominant role within the family, and they received the deference due to the head of the household. There was wide variation in practice, however. Where a man was absent, had limited economic assets, or was simply unassertive, a woman would assume the role of head of the family.
Sex role differentiation began early: boys were allowed to run about unclothed, while girls were much more carefully groomed and dressed. Bands of boys played unwatched; girls were carefully chaperoned. Girls were expected to be quiet and helpful; boys enjoyed much greater freedom, and they were given considerable latitude in their behavior. Boys and men were expected to have premarital and extramarital sexual adventures. Men expected, however, that their brides would be virgins. Parents went to considerable lengths to shelter their daughters in order to protect their chances of making a favorable marriage.
Parent-child relationships were markedly different depending on the sex of the parent. Mothers openly displayed affection for their children; the mother-child tie was virtually inviolate. Informal polls of money changers in the 1970s indicated that remittances sent from the United States for Mother's Day exceeded even those sent at Christmas. Father-child relationships covered a broader spectrum. Ideally, the father was an authority figure to be obeyed and respected; however, fathers were typically more removed from daily family affairs than mothers.
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RELIGION
More than 90 percent of Dominicans were professed Roman Catholics. In the late 1980s, the church organization included 1 archdiocese, 8 dioceses, and 250 parishes. There were over 500 clergy, more than 70 percent of whom belonged to religious orders. This yielded a ratio of nominal Roman Catholics to priests of more than 10,000 to 1. Among Latin American countries only Cuba, Honduras, and El Salvador had higher ratios in the late 1980s.
Roman Catholicism is the official religion of the Dominican Republic, established by a Concordat with the Vatican. For most of the populace, however, religious practice was limited and formalistic. Few actually attended Mass regularly. Popular religious practices were frequently far removed from Roman Catholic orthodoxy. What little religious instruction most Dominicans traditionally received came in the form of rote memorization of the catechism. Many people felt that they could best approach God through intermediaries--the clergy, the saints, witches (brujos), and curers (curanderos). The saints played an important role in popular devotion. Curanderos consulted the saints to ascertain which herbs, roots, and various home cures to employ. Witches (brujos) also cured by driving out possessive spirits that sometimes seized an individual.
Many Dominicans viewed the Roman Catholic clergy with ambivalence. People respected the advice of their local priest, or their bishop, with regard to religious matters; however, they often rejected the advice of clergy on other matters on the assumption that priests had little understanding of secular affairs. Activist priests committed to social reform were not always well-received because their direct involvement with parishioners ran counter to the traditional reserve usually displayed by the Roman Catholic clergy. Villagers often criticized this social involvement. Nonetheless, the priest was generally the only person outside their kinship group that people trusted and confided in. As such, the parish priest often served as an advocate in rural Dominicans' dealings with larger society.
Foreigners predominated among the clergy. The clergy itself was split between the traditional, conservative hierarchy and more liberal parish priests. At the parish level, some priests engaged in community development projects and in efforts to form comunidades de base (grass-roots Christian communities), designed to help people organize and work together more effectively.
The Roman Catholic Church was apolitical during much of the Trujillo era, although a pastoral letter protested the mass arrests of government opponents in 1960. This action so incensed Trujillo that he ordered a campaign of harassment against the Church. Only the dictator's assassination prevented his planned imprisonment of the country's bishops. The papal nuncio attempted to administer humanitarian aid during the 1965 civil war. The bishops also issued various statements throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, calling for respect for human rights and an improved standard of living for the majority. In the 1970s, Bishop Juan Antonio Flores of La Vega campaigned for indemnification for peasants displaced by the expansion of the Pueblo Viejo mine. Bishop Juan F. Pepen and Bishop Hugo Polanco Brito both supported the efforts of peasants and sugar colonos to organize.
Protestants first came as migrants from North America in the 1820s. West Indian laborers added to their numbers in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. By the 1920s, the various Protestant groups had organized nationally and had established links with North American Evangelical groups. The main Evangelical groups included the Seventh Day Adventists, the Dominican Evangelical Church, and the Assemblies of God. Protestant groups expanded, mainly in the rural areas, during the 1960s and the 1970s; Pentecostals made considerable inroads in some regions. With minor exceptions, relations between Protestants and the Roman Catholic majority were cordial.
Most Haitian immigrants and their descendants adhered to voodoo, and practiced it in secret because the government and the general population regarded the folk religion as pagan and African. In Haiti voodoo encompassed a well-defined system of hierology and ceremonialism (see Voodoo , ch. 7).
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SOCIAL WELFARE
Education
Formal education included the primary, the secondary, and higher education levels. The six-year primary cycle was compulsory. Three years of preschool were offered in some areas, but not on a compulsory basis. There were several types of secondary school; most students (90 percent) attended the sixyear liceo, which awarded the bachillerato certificate upon completion and was geared toward university admission. Other secondary programs included teacher training schools, polytechnics, and vocational schools. All primary and secondary schools were under the formal jurisdiction of the Secretariat of State for Education and Culture (Secretaria de Estado de Educación y Cultura). In 1984 there were an estimated 5,684 primary schools and 1,664 secondary schools.
Despite the compulsory nature of primary education, only 17 percent of rural schools offered all six grades. This explained to some degree the lower levels of secondary enrollment. For those who did go on to the secondary level, academic standards were low, the drop-out rate reportedly was high, and all but the poorest students had to buy their textbooks--another disincentive to enrollment for many.
The government decreed major curriculum reforms at the primary and secondary levels in the 1970s in an effort to render schooling more relevant to students' lives and needs. Expanded vocational training in rural schools was called for as part of the reforms. Few changes had been fully implemented by the early 1980s, however. Primary school teachers were trained in specialized secondary schools; the universities trained secondary-school teachers. In 1982, however, roughly half of all teachers lacked the required academic background. A chronic shortage of teachers was attributable to low pay (especially in rural areas), the relatively low status of teaching as a career, and an apparent reluctance among men to enter the profession.
Education expanded at every level in the post-Trujillo era. Enrollment as a proportion of the primary school-aged population grew by more than twenty percentage points between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s, and that of the secondary school-aged population nearly quadrupled. By the mid-1980s, the primary school population was virtually fully enrolled, but only 45 percent of those of secondary school age were enrolled.
Problems accompanied educational expansion. Teaching materials and well-maintained facilities were lacking at every level. Salaries and operational expenses took up most of the education budget, leaving little surplus for additional investment and growth. In addition, although an estimated 74 percent of the population was literate in 1986, the expansion of educational programs and facilities left a sizable backlog of illiterates largely untouched. Although there were some programs in adult literacy, in 1981 fully one-third of the population over twenty-five years of age had never attended school; in some rural areas the proportion rose to half (see table 3, Appendix A).
Higher education enjoyed the most spectacular growth. At Trujillo's death there was one university, the University of Santa Domingo (Universidad de Santo Domingo), with roughly 3,500 students. By the late 1980s, there were more than twenty-six institutions of higher education with a total enrollment of over 120,000 students. Legislation created the National Council of Higher Education (Consejo Nacional de Educación Superior--CONES) in 1983 to deal with issues surrounding accreditation, the awarding of degrees, and the coordination of programs on a national level.
The sole public institution was the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo (Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo--UASD). The UASD traced its lineage directly to the Universitas Santi Dominici, established in 1538. Although the university's administration was autonomous, the government provided all of its funding. This enabled the UASD to offer courses free of charge to all enrolled students. The student body reached approximately 100,000 in 1984. The leading private institutions were the Catholic University Mother and Teacher (Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra--UCMM), located in Santiago and administered by the Roman Catholic Church, and the Pedro Henríquez Ureña National University (Universidad Nacional Pedro Henríquez Ureña--UNPHU) in Santo Domingo. In the early 1980s, UCMM had a student body of approximately 5,000, while UNPHU enrolled approximately 10,000.
Enrollment in private schools also expanded during the postTrujillo era. Private schools, most of them operated by the Roman Catholic Church, enjoyed a reputation for academic superiority to public schools. By the 1970s, they appeared to be the preferred educational option for the urban middle class.
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Health and Social Security
Programs offered through the Secretariat of State for Public Health and Social Welfare (Secretaria de Estado de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social--SESPAS) covered 70 to 80 percent of the population in the late 1980s. The Dominican Social Security Institute (Instituto Dominicano de Seguro Social) covered another 5 percent (or 13 percent of the economically active population), and the medical facilities of the armed forces reached an additional 3 to 4 percent. SESPAS had a regionally based, fivetiered health care system designed to bring primary care to the whole population. The services ranged from specialized hospitals in the National District to rural clinics scattered throughout the countryside.
Both personnel and facilities were concentrated in the two largest cities (see table 4, Appendix A). There were roughly 3,700 inhabitants per physician nationally, for example, but this figure ranged from about 1,650 in the National District to roughly 5,000 in some southeast provinces and in the southcentral provinces. Similarly, more than half of all hospital beds were in the National District and the central Cibao.
SESPAS began a major effort to improve rural health care in the mid-1970s. By the early 1980s, the government had set up more than 5,000 rural health clinics, health subcenters, and satellite clinics. Doctors, performing their required year of social services, as well as a variety of locally hired and trained auxiliary personnel staffed the facilities. Critics charged that lack of coordination and inadequate management hampered the program's effectiveness, however. Preventive services offered through local health workers (who were often poorly trained in disease prevention and in basic sanitation) were not coordinated with curative services. In addition, absenteeism was high, and supplies were lacking. In 1982 there were approximately 2,500 physicians in the country (a ratio of one physician to 2,600 inhabitants) and 516 dentists.
Life expectancy at birth was 62.6 years for the 1980-84 period, 60.9 years for males and 63.4 for females. The crude mortality rate was 4.7 per 1,000 population in 1981. The infant mortality rate was 31.7 per 1,000 live births in 1982--down from 43.5 per 1,000 in 1975. Early childhood mortality declined from 5.9 per 1,000 in 1970 to 3.2 in 1980. The main causes of death in the population as a whole were pulmonary circulatory diseases and intestinal diseases (see table 5, Appendix A). Enteritis, diarrheal diseases, and protein energy malnutrition were the major causes of death in those under four. Maternal mortality in 1980 was 1.66 deaths per 1,000 live births. The main causes were toxemia, hemorrhages, and sepsis associated with birth or abortion. Roughly 60 percent of births were attended by medical personnel. As of late 1988, the Dominican Republic had reported 701 cases of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS); of these, 65 had died. Studies of the human immunodeficiency virus conducted in 1986 among sample groups of Dominican homosexual and bisexual males indicated an infection rate of 8.3 percent, much lower than the 70 percent rate detected in some similar sample groups in the United States.
Social security coverage included old-age pensions, disability pensions, survivors' and maternity benefits, and compensation for work injuries. General tax revenues supplemented employer and employee contributions. Wage earners, government employees (under special provisions), and domestic and agricultural workers were eligible, although the benefits that most domestic and farm workers received were quite limited. Permanent workers whose salaries exceeded 122 Dominican Republic pesos (RD$--for value of the peso, see Glossary) per week and the self-employed were excluded. In the early 1980s, more than 200,000 workers were enrolled. They represented only about 13 percent of the economically active population, or approximately 22 percent of wage earners. Most of those enrolled were in manufacturing, commerce, and construction.
Although the level of government services exceeded that of the republic's impoverished neighbor, Haiti, limited resources, inefficiency, and a lagging economy circumscribed the overall impact of these programs. In 1985 some 8.8 percent of the national budget supported health services and an additional 6.9 percent funded social security and welfare programs. From the perspective of the late 1980s, there appeared little prospect for major improvement in the quality of life for most Dominicans by the end of the twentieth century.
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There is a wealth of information on rural life and the changing rural-urban context in the Dominican Republic. Kenneth Sharpe's Peasant Politics, Glenn Hendricks's The Dominican Diaspora, Patricia R. Pessar's works, and Malcolm T. Walker's Politics and the Power Structure, all give a sense of the constraints most Dominicans must deal with. Jan Knippers Black's The Dominican Republic: Politics and Development in an Unsovereign State and H. Hoetink's The Dominican People are both valuable background reading. Sherri Grasmuck's "Migration within the Periphery: Haitian Labor in the Dominican Sugar and Coffee Industries" details the contemporary situation of Haitians in the Dominican Republic. José del Castillo and Martin F. Murphy describe the broad outlines of emigration and immigration in "Migration, National Identity, and Cultural Policy in the Dominican Republic." "Agricultural Development, the Economic Crisis, and Rural Women in the Dominican Republic," by Belkis Mones and Lydia Grant, describes the ways in which rural women earn a living. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
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Chapter 3. Dominican Republic: The Economy
The Plaza del Mercado, Puerto Plata, ca 1873
LONG DEPENDENT ON SUGAR, the Dominican Republic diversified its economy during the 1970s and the 1980s to include mining, assembly manufacturing, and tourism. In 1987, the country's gross domestic product (GDP--see Glossary) was approximately US$5.6 billion, or roughly US$800 per capita, which made the island nation the third poorest state in Latin America. A lower-middle- income country by World Bank (see Glossary) standards, the Dominican Republic depended on imported oil and, despite diversification, retained its historical vulnerability to price fluctuations in the world sugar market. Although poverty continued to be acute for many rural citizens in the 1980s, the economy had progressed significantly since the 1960s.
Beginning in the late 1960s, the Dominican economy began the arduous task of diversifying away from sugar. By 1980 the mining industry had become a major foreign exchange earner; exports of gold, silver, ferronickel, and bauxite constituted 38 percent of the country's total foreign sales. In the 1980s, the assembly manufacturing industry, centered in Industrial Free Zones (see Glossary), began to dominate industrial activity. During this decade, the number of people employed in assembly manufacturing rose from 16,000 to nearly 100,000, and that sector's share of exports jumped from 11 percent to more than 33 percent. Tourism experienced a similarly dramatic expansion during the 1980s, when the number of hotel rooms quadrupled. Revenues from tourism surpassed sugar earnings for the first time in 1984, and by 1989 total foreign exchange earnings from tourism nearly matched earnings from all merchandise exports.
Despite indisputable advances, by 1990 the country also faced serious inflation, chronic balance-of-payments deficits, and a large foreign debt. More important, whereas the Dominican Republic had made great strides since the dictatorial rule of Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina (1930-61), the nation's political economy continued to be strongly influenced by patronage, graft, and a lingering lack of political will to confront the traditional institutions that continued to restrain economic performance.
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GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY
Only three decades after their arrival on Hispaniola (La Isla Española) in 1492, Spanish mercantilists largely abandoned the island in favor of the gold and silver fortunes of Mexico and Peru (see The First Colony , ch. 1). The remaining Spanish settlers briefly established an economic structure of Indian labor tied to land under the systems of repartimiento (grants of land and Indian labor) and encomienda (grants of Indian labor in return for tribute to the crown). The rapid decline of the Indian population ended the encomienda system by the mid-1500s, however. Little productive economic activity occurred in Eastern Hispaniola (the approximate site of the present-day Dominican Republic). The French assumed control of the western third of the island in 1697, establishing Saint- Domingue (modern-day Haiti), which developed into a productive agricultural center on the basis of black slave labor. In the eastern part of the island, cattle ranching was common, but farming was limited to comparatively small crops of sugar, coffee, and cacao.
The Spanish side of Hispaniola slowly developed a plantation economy during the nineteenth century, much later than the rest of the West Indies. For much of the century, political unrest disrupted normal economic activity and hindered development. Corrupt and inefficient government, by occupying Haitian forces and by self-serving Dominican caudillos, served mainly to increase the country's foreign debt. After failing to achieve independence from Spain in the Ten Years' War (1868-78), Cuban planters fled their homeland and settled in Hispaniola's fertile Cibao region, where they sowed tobacco and later cacao. When tobacco prices fell in the late nineteenth century, United States companies began to invest heavily in the large-scale cultivation of sugar, a crop that dominated the Dominican economy for most of the twentieth century.
The rise of the sugar industry represented only one aspect of growing United States influence on the island in the early twentieth century. In 1904 United States authorities established a receivership over Dominican customs to administer the repayment of the country's commercial debt to foreign holders of Dominican bonds. United States forces occupied the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924, for the purposes of restoring order and limiting European (primarily German) influence. Although security interests motivated the occupation, the United States also reaped commercial benefits. Dominican tobacco, cacao, and sugar, previously exported to French, German, and British markets, were shipped instead to the United States. The powerful United States sugar companies came to dominate banking and transportation, and they benefited from the partition of former communal lands, which allowed the companies to augment their holdings. Although politically unpopular, the United States presence helped stabilize Dominican finances and greatly improved the physical infrastructure, as roads, sanitation systems, ports, and schools were built. The United States Marines left in 1924, but United States economic advisors remained to manage customs revenues until 1932, two years into the thirty-one year Trujillo dictatorship.
For more than three decades, the Trujillo regime invested heavily in infrastructure, but the bulk of economic benefits accrued to the dictator, his family, and his associates. Trujillo's primary means of self-enrichment was the national sugar industry, which he rapidly expanded in the 1950s despite a depressed international market. In the process of establishing his enormous wealth, he forced peasants off their land, looted the national treasury, and built a personal fiefdom similar to those of the Somoza and the Duvalier families in Nicaragua and Haiti, respectively. Before his assassination in 1961, Trujillo and his coterie reputedly possessed more than 600,000 hectares of improved land and 60 percent of the nation's sugar, cement, tobacco, and shipping assets. This immense wealth encompassed eighty-seven enterprises, including twelve of the country's fifteen sugar mills. Although the economy experienced steady growth under Trujillo, roughly 6 percent a year in the 1950s, the unequal distribution of that growth impoverished rural Dominicans as thoroughly as were any of their counterparts elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere.
The period between Trujillo's assassination and the 1965 civil war was chaotic economically as well as politically. Instability prompted capital flight. While demands on spending increased--mainly as a result of social programs instituted under the presidency of Juan Bosch Gaviño (February-September, 1963)-- bureaucratic upheaval hampered the collection of needed revenue. The country's economy was buoyed to some extent by infusions of cash from abroad in the forms of foreign aid (mainly from the United States) and loans.
During the presidency of Joaquín Balaguer Ricardo (1966-78), the country experienced a period of sustained economic growth characterized by relative political unity, economic diversification, the establishment of a developmental role for the state, and a more equitable distribution of the benefits of growth among the citizenry. During its peak growth period, from 1966 to 1976, the economy expanded at a rate of nearly 8 percent a year, one of the highest growth rates in the world at the time. With the formation of the National Planning Council in 1966, the national government assumed a developmental role after centuries of neglect. The Balaguer administration increased spending on social services, introduced the Industrial Incentive Law (Law 299) to protect domestic manufacturing and to spur more import substitution (see Glossary) industries, and promoted mining, assembly manufacturing, construction, and tourism. Mining in particular took on a greater role, as that sector's share of exports grew from an insignificant level in 1970 to 38 percent by 1980. Land reform programs helped rural dwellers to improve their economic status somewhat, but government pricing policies and the trend toward urbanization inhibited growth in rural areas. The country's physical infrastructure--roads, ports, and airfields-- also expanded.
The apex of the Dominican economic "miracle" came in 1975 when sugar prices peaked, other commodity prices were high, and gold exports became significant. Despite these fortuitous circumstances, the country still failed to register a trade surplus that year, an indication of structural problems in the economy. Economic growth, slowed by the late 1970s as sugar prices fluctuated and the quadrupling of oil prices that began in 1973, turned the country's terms of trade (see Glossary) sharply negative. Growing balance-of-payments shortfalls, declining government revenues resulting from widespread tax exemptions, and growing expenditures on state-operated companies rapidly increased the country's debt. The symbolic, if not the real, end of the Dominican economic "miracle" arrived in the form of Hurricane David and Hurricane Frederick in 1979. The two storms killed more than 1,000 Dominicans, and they caused an estimated US$1 billion in damage.
In the early 1980s, oil prices jumped again, international recession stifled the local economy, sugar prices hit a forty- year low, and unprecedentedly high interest rates on foreign loans spiraled the economy into a cycle of balance-of-payments deficits and growing external debt. Because economic growth averaged slightly above 1 percent per annum during the first half of the decade, per capita income declined. Another devastating blow was dealt in the 1980s by reduced United States sugar quotas, in response to the lobbying efforts of domestic producers, which served to cut the volume of Dominican sugar exports to the United States by 70 percent between 1981 and 1987. The unstable economic situation prompted the administration of Salvador Jorge Blanco (1982-86) to enter into a series of negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF--see Glossary) and to begin to restructure government economic policies. In 1983 the Jorge government signed a three-year Extended Fund Facility with the IMF that called for lower fiscal deficits, tighter credit policies, and other austerity measures. This paved the way for the first in a series of rescheduling agreements with foreign creditors. Although the reschedulings slowed the pace of repayment, the higher consumer prices that resulted from the agreements sparked food riots. The administration consequently suspended the agreements. In 1985 the Jorge government signed a one-year IMF Standby Agreement that included more austerity measures and the floating of the Dominican Republic peso (RD$; for value of the peso--see Glossary) in relation to the dollar for the first time in decades. Serious differences of opinion over the pace of reforms again ended the agreement prematurely, and the electorate ousted Jorge's Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano--PRD) in 1986 in favor of former president Balaguer, who evoked memories of the economic growth of the 1970s (see Political Developments since 1978 , ch. 4).
In contrast to Jorge, the Balaguer administration, refusing to negotiate with the IMF, sought to avoid the austere economic conditions that IMF agreements usually entailed. The economy expanded rapidly in 1987, but then contracted sharply in 1988, largely in response to government spending patterns. Balaguer's continued devaluation of the peso maintained the country's burgeoning export sector and tourist trade, but eroded the quality of life of poorer Dominicans earning fixed salaries. The administration's expansionary fiscal policies also fueled unprecedented inflation (prices rose 60 percent in 1988 alone), which worsened economic conditions for poor people. By the close of the decade, the country's foreign debt had reached nearly US$4 billion, roughly double the 1980 figure.
High levels of inflation, increasing debt, and persistent deficits masked several positive trends during the 1980s. The most positive development was the country's rapid diversification away from its dependence on sugar. New jobs in assembly manufacturing offset many of the lost jobs in the cane fields. Employment in assembly operations grew from 16,000 in 1980 to nearly 100,000 by 1989. This represented the world's fastest growth in free-zone employment during the 1980s. By 1987 the value of assembly exports surpassed that of traditional agricultural exports. The Dominican Republic also enjoyed the Caribbean's fastest growth in tourism during the 1980s. Although the mining industry suffered from low prices and labor disputes, it contributed a significant percentage of foreign exchange as well. The agricultural sector also diversified to a limited degree with a new emphasis on the export of nontraditional items such as tropical fruits (particularly pineapple), citrus, and ornamental plants to the United States under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI--see Appendix B).
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ECONOMIC POLICY
Fiscal Policy
The Budget Office within the Technical Secretariat of the Presidency (Secretaria Técnica de la Presidencia) administered fiscal policies. The fiscal year (FY--see Glossary) concurred with the calendar year throughout the government, except in the case of the State Sugar Council (Consejo Estatal de Azúcar--CEA), which ran on the cycle October 1 to September 30. Fiscal authorities traditionally pursued rather conservative policies, allowing for small deficits and occasional surpluses. Fiscal deficits grew in the 1980s, however, as the result of dwindling revenues and increasing losses from price and exchange-rate subsidies to state-owned enterprises. Revenues, as a percentage of GDP, fell from 16 percent in 1970 to a low of 10 percent by 1982, placing the Dominican Republic below virtually every Latin American country in this category. Liberal incentive laws enacted to spur industrialization during the 1960s and the 1970s were the main cause of the erosion of the revenue base. Beginning with the Jorge administration, officials began to increase taxes on an ad hoc basis, assessing mainly international trade. A moderate expansion of revenues resulted. Nonetheless, fiscal deficits averaged roughly 5 percent of GDP a year in the mid-1980s to the late 1980s. The shortfalls were financed by the printing of more pesos, a policy that accelerated inflation. Successive governments demonstrated a lack of political will to address the structural deficiencies on both the expenditure and the revenue sides of the national budget.
The execution of fiscal policies was influenced by personal and political custom. For example, many businesses illegally received tax-exempt status because of political contacts, while other qualified firms did not. Tax evasion among wealthier Dominicans was common. Government corruption, particularly among the parastatals, was believed to be similarly commonplace. The 1989 conviction of former president Jorge on charges that he and military leaders embezzled large sums on military contracts illustrated the extent of official corruption. The lack of competitive bidding on government construction contracts also contributed to perceptions of fiscal mismanagement. Despite Balaguer's anticorruption drive of the 1980s,institutionalized graft prevailed.
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Expenditures
Government expenditures, as a percentage of GDP, reached 21 percent by 1987, up from an earlier low of 15 percent; both figures were low by the standards of most developing countries. These data indicated that, with the exception of the enterprises inherited from Trujillo's holdings, the government's role in the economy was relatively limited. The ratio of total spending had also declined, beginning in the 1970s, because of the decline in revenues as a percentage of total output. Falling revenues dictated a corresponding decrease in the percentage of spending on social services, which worsened the position of poorer Dominicans. Ironically, a major drain of fiscal resources in the 1980s was the result of the low prices of goods and services provided by government-subsidized enterprises, such as utility companies, many of which were created to cater to lower-income citizens. These subsidies began in the 1970s, at a time of greater government resources; by the 1980s, however, they had created serious price distortions between government and market prices. Politicians were reluctant to cut price subsidies to the poor in the late 1980s, as the economy weakened and popular expectations for continued government support remained high.
Government spending was divided between current and capital expenditures. Current expenditures averaged nearly 70 percent of total expenditures during most years, and they were divided among the categories of social services, general services, and financial services. Social services received 30 percent of the national budget in 1988, some 13 percent of which was dedicated to education and 8 percent, to public health. As recently as 1984, social expenditures had accounted for 47 percent of the total. General services constituted 21 percent of spending: about 7 percent of this was allocated to defense; 5 percent, to judiciary and police; and 9 percent, to government operations. The 1988 budget also allocated 22 percent of expenditures under the designation of financial services to debt servicing; this percentage was lower than it had been in previous years, as a result of debt rescheduling. During most of the 1980s, capital expenditures (referred to as economic services in the budget) represented at least 30 percent of total government expenditures, a relatively high proportion. As the Balaguer administration initiated major public-works projects in the late 1980s, the budget share dedicated to capital expenditures increased to more than 40 percent.
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Revenues
The core of the government's fiscal problems lay on the revenue side. Starting in 1970, revenues, as a percentage of GDP, steadily declined. These revenues hit a low in 1982, as the result of generous tax exemptions for industry. Many economists criticized the role of fiscal exemptions in the island's industrialization because the government thereby forfeited badly needed revenues in favor of job creation. In 1983 the government introduced a 6-percent value-added tax and initiated a number of ad hoc taxes on international trade, licensing, luxury items, and foreign exchange transactions. These new taxes, however, did not make up for the loss of revenue that had resulted from the low rates of taxation on income and business profits.
A fundamental feature of the nation's tax system was the low level of taxes on income and profits. In 1985 income taxes represented only 0.6 percent of GDP, well below the average of 2 percent of GDP for all developing countries. Furthermore, the income tax was effectively regressive because it utilized a flat rate and allowed numerous exemptions. Most new corporations, generally the most dynamic, benefited from at least one of the many fiscal incentives, and these enterprises therefore added little to the public coffers. In 1987 taxes on income and profits accounted for 19 percent of total tax revenue. Because of the political strength of the local and the foreign business communities, major reforms in this section of the tax law were unlikely (see Interest Groups , ch. 4).
In addition to personal and corporate income taxes, goods and services and international trade were also taxed. Taxes on goods and services equalled 36 percent of all taxes in 1987, whereas those on international trade had reached 43 percent, a relatively high share. Steep import tariffs and export taxes on principal commodities constituted the bulk of taxes on trade. Dominican authorities found taxes on imports and exports far easier to legislate and to collect than domestic taxes, despite the fact that they created numerous economic disincentives. Non-tax revenues, such as government income from property and other equity, provided 12 percent of total revenues in 1987.
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Monetary and Exchange-Rate Policies
The Monetary Board of the Dominican Central Bank (Banco Central de la República Dominicana--BCRD) determined monetary policy and oversaw the nation's financial system. The BCRD performed typical central bank functions: it controlled the money supply, allocated credit, sought to restrain inflation, managed the national debt, allocated foreign exchange, and issued currency. The currency since 1948 had been the Dominican Republic peso, which was divided into 100 centavos and was issued in bank note denominations similar to those of the United States.
The BCRD successfully controlled prices in the Dominican Republic until the 1980s. During most of the 1970s, inflation remained below 10 percent, with the exception of 1974 and 1979, when oil prices increased substantially. During the 1980s, however, inflation afflicted the economy, eroding real wages, weakening the peso, and straining the financial system. As measured by the Dominican consumer price index, inflation had jumped from 5 percent in 1980 to 38 percent by 1985. The inflation rate reached 60 percent in 1988. Although the BCRD attempted to restrict the money supply in order to slow inflation, the central government's expansionary fiscal policies and chronic balance-of-payments deficits continued to push prices upward as the decade came to a close. The BCRD favored the use of reserve ratios, as its monetary policy tool of choice, during the 1980s. By regulating the amount in liquid reserves that financial institutions had to keep on their premises, this policy provided a check on the growth of credit. As inflation worsened in 1987, the BCRD temporarily instituted a 100 percent reserve requirement on all new loans. Credit was also restricted by regulation of the interest rate, but the BCRD fixed the rate by the imposition of legal ceilings rather than by letting rates float at market levels. High reserve ratios in the late 1980s squeezed the private sector's access to long-term credit even as its share of the credit market increased in relation to the public sector's share. As a consequence of the swift rise in the price index, real interest rates were often negative in the mid-1980s to the late 1980s as the BCRD's fixed rates failed to keep pace with inflation.
Of major concern to policy makers was the rising cost of basic consumer goods. Many prices were set by the government's National Price Stabilization Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estabilización de Precios--Inespre). Despite Inespre's efforts, food prices rose faster than all other prices during the 1980s. Inespre's pricing policies responded more to political concerns than to economic realities. Prices of basic foodstuffs were maintained at unrealistically low levels, in part because urban violence often resulted from efforts to bring these prices more in line with the free market. Keeping urban consumer prices low necessitated the purchase of staple crops from Dominican farmers at less than fair value, a practice that depressed the income and the living standard of rural Dominicans.
The Dominican peso, officially on par with the United States dollar for decades, underwent a slow process of devaluation on the black market from 1963 until the government enacted a series of official devaluations during the 1980s. In 1978 a Dominican law actually required that the peso be equal in value to the dollar, but as economic conditions worsened, authorities abandoned this policy. The most important change in Dominican exchange policy came in 1985 when the Jorge government, acting in accordance with the terms of an IMF stabilization program, floated the national currency in relation to the dollar, thereby temporarily wiping out the previously extensive black market. The floating peso fell to a level of US$1=RD$3.12, an official devaluation of over 300 percent that proved to be a major shock to the economy. Preferential exchange rates, however, remained in force for oil imports and parastatal transactions. The devaluation caused higher domestic prices and burdened many poorer citizens, while it boosted the country's export sector through newly competitive prices. Rising inflation, balance-of- payments deficits, and foreign debt compelled further devaluations after 1985. The peso stabilized somewhat at US$1=RD$6.35 by 1989, after bottoming out at nearly US$1=RD$8 in mid-1988. As a result of these fluctuations, the Monetary Board experimented during the 1980s with a multi-tier fixed exchange rate, a floating exchange rate, and other systems until by 1988 it had settled on a fixed rate subject to change based on the country's export competitiveness and domestic inflation. An important provision of the exchange-rate policy of 1988 prohibited currency transactions at the country's exchange banks and channeled all foreign currency transactions into the commercial banks under BCRD supervision.
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LABOR
Formal Sector
According to official statistics, the Dominican labor force had grown to 2.8 million by 1988. The labor force equaled about 74 percent of the nation's 3.8 million economically active citizens, a group that included all those between the ages of 15 and 64. Official unemployment stood at 26 percent, but like many of the country's labor statistics, this measure was only an approximation. More than 80,000 workers entered the job market annually in the 1980s. Unemployment declined slightly in the late 1980s, and it was expected to continue to drop because of the explosive growth of free-zone manufacturing jobs. The seasonal nature of jobs in agriculture and tourism, however, created patterns of structural underemployment that affected a quarter of the labor force. Half of the economically active population suffered from either unemployment or underemployment.
The structure of the labor force had changed significantly during the post-Trujillo era as agriculture's share of output diminished. In 1950 agriculture had employed 73 percent of Dominican labor, but by the end of the 1980s it accounted for as little as 35 percent. Industry and services had incorporated approximately 20 percent and 45 percent, respectively, of displaced agricultural labor. As a consequence of gaps in the labor statistics, official estimates of the female segment of the economically active population varied widely, from 15 to 30 percent of the labor force. Whatever the total figures, the role of women, particularly in the urban economy, was growing by the late 1980s. Seventy percent of the employees in free zones were women; as greater numbers of free zones opened in the late 1980s, the rate of employment for females more than doubled the rate of employment for males. This shift represented a major transformation in the labor force; previously, the percentage of women in the Dominican work force had been lower than that for any other Latin American country. Men continued to dominate agricultural jobs in the late 1980s. These were among the lowestpaid jobs in the country. The highest salaries were earned in mining, private utilities, financial services, and commerce. The distribution of income among workers was highly skewed; the top 10 percent earned 39 percent of national income, while the bottom 50 percent garnered only 19 percent.
Dominican labor laws dated back to the Labor Code of 1951. Among the many matters on which the code ruled were the maximum number of foreigners that could be employed in a workplace, guidelines for labor unions, child labor practices, the minimum wage, the length of the workweek, vacations, holiday pay, Christmas bonuses, overtime, social security, and other benefits. No government agency enforced labor legislation, however, which reduced the actual power of most workers vis-à-vis management.
In the 1980s, the most controversial labor law was the one governing the national minimum wage. Although the Congress of the Republic increased minimum wages on several occasions throughout the decade, unusually high inflation usually outpaced these increases, which reduced the real wages of workers. General strikes or other confrontations between labor and government frequently resulted. Government officials were reluctant to grant frequent raises in the minimum wage, in part, because they felt the need to keep Dominican wages competitive with those of other developing countries. Dominican wages did indeed remain lower than those in other Caribbean Basin countries, with the exception of impoverished Haiti.
Organized labor represented between 12 percent and 15 percent of the labor force in the late 1980s. The number of active union members ranged somewhere between the government's estimate of 250,000 and labor's figure of more than 500,000. Thousands of unions were syndicated into eight major labor confederations; nearly 100,000 Dominicans also belonged to independent unions. Scores of peasant-based movements and organizations were also active. Thirty-two percent of the eight labor confederations' member unions were affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, 16 percent with the World Confederation of Labor, and slightly more than half with international communist unions. Unions appeared only after the Trujillo era, and in the 1980s they were still young, weak, poorly financed, and politically divided. The issues most important to Dominican labor included rising prices, the declining real minimum wage, and collective bargaining. Industrial disputes increased noticeably in the late 1980s. In particular, these took the form of general strikes and intensified activism among professionals. Organized labor had begun to establish a foothold in the free zones, and disputes over unionization in these areas loomed as the fundamental labor issue of the future.
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Informal Sector
Many Dominicans escaped formal government data collection, but nonetheless played a major economic role, particularly in the urban economy. Estimates of the size of the informal urban economy in the late 1980s ranged from 20 percent to 50 percent of the total urban labor force. Workers in the informal sector included self-employed people, unpaid family workers, domestic servants, and very small businesses or "microenterprises" of only a few workers in manufacturing and assorted services. Although little reliable data existed on the country's informal sector, many in that sector received economic assistance from the United States Agency for International Development (AID), the InterAmerican Foundation, and other development agencies to promote their expansion into the formal sector. Some observers believed that the growth of the informal sector was a response to the complex legal framework for business, restrictive exchange-rate controls, widespread informal financial markets, pricing and tax policies, and the often-cited Dominican preference for highly personal relations.
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AGRICULTURE
Agriculture, the backbone of the Dominican economy for centuries, declined in significance during the 1970s and the 1980s, as manufacturing, mining, and tourism began to play more important roles in the country's development. During the 1960s, the agricultural sector employed close to 60 percent of the labor force, contributed one-quarter of GDP, and provided between 80 and 90 percent of exports. By 1988, however, agriculture employed only 35 percent of the labor force, accounted for 15 percent of GDP, and generated approximately half of all exports. The declining importance of sugar, the principal source of economic activity for nearly a century, was even more dramatic. Sugar's share of total exports fell from 63 percent in 1975 to under 20 percent by the late 1980s. The transformation in agriculture paralleled the country's demographic trends. In 1960, some 70 percent of the country's population was rural; by the 1990s, upwards of 70 percent was expected to be urban. Government policies accelerated urbanization through development strategies that favored urban industries over agriculture in terms of access to capital, tariff and tax exemptions, and pricing policies. As a consequence, the production of major food crops either stagnated, or declined, in per capita terms from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s. Lower world prices for traditional cash crops and reductions in the United States sugar quota also depressed the production of export crops in the 1980s.
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Land Tenure and Land Policy
The uneven distribution of arable land continued to be a fundamental obstacle to the economic development of the Dominican Republic in the 1980s. Despite active attempts to reform land tenure patterns, the basic dichotomy of latifundio and minifundio continued to be the predominant feature of rural life. According to the 1981 agricultural census, 2 percent of the nation's farms occupied 55 percent of total farmland. By contrast, landholdings averaging under 20 hectares, which represented 82 percent of all farms (314,665 units), covered only 12 percent of the land under cultivation. Land distribution on both extremes was notably worse. Some 161 farms, 0.1 percent of all farms, occupied 23 percent of all productive land, whereas tens of thousands of peasants possessed only a few tareas. (The tarea, the most common measurement of land on the island, equalled one-sixteenth of a hectare.)
The government was the largest landholder. The CEA and the Dominican Agrarian Institute (Instituto Agrario Dominicano--IAD), the national land reform agency, controlled the overwhelming share of public-sector land, most of which was derived from Trujillo's estate. The two major sugar producers in the private sector, Central Romana and Casa Vicini, along with several large cattle ranches, represented the largest private landholdings.
Data from the 1981 census displayed a land tenure structure that was essentially the same as that reflected in the 1971 census. The total number of farms in the 1981 survey was 385,000, up from 305,000 a decade earlier.While the number of farms had increased substantially, the amount of cultivated land had actually decreased slightly, from 2.74 million hectares in 1971 to 2.67 million hectares in 1981. The greater number of farms had resulted from agrarian reform measures and population growth, whereas the decrease in land cultivated had been caused by erosion, development, urbanization, the decline of the sugar market, and other factors. The size of the average farm shrank from 1,439 hectares in 1971 to 698 hectares in 1981, an indication of some minor success in land reform. Types of ownership were not so well documented, but government surveys indicated that individuals owned 66 percent of all farms, families owned 16 percent, and other types of tenure, such as cooperative ownership, sharecropping, and renting, accounted for the remaining 18 percent.
The concentration of land in the Dominican Republic, although it could trace its roots back to Christopher Columbus's parceling of land, had resulted principally from the "latifundization" of land with the advent of commercial sugarcane production in the late nineteenth century. The concentration of arable land ownership increased after 1948, when Trujillo intensified his involvement in the sugar industry. Trujillo doubled the amount of land dedicated to sugarcane, in a little over a decade. The dictator and his cronies seized as much as 60 percent of the nation's arable land through colonization schemes, the physical eviction of peasants from their land, and the purchase of land through spurious means. In the aftermath of Trujillo's assassination in 1961, the government expropriated his family's landholdings by means of Decree 6988, thus setting the stage for contemporary land policy.
In 1962 the post-Trujillo Council of State created the IAD, to centralize agrarian reform and land policy, with a mandate to redistribute the ruler's former holdings to peasants. Agrarian reform was hindered by the country's stormy political transitions in the 1960s, but it was strengthened in 1972 by legislation that authorized the government to expropriate unused farms in excess of 31.4 hectares under certain conditions. During the 1970s and the 1980s, however, the IAD made slow and uneven progress in dividing up the government's huge new properties. IAD reforms provided individuals, cooperatives, and settlements (asentamientos) with parcels of land. A range of support services, including land- clearing, road construction, irrigation, agricultural extension services, and credit usually were also provided. By the end of 1987, the IAD and its predecessor agencies had redistributed more than 409,000 hectares of land. The redistribution included 454 projects that benefited 75,000 families, or 460,000 citizens. In the late 1980s, IADsponsored land yielded 40 percent of the national output of rice, 75 percent of tomatoes, 31 percent of corn, and 39 percent of bananas and plantains.
Despite the broad mandate for land reform, a cause strongly advocated by the Balaguer administration in the late 1980s, many criticized the IAD's overall lack of progress since 1962. The greatest progress on land reform occurred from 1966 to 1978, when the government redistributed approximately 174,000 hectares. Reform slowed considerably from 1978 to 1986, when only 66,000 hectares were redistributed. Making land available, however, is only one component of successful reform. Peasants criticized the IAD's sluggish performance in transferring land titles, its providing mainly marginal agricultural land, and the generally inadequate level of support services caused by the lack of funding and the ineffectual management of the IAD. Only 38 percent of IAD land was actually devoted to the cultivation of crops in the late 1980s; 9 percent was devoted to livestock and 53 percent to forestry or to other uses.
After decades of wrangling, the Dominican Republic completed the 1980s with the issue of land largely unresolved from the perspectives of both peasants and commercial farmers, a failure most evident in data demonstrating an ongoing pattern of skewed land ownership. Frequent spontaneous land seizures and invasions by peasants of underused land throughout the 1980s epitomized rural frustrations. On one end of the economic spectrum, numerous rural associations, disconcerted by the pace and the quality of land reform, participated in land seizures, demanding "land for those who work it," an approach that forced the land reform issue into the judiciary rather than into the legislature. On the other end of this spectrum, agribusinesses complained of the government's inconsistent policies with regard to the expropriation of land. Some analysts viewed such inconsistencies as a deterrent to new investment in agriculture and therefore as counterproductive to the republic's efforts to diversify its economy away from sugar. Poverty continued to be a largely rural phenomenon and land a sensitive political subject, indicating that agrarian reform would persist as an issue.
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Land Use
An estimated 27,452 square kilometers, or 57 percent of the Dominican Republic's total territory of 48,442 square kilometers, was devoted to agriculture-related activities in the late 1980s. According to a soil survey conducted in 1985, 43 percent of the country's total area was moderately suited, or well-suited, for cultivation. The Cibao and the Vega Real regions, north and northeast of Santo Domingo, respectively, contained the republic's richest agricultural lands and produced most of the nation's food and cash crops, with the exception of sugar. Sugarcane cultivation centered on the coastal plains of the south and the east.
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Farming Technology
In the 1980s, Dominican farmers still suffered from the legacies of Trujillo's neglect and industrial strategies that placed little emphasis on agricultural development outside the sugar industry. As a result, the average farmer used far fewer purchased inputs, such as fertilizers, tractors, and irrigation, than his counterparts in many other Latin American countries.
Some progress had been made in irrigation systems by the late 1980s. The poor distribution of the country's generally adequate rainfall necessitated the development of irrigation under the management of the governmental National Water Resources Institute (Instituto Nacional de Recursos Hidráulicos--INDRHI). The amount of irrigated land increased rapidly with the construction of several dams, such as Tavera Dam and Sabana Yegua Dam, in the 1970s and the 1980s. By the late 1980s, however, only about 139,000 hectares, less than 15 percent of arable land, benefited from irrigation. Further expansion of irrigation was a key to reaching self-sufficiency, particularly in rice production. INDRHI pursued ambitious plans for future irrigation; it was projected that more than 200,000 hectares of land would be functionally irrigated by the early 1990s.
The Secretariat of State for Agriculture (Secretaria de Estado para la Agricultura--SEA) attempted to improve farming technology through its extension service and a series of agricultural research centers. The greatest constraints were money and training. The Superior Institute of Agriculture, established in 1962 and affiliated with the Catholic University Mother and Teacher (Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra--UCMM) in Santiago, successfully trained scores of agronomists; it also achieved crop innovations, the most important of which, in the late 1980s, concerned sorghum and African palm oil. Several regional, and generally crop-specific, institutes also conducted agricultural research.
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Crops
Cash Crops
Despite ongoing diversification efforts, in the late 1980s the Dominican Republic continued to be the world's fourth largest producer of sugarcane. The sugar industry influenced all sectors of the economy and epitomized the nation's vulnerability to outside forces. Fluctuating world prices, adjustments to United States sugar quotas, and the actions of United States sugar companies (such as Gulf and Western Corporation's sale of all its Dominican holdings in 1985) all could determine the pace of economic development for decades.
Columbus introduced sugarcane to Hispaniola, but sugar plantations did not flourish in the Dominican Republic until the 1870s, much later than on most Caribbean islands. Investment by United States sugar companies, such as the United States South Porto Rico Company and the Cuban-Dominican Sugar Company, rapidly transformed the Dominican economy. These companies had established themselves by the 1890s, and between 1896 and 1905 sugar output tripled. During the United States occupation (1916- 24), the sugar industry expanded further, acquiring control of major banking and transportation enterprises.
Trujillo constructed a string of sugar mills, many of which he owned personally, beginning in 1948. The elimination of United States sugar quotas for Cuba after the Cuban Revolution of 1959 further enhanced the economic role of sugar, as the Dominican Republic assumed Cuba's former status as the main supplier under the quota system.
Heavy reliance on sugar created a number of economic difficulties. The harvest of sugarcane, the zafra, is arduous, labor-intensive, and seasonal, and it leaves many unemployed during the tiempo muerto, or dead season. Haitian laborers have harvested most of the Dominican cane crop since the late nineteenth century, by agreement between Hispaniola's two governments. Although Haitian cane cutters lived under conditions of virtual slavery (see Haitians , ch. 2; Migration , ch. 7), two factors continued to draw them across the border: depressed economic conditions in Haiti and the reluctance of Dominicans to perform the backbreaking, poorly regarded work of cane cutting.
After the death of Trujillo, Dominican policy makers faced the sensitive issue of how best to manage the dictator's economic legacy, which on the one hand was the rightful property of the people, but on the other hand represented more of a drain on national finances than a catalyst to development. These contradictions played themselves out within the CEA, an entrenched, politicized, and inefficient parastatal.
The role of sugar changed markedly in the 1980s as external conditions forced the national economy to diversify. Sugar prices had reached unprecedented highs in 1975 and again in 1979. The international recession of the early 1980s, however, pushed prices to their lowest level in forty years. Lower world prices hurt the Dominican economy, but the reduction of sales to the United States market, as a result of quota reductions that began in 1981, was even more costly because of the preferential price the United States paid under the quota system. The international market continued to be unpromising in the late 1980s. The market had been glutted by over-production, caused principally by European beet growers; major soft-drink manufacturers had also begun to turn to high-fructose corn sweeteners and away from cane sugar.
In the late 1980s, the CEA continued to control about 60 percent of national sugar output through the ownership of twelve of the country's sixteen sugar mills, employment of a work force of 35,000, and possession of 233,000 hectares of land, only 100,000 hectares of which were sown with sugarcane. Governed by a board--the members of which were drawn from the public sector, labor, and the private sector--the CEA operated at a financial loss and at lower productivity than the two major private sugar companies, Casa Vicini and Central Romana. Besides these major producers, thousands of small farmers (colonos) also grew cane. Sugar from all properties covered an estimated 240,000 hectares in 1987, and it yielded 816,000 tons, well below the 1.25 million tons harvested in 1976, the year of peak volume. Worse yet, lower prices kept 1987 sales at less than one-third of what was realized in 1975, when sugar export revenues peaked at US$577 million. The Dominican Republic still exported about half its sugar to the United States in the late 1980s (but, unlike in the past, not all under the quota system with its preferential prices). The Soviet Union became the second largest purchaser of Dominican sugar, following the signing of a three-year bilateral agreement in 1987.
Coffee, the second leading cash crop, was also subject to varying market conditions in the 1980s. Introduced as early as 1715, coffee continued to be a leading crop among small hillside farmers in the late 1980s; it covered 152,000 hectares throughout various mountain ranges. Coffee farming, like sugar growing, was seasonal, and it entailed a labor-intensive harvest involving as many as 250,000 workers, some of whom were Haitians. The preponderance of small holdings among Dominican coffee farmers, however, caused the coffee industry to be inefficient, and yields fell far below the island's potential. Output of coffee fluctuated with world prices, which reached an eight-year low in 1989. Another problem was the coffee bushes' vulnerability to the hurricanes that periodically ravaged the island.
The Dominican coffee industry faced not only national problems, but also international ones, which resulted mainly from the failure of the International Coffee Organization (ICO) to agree on quotas through its International Coffee Agreement (ICA). As a consequence, the Dominicans' ICA quota dropped several times late in the decade, hitting a low of 425,187 sixty-kilogram bags by 1988. Although Dominicans consumed much of their own coffee, they were increasingly forced to find new foreign markets because of the ICO's difficulties. As was true of many Dominican commodities, middlemen often smuggled coffee into Haiti for re- export overseas. Official coffee exports in 1987 were US$63 million, down from US$86 million in 1985 and US$113 million in 1986.
Cacao, the bean from which cocoa is derived, endured as another principal cash crop, occasionally surpassing coffee as a source of export revenue. The Dominican cocoa industry emerged in the 1880s as a competing peasant crop, when tobacco underwent a steep price decline. Although overshadowed by sugar, cocoa agriculture enjoyed slow, but steady, growth until a period of rapid expansion in the 1970s. In response to higher world prices, the area covered with cacao trees grew from 65,000 hectares in 1971 to 117,000 hectares by 1980. Small farmers cultivated the most cacao, producing some 40,000 tons on approximately 134,000 hectares in 1987. This crop was enough to make the Dominican Republic the largest producer of cacao in the Caribbean. Combined cacao and cocoa exports in 1987 reached US$66 million. Despite the brisk growth in the crop, the Dominican cocoa industry suffered from low yields and from increasing quality-control problems. In addition, three exporters controlled 75 percent of all cocoa, thus limiting competition. The country also forfeited greater foreign-exchange earnings because only a small portion of the crop was processed into cocoa before export.
Tobacco enjoyed a renaissance in the 1960s, with the introduction of new varieties and an increase in prices. Sales revenues peaked in 1978, but they declined considerably in the 1980s because of lower prices, disease, and inadequate marketing. In 1987, 23,000 hectares yielded 23,000 tons of tobacco. Black tobacco of the "dark air-cured and sun-cured" variety represented 88 percent of national production in the late 1980s. Manufactured into cigars for export, black tobacco was the foremost foreign- exchange earner among the various strains of the crop grown in the Dominican Republic.
Numerous companies participated in the export of black tobacco. Sales to Spain, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), and France totaled US$14 million in 1987. A growing number of cigar companies operated out of the country's burgeoning free zones, registering US$26 million in sales in 1987.
Declining prices and structural changes in the international market for the Dominican Republic's traditional cash crops of sugar, coffee, cocoa, and tobacco forced the government to consider opportunities for nontraditional agricultural exports during the 1980s. This new emphasis on nontraditional exports also coincided with the implementation of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), which afforded the country reduced-tariff access to the United States market. The main categories of nontraditional exports that the government promoted included ornamental plants, winter vegetables (vegetables not grown in the United States during winter months), citrus, tropical fruits, spices, nuts, and certain types of produce popular among the growing Hispanic and Caribbean populations in the United States. However, new investments in agribusiness during the 1980s were less successful than anticipated, particularly in comparison to the dramatic success of assembly manufacturing and tourism. Nonetheless, officials apparently had succeeded in broadening the options of farmers and investors from a few crops to a diverse range of products. The government spearheaded agricultural diversification through an export promotion agency, the Dominican Center for the Promotion of Exports (Centro Dominicano de Promoción de Exportaciones--Cedopex), and through cooperation with a nongovernmental organization, the Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee, which promoted agribusiness investment in the republic. By 1989 some successes had been achieved with citrus and pineapples, but quicker growth in nontraditional agricultural exports was hindered by the slow pace of the CEA's diversification program, which had scheduled portions of the fertile sugar plains for conversion to nontraditional crop production.
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Food Crops
As part of the national dish of rice and beans, rice was the Dominican Republic's most important food crop in the late 1980s.Rice production expanded significantly in the post-Trujillo era, and by late 1979 the country had achieved self-sufficiency for the first time. Rice production, however, waned in the 1980s, forcing renewed imports. In 1987 about 112,000 hectares yielded 320,000 tons of rice, an amount inadequate to meet national demand, but well above the level of 210,000 tons in 1970.
Declines in production were related to a series of economic factors. Rice subsidies to the urban poor, who enjoyed less than two kilograms of rice a week as part of Inespre's food basket, or canasta popular, were generally at odds with the goal of increased output. The government's land reform measures also may have had a negative impact on rice yields; IAD's rice holdings, which rendered 40 percent of the nation's rice, were noticeably less productive than private rice holdings. In the late 1980s, the government continued to involve itself extensively in the rice industry by supplying irrigation systems to over 50 percent of rice farmers as well as technical support through the Rice Research Center in Juma, near Bonao. The government also moved to increase the efficiency of local distribution in 1987, when it transferred rice marketing operations from Inespre to the Agricultural Bank of the Dominican Republic (Banco Agrícola de la República Dominicana--Bagricola) and then to the private sector.
The other principal grains and cereals consumed in the Dominican Republic included corn (or maize), sorghum, and imported wheat. Corn, native to the island, performed better than many food crops in the 1980s because of the robust growth of the poultry industry, which used 95 percent of the corn crop as animal feed. The strong demand for feed notwithstanding, Inespre's low prices for corn and other distortions in the local market caused by donated food from foreign sources decreased incentives for farmers and reduced output during the late 1970s and the early 1980s. As of 1987, corn covered 28,000 hectares, and it supplied 43,000 tons, an amount far below domestic needs. The cultivation of sorghum, a drought-resistant crop also used as a feed, expanded rapidly in the 1980s because of sorghum's suitability as a rotation crop on winter vegetable farms and as a new crop on newly idle cane fields. An estimated 16,000 hectares yielded 49,000 tons of sorghum in 1987, more than double 1980's output of 23,000 tons. Wheat was another increasingly important cereal because Dominicans were consuming ever-greater quantities of the commodity, donated primarily by the United States and France. As a result, the country's two mills were functioning at full capacity in the late 1980s. The government was reluctant to do something about Dominicans' preference for the heavily subsidized wheat over local cereals for fear of violent protests by poorer consumers.
Other major food crops included starchy staples such as plantains and an assortment of tubers. Dominicans consumed large quantities of plantains, usually fried, because of their abundance, sweet taste, and low cost. An estimated 31,000 hectares of trees produced 251,000 tons of plantain in 1987. Peasants routinely cultivated and consumed root crops, such as cassava, taro, sweet potatoes, and yams because they were cheap and easy to cultivate. Production of these basic food crops did not fare well in the late 1970s and the 1980s because of low government prices and the exodus of population to the cities. Some 17,000 hectares sown with cassava, the most common tuber, produced approximately 98,000 tons of that crop in the late 1980s.
Beans, a dietary staple and the chief source of protein for many Dominicans, were grown throughout the countryside. Although the country was generally self-sufficient in the universally popular red bean, shifts in output created the need to import some beans during the 1980s. Red beans covered 57,000 hectares, yielding 39,000 tons, whereas black beans were grown on only 9,000 hectares, yielding only 4,000 tons. Other varieties generated even smaller harvests.
Dominicans also grew an assortment of fruits, vegetables, spices, and other foods. These included bananas, peanuts, guava, tamarind, passion fruit, soursop, coconut, tomatoes, carrots, lettuce, cabbage, scallions, cilantro, onions, and garlic.
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Livestock
The raising of livestock, the basis of the economy during colonial times, continued to be a common practice in the 1980s, despite the country's warm climate and hilly interior. The predominant livestock on the island were beef and dairy cattle, chickens, and pigs. The country was essentially self-sufficient in its production of basic meats. Cattle-raising was still the primary livestock activity in the late 1980s, and the Dominican stock exceeded 2 million head, the great majority of which were beef cattle, raised mostly on medium-to-large ranches in the east. The annual output of slaughtered beef surpassed 80,000 tons annually, by the late 1980s, over 10 percent of which was processed by five specially certified slaughterhouses and was exported to the United States. Ranchers also smuggled out much beef to circumvent export duties. The country also contained an undetermined, but dwindling, number of dairy cows. The decline in the dairy cow population was the direct result of years of low government prices for milk. Implemented in an effort to keep milk prices low, this policy dramatically increased milk imports, and it created serious milk shortages. Many private milk pasteurizers consequently closed their businesses in the 1980s. By the late 1980s, only four pasteurizing plants, including one owned by Inespre, processed local milk and reconstituted imported powdered milk.
The poultry industry, in contrast to the dairy industry, enjoyed strong growth in the 1980s. A few large producers supplied the nation with 90,000 tons of broilers a year and with hundreds of millions of eggs. As in other developing countries, the cost of feed continued to play a major role in the pace of the poultry industry's expansion in the 1980s. The pork industry had also rebounded by the mid-1980s, after suffering the virtual eradication of its stock from 1978 to 1982 because of an epidemic of African Swine Fever (ASF; see Livestock and Fishing , ch. 8). Afterward, the Dominican Republic established an increasingly modern and well-organized pork industry. By the late 1980s, however, the national stock exceeded 500,000. This number was well below 1979's peak figure of 750,000, however. The government succeeded in restocking the pig population very rapidly after 1982, but higher feed prices and slack consumer demand for pork, previously a traditional Dominican favorite, in response to high prices had slowed that effort by 1989.
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Forestry and Fishing
Pine, hardwood, and other tree cover, once ample, covered only 15 percent of the land by 1989. To offset losses caused by the indiscriminate felling of trees and the prevalence of slashand -burn agriculture, the government outlawed commercial tree cutting in 1967. Since then, there had been some limited development of commercial plantation forestry, but the nation continued to import more than US$30 million in wood products each year. Although not so drastic as in Haiti, deforestation and the erosion that it caused posed serious environmental concerns for the country's watersheds into the 1990s and beyond. Reforestation efforts drew funding from a number of international development agencies during the 1980s.
The fishing industry also was underdeveloped. Undercapitalized, it consisted of only small coastal fishermen with modest nonrefrigerated boats, who barely exploited the 1,600 kilometers of coastline. The government did not place much emphasis on the industry and, therefore, provided little financial or other assistance to fishermen.
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INDUSTRY
Manufacturing
Manufacturing, particularly assembly operations in free zones, constituted one of the most dynamic sectors of the Dominican economy in the 1980s. As had been true of mining, the growing role of manufacturing accelerated the industrialization and the diversification processes affecting the island's economy. Manufacturing in 1988 contributed about 17 percent of GDP, employed 8 percent of the labor force, and generated about onethird of exports, although assembly exports did not appear in normal trade data because of their free zone origins. The sector consisted of traditional manufacturing, with large roles for both the public and the private sectors, and free-zone manufacturing, consisting mainly of assembly operations with some agroprocessing as well. Growth in manufacturing during the 1980s centered on the free zones; their projected employment of as many as 180,000 workers by 1991, when compared with a total of only 16,000 workers in 1980, was expected to represent the most dramatic increase in assembly labor in the world during that tenyear period. Manufacturing's export performance was equally dramatic. Manufactured goods went from 11 percent of total exports in 1980 to 31 percent by 1987.
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Traditional Manufacturing
During the Trujillo era, manufacturing grew more slowly than it did in other Latin American and Caribbean countries because of the dictatorship's disproportionate emphasis on sugar production. In 1968 the Balaguer government introduced the Industrial Incentive Law (Law 299). For the first time, domestic manufacturers received substantial tariff protection from foreign competition. In the same year, the government signalled the beginning of industrial diversification in the post-Trujillo era by establishing the Industrial Development Board to oversee industrial policy. Although these incentives stimulated an array of domestic industries, created jobs, and helped to diversify the country's industrial base, Dominican industries failed to develop a capacity to compete internationally. Although envisioned largely in terms of import substitution, most Dominican industries depended heavily on foreign inputs. In addition, because they were generally capital-intensive, these industries failed to provide adequate employment for a burgeoning population.
Local manufacturing was both inefficient and inequitable. The application of tariff and income tax exemptions became a politicized process whereby benefits accrued to individual firms rather than to specific industries. The Jorge government, which itself manipulated incentives regulations to its political advantage, introduced in 1983 the Democratizing Law 299, purportedly to standardize industrial incentives for all producers.
In the late 1980s, more than 5,000 traditional manufacturing firms existed in the republic. Food-processing activities were dominant, representing over 50 percent of manufacturing activity; followed by chemicals, 12 percent; textiles, 9 percent; and nonmetallic minerals, 6 percent. Some 3 percent of all firms accounted for nearly 50 percent of all industrial output; these firms, however, employed only 23 percent of the manufacturing labor force, indicating the capital-intensive nature of larger companies. By contrast, 85 percent of the smallest firms registered only 30 percent of industrial production, while employing 50 percent of Dominican workers.
The Dominican government generally abstained from involvement in new manufacturing operations, but twenty-five industrial enterprises, part of the Trujillo "legacy," remained in the government's portfolio in the late 1980s. Most of these parastatals were under the control of a state holding company, the Dominican State Enterprises Corporation (Corporación Dominicana de Empresas Estatales--Corde). Initially converted into state-owned enterprises as the "inheritance of the people," Dominican parastatals endured in the late 1980s because of their role in the political patronage system (see Public Administration , ch. 4). Corde's holdings were diverse, ranging from a five-man auto parts firm to a 1,600-employee cigarette factory. Although the Balaguer administration considered privatizing some state-owned enterprises to improve its fiscal position, that prospect remained unlikely because of the political value of such firms.
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Free-Zone Manufacturing
There was no economic process more dynamic in the Dominican Republic during the 1980s than the rapid growth of free zones. Although the Dominican government established the legal framework for free zones in 1955, it was not until 1969 that the Gulf and Western Corporation opened the country's first such zone in La Romana. Free-zone development progressed modestly in the 1970s, but it accelerated rapidly during the 1980s as the result of domestic incentives, such as Free-Zone Law 145 of 1983 and the United States CBI of 1984. Free-Zone Law 145, a special provision of the Industrial Incentive Law, offered very liberal incentives for free-zone investment, including total exemption from import duties, income taxes, and other taxes for up to twenty years. By the close of the decade, the results of free-zone development were dramatically clear. From 1985 to 1989, the number of free zones had more than doubled, from six to fifteen; employment had jumped from 36,000 to nearly 100,000. The number of companies operating in free zones had increased from 146 to more than 220. In 1989 six more free zones were being developed, and three more had been approved. These zones were projected to bring the total to twenty-four by the mid-1990s. Demand nonetheless outpaced growth, forcing some companies to wait as long as a year to acquire new factory space.
The country's free zones varied widely in terms of size, ownership, production methods, and location. The size of free zones ranged from only a few hectares to more than 100 hectares. Private companies operated nine of the country's fifteen free zones in 1989, but only four of those were managed as for-profit ventures. The government administered six zones, including the Puerto Plata free zone, the only mixed public-private venture. Most companies in the free zones, 66 percent in 1989, were from the United States. Dominicans owned 11 percent of the firms, and the remaining enterprises had originated in Puerto Rico, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Panama, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Canada, Italy, and Liberia. Most free zones hosted an assortment of producers, while a few focused on a limited number of subsectors, such as garments, electronics, or information services. Other free-zone products included footwear, apparel, jewelry, velcro, furniture, aromatics, and pharmaceuticals. Most operations were performed under short-term subcontracting arrangements. The government also afforded free-zone benefits to certain agrobusinesses , dubbed special free zones, which were physically located outside the free zones themselves, thus causing some agro-processing to fall under the free-zone export category. Among the most innovative activities in the free zones were information services, such as data entry, Spanish-English translation, computer software development, and even toll-free telephone services for Spanish-speakers in the United States; all of these services were available because of the island's advanced telecommunications infrastructure (see Communications , this ch.). By 1989 nearly every region of the country was home to at least one free zone; the greatest concentration was found in the south and southeast.
Apart from the incentives of Free-Zone Law 145 and other domestic legislation, a growing number of foreign companies chose the Dominican Republic as an investment site because of the twin plant scheme (see Glossary), or 936 scheme, with Puerto Rico under the CBI. The twin-plant concept allowed companies to benefit both from the exemption of United States import duties under the CBI and from income the tax exemptions granted to firms in Puerto Rico under Section 936 of the United States tax code, while also taking advantage of the Dominican Republic's low labor costs. As the Spanish-speaking country closest to Puerto Rico and the most prolific developer of free zones in the region, the Dominican Republic hosted over 50 percent of the seventy twinplant investments that had been recorded by 1989.
The National Council for Free Zones (Consejo Nacional de Zonas Francas--CNZF), within the Secretariat of State for Industry and Commerce, spearheaded free-zone development. A major justification for the development of free zones was the levels of employment that the generally labor-intensive work stimulated. Also, free zones provided hard currency, mostly in the form of wages, rent, utilities, and supplies, for a nation hungry for foreign exchange. By the late 1980s, however, jobs in the free zones were only beginning to make a dent in the country's chronically high unemployment, which had averaged about 25 percent for more than a decade.
Based on the export success of Southeast Asian nations, freezone development had a proven economic value, but it was not without policy trade-offs. Although the strategy provided numerous jobs, the new jobs that it created offered limited opportunity for advancement. Similarly, with the exception of information services and agro-processing, free-zone enterprises entailed limited technology transfer for longer-term development. Free-zone development also forged few economic links with the local economy because of the limited value added by assembly operations. Besides labor and utilities, few local inputs became part of the manufacturing process, mostly because of insufficient local supply, uneven quality, and certain government regulations. The rapid growth of free-zone construction also created some nationwide bottlenecks in cement production, the generation of electricity, and other basic services. Finally, the liberal tax and tariff exemptions extended to free-zone manufacturers reduced the potential revenue base of the government and forced domestic businesses and individuals to assume a greater portion of the tax burden.
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Mining
Like the economy at large, the mining industry enjoyed extraordinary growth in the 1970s, when the country's major ferronickel and doré (gold and silver nugget) operations were inaugurated. Mining's contribution to GDP rose from 1.5 percent in 1970 to 5.3 percent by 1980, where it remained in the late 1980s. Although the mining sector employed only about 1 percent of the labor force throughout this period, it became a major foreign-exchange earner, increasing from an insignificant portion of exports in 1970 to as much as 38 percent by 1980, then leveling off at approximately 34 percent in 1987. Nonetheless, mining companies struggled in the 1980s because of low international prices for the island's key minerals--gold, silver, bauxite, and nickel. In the late 1980s, the government strove to tap new resources and to strengthen export diversification by actively seeking foreign investment in mining (see table 6).
Gold and silver doré, which occur naturally in the Dominican Republic, played a central role in the rapid emergence of mining. Although the Spanish mined gold on the island as early as the 1520s, gold production in the Dominican Republic was insignificant until 1975, when the private firm Rosario Dominicano opened the Pueblo Viejo mine, the largest open-pit gold mine in the Western Hemisphere. In 1979 the Dominican government, then owner of 46 percent of the shares of Rosario Dominicano, purchased the remaining equity from Rosario Resources, Inc., a New York-based company, thereby creating the largest Dominican-owned company in the country. Rosario's huge mining infrastructure, with an annual capacity of 1.7 million troy ounces of gold and silver, impelled by rapidly increasing international prices for gold, had nearly succeeded in pushing doré past sugar as the country's leading source of export revenue by 1980. From 1975 to 1980, gold and silver skyrocketed from 0 percent of exports to 27 percent. Declining prices for gold and silver during the 1980s, however, curtailed the extraordinary growth trend of the 1970s, and by 1987 doré exports represented only 17 percent of total exports (one percentage point above ferronickel exports, and one percentage point below sugar exports). Declining reserves also limited doré production. Japanese and United States companies actively explored new gold reserves on the island, but gold mining was shifting away from the search for oxide ores, supplies of which were dwindling, toward the more expensive process of exploiting sulphide ores. There were some alluvial gold deposits as well.
Ferronickel also contributed to the mining prosperity of the 1970s. From 1918 to 1956, the United States Geological Survey performed a series of mineral studies in the Dominican Republic. These studies encouraged the Canadian firm Falconbridge to undertake its own nickel testing starting at the end of that period. Falconbridge successfully opened a pilot nickel plant in 1968, and by 1972 the company had begun full-scale ferronickel mining in the town of Bonao. In the late 1980s, the Bonao ferronickel mine was the second largest in the world. Buoyed by high international prices, nickel exports rose from 11 percent of total exports in 1975 to 14 percent by 1979. Although nickel exports, as a percentage of total exports, continued to climb in the 1980s, reaching 16 percent by 1987, lower world prices for nickel and a lengthy dispute between the government and Falconbridge over tax payments hampered output throughout the decade. Unlike gold, nickel had been proven to exist in large reserves in the Dominican Republic, which meant bright prospects for mining.
The Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa) began bauxite mining in the southwest province of Barahona in 1958. Bauxite output peaked in 1974 when Alcoa surface-mined nearly 1.2 million tons; exports totaled as much as US$22 million as late as 1979. As with other minerals, however, the international recession of the early 1980s caused bauxite prices to topple, as world supply outpaced demand. Alcoa closed its Dominican bauxite operations in 1982 and its small limestone mine in 1985. The Barahona mine remained closed until 1987, when the government purchased Alcoa's facilities and recommenced bauxite mining, selling the red ore to Alcoa for processing in Suriname.
The Dominican Republic also produced varying amounts of iron, limestone, copper, gypsum, mercury, salt, sulfur, marble, onyx, travertine, and a variety of industrial minerals, mainly for the construction industry. In the late 1980s, the National Marble Company was a profitable, but outmoded, government monopoly that mined marble, onyx, and travertine for the local construction industry. Corde's Minas de Sal y Yeso extracted salt and gypsum, generally at a loss. Salt mining was primitive, and its product was destined solely for the local market. The private sector mined and exported limestone, some of which went to the United States.
The government increasingly favored greater participation by the private sector in mining, so that the state's resources might be combined with the technology and the capital of foreign firms. Mining's promoters also sought to diversify the economy's export basis and to improve its international credit worthiness. Through Decree 900 of March 1983, the Jorge government further defined and limited the role of government in mining, by providing broader incentives for private involvement. Nonetheless, the state retained exclusive rights to mine gold, gypsum, and marble. United States, Japanese, Australian, and European firms explored Dominican soils after 1987, when the government opened up areas previously closed to foreign investors.
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Construction
The construction industry had a major effect on the economy during the 1970s and the 1980s, as government-funded public works provided thousands of jobs and improved the physical infrastructure. In 1987 the sector contributed nearly 9 percent of GDP, a relatively high figure for a developing country. Construction activity boomed in the early 1970s, increasing at a rate of 16 percent annually from 1970 to 1975, faster than any other sector during that period, with the exception of mining. Public-works projects such as dams, roads, bridges, hospitals, low-income housing, and schools transformed the national infrastructure during the 1970s. The sector's rapid growth continued in the 1980s, but it was very uneven because of fluctuations in annual government spending. Private-sector construction, particularly of free-zone facilities and hotels, also boosted industry performance.
Construction firms, like many other Dominican businesses, relied heavily on personal contacts. For example, in the late 1980s the government awarded only about 15 percent of its construction contracts through a competitive bidding process. Government authorities, up to and including the president, negotiated or offered the remaining contracts as if they were personal spoils. The Balaguer administration's emphasis on construction in the late 1980s focused primarily on renovations in Santo Domingo, and it included the construction of museums, a lighthouse, and a new suburb, all in preparation for 1992's observance of the five-hundredth anniversary of Columbus's arrival in the New World.
The construction sector generally was self-sufficient; less than one-third of all construction materials was imported. Domestically produced materials included gravel, sand, clay, tiles, cables, piping, metals, paint, and cement. Although the main indicators of construction materials output generally rose in the 1980s, the rapid expansion of activity during the decade caused a serious shortage of cement that slowed the progress of some projects. The Dominican government built cement factories in Santiago and San Pedro de Macorís in 1977 in joint ventures, with private investors, to complement its major plant in Santo Domingo, but the new capacity quickly became insufficient, and the country was forced to begin importing cement by the mid1980s . By the late 1980s, cement factories were operating at full capacity, a rarity among developing countries such as the Dominican Republic. Besides materials, the industry encompassed ten major construction firms as well as several design and civil engineering companies, which handled all but the most complex projects. The construction sector was a major employer of unskilled labor, which constituted 65 percent of that industry's work force.
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Energy
The cost and the availability of energy became major impediments to development in the 1970s and the 1980s. An oil importing nation, the Dominican Republic saw its import bill for petroleum multiply tenfold in absolute terms during the 1970s. Although oil prices eased during the 1980s, the country faced a new energy crisis as a result of a critical shortage of electrical-generating capacity. Inadequate supplies of electricity resulted by the late 1980s in frequent power outages, frustrated consumers, and disrupted productive activities.
The country's aggregate consumption of energy was low, even by Latin American standards. For example, Costa Rica consumed more than half again the amount that the Dominican Republic did on a per capita basis in the 1980s. The energy consumed by the nation came from a variety of sources: petroleum and petroleum products (49 percent), wood (26 percent), biomass (20 percent), hydropower (3 percent), and coal (2 percent). The country continued to be dependent on imported crude oil and related petroleum products, and its narrow domestic energy resource base satisfied barely half the nation's energy demand. The potential supply of hydropower, the most promising resource, was estimated at 1,800 megawatts (MW), but less than a quarter of that amount was being tapped in 1989. Wood and charcoal use was constrained by the small size of the country's remaining forests. Biomass, mostly bagasse from sugarcane residue, was getting more use but had limited potential as a fuel. Deposits of lignite (brown coal), were known to exist in the Samaná Peninsula in undetermined amounts, but exploitation of this resource was considered unprofitable in the late 1980s. Nontraditional energy resources, such as geothermal and solar power, were also being considered, but they, too, promised little return on potential investment in the 1980s.
United States, Venezuelan, and Canadian oil companies began prospecting for oil in Dominican soil in the early twentieth century; these efforts met with little success, however. Only small deposits were known to exist at Charco Largo in the 1980s, and the prospect of new oil finds appeared poor. Consequently, the country imported crude oil and certain special petroleum products that could not be refined locally. Mexico and Venezuela, under the San José Accord (see Glossary), met about one-third of the country's oil needs at concessional rates. Under pressure from urban consumers, the government traditionally had subsidized gasoline prices; sudden price increases, like those of 1984 and 1989, often triggered unrest.
The Dominican Electric Company (Corporación Dominicana de Electricidad--CDE), a parastatal that replaced a private company in 1955, operated the country's national electrical system in 1989. The CDE supplied two-thirds of the country's 1,573 MW electrical capacity in 1986. Private and public production--used to power mines, sugar mills, cement factories, other industries, and residences--accounted for the balance. Oil-based thermal plants generated most of the nation's electricity (62 percent). Smaller amounts were produced by gas turbines (14 percent), hydroelectric dams (14 percent), and other sources (10 percent). Residences consumed the most electricity (41 percent), followed by industry (28 percent), the public sector (19 percent), and commercial users (12 percent). Prices ranged from the low subsidized rates afforded households to the much higher tariffs the CDE charged its large commercial customers. Only 38 percent of Dominican homes had electricity in the late 1980s, a low percentage by Latin American standards; for example, 54 percent of Jamaicans had such access.
Generally dilapidated and outdated, the CDE's facilities suffered from inadequate maintenance and inefficient, politicized financial management. For example, approximately one-third of all electricity generated in 1988 was lost because of maintenance problems or unauthorized use. Not surprisingly, by the late 1980s the country was facing a huge deficit in electrical capacity that was substantially hindering economic development. Some areas suffered as many as 500 hours of outages a year, which often caused damage to appliances because of drops in voltage and other irregularities. Because of this unreliable service, many businesses, especially in free zones, ran their own generators. With assistance from the World Bank and the Japanese government, the CDE attempted to improve efficiency by increasing tariffs, upgrading infrastructure, and expanding capacity. The Balaguer administration in the late 1980s considered privatizing portions of the CDE's operations. Nevertheless, demand was expected to outpace supply for years to come.
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SERVICES
Tourism
The Dominican tourist industry grew tremendously during the 1970s and the 1980s, and by 1989 it boasted more than 18,000 hotel rooms--more than any other location in the Caribbean. Foreign-exchange earnings from tourism also multiplied dramatically, during the 1980s, from US$100 million in 1980 to US$570 million by 1987, or the equivalent of 80 percent of all merchandise exports. In 1984 tourism replaced sugar as the country's leading foreign-exchange earner, exemplifying the growing diversity of the Dominican economy. The number of tourists visiting the island increased from 278,000 in 1975 to 792,000 in 1985, and in 1987 the number of vacationers surpassed 1 million for the first time. This total surpassed those of traditional resort locations like Bermuda and Barbados, and it made the Dominican Republic the fifth largest earner of tourism dollars in the Caribbean, behind the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, Jamaica, and the United States Virgin Islands.
Government promotion of tourism did not begin in earnest until the passage in 1971 of the Tourist Incentive Law (Law 153). Law 153 created certain "tourist poles" to promote the industry's growth, and, more important, it provided investors in tourism a ten-year tax holiday and an exemption from tariffs on imports not available locally. The law also created a special arm of the central bank to co-finance new investments in the sector. In 1979 the administration of Silvestre Antonio Guzmán Fernández (1978- 82) elevated the director of the country's tourism development efforts to cabinet level, a further indication of official interest and commitment.
The Dominican Republic offered a number of attractions to tourists, not least among them, its bargain rates and liberal divorce laws. As a consequence of numerous devaluations of the peso in the 1980s, the country was the least expensive Caribbean resort. The republic also benefited from a general upswing in Caribbean tourism, in the 1980s, associated with the strong United States economy. Each year during the decade, the United States accounted for more than fifty percent of the visitors to the Dominican Republic. Other vacationers came mainly from Canada, Italy, Spain, West Germany, and the Scandinavian countries. As the island offered more "all-inclusive" package vacations to visitors, the average tourist expenditure and length of stay also increased, indicating the gradual maturation of the trade. Levels of hotel occupancy generally were very high, between 80 percent and 90 percent. Traditionally, the most popular resorts had been in La Romana, Puerto Plata, and Santo Domingo, but new beach hotels in the southwest, the east, and the north all promised to be major attractions in the future.
Despite its successes, the tourist industry was still relatively young, and it faced a series of problems related to its rapid growth. For example, inadequate supplies of clean water and electricity, combined with slow construction caused by shortages of materials, forced some vacationers to leave early because of unsuitable accommodations. Although workers were drawn by tourism's higher wages and the access that it provided to foreign currencies, the rapid development of the industry ensured that qualified labor continued to be in short supply. Tellingly, the industry's return rate for visitors was low, by Caribbean standards.
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Banking and Financial Services
The Dominican Republic had a diversified, dynamic financial system in the 1980s, which had undergone rapid expansion throughout the post-Trujillo era. In the late 1980s, more than 400 financial enterprises, representing 17 types of institutions, made up the country's financial services sector, which contributed 7 percent of GDP in 1988. The financial system in the 1980s included the Dominican Central Bank (Banco Central de la República Dominicana--BCRD); see Monetary and Exchange-Rate Policies , this ch.), commercial banks, savings and loan institutions, private development finance companies (or financieras), mortgage banks, state banks, and assorted other establishments.
The financial system grew rapidly after 1961, as the private sector gained greater access to credit, new forms of finance became available, and Dominicans created new institutions to meet their growing credit needs. The number of formally regulated financial institutions rose from 7 in 1960 to 31 in 1970, and to 78 by 1985. These institutions had a total of 263 branch offices. Much of the growth in the 1970s and the 1980s involved consumer finance companies and larger financieras, which underwrote medium-term and long-term loans for priority economic sectors. The financial sector experienced a crisis in the first half of the 1980s because of the poor macroeconomic climate, but increased government regulation as part of a 1985 stabilization program eased some of the system's problems. Despite high inflation and unusually high interest rates, many new commercial banks and related services were founded in the late 1980s.
Twenty-four commercial banks made up the core of the private financial system in 1989. Commercial banks controlled about 64 percent of the financial system's total assets, and over 40 percent of commercial bank funds were deposited in one bank, the Reserve Bank (Banco de Reservas de la República Dominicana). Although it served as the main fiscal agent of the government, the Reserve Bank also operated as a commercial bank. Banks were largely Dominican-owned, especially after several foreign banks sold most of their portfolios to local banks in 1984 and 1985 because of the unfavorable economic climate. Nonetheless, Chase Manhattan and Citibank, from the United States, and the Bank of Nova Scotia, from Canada, maintained local operations in the late 1980s. Banks provided a full range of services, and they were the only institutions offering checking accounts. The Superintendency of Banks, within the Secretariat of State for Finance, regulated the banks in conjunction with the Central Bank.
Commercial bank loans to productive sectors favored manufacturing, which received 34 percent of bank credit in 1987; followed by agriculture, 19 percent; services, 8 percent; and construction, 6 percent. The remainder financed exports, imports, and consumer purchases.
The growth in investment in the priority areas of assembly manufacturing and tourism increased the private-sector share of total domestic credit, beginning in 1984, despite tight credit conditions. Large corporations dominated access to bank credit, often irrespective of their credit worthiness or need for credit, mainly because of their superior "connections." Besides their assets in the domestic banking system, Dominicans held an estimated US$1 billion in accounts overseas, mainly in the United States.
Savings and loan associations and mortgage banks were the main sources of household finance. Seventeen savings and loan associations served the nation in 1989, up from only twelve in 1970. These associations, established since 1962, contained 19 percent of the financial system's assets and catered mostly to middle-income home-buyers, but they also offered passbook savings, certificates of deposit, and collateralized loans. The National Housing Bank (Banco Nacional de la Vivienda--BNV) regulated the savings and loan institutions by imposing perfamily lending ceilings. Fourteen mortgage banks, holding about 10 percent of the financial system's assets, served mostly upperincome homeowners. The most prominent of these institutions was the Dominican Mortgage Bank (Banco Hipotecario Dominicano--BHD). Unlike the savings and loans, however, mortgage banks also financed the short-term needs of builders and medium-term and long-term commercial construction. Both the Central Bank and the BNV regulated mortgage banks, but they imposed less stringent regulations than those applied to the savings and loan associations. Lower-income homebuyers obtained credit via the National Housing Institute and household finance companies (sociedades inmobiliarias).
The very popular financieras, the equivalent of private development finance companies, controlled 6 percent of national assets, and they were an important vehicle for the financing of medium-term and long-term investment in priority sectors. The number of financieras had grown from eight in 1970 to twenty-five by 1989. Established in 1966, financieras issued stocks and funded bonds, guaranteed by government financial institutions, to mobilize capital in major development projects in agribusiness, industry, transportation, and tourism. In addition, they supplied technical assistance to borrowers, and they served as guarantors of the liabilities of others. As many as 300 consumer finance companies, also called financieras, providing short-term consumer credit throughout the countryside, were largely unregulated. Increased government regulation of the small financieras, particularly in the area of currency speculation, forced many to close in the late 1980s.
Three state banks played a relatively minor role in the financial system. These included the BNV, which provided some housing-related finance, and the Industrial Finance Corporation, which played a smaller role than its name suggested. The Agricultural Bank of the Dominican Republic (Banco Agrícola de la República--Bagricola), by contrast, was an important creditor. Through its thirty branch offices, Bagricola covered most of the countryside in an attempt to serve small farmers. It faced an uphill battle, as both public sector and private sector credit policies favored urban activities. The bank declined in importance during the early 1980s because of a high level of unpaid debt, but it rebounded in the late 1980s as it became more autonomous and, for the first time, mobilized capital through savings accounts.
A wide range of other financial enterprises, providing a broad array of financial services, also existed in the Dominican Republic. Many of these organizations served the large informal sector. The Dominican Development Foundation and the Association for Microenterprise Development were successful lenders to microenterprises and unincorporated businesses. Rural credit unions, in existence for decades, also served rural borrowers and savers. Money lenders abounded as well. Monetary authorities closed down some seventy exchange banks in 1988 as part of foreign exchange reforms; it remained unclear in 1989 whether that was to be a permanent policy. Fifty insurance companies, half of which were locally owned, underwrote policies in the late 1980s, under the supervision of the Superintendency of Insurance.
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Transportation
The Dominican Republic's relatively advanced transportation infrastructure had experienced sustained expansion since the 1950s. Transportation, along with communications, accounted for approximately 6 percent of GDP in 1988, and that share was growing because of the booming tourist industry. Roads were the most common medium of travel. The national road network, which totaled more than 17,000 kilometers in 1989, was extensive by Caribbean standards. One-quarter of all roads were highways (see fig. 4). Seventy percent of the highways were paved, and they received some maintenance. Poor conditions were extremely common, and 80 percent of all feeder roads were badly deteriorated by the mid-1980s. Moreover, most roadways were narrow and flooded easily. The Directorate for Highway Maintenance of the Secretariat of State for Public Works and Communications provided poor upkeep services, largely because of an insufficient budget. The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) financed programs in the late 1980s that would upgrade roads and develop better maintenance systems. An estimated 60,000 registered freight vehicles and 10,000 unregulated, inter-urban jitneys constituted the republic's commercial transportation fleet.
The country's 325-kilometer railroad system was one of the longest in the Caribbean. The CEA owned 60 percent of the railroad, which primarily served the sugar industry. Over half of all sugarcane traveled from the fields to the mills by rail. Central Romana also operated a railroad for its private sugar interests. The other owners of railroads included the stateoperated salt mining and bauxite companies, Dominican Agrarian Institute (Instituto Agrario Dominican--IAD) and Falconbridge. Falconbridge also operated nearly all of the country's pipelines, seventy-four kilometers of which supplied oil to the Canadian firm's ferronickel smelting plant in Bonao.
Fifteen seaports were in operation in the late 1980s. Nine were engaged in international commerce, while six were limited to commerce among Dominican ports; however, only four were considered major ports. Shipping was the leading form of international commerce. The country's major seaport was Haina, located on the Caribbean coast just west of Santo Domingo. New container equipment that it received during the 1980s made Haina one of the most modern ports in the Caribbean. As a consequence, Haina replaced Santo Domingo and Boca Chica as the Dominican Republic's central shipping facility. The government funded renovation of the port of Santo Domingo in the late 1980s, however, converting it into one the region's major berths for cruise ships. Most other seaports were specialized as well: Boca Chica handled sugar exports; Cabo Rojo and Barahona shipped minerals; and Puerto Plata also catered to cruise ships. The Dominican Port Authority regulated only the capital's ports in the late 1980s, but by law it was given responsibility for the eventual administration of all the country's wharves. Foreign lines dominated shipping, despite a Dominican law that required 40 percent of all vessels to fly Dominican flags. Domestic undercapacity, however, rendered that law unenforceable. Many rivers traversed the island, but few were commercially navigable.
Four international airports accommodated the nation's growing numbers of travelers. The two major airports were Las Américas, near Santo Domingo, and the newer La Unión, near Puerto Plata, both of which handled wide-bodied jets. Las Américas traditionally received more than two-thirds of all air passengers and most air cargo, but La Unión's share of air passengers grew steadily after its completion in the 1970s as a result of the burgeoning tourist industry on the north coast. A French construction company renovated the Las Américas airport in 1989, so that it could more effectively manage the growing influx of passengers. The smaller international airports at La Romana and Santiago accommodated mainly chartered flights. Fourteen carriers scheduled regular flights within the Dominican Republic in 1989. Four of these carriers also offered direct daily flights to the United States. Dominican Airlines (Compañía Dominicana de Aviación--CDA, also known as Dominicana) was the country's national airline; traditionally, it had served 35 percent of all passengers. The parastatal's heavy financial losses in the 1980s forced it to cancel many flights, however, which reduced its market share. By 1989 the government had decided to sell 49 percent of CDA's stock to a foreign airline in a bid to bolster its finances. A local company, Alas del Caribe, flew domestic flights.
The Dominican side of Hispaniola also contained an estimated 120 clandestine airstrips. Many of these were used by international drug traffickers during the 1980s to transit the island en route to the United States (see Crime , ch. 5).
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Communications
One of the most modern and dynamic sectors of the Dominican economy was the telecommunications industry, which surpassed its counterparts in every Latin American and Caribbean nation in terms of technology. Telecommunications services, however, were largely concentrated in urban areas.
The most impressive and technologically advanced component of the nation's telecommunications network was its phone system. Codetel, a wholly owned subsidiary of the United States company GTE, operated approximately 90 percent of the 250,000-unit national phone system under the regulatory authority of the General Directorate for Telecommunications of the Secretariat of State for Public Works and Communications. Codetel planned to double the number of phones in the country by the mid-1990s. Some of the advanced features of the phone system included direct domestic and international dialing, toll-free access to the United States through "800" numbers, incoming toll-free or WATS service, high-speed data transmission capabilities, fiber-optic cables, digital switching, and a full range of services usually available only to consumers in the United States. In 1987 the Dominican Republic became the second Latin American country to boast cellular mobile telephones, and it was the only developing country in the hemisphere to offer this service to the public on a national basis. Codetel and other companies also offered telex, electronic mail, telenet, and facsimile services to the public. A member of the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), the country possessed a satellite earth station, submarine cable to the United States Virgin Islands, and microwave stations. In 1989 a fiber-optic cable to Puerto Rico was completed to expedite sophisticated data transmission to the United States.
The Dominican Republic's unique advantage in terms of telecommunications technology allowed the creation of new industries derived from the growing field of information technology. For example, four free zones in the Dominican Republic served information industries, and the free zone in San Isidro was a teleport with direct links to United States telecommunications networks. These new information industries provided a wide range of innovative services that were creating a comparative advantage for the republic by the late 1980s. These services included data entry, telemarketing support for United States companies, response to toll-free service calls for Hispanic consumers in the United States, computer graphics services, computer software development, and Spanish-English translation services. Potentially, any computer-based service available in the United States that could be transmitted via satellite or through fiber-optic cables could be handled in the Dominican Republic.
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FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Foreign Trade
According to official figures, exports in 1987 dipped to US$718 million, a ten-year low. Diminished exports, in combination with the country's largest import bill ever (US$1.5 billion), caused the nation's merchandise trade deficit to reach the unprecedented and precarious level of US$832 million. Traditional exports suffered a steady decline from 1984 to 1987 because of a steep drop in sugar revenues.
This negative data on overall exports, however, masked positive patterns in exports at the sectoral level, as the economy continued to diversify away from sugar. For example, the structure of Dominican exports changed dramatically from 1981 to 1987 as the share of traditional exports (sugar, coffee, cocoa, and tobacco) dropped from 62 percent to 43 percent, while minerals as a percentage of exports went from 28 percent to 34 percent, and nontraditionals jumped from 10 to 23 percent. These data, however, excluded free-zone exports, which technically were not recorded as merchandise trade. Free-zone exports swelled from the equivalent of 10 percent of total exports to 31 percent of total exports from 1981 to 1987, and in 1987 free-zone export revenues surpassed those derived from traditional agricultural exports for the first time (see table 7).
The novel composition of Dominican exports also caused a redirection of the country's goods and services toward the United States market and those of developed countries in general. The United States share of Dominican exports, after peaking at 83 percent in 1970, fell to 52 percent by 1980, but then leaped to 87 percent by 1987, indicating a somewhat risky dependence on a single export market. Puerto Rico's share of the country's exports, which were included in the United States figures, steadily increased during the 1980s, and it exceeded 7 percent by 1987. Less developed countries received only 3 percent of Dominican exports in 1987; only 2 percent of all foreign sales went to Latin America. The Soviet Union, which first contracted to purchase Dominican sugar in the mid-1980s, accounted for 2 percent of exports, a figure that was expected to increase. European markets, particularly Spain, Switzerland, and Belgium, received the balance. An unknown, but presumably large, amount of exports was smuggled out of the Dominican Republic, especially to Haiti, to circumvent international agreements, exchange controls, and export taxes.
The government supported the diversification of exports through the Dominican Center for Export Promotion (Centro Dominicano de Pronoción de Exportaciones--Cedopex). Although established in 1971, Cedopex had a minimal economic role until the 1980s, when the country began to move from import substitution toward export promotion. An important foundation of that policy was the Export Incentive Law of 1979 (Law 69), which afforded duty-free entry of imported inputs for exporters and provided certain foreign-exchange benefits. In the first five years that Cedopex administered Law 69, businesses exported 275 new products as a result of the legislation. This number rose considerably after 1984 with the passage of the CBI, the signing of bilateral textile agreements with the United States, and the designation of a series of new free zones. Cedopex also extended conventional investment promotion services, such as market research, overseas promotion of new products, and investor guidance to government regulations. Despite these advances in export promotion, some economists pointed to the continued use of export taxes and the outright prohibition of certain exports, mainly staple foods, as disincentives to improved export performance.
Dominican imports reached an unprecedented US$1.55 billion in 1987. Even more alarming than the country's unparalleled trade deficit, however, was its inability to reduce import demand even as oil prices fell during the late 1980s. Oil's share of total imports, as high as 61 percent in 1980 after the disruptions of the 1970s, declined to a manageable 24 percent by 1987. Non-oil imports mounted, however, thereby ravaging the country's balance of payments and leaving the nation vulnerable in the event of another oil price increase. In order of importance, other imports included intermediate, consumer, and capital goods. A large percentage of increased imports in the late 1980s was dedicated to public sector projects pursued for both economic and political reasons. The country drew an increasing share of its total imports from developed countries; this figure grew from 62 percent in 1981 to 78 percent in 1987. The United States was the major supplier, providing 55 percent of imports, followed by Japan with 11 percent, and West Germany and Canada with 2 percent each. Developing countries contributed only 22 percent. This consisted primarily of oil imports originating in Venezuela and Mexico.
The government's import policies in the 1980s continued to endorse steep tariff protection for local industry, and only limited import liberalization was achieved. In the late 1980s, the country banned more than 100 imports, mostly agro-industrial products, and some tariffs reached 350 percent. Moreover, successive Dominican governments used import tariffs as a political tool to reward powerful constituents. Excessive public sector imports and exchange-rate subsidies for certain parastatals exacerbated the import crisis in the late 1980s.
The republic's other trade policies consisted of securing markets for traditional and nontraditional exports through bilateral agreements, such as the United States sugar quota agreement, the United States General System of Preferences, the CBI, and the 807 program (see Glossary), as well as international agreements for coffee, cocoa, and other products. For many years, the Dominican Republic unsuccessfully attempted to become a member of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom) and the Lomé Convention (see Glossary) of the European Economic Community. Although the country had achieved observer status in both, full participation continued to be unlikely because Dominican exports competed directly with those of other members.
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Balance of Payments
Poor trade performance and a heavy debt burden caused the country's balance of payments to register severe deficits during the 1980s. In 1987 the overall deficit reached US$593 million, or roughly 11 percent of GDP. This deficit was financed by a draw down in reserves and a rollover of the oil debt owed to Venezuela and Mexico. The nation's current account was chronically negative; it had not registered an annual surplus for decades. Large merchandise trade deficits were the prime cause of current account deficits. After 1981, however, increased revenues from "invisibles" (tourism and remittances from abroad) reduced the current account deficit, which by 1987 stood at 6 percent of GDP. Remittances--cash transfers sent from the nearly 1 million Dominicans residing in the United States--were an increasingly important source of foreign exchange. In 1987, they were estimated to range from US$300 to US$800 million a year. Reduced interest payments on the country's foreign debt because of debt rescheduling also lowered the service debit on the current account. The country's capital account, like that of most Latin American countries in the 1980s, suffered from capital outflows precipitated by the debt crisis. This crisis essentially precluded new commercial bank lending to the Dominican Republic during the decade. Most new capital flows were registered in the form of official multilateral and bilateral aid and as foreign investment. The United States Department of Commerce estimated cumulative foreign investment at US$400 million in 1987, approximately half of which came from the United States. The nation was increasingly dependent on foreign assistance to stabilize its balance of payments, and its continued drawing on negative reserves placed it in a tenuous financial position as the decade came to a close.
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Foreign Debt
The Dominican Republic's foreign debt had grown to nearly US$4 billion by 1989, about double the 1980 total. The country's debt skyrocketed during the 1970s, barely more than a decade after Trujillo had paid it off, an event he had proclaimed as the "financial emancipation of the nation." Subsequent indebtedness was incurred in the context of a tenfold increase in the oil import bill, increasingly unfavorable terms of trade, and volatile sugar prices. Persistent balance-of-payment shortfalls, relatively easy access to loans from foreign commercial banks, and the demand for funds occasioned by ambitious public sector projects rapidly indebted the country; from 1975 to 1980, the national debt surged from US$700 million to nearly US$2 billion. Further deterioration in the country's terms of trade, unprecedentedly high interest rates, and international recession increased the country's foreign debt in the 1980s, even in the absence of new commercial lending.
In 1988, 63 percent of the public sector external debt was owed to public institutions, including 20 percent to multilateral organizations and 43 percent to bilateral creditors; 23 percent was owed to 90 commercial banks, with the remainder classified under other categories, such as oil credits owed to Mexico and Venezuela. The structure of the country's debt, which remained rather stable during the decade, differed from the debt structure of Latin America as a whole, in that so much more of the region's foreign liabilities (57 percent) were commercial. From 1983 to 1988, Dominican debt as a percentage of GDP grew from 48 percent to 94 percent, signaling that debt was swiftly outpacing economic output. As a result of frequent rescheduling, however, debt repayments as a percentage of total exports declined from 23 percent in 1983 to 15 percent in 1988.
The BCRD, the central bank, took an activist approach to managing foreign debt. The major tool was rescheduling. Beginning with a rescheduling of US$500 million of its commercial debt in 1983, the country embarked on a series of debt negotiations that entailed a Paris Club (see Glossary) rescheduling agreement of US$270 million in 1985, another commercial bank deal of US$787 million in 1986, and a rollover of Venezuelan and Mexican oil debt in 1987. Although debt rescheduling eased the short-term debt burden and improved the government's cash flow, it did not establish long-term solvency. In an effort to reduce its actual debt, the government experimented with debt-equity swaps, a process by which investors purchased the country's United Statesdenominated debt at a discounted level in local currency, which was then applied to investments in the republic. In 1988 the Debt Conversion Unit of the BCRD's Monetary Board approved the concept of debt-equity conversions, and in 1989 the first such swap converted US$9 million in debt into a free-zone investment at a discount of 35 percent. Investors provided the BCRD with more than US$650 million in other proposals for investments in tourism, free zones, agro-industries, utilities, and mining. To restrain expansion of the money supply, the BCRD consented to a maximum of US$50 million in conversions annually. Even under the best circumstances, however, debt-equity swaps would only partially reduce the debt. As of late 1989, the government and its creditors had not agreed on a comprehensive debt strategy.
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Foreign Assistance
The IMF, the World Bank, and the IDB were the major multilateral donors in the Dominican Republic. The IMF, the lender of last resort and for purposes of economic stabilization, had a long and controversial history in the country. The Jorge government had signed agreements with the IMF in 1983 and 1985, but both ended prematurely because of disagreements over the pace and the extent of economic reforms. Austerity measures mandated under the 1985 IMF agreement were met with widespread rioting and other violence. The Balaguer administration (1986-90) had yet to sign an IMF agreement as of 1989, and it often lambasted the international institution over its unpopular economic remedies. In the absence of an IMF agreement, World Bank lending was limited to about US$15 million a year, mainly in support of road construction, energy, financial sector reform, and other technical assistance. The IDB had assisted the island since the early 1960s; in the 1980s it provided funding for projects in irrigation, education, hurricane assistance, and highways.
The United States was the major bilateral donor in the Dominican Republic, furnishing between one-quarter and one-half of bilateral assistance. The level of United States assistance since the 1940s had fluctuated widely in response to economic and political trends. The Dominican Republic became one of the top recipients of United States aid in 1966, when US$100 million in economic assistance was provided in the aftermath of the United States occupation. Assistance slowed during the 1970s, averaging only US$21 million a year. The United States Agency for International Development (AID) strengthened its presence in the 1980s, and from 1984 to 1987, United States assistance averaged US$115 million a year, the highest level since 1966. The composition of United States assistance changed markedly during the 1980s, from an emphasis on development assistance--which constituted 56 percent of total aid in 1979 but only 25 percent in 1987--to greater use of Economic Support Funds (mainly balance-of-payments support), which, although they had not existed in 1979, accounted for approximately 55 percent of aid in 1985. The level of food aid under the Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) program remained fairly constant, about 45 percent of total aid. The focus of AID's interventions in the republic also shifted dramatically, from basic human needs--education, health, and family planning in the 1970s--to short-term economic stabilization, privatization, export promotion, economic policy reform, natural resource management, and small business development. Besides AID, other United States bilateral agencies, such as the Peace Corps and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation actively assisted development. Japanese, European, and Canadian bilateral development agencies also had representatives on the island. Private nongovernmental development groups, both local and international, were numerous in the Dominican Republic; they provided hurricane relief, food donations, and project support to multilateral and bilateral donors.
Although privation and poverty persisted, especially in rural areas, the economy appeared in the late 1980s to be moving toward a new phase of development, based on export promotion and new, innovative service industries. Reliance on the United States as a customer, supplier, and aid donor was crucial to this process. Long-term prospects for diversification and growth were encouraging, providing the government was able to deal effectively with negative trends in trade and the balance of payments. The problem of the foreign debt appeared intractable, partially for political reasons. As in other areas, however, the Dominican economy in 1989 contrasted dramatically with the sugardominated fiefdom left behind by Trujillo in 1961.
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The works that best describe the Dominican economy in the 1980s include Claudio Vedovato's Politics, Foreign Trade, and Economic Development. A Study of the Dominican Republic, Howard J. Wiarda and Michael J. Kryzanek's The Politics of External Influence in the Dominican Republic, and Jan Knippers Black's The Dominican Republic: Politics and Development in an Unsovereign State. The annual Dominican Republic: Investors Handbook, published by the American Chamber of Commerce of the Dominican Republic, provides a useful guide to economic developments. As of 1989, however, there was no definitive book-length study detailing the economy's shift from sugar toward free-zone manufacturing, tourism, and other nontraditional activities. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United States Agency for International Development, and the United States Department of Agriculture issue the most important field-based studies on the Dominican Republic available on a regular basis. The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean and the Economist Intelligence Unit also publish helpful annual reports on the Dominican economy. On the island, the Dominican Central Bank, the Technical Secretariat of State of the Presidency, the Investment Promotion Council, the State Sugar Council, and the Dominican Center for the Promotion of Exports, all generate essential data and studies on local economic activity. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
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Chapter 4. Dominican Republic: Government and Politics
THE ROOTS OF DEMOCRACY were not deep in the Dominican Republic. The country traditionally had been mostly poor, rural, and underdeveloped. It had a weak economy, largely based on sugar exports, and it lacked the social and the political infrastructures--political parties, interest groups, and effective government institutions--necessary for democratic rule. Thus, for most of their history the people of the Dominican Republic had lived under authoritarian governments.
In addition, the international climate had not favored democracy and development. The Dominican Republic, a small, dependent nation, poor in resources, shared the island of Hispaniola (La Isla Española) with more populous but even poorer Haiti. Tensions between the two nations could be traced back to the nineteenth century, when Haiti controlled the entire island (1822-44), or farther back, to the era of colonial rule by the Spaniards. The Dominican Republic's economy, historically oriented toward the export of primary products for the world market, was dependent on fluctuating world market prices for those products, or on the quotas set by major importers--factors beyond the Dominican Republic's control. Moreover, the country's strategic location in the Caribbean, astride all the major sea lanes linking North America and South America and leading into the Panama Canal, exposed the country to the buffeting winds of international politics, or led to its occupation by major powers such as Spain, Britain, France, The Netherlands, and, most recently, the United States. The nation's almost inevitable entanglement in international conflicts afforded it little opportunity to develop autonomously.
Beginning in the early 1960s, however, many things began to change in the Dominican Republic. Per capita income in the late 1980s was four times what it had been in 1960. The country's population was approximately 70 percent urban (the corresponding figure in 1960 was 30 percent), more literate (in about the same proportion), and more middle class. Political institutions had developed and had become more consolidated. The country's international debt continued to be a major problem and a severe drain on the economy, but in general the Dominican Republic's economic position within the international community was more stable than it had been in past decades. These changed conditions made the climate more conducive to democracy than it had been at any previous time.
In 1961 assassins ended the thirty-one-year dictatorship of Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina. There followed five years of instability that witnessed a short-lived democratic regime under Juan Bosch Gaviño, the military overthrow of Bosch, a Bosch-led revolution in 1965, civil war, United States intervention, and the restoration of stability in 1966 under a former Trujillo puppet, Joaquín Balaguer Ricardo. Balaguer governed for the next twelve years, until forced to bow to the electorate's desire for change in 1978. That year Silvestre Antonio Guzmán Fernández, of Bosch's party, the Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano--PRD), won the presidency. Guzmán was succeeded by another PRD leader, Salvador Jorge Blanco (1982-86). In 1986 the shrewd, but aging, Balaguer won four more years as president in another fair and free election.
There was, therefore, a democratic breakthrough in the Dominican Republic in the early 1960s that led to instability, conflict, intervention, and eventually an authoritarian restoration. In 1978, however, a new democratic opening occurred. Whether this new democracy would be more permanent than other frustrated efforts in the past, or the Dominican Republic would again revert to instability and authoritarianism, remained to be seen.
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THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
Constitutional Development
By 1989 the Dominican Republic had gone through 29 constitutions in less than 150 years of independence. This statistic is a somewhat deceiving indicator of political stability, however, because of the Dominican practice of promulgating a new constitution whenever an amendment was ratified. Although technically different from each other in some particular provisions, most new constitutions contained in reality only minor modifications of those previously in effect. Sweeping constitutional innovations were actually relatively rare.
The large number of constitutions does, however, reflect a basic lack of consensus on the rules that should govern the national political life. Most Dominican governments felt compelled upon taking office to write new constitutions that changed the rules to fit their own wishes. Not only did successive governments often strenuously disagree with the policies and the programs of their predecessors, but they often rejected completely the institutional framework within which their predecessors had operated. Constitutionalism--loyalty to a stable set of governing principles and laws rather than to the person who promulgates them--became a matter of overriding importance in the Dominican Republic only after the death of Trujillo.
Dominicans historically had agreed that government should be representative and vaguely democratic, that there should be civil and political rights, separation of powers, and checks and balances. Beyond that, however, consensus broke down. The country actually had been alternately dominated throughout its history by two constitutional traditions, one relatively democratic and the other authoritarian. Rarely were there attempts to bridge the gap between these diametric opposites.
The first Dominican constitution was promulgated in 1844, immediately after the nation achieved independence from Haiti. It was a liberal document with many familiar elements--separation of powers, checks and balances, and a long list of basic rights. However, an authoritarian government replaced the country's liberal, democratic government during its first year. The new regime proceeded to write its own constitution. This second constitution considerably strengthened the executive, weakened the legislative and the judicial branches, and gave the president widespread emergency powers, including the power to suspend basic rights and to rule by decree. Thereafter, governance of the country often alternated between liberal and authoritarian constitutional systems.
Even the dictator Rafael Trujillo always took care to operate under the banner of constitutionalism. Under Trujillo, however, the legislature was simply a rubber stamp; the courts were not independent; and basic rights all but ceased to exist. He governed as a tyrant, unfettered by constitutional restrictions.
After Trujillo's death in 1961, the constitution was amended to provide for new elections and to allow the transfer of power to an interim Council of State. Although promulgated as a new document, the 1962 constitution was actually a continuation of the Trujillo constitution, and it was thus unpopular.
In 1963, Bosch's freely elected, social-democratic government drafted a new and far more liberal constitution. It separated church and state, put severe limits on the political activities of the armed forces, established a wide range of civil liberties, and restricted the rights of property relative to individual rights. These provisions frightened the more conservative elements in Dominican society, which banded together to oust Bosch and his constitution in September 1963.
Subsequently, the more conservative 1962 constitution was restored. In the name of constitutionalism, Bosch and his followers launched a revolution in 1965, the objective of which was restoration of the liberal 1963 constitution.
Largely as a result of the United States military intervention of April 1965, the civil war had died down by 1966. With Balaguer and his party in control, the Dominicans wrote still another constitution. This one was intended to avert the conflicts and polarization of the past by combining features from both the liberal and the conservative traditions. The 1966 Constitution incorporated a long list of basic rights, and it provided for a strengthened legislature; however, it also gave extensive powers to the executive, including emergency powers. In this way, the country sought to bridge the gap between its democratic and its authoritarian constitutions, by compromising their differences. Although the 1966 Constitution had been amended several times afterwards, it was this document under which the Dominican Republic continued to operate in 1989 (see fig. 5).
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The Executive
The executive had long been the dominant branch in the Dominican governmental system. The president's powers derived from his supreme authority over national administration, the armed forces, and all public affairs. In addition, the president was the beneficiary of the worldwide trends toward centralized decision making and increased executive dominance. Television and other forms of modern mass communications also focused greater attention on the president. The political culture of the Dominican Republic, with its emphasis on machismo and strong leadership, reinforced this tendency to make the president the focal point of the political system. Not surprisingly, Dominican presidents traditionally had been dominant, charismatic, forceful personalities.
The Constitution vests executive power in a president who is elected by direct popular vote and whose term of office is four years. There is no prohibition against a president's seeking reelection, but since the electoral defeat of Balaguer in 1978, presidents had limited themselves to one term. The Constitution requires that presidential candidates be Dominican citizens by birth or origin, at least thirty years old, and in possession of all political and civil rights. A candidate cannot have been a member of the military, or the police, for at least one year prior to his election. Vice presidential candidates must meet the same qualifications.
The vice president may assume the office of president when the chief executive is ill, outside the country, or otherwise unable to perform his duties. If the president dies, or becomes permanently unable to carry out the functions of his office, the vice president serves until the next scheduled election. If the vice president is also unable to fill the office, the president of the Supreme Court of Justice (who is chosen by the Senate) serves temporarily. Within fifteen days, he must convene the National Assembly (which consists of both houses of the Congress of the Republic), which must then select a substitute to fill out the term.
The Dominican Constitution takes twenty-seven paragraphs to spell out the president's extensive powers. Among the most important are those that grant him authority over virtually all appointments and removals of public officials; empower him to promulgate the laws passed by Congress; direct him to engage in diplomatic relations; and empower him to command, to deploy, and to make appointments in, the armed forces. The president also has vast emergency powers to suspend basic rights in times of emergency, to prorogue the Congress, to declare a state of siege, and to rule by decree. Historically, the exercise of these emergency powers usually had been the prelude to dictatorship.
The few limitations the Constitution places on presidential authority focus primarily on the requirement to secure congressional consent to certain appointments, treaty negotiations, entry into certain contracts, and the exercise of emergency powers. These provisions put no more thana limited check on presidential authority, however, because the Dominican voting system almost automatically guarantees the president a majority of his followers in Congress. The Dominican courts also offer little impediment to the exercise of executive power, mainly because they lack the power of judicial review.
The 1966 Constitution provides for ministers and subcabinet ministers to assist in public administration. These officials must be Dominican citizens, at least twenty-five years of age, with full civil and political rights. The powers of the ministers are determined by law; they are not set forth in the Constitution. However, the president is constitutionally responsible for the actions of his ministers. Ministers serve at the president's discretion, can be removed by him, and function both as administrators of their ministries and as agents of presidential authority.
In a system as heavily weighted toward the executive as the Dominican one, the force of a president's personality can do much to determine his relative success or failure in office. Trujillo, the dictator, was tough and forceful; Bosch, the democrat, was weak and ineffectual. Balaguer, although he appeared meek in public, proved to be a very shrewd politician.
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The Legislature
The 1966 Constitution confers all legislative powers on the Congress of the Republic, which consists of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. The election of senators and deputies is by direct vote every four years. Congressional terms, therefore, are coterminous with presidential terms, which greatly increases the possibility that the president's party will enjoy a majority in the legislature.
One senator is elected from each of the country's provinces and from the National District (Santo Domingo) (see fig. 1). In 1989 the Dominican Senate had thirty members. Deputies also represent provinces, but their seats are apportioned on the basis of population; thus, the more populous provinces and the National District have larger delegations. In 1989 there were 120 representatives in the Chamber of Deputies.
Deputies and senators must be Dominican citizens, at least twenty-five years old, with full civil and political rights. They must have been natives, or residents for at least five years, of the province they wish to represent. Naturalized citizens are eligible to run for Congress if they have been Dominican citizens for ten years. Congressmen are not allowed to hold another public office concurrently.
The Senate and the Chamber of Deputies may meet together as the National Assembly on certain specific occasions cited by the Constitution--for example, when both the president and the vice president are unable to complete their terms of office and a successor must be designated. By a three-fourths vote, the Chamber of Deputies may bring accusations--against public officials--before the Senate, but it has no other exclusive powers. In contrast, the Senate has several exclusive powers: selecting members of the Supreme Court and other lower courts, choosing the president and the members of the Central Electoral Board, approving diplomatic appointments made by the president, and hearing cases of public misconduct brought before it by the Chamber of Deputies.
The Congress has broad powers to levy taxes, to change the country's political subdivisions, to declare a state of emergency, to regulate immigration, to approve or to reject extraordinary expenditures requested by the executive, to legislate on all matters concerning the public debt, to examine annually all the acts of the executive, to interrogate cabinet ministers (a bow to parliamentary government), and to legislate on all matters not within the constitutional mandate of other branches of government or contrary to the Constitution.
For more than a century, the Congress remained a submissive, even somnolent, branch. For many years, under one or another of the country's many dictators, it did not meet at all. Beginning in the 1960s, however, the Congress began to assert itself. President Bosch sometimes had trouble with members of his own party in the Congress; and, although Balaguer ruled as a strong leader from 1966 to 1978, his Congress did not always function as a rubber stamp either.
The real breakthrough came with the restoration of full democracy in 1978. Even though, under presidents Guzmán and Jorge, the majority in Congress belonged to the president's party, that did not stop the Congress from dissenting on various bills, frustrating presidential initiatives in certain particulars, and serving as an increasingly important check on the executive. Although not yet coequal with the executive as a branch of government, the Congress had grown as an independent body, and its ability to check presidential power could no longer be easily dismissed.
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The Judiciary
Judicial power is exercised by the Supreme Court of Justice and by other courts created by the Constitution and by law. The Constitution establishes courts of first instance in each province as well as a land tribunal and courts of appeal. Justices of the peace exist in each municipality and in the National District. The Constitution also mandates a court of accounts, which examines the country's finances and reports to the Congress.
Centralized and hierarchical, the Dominican legal system was patterned after the French system. It employed a code-law legal system rather than a common law system, such as the one used in the United States. Detailed and comprehensive, the codes left little room for United States-style judicial activism or citation of precedent. Legal reasoning was deductive (from the codes), rather than inductive, or based on past cases.
The Constitution calls for a Supreme Court consisting of nine judges. Judges are chosen by the Senate, not by the president, ostensibly to limit executive power. The Senate also selects the judges for the lower courts. Supreme Court justices must be Dominican citizens by birth or parentage, at least thirty-five years old, with full political and civil rights. They are required to have law degrees and to have practiced law, or held judicial office, for at least twelve years. These requirements become progressively less strict for lower-court justices.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive power to assume jurisdiction in matters affecting the president and other high officials, to act as a court of cassation, to serve as a court of last instance in matters forwarded from appellate courts, to exercise final disciplinary action over other members of the judiciary, and to transfer justices from one jurisdiction to another. The Supreme Court does not have the formal power to review the constitutionality of laws, decrees, or resolutions put into effect by the president or the Congress, although a movement began in the late 1970stoward limited judicial oversight of government acts.
The courts in the Dominican Republic historically have been subservient to the government in power. Moreover, politics have frequently dominated court proceedings, and the entire judicial system may be subject to outside pressures and, at times, even intimidation. Nevertheless, since the early 1960s the court system has become stronger, and the judiciary has become a more independent, if not a coequal, branch of government.
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Public Administration
The fall of the Trujillo dictatorship in 1961 did not produce a corresponding disruption of the traditions and practices characteristic of the government service. Corruption, nepotism, wholesale dismissals for purely political reasons, loyalty checks, patronage, and the sowing of distrust and suspicion had become ingrained habits which, unlike Trujillo, did not disappear overnight. However, the old habits were challenged by new pressures: demands that the bureaucracy provide real goods and services, that public functions be carried out honestly and efficiently, and that the government respond to the pent-up needs and demands of the population. The clash between the traditional patterns of bureaucratic behavior and new demands for public services, such as health care, education, water supplies, and electricity, contributed significantly to the political instability of the post-Trujillo period.
No effective law existed to protect Dominican public officials in their jobs. From the cabinet level to the lowest ranks, virtually all civil servants were appointed, served, and could be removed largely at the will of the president. The result was a patronage-dominated system in which public sector jobs were given out in return for loyalty and service.
Merit, achievement, and competence, therefore, were not always the main criteria guiding government appointments. The public bureaucracy was often characterized by genuine incompetence, even at the highest levels. Nepotism and corruption--defined as a favor in return for a favor, the granting of special governmental privileges to favored persons, private enrichment stemming from public service, or outright bribery--were also widespread. Those who tried to be honest were scorned; they were considered foolish by their colleagues. Indeed, government service was thought of, not so much as an honored career, as a brief opportunity to indulge oneself at the public trough. The frequent failure of government programs could often be attributed directly to the corruption and incompetence of the bureaucracy. Patronage and related activities were often tolerated at lower levels, so long as they were kept within reasonable bounds; however, when the corruption became blatant, as it did under President Jorge, the government was likely to suffer at the polls.
Under the president, were a number of technical offices-- administration, planning, budget, personnel--designed to help him perform his job more effectively. These offices generally did not function well, however, and most Dominican presidents continued to operate as personalistic and patronage leaders.
The size of the cabinet could vary; in 1989 it consisted of sixteen secretaries of state, three without ministerial portfolio. There were also an administrative secretary of state for the presidency, a technical secretary of state for the presidency, and twelve additional secretaries of state administering various ministries. The cabinet did not function as an independent arm of, nor very often as an advisory body for, the presidency (although some of its individual members might); rather, it was a loose collection of administrators, operating almost entirely according to the wishes of the president.
In addition to the cabinet ministries, there were in 1989 fourteen autonomous agencies and eleven semiautonomous agencies. The autonomous and semiautonomous agencies were established in the early 1960s to administer new public programs as well as the vast properties and enterprises inherited by the state after the death of Trujillo, who in addition to his political power had vast economic holdings. These agencies administered an array of programs and enterprises, ranging from farm loans to cooperatives and vast sugar lands. The largest of these were the State Sugar Council (Consejo Estatal de Azúcar--CEA), the 85,000 employees of which made it the largest employer in the country, and the State Enterprises Corporation (Corporación Dominicana de Empresas Estatales--Corde), into which a number of smaller state-owned enterprises had been consolidated.
Dominated by patronage considerations and plagued by corruption, the autonomous and semiautonomous agencies were frequently mismanaged. Some officials, believing that these agencies could be run more efficiently by the private sector, periodically proposed putting them up for sale. The usual reactions to such efforts included objections from nationalists about selling out the national patrimony; from politicians, seeking to preserve patronage opportunities; and from the employees of the state-run agencies, who feared layoffs under private sector management.
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Local Government
The Dominican system of local government, like the Dominican legal system, was based on the French system of top-down rule and strong central authority. The country was divided into twentynine provinces, plus the National District (Santo Domingo). The provinces, in turn, were subdivided into a total of seventy-seven municipalities (or counties). Each province was administered by a civil governor appointed by the president. A governor had to be a Dominican citizen, at least twenty-five years old, and in full possession of his civil and political rights. The powers and duties of governors are set by law. The Constitution establishes the structure of local government; its specific functions are enumerated in the municipal code.
The municipalities and the National District were governed by mayors and municipal councils, both popularly elected to fouryear terms. The size of the councils depended on the size of the municipality, but each was required to have at least five members. The qualifications of local officials as well as the powers and duties of mayors and councils were set by law. Naturalized citizens could hold municipal office, provided they had lived in the community at least ten years.
Neither provinces nor municipalities had any independent power to levy taxes, so few services could be initiated at the local level. There were no local police departments, only a single national force. Policy and programs with regard to education, social services, roads, electricity, and public works were similarly administered at the national level, rather than at the provincial or the municipal level. Local government was therefore weak and ineffective, not only because it lacked taxing authority, but also because, in the Dominican system, the central government set virtually all policy.
Starting in the early 1960s, various efforts were made to strengthen Dominican local government. A new municipal league came into existence in 1962, and efforts were made to develop community spirit, local initiative, and self-help projects. These projects were not wholly successful, in large part because of the traditional arrangement under which virtually all power flowed downward from the central government. In the late 1980s, Santo Domingo remained the focus of the country's affairs, the source of power and largesse.
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The Electoral System
The electoral system in place as of 1989 could trace its roots to the death of Trujillo. Following the dictator's assassination in 1961, the Dominican government asked the Organization of American States (OAS) to send a technical advisory mission to the country to help set up a system of free elections. Upon the mission's recommendation, the country established a hierarchy of electoral boards. The Central Electoral Board, consisting of three members appointed by the Senate, was the highest of these bodies.
Members of the Central Electoral Board were appointed to serve twelve-year terms. The Board chose the members of the provincial and municipal boards, who served at its pleasure. The Board issued regulations to ensure free and honest elections; directed the distribution of ballots, equipment, and voting materials; and supervised the functioning of the lower-level electoral boards.
The Central Electoral Board was given responsibility for printing ballots for each Dominican political party. To facilitate voting by those unable to read, each party's ballot was printed a different color. The ballots also bore the emblems of the parties participating, as an additional aid to nonreaders. Election day was a national holiday; alcoholic beverages could not be sold that day, and the polls were open from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
Voting was free, secret, and obligatory for both men and women. Suffrage was granted to everyone eighteen years old or older, and to every married person regardless of age. Members of the police or the armed forces were ineligible to vote, as were those who had lost their political and civil rights, such as incarcerated criminals. Elections were regulated by law, and they were administered by the Central Electoral Board.
Dominican elections could be breathtaking affairs. In 1978 losing candidate Balaguer impounded the ballot boxes and seemed about to steal the election; pressure from the United States forced a resumption of the vote count, which led to Guzmán's victory. The 1986 presidential election also produced controversy. This time Balaguer won, but the losing candidate of the PRD Jacobo Majluta Azar, claimed fraud and refused to concede. Majluta demanded a recount and threatened that violence might result otherwise. In this case, an independent electoral commission headed by the archbishop of Santo Domingo intervened in the dispute, verified the Balaguer victory, and persuaded Majluta to accept its independent vote tally.
Since 1978, elections had gained legitimacy as a means of choosing the president and other leaders. The elections of 1982 and 1986 had generally been fair, honest, competitive, and free, but elections still represented only one of several possible means to power in the Dominican Republic, the others being a skillfully executed coup d'état or a heroic revolution. Moreover, Dominican elections did not necessarily bestow the definitive legitimacy usually accorded an elected government in more developed democratic nations.
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POLITICAL DYNAMICS
The System of Dominican Politics
The Dominican Republic's long history of political instability had included many revolutions, coups d'état, barracks revolts, and pronunciamientos (insurrections accompanied by declarations of disagreement with the existing government), as well as social and political breakdowns. Coups and revolutions are among the easiest political phenomena to measure systematically. When a country has had so many, one must conclude that they are a regular, normal part of the political process. Therefore, it is not the case that Dominican politics are unsystematic.
Politics in the Dominican Republic functions on a smaller and less formal scale than politics in the United States. Sometimes it seems that everyone in the Dominican Republic who counts politically knows everyone else who counts; many in this group are also interrelated by blood or marriage. It is a small country, with only one main city. Politics is therefore more like old-fashioned United States county politics. In this context, family and clan networks, patronage systems, close friendships, the bonds of kinship, personal ties, and extended family, ethnic, or other personal connections are as important as the more formal and impersonal institutions of a larger political system. The Dominican Republic has large-scale organizations, such as political parties, interest groups, professional associations, and bureacratic organizations, but often the informal networks are at least as important. They are, in addition, the features that are the most difficult for outsiders to penetrate and to understand.
To comprehend Dominican politics, therefore, one must understand first of all the family networks: who is related to whom, and how and what (if anything) these family ties mean. One must also understand the social and the racial hierarchies, who speaks to whom and in what tone of voice, who sees whom socially, and what these social ties imply politically. One must know about past business deals and associations, whether they were clean or "dirty," and what each family or individual knows or thinks about associates. One must understand where the different families "fit" in the Dominican system, whether they are old rich or new rich, their bloodlines, what they share politically, and what pulls them apart. Many of these family and clan associations and rivalries go back for generations.
Family and personalistic associations overlap and interact with the institutions of a more modern political system in all sorts of complex ways. For example, what goes by the name of a political party actually may turn out to be the personalistic apparatus of a single politician or family; or a certain office within the government bureaucracy may turn out to be the private preserve of a single family or clan. In order to understand Dominican politics, one must comprehend these complex overlaps of traditional and modern institutions and practices, of family and clan-based politics, and of modern political organizations.
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Political Developments since 1978
The contemporary political system of the Dominican Republic dates from 1978. That year Balaguer, who had governed the country in an authoritarian, but paternalistic, manner for the preceding twelve years, was forced, because of domestic and international pressures, to yield the presidency to Guzmán, a wealthy rancher and candidate of the PRD, who had clearly won the election. Guzmán governed democratically and with full respect for human rights, but he committed suicide in 1982, apparently because of evidence of corruption reaching into his own family. The vice president, Majluta, took over temporarily until a new government, which actually had been elected before Guzmán's suicide, could be inaugurated.
The 1982 election was fair, honest, and competitive. It was won by Jorge, a lawyer who, like Guzmán, was a member of the PRD. But whereas Guzmán had represented the conservative wing of the party, Jorge represented its centrist, or social-democratic, wing.
President Jorge continued, like Guzmán, to govern in a democratic matter. His government respected civil liberties and honored human rights. Jorge had promised to expand the democratic reforms begun by his predecessor in the areas of agrarian reform, social justice, and modernization. He campaigned on the slogan, and entered office with the intention of bringing, "economic democracy" to the country to go with its now flourishing political democracy.
But 1982, the year of Jorge's inauguration, was the year the bottom dropped out of the Dominican economy. The country began to feel the full impact of the second oil price rise, induced by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); recession in the United States and Western Europe dried up the market for Dominican exports; and the international debt crisis also hit home strongly. These conditions forced Jorge to abandon his ambitious reform agenda in favor of severe austerity, belttightening , and a cutback in services. The nation witnessed the wrenching dilemma of a reform democrat, a socialist, who had to give up his entire social-democratic program in order to impose severely restrictive economic policies, the burden of which, as usual, fell most heavily on the shoulders of the poor--precisely those people who had been Jorge's main constituency. Jorge's popularity plummeted, and in 1985 riots broke out in response to his austerity measures, riots that the police put down with considerable loss of civilian life.
To his credit, Jorge succeeded in putting in place a sorely needed budget-balancing program that offered hope of getting the country out of its severe economic troubles. The steep decline in the president's popularity, however, prompted even members of his own party in the Congress and elsewhere to turn against him. In addition, increasing evidence of corruption in the public bureaucracy began to surface; as the austerity measures pinched, there was little extra money in the system, and the low-level patronage that had always existed began to be perceived as blatant, high-level graft. As Jorge's popularity declined, so did that of his entire government and his party.
New elections were held in 1986. President Jorge's deeply divided PRD eventually nominated Majluta, Guzmán's vice president, who four years earlier had served a short stint as interim president. Majluta was of Lebanese background, a longtime PRD stalwart, and a businessman who was tainted with the corruption of the previous administrations. He was opposed by Balaguer, who, though old and legally blind, still enjoyed widespread popularity. Many associated Balaguer with the economic boom of the 1970s; in addition, he was widely admired as a shrewd, resourceful, and skilled politician. In a very closely contested election, Balaguer won with 41 percent of the vote to Majluta's 39 percent. Another former president, Bosch, candidate of the leftist Dominican Liberation Party (Partido de la Liberación Dominicana--PLD), garnered 18 percent.
In office, Balaguer proved as adept as before, although now slowed by age and infirmity. He juggled assignments within the armed forces to assure its loyalty and support; followed policies that pleased the economic elites, while at the same time doling out land and patronage to the peasants; and fostered greater contact with Cuba, while simultaneously keeping United States support. He listened to advice from all quarters, but kept his own counsel, kept his subordinates off guard and insecure so they could not develop a base from which to challenge the president himself, and refused to designate a successor while keeping all his own options open. Balaguer delegated some limited power and patronage to subordinates, but he kept most of the reins of power in his own hands; he let cabinet and autonomous agency heads have a bit of responsibility, while he maintained control of the allimportant jobs--patronage, money, and military matters. Whatever one thinks of his policies, Balaguer must be considered one of the cleverest presidents in Dominican history.
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Interest Groups
The Dominican Republic did not have the large number of interest groups and the intensely competitive pluralism found in larger, more advanced nations. In the 1970s and the 1980s, a growing number of private associations started to fill the organizational vacuum that many Dominicans held primarily responsible for their nation's history of instability. That process remained incomplete, however, and the falta de organización (lack of organization) was still the bane of national life.
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The Armed Forces
The armed forces (army, navy, air force, and National Police) were among the best organized and the most powerful groups in Dominican national life. The military was more than a simple interest group, however. Stemming historically from the medieval Spanish system, the military constituted an integral part of the political regime, but one only nominally subordinate to civilian authority.
The modern Dominican armed forces were a product of the Trujillo era and of the often corrupt and brutal practices of that regime. Trujillo built up the armed forces enormously and gave them modern equipment, but he also encouraged graft, rakeoffs , and political interference (see History and Development of the Armed Forces , ch. 5).
Since Trujillo, various efforts had been made to reform, to modernize, and to professionalize the armed forces. These efforts had been only partially successful. In the late 1980s, the armed forces undoubtedly were better trained, better educated, and better equipped than before, but military personnel also tended to use their positions to augment their salaries, to acquire wealth and land, and to exercise political as well as military power, sometimes on a grand scale. At the same time, civilian political interference in the military (promotions, commands, favoritism, etc.) occurred at least as often as military interference in political affairs.
Since the mid-1970s, the pressures to reform the armed forces and to make them definitively apolitical and subordinate to civilian authority had intensified. Evidence of the success of this subordination is that, in various crises (for example, the electoral crises of 1978 and 1986 and the riots of 1985), the military behaved quite professionally and made no effort to seize the government. Nevertheless, no one is really certain how the armed forces would react in the face of endemic unrest, a popular guerrilla movement, economic collapse, or the possibility of a leftist electoral victory.
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The Roman Catholic Church
The Dominican Republic remained over 90 percent Roman Catholic in the late 1980s, despite major gains by Protestant groups, especially evangelical, charismatic, and spiritualist sects (see Religion , ch. 2). The Dominican Roman Catholic Church was historically conservative and traditionalist; in general it supported the status quo and the existing power structure. The Roman Catholic Church was weak institutionally, however, with few priests (fewer than 200 in the entire country), little land, few educational or social institutions, and little influence over the daily lives of most Dominicans.
Since the 1960s, the Roman Catholic Church had ceased to identify wholly with the status quo. Rather, it tended to stand for moderate change. It organized mainstream Catholic political parties, trade unions, student groups, peasant leagues, and businessmen's associations.
Liberation theology (see Glossary) had made few inroads in the Dominican Republic. A few priests espoused liberationist ideas, but they were not considered to be in the mainstream of the clergy. Nor had there been calls by church officials for an alliance with Marxist groups, let alone calls for guerrilla struggles or other militant action against the system.
As the Dominican Republic modernized and secularized, the church lost some of its influence. The country had legalized divorce in 1963 and had instituted government-sponsored family planning in 1967, two measures the church had opposed. The church seldom succeeded in mobilizing voters in support of its favored programs. With only about 10 percent of the population engaged as active, practicing Catholics, and with Protestant groups continuing to grow rapidly, political scientists estimated that the church had gone from being one of the top three most influential interest groups, in past decades, to about the sixth or the seventh by the late 1980s.
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Economic Elites
If the Roman Catholic Church had been gradually losing political strength, the power of the economic elites had been steadily growing. Most Dominicans considered a strong economy essential to the successful development efforts of any government in power; only the country's economic entrepreneurs had the wherewithal and the expertise to promote economic growth. Therefore, economic importance also implied political importance.
By the 1980s, the Dominican Republic's economy was no longer almost exclusively agrarian. Trade, tourism, commerce, industry, banking, real estate, and services had also become important sectors of the economy. These economic changes also meant that the Association of Landowners and Agriculturists (Asociación de Hacendados y Agricultores), once the preeminent political interest group, had relinquished some of its influence to the Chamber of Commerce, the associations of industry and of exporters, various professional associations, and other economic groups. The enormous economic power of these groups allowed them to wield political power as well.
Although many observers considered the armed forces to be the ultimate arbiter of Dominican national affairs, on an everyday basis the economic elites wielded far more power. They constituted the primary source of cabinet and other high-level government appointees--regardless of which government was in power. They often enjoyed direct access to government decision making and decision makers. They were the people who knew how to get things done at home and abroad for the country, and the government depended on them for advice and often for financing. Under these circumstances, the economic elites were indispensable to the effective functioning, not just of the economy, but of the country.
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Trade Unions
As of 1989, trade unions had not played the consistently strong role in the political system that the economic elites had. Only a small percentage (5 to 7 percent) of the population (12 to 15 percent of the labor force) belonged to labor unions in the late 1980s, and the unions themselves tended to be internally fragmented and weak.
The trade unions were also inclined to be highly political; most were associated with the major political parties. There were a Christian Democratic trade union group, a communist labor organization, a group of unions associated with the PRD, an organization for government workers, a teachers' union, and one relatively nonpartisan group. The several union groups conflicted as often with each other as with management.
Since most Dominicans earned very low salaries, the unions could not support themselves, or very many of their activities, on the basis of union dues. Several of the major groups received funding from outside the country. In addition, because the country typically had high rates of unemployment and underemployment and a surplus of unskilled labor, employers often replaced workers who tried to organize. Sometimes employers engaged in what could be described as union-breaking activities, including the summoning of the police to put down union activities. These and other conditions both weakened and politicized the labor movement. Although collective bargaining had gained popularity and legitimacy, political action was still more widely used by the unions to satisfy their demands. Political action might take the form of street demonstrations, violence, marches to the National Palace, and general strikes-- all meant to put pressure on the government to side with the workers in labor disputes. In extreme cases, a general strike might be called in an effort to topple a government or a labor minister deemed insufficiently receptive to labor's demands.
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Student Politics
The Dominican Republic had some 80,000 students enrolled in institutions of post-secondary education in the late 1980s. The largest institution, the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo (Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo--UASD), had its main campus in the capital city and several branches in different areas of the country. The Catholic University (Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra--UCMM)--literally mother and teacher, with religious connotations not apparent in English--was located in the second largest city, Santiago de los Caballeros (Santiago); another private university, the Pedro Henríquez Ureña National University (Universidad Nacional Pedro Henríquez Ureña-- UNPHU), competed with the public university in the capital, as did a branch of the Catholic University. Several private research centers and technical institutes provided specialized postsecondary education (see Education , ch. 2).
The Autonomous University was highly politicized. The student body sometimes devoted whole weeks, or even semesters, to political activities. Most of the activist groups were composed op people who espoused leftist ideologies: communists, Trotskyites, independent revolutionaries, Marxists, sympathizers of Juan Bosch and his PLD, sympathizers of the PRD, and radical Christian organizations accounted for most of the membership of student political groups. The private universities were less politicized. Even in the public universities, however, the level of politicization varied according to the faculty: arts and letters as well as law tended to be more political; medicine and the sciences tended to be less so.
University students were important political actors, although as a group they did not appear to have the ability to topple a government by themselves. However, because education (especially higher education) was so rare in the Dominican Republic, the students formed an intellectual elite in the eyes of those less educated than they. Hence, in alliance with the trade unions and the urban unemployed, the students had the potential to provide a moral leadership that would expand their political reach and power.
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Peasants
Traditionally the forgotten sector of Dominican society, the peasants were largely illiterate, unorganized, and politically inarticulate. Although numerically the largest group in Dominican society, politically they were the weakest.
By the late 1980s, however, vast changes had begun to occur, even in the Dominican countryside. For example, in 1960 the country was 70 percent rural and 30 percent urban, but as 1990 approached those percentages had been reversed. In the intervening decades, millions of peasants had left the harsh life of the countryside behind for the somewhat more promising life of the cities; many others had emigrated, mainly to Puerto Rico and the United States.
In addition, mobilization and organization had begun in the countryside. The requirement that voters be literate had been struck down in 1962. Peasants voted regularly and in high numbers, usually splitting their votes between liberal and conservative candidates. Beginning in the early 1960s, Peace Corps volunteers, political party officials, community organizers, students, missionaries, and government officials had been fanning out into the countryside organizing the peasants, soliciting their votes, and generally mobilizing them. Modern communications--radio, even television--also reached the countryside, and, along with numerous farm-to-market roads, they had helped ease the isolation of rural life.
Numerous peasant cooperatives and associations had also sprung up. Like the unions and the student groups, most of these were associated with the main political parties: Bosch's PLD, the PRD, and the Social Christian Reformist Party, (Partido Reformista Social Cristiano--PRSC; also referred to as the Christian Democrats). Balaguer also attracted widespread support among the peasants because they associated his rule with peace, stability, and prosperity. In highly paternalistic fashion, and with great publicity, Balaguer also made a point of handing out land titles to peasants for lands formerly belonging to Trujillo. Despite the upswing in their political activities, however, the peasants were still not effectively organized, and they seldom managed to influence national policy making.
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Middle Class
By the 1980s, Dominican society no longer consisted of a small landed elite at the top and a huge mass of peasants at the bottom, with almost no one in between. In large part, as a result of the economic development and modernization that had occurred since the end of the Great Depression, a sizable middle class, constituting 30 to 35 percent of the population, had emerged (see Urban Society , ch. 2).
The middle class consisted of shopkeepers, government officials, clerks, military personnel, white-collar workers of all kinds, teachers, professionals, and the better paid members of the working class. Most of the middle class resided in Santo Domingo, but secondary cities like Santiago, Barahona, Monte Cristi, La Romana, San Francisco de Macorís, and San Pedro de Macorís had also developed sizable middle-class populations.
The middle class, not the oligarchy, had come to predominate within the country's major political institutions: the Roman Catholic Church, the military officer corps, the government service, the political parties, interest groups, and even the trade union leadership. However, the middle class was often divided on social and political issues. Generally, its members advocated peace, order, stability, and economic progress. It backed Balaguer in the late 1960s and the early 1970s because he was thought to stand for those things that the middle class wanted; later it supported the PRD governments of Guzmán and Jorge for the same reason. The middle class used to support authoritarian governments because it thought they would best protect its interests; in the 1980s, however, the middle-class consensus generally supported democracy as the best way to preserve stability and to sustain development.
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The Bureaucracy
Its large ministries, autonomous agencies, and public corporations made the Dominican government by far the largest employer in the country. By dint of numbers and its location in the capital city, the bureaucracy constituted a major interest group in its own right.
The Dominican Republic's ineffectual civil service laws left government employees subject to wholesale turnovers with virtually every change of government. The system worked more on the basis of patronage--with government positions given out in return for personal and political loyalty and service--than on the basis of merit.
In an effort to protect themselves, government workers had formed unions. However, their activities and effectiveness were generally severely circumscribed by the country's antiquated civil service laws. Some unions, such as those for teachers and employees of the state-run sugar industry, had themselves become highly politicized, usually in a leftist direction. Frequent clashes occurred between these unions and the police.
Dominated by patronage and rife with corruption, the public service was neither efficient nor responsive. Various efforts had been made over the years to reform this vast, cumbersome bureaucracy. Yet politicians often hesitated to tamper with it because the patronage positions provided by the bureaucracy constituted one of the main sources of their power. For the same reason, they resisted the privatization of the many inefficient and cumbersome state-owned enterprises. Political leaders recognized the inefficiencies of these bloated enterprises, but they also appreciated the effectiveness of buying the loyalty of friends, allies, and even political foes, by putting them on the public payroll.
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Outside Actors
The Dominican Republic is a relatively small and weak country, heavily dependent on the outside world economically and strategically, and located in the center of one of the world's most important areas of East-West and North-South conflict--the volatile Caribbean. For these reasons, various outside actors have long exercised a significant degree of influence in the island nation's internal politics.
In the early nineteenth century, the principal outside actors were Spain, France, and Britain; toward the end of the century, Germany and the United States had also become involved in Dominican affairs. Because the Dominican Republic shares the island of Hispaniola with Haiti, and because Haiti represented a constant threat to the Dominican Republic, both before and after the Haitian occupation of 1822-44, Haiti also exerted significant influence (see Haiti and Santo Domingo , ch. 1).
A variety of transnational actors have played a significant role in Dominican politics. Transnational actors had no single national identity; they transcended national boundaries, but had local influence nonetheless. They included multinational corporations, the Socialist International (the international grouping of social democratic parties highly involved in Dominican affairs during the 1970s and the 1980s), the Vatican, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Christian Democratic International, among others.
Many of these agencies, or the embassies of such countries as the United States or Haiti, played a role not only in Dominican international affairs, but in the country's internal affairs as well. Some of them tried to influence national politics; they maintained programs (scholarships, travel awards, etc.) to attract and to influence young people, labor leaders, and government officials. In many ways, they functioned almost like domestic interest groups. In a small, weak, and dependent country like the Dominican Republic, the influence of outside actors was often considerable.
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Political Parties
Political parties and a political party system in the modern sense had a very short history in the Dominican Republic, dating back only to the early 1960s. Most parties were weakly organized, had weak and inexperienced political leadership, were neither very ideological nor programmatic, and were generally based on personalistic followings rather than on concrete programs.
Beginning in the mid-1960s, two main parties, or movements, had dominated Dominican politics. These were the PRD and the Reformist Party (Partido Reformista--PR). Both these parties had gone through several reorganizations.
The PRD had been founded in 1939 by exiles from the Trujillo dictatorship. It functioned as an exiled organization for twentytwo years, before returning to the Dominican Republic in 1961 after Trujillo's assassination.
In the late 1980s, the PRD was a left-of-center, democratic political party. Strongly oriented toward social justice, it sought to assist peasants and workers. Although nationalistic, the PRD belonged to the Socialist International. Its platform supported both political and economic democracy. A strongly reformist party, the PRD nonetheless was committed to implementing change through democratic means.
On the strength of this program, the PRD, led by the charismatic Juan Bosch, had won the 1962 election, the freest in the country's history, by a two-to-one margin. Bosch was overthrown, however, after only seven months in office. The PRD organized a constitutionalist revolt, in 1965, aimed at restoring democratic government, but the revolution was put down militarily by the United States, an action that made Bosch and many PRD leaders bitterly resentful of the United States. Perceived as a symbol of instability and revolution, Bosch lost the 1966 election to Balaguer. For the next twelve years, the PRD went into eclipse; it functioned primarily as the Dominican Republic's largest opposition party. After a major split, Bosch left to form his own, more radical, PLD.
In 1978, under Guzmán, and again in 1982 under Jorge, the PRD won the national elections. It governed moderately and without the rancor of the past, but as it tried to put its social program into effect, it ran up against the constraints of austerity.
The PRD had a clear ideological program and was the best organized political party in the country; however, it was torn by personal and ideological differences. Pitted against each other were its right wing, led by Majluta; its center, led by Jorge; and its left wing, led by José Francisco Peña Gómez. These differences became even more pronounced in 1989. Former president Jorge was indicted for corruption, and hence his popularity plummeted; Majluta was neither trusted nor respected by many in the party and the nation; and Peña Gómez was reportedly contemplating the launching of his own independent movement, which would further split the PRD. A number of younger leaders, such as Jorge protegé Hatuey de Camps Jiménez, also rose to prominence within the party in the 1980s. When unified, the PRD was usually strong enough to win elections, but when divided it usually lost. After the death of Trujillo, the PRD was divided more often than it was unified.
The other major party was the PR, the personal machine of President Balaguer. More conservative than the PRD, the PR lacked a clear-cut program. It consisted of officeholders, job seekers, and persons loyal to Balaguer. The PR functioned more as a patronage mechanism than as a party with an identifiable ideology. Balaguer used this political machine to win elections in 1966, 1970, and 1974. The PR dispensed jobs and favors and, in general, helped him to govern.
In 1985 Balaguer promoted a union between the PR and the Revolutionary Social Christian Party (Partido Revolucionario Social Cristiano--PRSC). The PRSC was the established Christian Democratic party in the country; it was widely respected, but it had little electoral strength. Balaguer gave the PRSC the leadership and the electoral support that it had lacked. The PRSC, in turn, gave Balaguer the support of its trade union, student, and peasant organizations; its legitimacy as a serious Christian Democratic party; and its connections with the Christian Democratic International. The new party designated itself the Social Christian Reformist Party (Partido Reformista Social Cristiano--PRSC), changing its name slightly, but retaining the old initials. The PRSC won the 1986 election by a slim margin over the PRD.
The third major party, Bosch's PLD, won 18 percent of the vote in 1986. It was more radical than the PRD and more antiUnited States. Its program called for the establishment of a "revolutionary dictatorship" and for close relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union. The PLD appealed to young people and to those whose disaffection with the prevailing social, political, and economic system in the Dominican Republic had reached an extreme degree; it gained popular support during the 1980s as a result of the country's manifold economic and political problems.
Balaguer and Bosch had long been personal, as well as political and ideological, rivals. Indeed, by 1989 these two men had been jousting with each other politically for some fifty years. In 1989 both were in their eighties. They were the two main protagonists, the two rival caudillos, of modern Dominican politics. Their rivalry delineated the overlap between traditional personalism and modern party politics.
The Dominican Republic's several minor parties were weakly organized, and they usually represented the personal followings of individual caudillos. In the 1986 election, none of these parties received as much as 1 percent of the vote, which made their eligibility to compete in future elections questionable. Several of these personal machines were simply testing the political waters in 1986, and they might come back in reorganized form in future elections. Another possibility was that their leaders might try to merge their organizations with the larger parties, or perhaps themselves become the candidates of the larger parties. These relations illustrated the fluidity and the lack of institutionalization of the Dominican party system.
The extreme-left and communist parties never had much of a popular following. Bosch's formation of the PLD further undermined the potential support of the extreme left. Many Dominican peasants were conservative rather than radical, and the weak unions were increasingly oriented toward "bread-and-butter" issues rather than revolutionary action. In addition, the close ties of the Dominican Republic to the United States and the absence of widespread class conflict among Dominicans--Haitians formed the cane-cutting "proletariat" in the countryside, and, therefore, the potential for class conflict was sapped by racial, cultural, and nationalistic considerations--further diminished the possibility of a strong communist movement.
The two main far-left parties were the Communist Party of the Dominican Republic (Partido Comunista de la República Dominicana- -Pacoredo)--a splinter group of the Dominican Communist Party (Partido Comunista Dominicano--PCD)--and the Socialist Bloc (Bloque Socialista--BS). These two parties chose not to field candidates in the 1986 election, in part because doing so would have revealed their weak electoral appeal. The Moscow-line PCD did enter the 1986 election, and it received only 4,756 votes-- considerably less than 1 percent of the total. Nevertheless, all the far-left parties actively criticized the PRD and the PRSC and publicly presented their own points of view. The communist parties had little popular following in their own right, but by attaching themselves to the nationalistic Bosch and the PLD they could conceivably wield influence out of proportion to their numbers.
Some signs indicated that a basic and more stable two-party system, consisting of the left-of-center PRD and the right-of- center PRSC, might be evolving in the Dominican Republic in the late 1980s. A two-and-a-half party system, with the PLD joining these other two, represented another possibility. Nevertheless, the political system continued to be quite fluid; personalities still counted at least as much as parties. Other routes to power existed besides party activism and elections; therefore, the consolidation of a stable, functioning party system could not yet be taken for granted.
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The Mass Media
Beginning in the early 1960s, the Dominican Republic experienced a communications revolution. The spread of radio, television, and newspapers awakened the previously isolated countryside, stimulated rapid urbanization, and led to the political mobilization of millions of people who had never participated in politics before. In addition, since Trujillo's death in 1961, the Dominican media had been among the freest of all those in Latin America.
There were 123 radio stations--115 commercial and 8 government-sponsored--operating in the country in 1989. Of these, thirty-four stations operated in the capital city alone, and half that number broadcasted from the second city, Santiago. Most other secondary cities had several radio stations. All stations were government-licensed. The Dominican Republic's large number of stations ensured that every part of the island was accessible to radio broadcasting.
The advent of cheap transistor radios in the early 1960s ushered in the communications revolution. Even poor peasants, eking out a subsistence living, could afford such a radio. Transistor radios brought in the political news from the capital city and thus helped to integrate rural elements into the national political life for the first time. Just as important, they also exposed Dominicans to the culture, the behavior, and the music of the outside world.
There were eighteen television channels, operated by six companies in 1989; two channels were government-owned, and sixteen were private. All were government-licensed. Although most Dominicans could not afford a set of their own, those who did not own one often watched at neighbors' houses or in public places, such as bars or shops. Thanks to relay stations, television broadcasts originating in Santo Domingo could be transmitted to the interior.
The main newspapers were El Caribe and Listín Diario. Both were dailies, published in the capital city, and both had circulations over 30,000. El Caribe was moderate and nationalistic; it was, for a long time, the main newspaper in the country. Listín Diario, founded in 1889 and published intermittently thereafter, was most recently revived in 1964. It was more reformist and more critical of the government. It established a reputation as a crusading paper and soon matched El Caribe in circulation.
Other major Santo Domingo newspapers were El Tiempo, El Nacional, and Última Hora. El Tiempo was conservative, El Nacional was more crusading and nationalistic, and Última Hora had been launched by Listín Diario as an afternoon newspaper to challenge El Nacional. In Santiago there were two main newspapers: La Información, a conservative afternoon paper, and El Sol, a moderate morning paper. Other cities had smaller papers, focused mainly on local news. The big circulation dailies all received the major wire services--Associated Press (AP), United Press International (UPI), Reuters, and others. As a result, their international coverage was often quite extensive. The largest weekly newsmagazine in the country was Ahora, which was owned by El Nacional.
Each main political party published its own small newspaper and aired its own radio program. The major trade unions, professional associations, and interest groups also produced their own newspapers, although they often published sporadically, and some maintained public relations offices. The armed forces operated its own radio station, and the Roman Catholic Church owned and operated several radio stations and small newspapers. The Voice of America was widely listened to; Radio Havana and Radio Moscow also beamed broadcasts that could be heard throughout the country.
Although the coverage of news stories was not always entirely professional, and although there had been attempts by government and the military over the years to intimidate, or even to close down, some papers and stations, by and large the Dominican media had been remarkably free, independent, and diverse since 1961. They performed an important educational function in the country, and they exerted an important influence in mobilizing the country politically. In fact, the mass media had become one of the most important bulwarks of Dominican democracy.
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FOREIGN RELATIONS
The Dominican Republic maintained very limited relations with most of the countries of Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. It had little commerce, tourist trade, or diplomatic contact with most of these nations, and hence little reason for an embassy or mission. The Dominican Republic was not a global power with global responsibilities; nor, as a poor country, could it afford to maintain widespread diplomatic representation.
The Dominican Republic concentrated its diplomatic activities in four critical arenas: the circum-Caribbean, Latin America, the United States, and Western Europe. It belonged to the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations (UN), and other international bodies.
Although the Dominican Republic shares the island of Hispaniola with Haiti, traditionally relations between the two countries have seldom been good. In the nineteenth century, Haiti repeatedly invaded, plundered, and occupied the Dominican Republic. In addition, Dominicans tended to see Haiti as black, African, and uncivilized, in contrast to their own country, which they considered Hispanic and European.
When political troubles flared up in Haiti, Dominican governments usually mob
ilized the armed forces and put them on alert. Haitian political exiles often settled in Santo Domingo, which they used as a springboard for their partisan activities. Numerous Dominican governments had also tried to influence political events in Haiti. The border between the two countries had been closed on a number of occasions.
Over the years, higher salaries and better living conditions had induced many Haitians to settle in the Dominican Republic (see Migration , ch. 7). Dominicans would express resentment of this Haitianization, but at the same time they depended on Haitian labor. This was particularly true during the cane-cutting season, when thousands of Haitians were trucked in, kept in miserable labor camps, and then trucked back (although some remained behind, melding into the local population). The practice commonly gave rise to human rights abuses, and the term "slavery" was sometimes used when changes were raised in some international bodies.
Little trade or commerce existed between the Dominican Republic and Haiti. Each eyed the other's politics warily and often tried to influence the outcome. Because of the complex racial, cultural, and social disparities between the two nations, it seemed doubtful that relations between the two countries would ever be friendly.
Dominican relations with the nearby island of Puerto Rico were quite good. A considerable amount of commercial trade, tourism, and investment activity took place between the two islands. Many Dominicans emigrated to Puerto Rico, where they generally enjoyed better jobs, salaries, and benefits. A lively-- and dangerous--traffic existed in small boats that traversed the Mona Passage, by night, carrying illegal Dominican emigrés to Puerto Rican shores. Puerto Rico's links to the United States through its commonwealth status also facilitated the migration of Dominicans to the United States mainland.
Many Puerto Ricans had invested in the Dominican Republic or owned weekend cottages there. At the same time, the large Dominican population in Puerto Rico was used by some as evidence to support the charge that Dominicans were taking jobs away from Puerto Ricans.
Despite a few minor points of contention, relations between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico were generally stable and amiable. In contrast, the Dominicans had an uneasy, and still largely informal, relationship with Cuba. The Dominican Republic had broken diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1962; on several subsequent occasions, Cuba sought to promote revolution in the Dominican Republic. With the growth of the Dominican economy in the 1970s, however, the Dominican Republic surpassed Cuba in per capita gross domestic product (GDP--see Glossary), reversing the two nations' traditional relative positions. By the late 1980s, the Dominicans dealt with Cuba from a position of strength rather than weakness, but they remained wary of Cuban military strength and the possibilities of Cuban subversion.
During the 1980s, the contacts between Cuba and the Dominican Republic increased: there were both sports and cultural exchanges. Most of these contacts were informal, but some official contacts between government representatives of the two countries also took place. For Cuba these exchanges formed part of its hemispheric-wide efforts to break out of the relative diplomatic and commercial isolation in which it existed after 1962 and to overcome the United States economic blockade. For the Dominican Republic, a flirtation with Cuba served to keep the domestic left from criticizing the government; it also put pressure on the United States, which in the 1980s did not favor normalization of relations with Cuba. One major impediment to closer ties was the competition of the two island nations in world sugar markets, a situation hardly calculated to encourage cooperation.
By 1989 the Dominican Republic had become more closely involved in the larger political and economic developments of the circum-Caribbean. It maintained close relations with Venezuela, with which it had important trade links. Its relations with the smaller, formerly British, Caribbean islands (including Jamaica) were also closer than they had been previously, and they included observer status in the Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom).
The Dominican Republic avoided too deep an involvement in the Central American imbroglios. It had offered its good offices and had served as an intermediary and peacemaker in some facets of the conflict. Not wanting to jeopardize its relations with Mexico, the Central American nations, or the United States, however, it had stayed aloof from the more controversial aspects of the various Central American conflicts. Dominicans were resentful when Nicaragua used its Soviet, East European, and "non-aligned" connections to beat out the Dominican Republic for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
The Dominican Republic's most important relations were with the United States. Politically, economically, and strategically, the Dominican Republic was more dependent on the United States than it was on any other nation. The United States maintained the largest embassy, by far, in Santo Domingo, and the Dominican embassy in Washington was the country's most important.
Dominicans sometimes resented the large United States presence in their country and the condescending and patronizing attitudes of some Americans. They also resented United States intervention in their internal affairs, particularly the military intervention of 1965. But most Dominicans strongly liked and admired the United States, wanted to travel or emigrate there, and had gotten used to the influence of the United States embassy in their country. Although Dominicans did not appreciate United States interference, they also feared United States inaction in regional affairs. Over the years, most Dominican politicians had determined that the prudent course was to make accommodations with the United States. In recent years, however, this relationship of dependence had become more one of bilateral interdependence.
The Dominican Republic maintained good relations with the nations of Western Europe and tried to increase trade with that region as a way of diversifying its economic relations. Cultural and political links were also important. The leading West European nations with interests in the Dominican Republic were the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), which significantly increased its exchange programs during the 1980s; Spain, for reasons of culture and language, as well as the Spaniards' generally more visible and active foreign policy in Latin America; and France, because of cultural and economic relations.
Among Asian nations, Japan had become a significant commercial presence in the 1980s, but it had little interest in political or strategic matters. The Republic of China (Taiwan) had extensive commercial and diplomatic relations. Similarly, Israel had provided aid and technical assistance and maintained some commercial, cultural, and diplomatic ties. In return, the Israelis often counted on the Dominican Republic to support their positions in international fora.
The Dominican Republic was a signatory to the Charter of the OAS, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty), the Pact of Bogotá, and all major inter-American conventions. Historically, its ties to, and involvement in, the OAS had been stronger than its relations with the UN.
The Dominican Republic was a member of the UN, its Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), and its Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the International Court of Justice. It subscribed to the International Monetary Fund (IMF--see Glossary), the World Bank (see Glossary), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the International Development Association (IDA). It was a participant in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Universal Postal Union (UPU), and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). It was also a member of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
In the 1980s, the Dominicans have actively sought leadership roles in international organizations. This trend, along with the establishment of new diplomatic and economic ties, prompted debate throughout the country on issues of foreign policy and strategic relations. Such an awareness of world affairs was understandable in a country the identity, development, and direction of which were, in considerable measure, the result of external influences.
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An abundance of good books is available on the government and politics of the Dominican Republic. On the formative Trujillo era, see Jesús de Galíndez, The Era of Trujillo; the excellent biography by Robert Crassweller entitled Trujillo; and Howard J. Wiarda, Dictatorship and Development: The Methods of Control in Trujillo's Dominican Republic. Post-Trujillo developments are treated in detail in John Bartlow Martin, Overtaken by Events, and Howard J. Wiarda, Dictatorship, Development, and Disintegration: Politics and Social Change in the Dominican Republic (3 vols.), as well as Wiarda's briefer The Dominican Republic: Nation in Transition. The 1965 revolution and United States intervention are well covered in Piero Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis; Dan Kurzman, Santo Domingo: Revolt of the Damned; Abraham Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention; and Jerome Slater, Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Republic.
For the Balaguer era of the 1960s and the 1970s, see G. Pope Atkins, Arms and Politics in the Dominican Republic; Ian Bell, The Dominican Republic; and Howard J. Wiarda and Michael J. Kryzanek, The Dominican Republic: A Caribbean Crucible. More recent developments are analyzed in Jan Knippers Black, The Dominican Republic: Politics and Development in an Unsovereign State, and in Michael J. Kryzanek and Howard J. Wiarda, The Politics of External Influence in the Dominican Republic. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
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Chapter 5. Dominican Republic: National Security
BY TRADITION, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC'S armed forces had been active participants in the competition for national political power and often had functioned as a praetorian guard for the government holding power. The military continued to play these parts as the 1990s neared; however, it appeared that, during the 1970s and the 1980s, successive governments had been able to reduce the military's former role in national political life (most evident in the early 1960s) as self-appointed final arbiter of public policy.
The armed forces' reduced stature was made evident in the late 1980s by their transformation into an interest group--albeit an important one--competing with other such groups for power and influence within the nation's increasingly pluralistic political system. It would be premature, however, to conclude that the goal of developing an institutionalized and apolitical military establishment had been completely realized by 1989. Individual military officers continued to exert considerable political influence, and armed forces units continued to be employed overtly during political campaigns. Nonetheless, the military's explicit support of civilian governments during the 1980s suggested that the armed forces had accepted the principle of civilian control.
As of mid-1989, the nation faced no credible external threat and only a negligible insurgent threat. As a result, the armed forces were principally employed in working with the National Police to maintain domestic order, chiefly by helping to control demonstrations, riots, and other large-scale threats to public order. Most such disturbances during the mid-1980s and the late 1980s received their impetus from domestic austerity programs inaugurated because of adverse international economic conditions. Public discontent over the concomitant deterioration of living conditions for ordinary citizens, as well as a decline in the level and the quality of public services, occasionally manifested itself in widespread, and sometimes violent, outbreaks that resulted in the intervention of the armed forces and police. The security forces were also called out on several occasions to deal with violence associated with political campaigning and elections.
National economic constraints during the mid-1980s and the late 1980s were reflected in defense budgets, as spending on weapons replacement and modernization was virtually eliminated. The military leadership apparently acquiesced in this policy, despite its serious effects on readiness. This acquiescence may have occurred because the armed forces' pay and benefits were largely shielded from the cuts.
For administrative purposes, the armed forces were under thejurisdiction of the secretary of state for the armed forces. Operational command of the approximately 21,000-member military was exercised through the deputy secretaries of state for the army, the navy, and the air force. The army was the largest and the most influential of the three services, and it was equipped mainly as a light infantry force. The navy was a coastal patrol force that included a battalion of marines. The air force flew transport planes and helicopters, and it had a small number of Cessna A-37B Dragonfly counterinsurgency aircraft used mainly for patrol purposes.
The National Police was the principal agency charged with maintaining public order. In addition to its paramilitary activities, it was organized to perform routine patrols and other crime prevention and control functions. Approximately half the members of the National Police were stationed in the capital. The rest were assigned to posts throughout the remainder of the country.
Criminal justice was the responsibility of the national government. The national judiciary, headed by the Supreme Court of Justice, administered the country's criminal courts, and the attorney general oversaw the system of government prosecutors. All penal and procedural statutes were issued by the central government.
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HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES
Spanish colonial militias were the first organized military forces in what is now the Dominican Republic. These forces maintained law and order over the entire island of Hispaniola (La Isla Española), which from 1496 was ruled from Santo Domingo, the center of Spanish colonial administration in the New World (see The First Colony , ch. 1). By the mid-1500s, when Spain's interests shifted to the richer colonies of Mexico and Peru, the Dominican colony had a well-established hierarchical social system that was based on authoritarian rule by a small white elite. The colony also included a large black slave population (see Ethnic Heritage , ch. 2).
The shift in Spain's colonial interests and the consequent withdrawal of most of Spain's military from the Dominican colony was followed by a long period of economic and political decay, during which domestic order deteriorated. The colony was threatened by pirates along the coast as well as by periodic encroachment by the forces of France and England, which were competing with each other and with Spain for territory and power in the New World.
As a result of this competition, Spain was forced in 1697 to cede the western third of Hispaniola to France. Tension over the boundary and continued international competition between France and Spain manifested itself in border disputes, and by 1797 France had prevailed on Spain to cede the rest of the island.
Before French rule became established in the Dominican colony, however, a slave revolt broke out in the western portion of the island, which came to be known as Haiti. In what proved to be the first in a series of Haitian incursions into Dominican territory, the rebellious Haitians invaded the poor and less populous eastern side of the island in 1801. Haitian forces were repulsed, but the rebellion within Haiti continued, and the French were forced to withdraw from the island by 1804. In 1809, helped by Britain, Spain regained control of the Dominican portion of the island. Spain ruled only until 1821, however, when the Dominican colonists revolted. Independence lasted just a few weeks before Haiti invaded in 1822. The Dominicans were not able to expel the Haitian forces until 1844 (see Haiti and Santo Domingo , ch. 1).
The long-delayed achievement of independence did not bring peace to the new Dominican Republic, nor did it improve public order. Political power was extremely decentralized, and competition among factions of the landowning white elite produced a level of national disunity that had disastrous effects on public safety. Although the central government had established a national army, this force essentially consisted of a small group of officers who were interested chiefly in personal enrichment and whose duties were largely ceremonial. The national army was far outnumbered by armed militias that were organized and maintained by local caudillos, who had set themselves up as provincial governors. Using these militias, the caudillos waged bloody civil wars as they contended for regional and national power. National political life was characterized by repeated coups and military uprisings against whichever caudillo--usually self-promoted to general-officer status--had gathered enough power to grab the presidency.
The continuous civil war, political upheaval, and misrule that characterized the republic's early years was punctuated by repeated Haitian attempts to invade. During such periods of danger, forces larger than the small national army were needed to defend the nation. These forces, hastily raised and poorly equipped, were essentially conglomerations of regional militias that had been filled out by poor farmers or landless plantation workers who had been impressed into service. Once the threat had subsided and Haitian forces had been repulsed, the militias would return to advancing the cause of particular regional leaders. The impressed troops would return home, where some would contribute to the general state of disorder by taking up banditry.
During its first thirty years of independence, the Dominican Republic was run directly, or indirectly, by General Pedro Santana Familias and General Buenaventura Baez Méndez, whose bitter rivalry was played out in civil wars that resulted in alternating Santana and Baez regimes (see Santana and Baez: The Caudillos Take Charge , ch. 1). Each of the two generals used his position to enrich himself, his relatives, and his followers at public expense. In order to deal with the national bankruptcy caused by civil war, corruption, and mismanagement, Santana called on Spain in 1861 to restore colonial rule. Nationalistic rebellions during 1861-65, however, forced the Spanish out.
General Ulises Heureaux took over the presidency in 1882. During his rule, political factionalism was repressed, and the nation enjoyed relative internal peace. Heureaux ruled in an increasingly brutal, autocratic, and corrupt manner, however, employing a network of spies and assassins. After he was himself assassinated in 1899, political factions again warred for power and for access to the national treasury. By 1904 the economy was a shambles, and foreign governments were threatening to use force to collect defaulted loans. Citing the need to avert European intervention, the United States assumed control of the management of Dominican customs receipts in 1905. During the next decade, a growing contingent of United States marines and other American officials attempted to establish internal order. Their limited efforts were apparently unsuccessful. The marines were authorized by President Woodrow Wilson to take full control of the Dominican government in 1916 (see Occupation by the United States, 1916-24 , ch. 1).
The marines disbanded the regional militias, and they ruled the nation directly for eight years, acting as police in cities and in rural areas. As part of its effort to build effective institutions of government in the Dominican Republic, the United States formed a new Dominican Constabulary Guard to replace the old national army. Up to this time, both the civilian and the military elites had been drawn from the same wealthy landowning class. Intense resentment, among the elite, against the United States presence made it impossible to find recruits for the new constabulary among the landowning class. The ranks became filled by the lower strata of Dominican society, and, as a result, the new force had neither ties nor debts to the traditional elite. The most notable representative of the new military leadership was Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina, who entered the Dominican Constabulary Guard in 1919 as a second lieutenant.
In 1924, after the Dominican Republic had adopted a new constitution and had elected a civilian president, the United States forces withdrew. The same year, the guard was renamed the Dominican National Police, a somewhat misleading title for what had become more a military entity than a law enforcement organization. By that time, Trujillo had risen to the rank of major and had assumed one of the nation's two field commands. He had also emerged as one of the most influential voices within the force, increasingly able to mold its development to suit his personal ambitions. In 1928, when the National Police was renamed the National Army (Ejército Nacional), Trujillo became a lieutenant colonel and army chief of staff. As head of the nation's only centralized military force, Trujillo was the most powerful individual in the nation, even before his election to the presidency in 1930 (see The Era of Trujillo , ch. 1).
By 1930 the new Dominican military establishment had developed into a centrally controlled and well-disciplined force that was both larger and far better equipped than any previous Dominican military force. The unified, apolitical, and professional force that had been envisioned by the United States military government had not been realized, however. Instead, traditional Dominican patterns of military service persisted, including factionalism, politicization, and the perception that position entitled one to personal enrichment. Trujillo encouraged and strengthened these patterns, and he used them both to retain the support of the armed forces and to control them. Military officers became an elite national class, gaining wealth, favors, prestige, and power, and developing an ésprit de corps that Trujillo carefully nurtured. Under these conditions, a career in the military came to be esteemed as an avenue of upward mobility. The services themselves were built up, large quantities of arms were imported, and a defense industry was established.
Trujillo rationalized maintenance of a large military by citing the purported need for vigilance against Haiti and, particularly after the Cuban Revolution of 1959, against communism. For the most part, however, Trujillo used the large and powerful military establishment to maintain internal control over the nation. The army and the navy intelligence services were among the numerous agencies Trujillo employed to maintain close surveillance and rigid control over the population. In 1957 the intelligence and the secret police organizations were unified into the State Security Secretariat. With a personnel strength of 5,000, this new organization was larger than either the regular National Police, the air force, or the navy.
Trujillo did not rely solely on rewards to keep control over the military. From the time of his election in 1930 until he was assassinated in 1961, he maintained personal command of all aspects of military organization, including promotions, logistics, assignments, and discipline. He constantly shuffled personnel from assignment to assignment, and he prevented any potential rival from gaining an independent power base. Trujillo also used the tactic of frequent inspection, sometimes in person and sometimes by undercover operatives, to keep tabs on both men and operations. In addition, he brought many of his relatives and supporters into the armed forces, promoting them rapidly as a reward for loyalty.
As part of his effort to keep control over the armed forces, Trujillo also built up the air force as a political counterbalance to the army, and he encouraged factionalism in all the services. During a major expansion of the military after World War II, Trujillo acquired armored fighting vehicles from Sweden and formed a full armored battalion at San Isidro Air Base outside Santo Domingo. This battalion, which was directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, essentially constituted a fourth armed force, further splintering power within the military.
After Trujillo was assassinated in 1961, the military, as the nation's most powerful and best-organized interest group, claimed a major role in the political competition that followed. It soon became clear, however, that the factionalism encouraged by Trujillo prevented the military from acting as a unified institution. Instead, elements in the armed services allied with various civilian politicians. After Juan Bosch Gaviño of the center-left (or, social democratic) Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano--PRD) won the presidential election in 1962, portions of the military became alarmed over his reforms and his tolerance of leftists and legal communist parties. In 1963 armed forces officers, led by Elías Wessín y Wessín (a colonel at the time), overthrew Bosch and replaced him with a civilian junta. Another military faction made up principally of army officers who called themselves Constitutionalists favored the return of Bosch. In 1965 this faction overthrew the civilian junta. In the following days, civil war erupted as the armed forces split into warring camps. The majority within the armed forces united behind Wessín y Wessín (who by this time had become a general) and attacked the new government with armored and air support. The Constitutionalists armed their civilian supporters in order to defend the capital (see Civil War and United States Intervention, 1965 , ch. 1).
United States intervention in the conflict halted the fighting, but subsequent efforts to reunify the armed forces were only partly successful. The agreement to reintegrate those officers who had supported Bosch was never fully implemented, and only a few gained readmission. Politically, the outlook of the officer corps as a whole remained right of center after the civil war.
Although the armed forces continued to be a significant factor, their influence on national political life steadily declined. This decline began during the administration of Joaquin Balaguer Ricardo, who made effective use of some of the same tactics employed by Trujillo to maintain control over the military, including the encouragement and the manipulation of factionalism within the officer corps and the frequent shuffling of top assignments. At the same time, Balaguer gave senior officers a stake in his regime by appointing many to positions in government and in state-run enterprises. He also increased the number of general officers from six in 1966 to forty-eight by 1978.
The process of reining in the military advanced significantly during the terms of Balaguer's successors, Silvestre Antonio Guzmán Fernández (1978-82) and Salvador Jorge Blanco (1982-86), each of whom made a determined effort to institutionalize the armed forces and to remove the powerful group of officers who had supported Trujillo and Balaguer. The partial success of their efforts was demonstrated in 1984 to 1985, when the armed forces' leadership repeatedly and publicly supported Jorge's government in the face of social unrest provoked by adverse economic conditions. Although Jorge had not been the military's preferred candidate in the 1982 elections, the leadership chose to support him as constitutional head of state rather than to take power itself.
Military capability in the years after the 1965 civil war declined to an even greater extent than did the armed forces' national political role. After that time, each administration faced increasingly difficult national economic constraints that forced stringent limits on defense spending. Although force levels and personnel budgets were generally left untouched, aging equipment was not replaced. As a result, equipment in all three services was outmoded, in short supply, and in poor repair as of 1989.
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THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN PUBLIC LIFE
The 1966 Constitution describes the armed forces as "essentially obedient and nonpolitical and without the right to deliberate. The purpose of their creation is to defend the independence and integrity of the republic, to maintain public order, and to uphold the Constitution and the laws." By law, members of the armed forces are denied the right to vote and the right to participate in the activities of political parties and organized labor.
Although by 1989 the political influence of the armed forces had declined relative to the early 1960s, the characterization of the military as a nonpolitical body was still an ideal rather than a reality (see Interest Groups , ch. 4). The armed forces continued to be an organized force available for use against a regime's opposition, and military personnel and equipment were employed overtly to support candidates favored by the armed forces. Individual officers also competed for national political and economic power and privilege.
The practice of appointing military officers to positions in the civil administration had lessened somewhat by 1989, although, as was traditional, military officers continued to hold a significant number of government positions, serving either while in uniform or after temporary or permanent retirement. The appointment of military personnel to civilian positions occurred in part because officers possessed proven managerial and administrative skills that were frequently in short supply. The practice also provided a source of largess that gave powerful officers a stake in the current regime and a reward for loyalty to it. Many officers in such positions achieved levels of wealth not attainable in the purely military sphere.
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Missions
The Dominican Republic faced no serious external military threat during the 1980s, and as of 1989, it appeared unlikely that the armed forces would be required to undertake an external defense mission during the 1990s. Nonetheless, military posture continued to focus on the potential security threats represented by Haiti and Cuba.
The nation's traditional enmity toward Haiti made security along the common border a matter of concern, and army troops and observation posts were located along the length of the 388- kilometer frontier. The Dominican armed forces did not view defense against a possible Haitian invasion as a particularly high priority, however. Border defense commanded relatively few military resources, in part because Haitian military capability was clearly unequal to that of Dominican forces. Despite these factors, the Dominicans showed no signs of forgetting Haiti's historically proven ability to raise large armies on short notice. Practically speaking, however, continuing political upheaval in Haiti represented a more serious concern than did a potential invasion. Several hundred thousand illegal Haitian immigrants were working in the nation as agricultural laborers, and the Dominicans feared that the number could grow if the economic situation in Haiti continued to deteriorate. Continuing border disputes between the two nations were also a source of concern (see Foreign Relations , ch. 4).
After Fidel Castro Ruz's assumption of power in 1959, the Dominican Republic also viewed Cuba as a potential external threat. This stance was rooted in the anticommunist sentiments first espoused by Trujillo and still felt by most military officers as the 1980s ended. It also had a basis in a 1959 Cubanbased invasion attempt by anti-Trujillo Dominicans. Cuba itself had never taken overt military action against the nation, however, and security concerns usually focused on the prevention of Cuban-sponsored insurgency. Critics of the armed forces charged that the military justified attacks on political groups and on political and labor activists by falsely accusing them of having ties with Cuba.
In practice, the primary mission of the armed forces was to maintain internal security and public order in the nation. Until the mid-1970s, the military occasionally conducted operations against limited insurgencies, but by the late 1970s, the country was relatively free of insurgent groups. Those still in existence in 1989 were small underground groups confined mainly to remote mountain areas. These groups rarely presented a threat to public peace.
As part of its mission to assist the police in maintaining public order, the military kept close watch on political groups that it deemed possible sources of instability, including legal opposition parties. The armed forces were also frequently called out to augment police efforts to control demonstrations and riots. On several occasions during the 1980s, such disturbances resulted in injuries and loss of life, leading critics to charge that the armed forces had used unnecessarily harsh tactics to restore order.
Article 93 of the Constitution states that an objective of the creation of the armed forces is to pursue civic action programs and, at the direction of the executive branch, to participate in projects that promote national social and economic development. As a result, the armed forces maintained an active civic action program. Units of the armed forces dug wells, constructed roads, built houses and schools, and provided educational and sports equipment to rural schools. Military medical and dental teams made visits around the country. As part of its civic action mission, the army was largely responsible for protecting and replanting the nation's forests. It supervised the Directorate General of Forestry, through which the army helped to protect against forest fires and worked to publicize the need for forest conservation. The air force transported medicine, doctors, and food to areas damaged by hurricanes or other natural disasters, and flew the injured to hospitals. Navy schools trained most of the nation's diesel mechanics, and the navy played a large role in transporting the nation's stock of fuel oil. Critics of the armed forces asserted that these contributions, although varied, were sometimes limited in scope and were not nearly so important to national development as claimed in armed forces public relations statements.
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Manpower
The combined strength of the three armed forces in 1989 was 20,800. This figure represented a ratio of 3.3 military personnel for every 1,000 citizens, which was below the average for other Latin American states.
Although the armed forces no longer had the strength and the military potential they enjoyed under Trujillo, the military continued to be a popular career. Although the Constitution provides for compulsory military service for all males between the ages of eighteen and fifty-four, the ranks were easily filled by volunteers, and the military did not present a drain on national manpower. Officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and many enlisted personnel, as well, looked on the military as a long-term career. As a result, all three services consisted largely of experienced and well-trained professionals.
Entry into the armed forces was competitive, and most entrants were drawn from the middle and the lower-middle classes. Most enlisted personnel came from rural areas. There was a very small number of females in the military; most served in positions traditionally reserved for women, such as nursing. Women first gained admittance to positions traditionally held only by men in 1981, when a few female personnel were commissioned as medical officers.
Pay and conditions of service compared well with opportunities available in civilian fields. Larger installations maintained a number of commissaries and exchanges, and each of the three services operated officer and enlisted clubs. Military personnel also benefited from free medical service. Under the armed forces' generous benefit program, all members who had served thirty years were entitled to receive a pension based on 75 percent of their active-duty pay at the time of retirement. Certain officers, such as pilots and naval engineers, could receive a full pension after twenty years of service.
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Defense Spending
The military budget for 1987 was US$64 million. This amount represented approximately 11 percent of central government expenditures, well in keeping with the levels maintained over the 1975 to 1987 period, which ranged between 7.8 and 11.7 percent. Defense expenditures, as a percentage of gross national product (GNP--see Glossary), averaged between 1.2 and 1.9 percent over the 1975 to 1987 period. In comparison with other Latin American countries, the nation spent a lower than average proportion of GNP for defense.
The value of military spending in Dominican currency rose steadily during the late 1970s; it held at relatively constant rates during the early 1980s and then rose rapidly in the late 1980s. These trends reflected the effects of inflation more than any real increase in military funding, however. When adjusted for inflation, the value of military spending actually fell at least 20 percent during the 1980s. The effects of shrinking financial resources on military readiness were exacerbated by a severe decline in the value of the peso. This resulted in a 40-percent drop in the United States dollar value of defense spending from 1983 to 1987, which greatly weakened the nation's ability to finance the arms imports necessary for modernization, not to mention replacements and spare parts.
This problem was made even more acute by the fact that most of the military budget was allocated to current operations. In 1986, for instance, capital expenditures accounted for only 3.3 percent of total military spending. The low proportion of the budget devoted to funding capital improvements was reflected in the following statistic: during the 1980s, military equipment never accounted for more than 0.7 percent of total imports. Until the early 1980s, the Dominicans imported most of their arms from the United States. Although the United States continued to be an important source of military equipment, the nation's principal arms supplier during the 1982-1987 period was France.
Trujillo had established the nation's defense industry just after World War II. By the late 1950s, the Dominican Republic had the capacity to be nearly self-sufficient in small weapons. Although that capability had deteriorated by 1989, the nation still had a modest arms manufacturing industry, limited mainly to producing small vessels, ordnance, uniforms, and personal equipment. The arsenal at San Cristóbal, twenty-four kilometers west of Santo Domingo, could produce carbines, machine guns, mortars, and antitank guns, and could also rebuild heavier weapons and manufacture munitions. The nation produced military equipment for domestic use only, and it did not export any arms.
The United States government provided the Dominicans with military assistance on a continuing basis. During the 1958 to 1988 period, assistance totalled more than US$15.6 billion. A portion of these funds defrayed military training for 5,391 of the nation's uniformed personnel during the same period. During the 1970s and the early 1980s, this assistance focused mainly on improving counterinsurgency capability. After that time, United States security assistance increasingly sought to foster bilateral cooperation, especially in antinarcotics programs. As part of an overall decline in security assistance worldwide, United States military assistance to the nation fell sharply during the mid-1980s. Foreign military sales credits were phased out in 1986, and funds provided under the military assistance program were eliminated in 1988. Proposed United States security assistance for fiscal year (FY--see Glossary) 1990 consisted mainly of economic support funds that were intended to help build a stable political climate, foster economic growth, and strengthen democratic institutions. Funds were also allocated to provide military training for ninety-two members of the Dominican armed forces, many in United States military schools.
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ARMED FORCES ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND EQUIPMENT
Under the Constitution, the president of the republic is the commander in chief of the armed forces. The chain of command extended from the president to the secretary of state for the armed forces and then to deputy secretaries of state for the army, the navy, and the air force (see fig. 6). The secretary and the three deputies were all military personnel. The secretary, usually an army lieutenant general, was appointed by the president; the secretary also served as chief of the armed forces general staff. The deputies were appointed by the secretary with the approval of the president.
Each of the deputies controlled his service through a chief of staff and a general staff. Each general staff had five principal sections: personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, and public relations. In addition, there was an administrative judge advocate section for each service to handle military legal matters. Except in emergencies, the chiefs of staff exercised operational control over the three services of the armed forces. In the late 1980s, the chiefs of staff consisted of an army lieutenant general, an air force major general, and a navy vice admiral.
The country was divided into three defense zones. The Southern Defense Zone was headquartered in Santo Domingo. It comprised the provinces of Peravia, San Cristóbal, Monte Plate, Hato Mayor, El Seibo, San Pedro de Marcorís, La Romana, La Altagracia, and the National District of Santo Domingo. The Northern Defense Zone, headquartered in Santiago de los Caballeros (Santiago), covered the provinces of Puerto Plata, Santiago, La Vega, Valverde, Monseñor Nouel, Espaillat, Salcedo, Duarte, Sánchez Ramírez, María Trinidad Sánchez, and Samaná. The Western Defense Zone had its headquarters in Barahona. It covered Azua, Dajabón, Monte Cristi, Santiago Rodríguez, Elías Piña, San Juan, Baoruco, Independencia, Pedernales, and Barahona provinces (see fig. 1). The Southern Defense Zone contained approximately half of the army's effective assets.
The armed forces secretariat operated several schools, including the three military academies. The secretariat also ran the General Juan Pablo Duarte Advanced School of the Armed Forces, which was located in Santo Domingo and provided a oneyear command and staff course for senior officers. The school graduated its first class in 1984. In addition to these schools, which offered purely military curricula, the secretariat also administered the Vocational School of the Armed Forces and Police. The school was established in Baní in 1966, and other branches were later set up throughout the nation. The school trained enlisted personnel in trades that could be used in the armed forces as well as in civilian life. Its programs provided high-quality training in technical specialties to service members, police personnel, and selected civilians.
The armed forces maintained an integrated judicial system for courts-martial for officers, and each branch conducted courts for minor offenses. All persons subject to military jurisdiction who committed a crime or a misdemeanor while on military duty were accountable to military authorities. Those not on military duty were liable to prosecution by civilian authorities.
Although United States military aid and the number of United States military representatives in the nation diminished during the 1980s, the armed forces continued to maintain their closest foreign military relations with the United States. Under a 1962 bilateral military assistance agreement with the United States, Dominican officers attended advanced training programs run by the United States.
As of 1989, the Dominican Republic was a partner in several multilateral defense agreements and organizations designed to assure regional security. These included the Act of Chapultepec, the Inter-American Defense Board, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty). The country was also a signatory to the Biological Weapons Convention, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Treaty on the Control of Arms on the Seabed.
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The Army
As of 1989, the Dominican army had a strength of approximately 13,000. Army headquarters was located in Santo Domingo. The army consisted of infantry, armor, artillery, communications, engineer, medical, military police, transport, and war matériel units. The army had no airborne or air assets.
The army's principal tactical organizations were four infantry regimental-type organizations called brigades. Each brigade had three to five infantry battalions, as well as various support units. There were seventeen infantry battalions in all. Several of the battalions assigned outside the capital area performed constabulary functions that included involvement in local political and administrative matters. Other major combat elements included one artillery battalion, one armored battalion, one presidential guard battalion, and one engineer battalion.
Stationed near Santo Domingo, the First Brigade was traditionally the most powerful of the brigades, by virtue of its location and military resources. The First Brigade had five infantry battalions, as well as the nation's only engineer battalion. The Second Brigade and the Third Brigade were located at Santiago and Barahona, respectively. Their assets were spread across the country, and their units focused mainly on local problems. The Fourth Brigade, sometimes called the Armed Forces Training Center because of its extensive training mission, was located at San Isidro, just over ten kilometers east of the capital. The Fourth Brigade controlled the nation's only armored battalion, as well as three infantry battalions. The Fourth Brigade also provided basic, advanced, and specialized training. Also at San Isidro was the army's single artillery battalion, which was organized as a separate command under the general staff. Another separate and very powerful organization was the Combat Support Command, which included the presidential guard battalion and military police units. Although formally under the control of specific commands, the army's armored, engineer, and artillery assets were usually detached as support units to each of the four brigades.
As of 1989, armored assets included fourteen light tanks, twenty armored cars, and ten armored personnel carriers (see table 8, Appendix A). The field artillery was equipped with twenty-two 105mm howitzers. The army used United States 81mm and 120mm mortars and United States M40 106mm recoilless launchers. The principal small arm was the Federal Republic of Germany (West German) G3 7.62mm rifle. Much of the army's equipment was outmoded or in poor repair.
Army enlisted personnel received basic training at the Armed Forces Training Center near San Isidro. Advanced and specialized training was also provided to relevant units. Officer candidates were required to have graduated from high school and to have met strict physical requirements. Once accepted as officer cadets, they attended the four-year Military Academy at Haina, which had been founded in 1921. The army conducted a six-month course for infantry captains and lieutenants--a basic course designed to prepare the students to function efficiently as company commanders. Senior officers attended the armed forces staff college in Santo Domingo in preparation for battalion-level and higher commands.
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The Navy
A Dominican navy was first established in 1873, when the country acquired a gunboat built in Scotland. By the time the navy was disbanded in 1916, during the United States Marine occupation, the fleet had acquired only two more gunboats and four armed launches. Several elements of the navy were incorporated into the Dominican Constabulary Guard in 1917 to function as a small coast guard. The navy remained an element of the National Army until 1943, when the Dominican National Navy was formally established as a separate service. During the next year, the navy began activities at the naval base at Las Calderas; in 1948 a separate naval school opened there.
The navy expanded greatly after World War II, acquiring vessels from Canada and the United States. By 1950 the Dominican navy had become the most powerful in the Caribbean. Its personnel numbered 3,000, including one marine battalion. Naval capability remained relatively constant up to the time of the 1965 civil war, when naval units participated in the bombardment of Constitutionalist positions in Santo Domingo. After 1965, aging vessels were not replaced, and the naval inventory steadily declined.
As of 1989, the navy had approximately 4,300 personnel. These included one battalion of marines. Navy headquarters was located at the 27 de Febrero Naval Base in Santo Domingo. Other main naval bases were located at Las Calderas and at Haina, both of which had dockyard facilities.
The navy chief of staff supervised the operations of three geographical commands. The Santo Domingo Naval Zone administered the naval headquarters and the various naval organizations located in the capital. The Northern Naval Zone, at Puerto Plata, was responsible for the coast from the northern border with Haiti to the Mona Passage at the eastern tip of the country. The Southern Naval Zone, headquartered at Barahona, covered the territory from the Mona Passage to the southern border with Haiti.
National economic constraints had reduced the Dominican fleet, by 1989, to one offshore vessel and seventeen inshore vessels (see table 9, Appendix A). Almost all were World War IIvintage craft of United States origin. The sole offshore vessel was a frigate modified for use as a presidential yacht and cadet training vessel. The frigate had been acquired from Canada in the late 1940s, and it was the only vessel in the fleet not of United States origin. The navy's inshore vessels consisted of five corvettes used for patrol duties, eleven large patrol craft, and one amphibious landing craft. Support vessels included two tankers, ten tugs, and one floating dock.
Naval enlisted personnel received instruction at the training center at Las Calderas. The Naval Academy at Las Calderas offered a four-year course to officer cadets.
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The Air Force
The air force traced its origins to 1928, when the government, inspired by the use of air power in World War I, authorized the creation of an aviation school. The nation's first military aviation element was established in 1932 as an arm of the National Army. As the Military Aviation Corps, the air force became an independent service in 1948. It underwent several name changes during the 1950s, being known as the Dominican National Aviation during 1952-55 and 1957-62 and as the Dominican Air Force during 1955-57. In 1962 it again became known as the Dominican Air Force, the name still in use as of 1989.
After World War II, Trujillo greatly expanded the air force, in part to form a counterweight to the army. By the mid-1950s, the air force had some 240 aircraft and approximately 3,500 personnel. After Trujillo's assassination, however, funds were not allocated for the replacement of aging aircraft, and the air force's air inventory dwindled rapidly.
Air force headquarters was located at San Isidro Air Base. Most aircraft were based at San Isidro as well. Other military air bases were located at Azua, Barahona, La Romana, La Vega, Monte Cristi, Puerto Plata, and San Cristóbal. The air force administered the general military medical center located in San Isidro. The air force also ran the nation's civil aeronautics directorate, and air force officers oversaw the operation of the nation's airports.
The air force, numbering some 3,800 personnel in 1989, was organized into four commands, all headquartered at San Isidro. The Air Command was responsible for the direction of all flight operations. It was made up of one counterinsurgency squadron equipped with eight Cessna A-37B Dragonflies, one transport squadron equipped with six C-47 Douglas Dakotas and seven other assorted aircraft, one helicopter squadron (consisting of thirteen aircraft) used for sea and air rescue and for transport, and one training squadron equipped with ten Beech T-34B Mentors and seven Beech T-41D Mescaleros (see table 10, Appendix A).
The Base Defense Command provided security for all bases and aircraft. It included an airborne commando squadron and an antiaircraft battalion, which was equipped with ten Bofors 40mm antiaircraft guns. The Maintenance Command was responsible for maintenance and repair. The Combat Support Command controlled all base services.
Air force cadets were trained at the Naval Academy at Las Calderas. All other ranks received their training at the Military Aviation School at Haina.
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Ranks, Uniforms, and Insignia
The rank structure of the armed forces followed traditional lines and largely conformed to the pattern of the United States services, with minor variations reflecting the disparity in force levels. The army had eight enlisted ranks, six company and fieldgrade ranks, and three ranks for general officers (see fig. 7; fig. 8). The air force had seven enlisted ranks. Its officer ranks were identical to those of the army. Naval enlisted personnel were separated into six ranks; officers, into six; and flag-rank officers (admirals), into three. The highest rank attainable was lieutenant general (army or air force) or vice admiral (navy).
Uniforms resembled those of United States counterparts in cut, design, and material. The ground forces wore olive green uniforms; the air force, blue; and the navy, either navy blue or white. All branches also had khaki uniforms. The three categories of uniform included full dress, dress, and daily. The dress uniform was worn off-duty as well as on semiformal occasions. The basic uniform for officers consisted of a short-sleeve or a longsleeve shirt, tie, trousers, belt, and black shoes. The basic uniform for army and air force enlisted personnel was an olive green fatigue uniform with combat boots. Navy enlisted personnel wore denim shirts and dungarees for work and middy blouse and trousers when off-duty.
Army and air force company-grade officers wore one, two, or three silver laurel leaves as their insignia of rank. For fieldgrade officers, rank insignia consisted of one to three gold stars. Brigadier, major, and lieutenant generals wore one, two, and three silver stars, respectively. Naval officer ranks were indicated by gold bands worn on the lower sleeve of the uniform jacket. Army and air force enlisted personnel wore green chevrons on the upper sleeve; navy enlisted personnel wore red chevrons.
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INTERNAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC ORDER
A domestic austerity program, begun in the mid-1980s, and falling prices for agricultural commodities, principally sugar, combined to produce a serious economic downturn in which unemployment rose steadily and wages failed to keep pace with inflation (see Growth and Structure of the Economy , ch. 3). As living standards declined, unrest manifested itself in the form of demonstrations, strikes, and illegal occupations of publicly owned lands. Most marches, mass assemblies, and demonstrations were relatively peaceful, but a few such events turned violent, resulting in numerous arrests and injuries and in a number of deaths. The decade's most violent protest took place in April 1984, when at least sixty people were killed in riots that followed the announcement of austerity measures and price increases for basic foodstuffs and fuel. Another series of riots, provoked by further price increases, left four dead and more than fifty injured in February 1985.
Among the groups most frequently involved in protests that turned violent were Marxist and radical leftist parties, populist agrarian organizations, organized labor, and students. Dominican Marxist parties, illegal under Trujillo, emerged from the underground after his death, and they supported Bosch and the Constitutionalists during the civil war. After Balaguer was elected president in 1966, several of the leftist parties unsuccessfully attempted to launch guerrilla warfare against his regime. During the 1980s, most of these groups operated as legal political parties. Some contested both the 1982 and the 1986 elections, but they failed to win any seats in the legislature.
Communist party organizations were badly fragmented by dissension over leadership and policy issues. The oldest and largest of the Marxist parties was the pro-Soviet Dominican Communist Party (Partido Comunista Dominicano--PCD). As of 1988, there were fifteen to twenty additional Marxist organizations in the nation, their orientations ranging from Maoist to pro-Cuban, to pro-Albanian, to pro-Soviet; some of these parties had fewer than twenty members.
Despite being weak, divided, and poorly supported, Marxist and leftist parties continued to be closely scrutinized by the police and the military. The government regularly detained members of such groups, as well as members of labor organizations and populist groups, who were believed to be preparing to instigate public disturbances. Such detentions were particularly prevalent during political campaigns. For instance, in May 1986 police detained four PCD candidates; their arrests brought to some 6,000 the number of communist militants detained during the campaigns. Those detained were usually released within fortyeight hours, which by law was the maximum period a person could be held without charge.
Organized labor and populist agrarian organizations staged several strikes, demonstrations, and other work-related actions during the late 1980s. These were generally peaceful events, designed to protest social conditions, low wages, and deteriorating public services. There were a few exceptions, however. Labor officials, for example, called a one-day nationwide general strike in July 1987; violence was isolated, but one man was killed during clashes between police and protesters in the capital.
Students frequently staged demonstrations in support of labor protests, or they joined directly in those protests. Student groups also mounted demonstrations concerning purely educational issues; some of these protests ended violently. In March 1985, for instance, students called for demonstrations to support increased funding for a university in the capital; these resulted in clashes with police that left one student dead. Students protesting the United States attack on Libya in April 1986 also clashed violently with police, forcing suspension of university classes for several days.
Political violence associated with campaigning and voting also broke out at times during the 1980s. Campaigning was for the most part free, open, and peaceful, but on a few occasions when rival political groups held competing campaign events, violence resulted. In November 1985, factionalism in the then-ruling PRD degenerated into violence as supporters of rival candidates for the party's presidential nomination engaged in confrontations that left two dead and caused the PRD convention tally to be delayed several weeks. In the months that followed, there were thirteen additional deaths related to the May 1986 elections; these occurred at polling places and during demonstrations over vote counting. Many of these deaths were caused by members of the security forces, who fired on demonstrators. Nine officers were either retired or dismissed as a result of one incident.
The treatment of Haitians living illegally in the Dominican Republic was a subject of controversy. Several Haitians were killed in 1985 during disturbances at a sugar plantation. The exact circumstances of the deaths were unclear, but it appeared that the incident was triggered by Haitian frustration over delays in the repatriation of cane cutters who had come to the Dominican Republic on temporary contract. After 1985 the government halted the practice of contracting for Haitian cane cutters, but this did not end the problem. The Roman Catholic Church, several political parties, labor groups, and several human rights groups charged that the government had forced illegal Haitian residents to engage in cane cutting by picking them up and giving them the choice of cutting cane or being forcibly repatriated. The government denied such charges, as well as allegations that some Haitians were forcibly removed from their homes and involuntarily repatriated.
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Crime
The government did not publish statistics on the national incidence of crime, but the daily newspapers of Santo Domingo regularly reported criminal acts. The crimes enumerated ran the gamut from murder, rape, and robbery to fraud, counterfeiting, and extortion. According to the newspapers, rural crime accounted for only a small portion of the total. Crime in urban areas was believed to have risen during the 1980s as a result of growing unemployment, pervasive underemployment, and migration from rural to urban areas (see Urbanization , ch. 2; Labor , ch. 3). One manifestation of urban crime was criminal activity by juvenile street gangs. This problem was deemed sufficiently serious in 1988 to merit a campaign that targeted juvenile delinquents for detention.
Crimes associated with narcotics presented a growing problem in the 1980s, as drug traffickers attempted to use the Dominican Republic as a transshipment point between various Latin American countries and the United States. The police were on the front line of the war against drugs, but elements of the military took part as well. The navy, for instance, intercepted several boats carrying cocaine and marijuana during the late 1970s, and air force patrols were given the task of spotting seaborne drug traffickers. In 1988 the government created the National Economic Council for the Control of Drugs to coordinate domestic and international narcotics programs and to integrate the efforts of all police and military elements involved in antinarcotics activities.
Corruption among government officials was another problem given special attention by the government, as well as by the press. This attention reflected a widespread public perception, buttressed by documented accounts in the press, that corruption was pervasive in several spheres of official life. Successive governments had stated their intention to bring offenders to trial. Although several such proceedings had resulted, the perception persisted that corruption continued unabated.
The government's prosecution of some former officials had itself been tainted by charges that political persecution, not a desire for justice, was behind certain indictments. Such charges were made most forcefully in 1987, when former president Jorge and several top members of the armed forces leadership in his administration were charged with fraud in connection with weapons purchases. Jorge, in the United States for medical treatment at the time, was sentenced in absentia to twenty years in prison and was fined several million pesos. He returned to the nation in late 1988 to appeal his conviction. His trial was still underway as of mid-1989.
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The National Police
The country's first police organization was a municipal force set up in 1844 in Santo Domingo. Beginning in 1847, other towns formed similar organizations. Eventually, there were independent police forces in every province. These forces were largely controlled by local caudillos, and the national executive branch had only nominal influence over them. These local forces were disbanded in 1916 during the United States occupation; the United States Marines, and later members of the Dominican Constabulary Guard, assumed police duties. The National Police was created in 1936. After that time, police activities in the nation were completely centralized, and no independent provincial or municipal forces existed.
In 1989 police personnel numbered some 10,000; the strength of the police had remained relatively constant since the 1950s. The director general of the National Police was a police major general, who was directly subordinate to the secretary of state of interior and police. The police maintained a close relationship with the armed forces, and until the 1980s, the chief of the National Police was quite often a senior officer from one of the armed services. The director general was assisted by a deputy director and two sections: internal affairs and planning, and special operations. Three sections, each headed by an assistant director general, carried out the administration and operation of the National Police. These were the Administration and Support Section, the Police Operations Section, and the Special Operations Section.
The Administration and Support Section supervised personnel, police education and training, and finances. It was responsible for the logistical system, communications, transportation, records, the police radio station, the police laboratory, and the data processing center. This section administered the police academy at Hatillo in San Cristóbal Province. The Police Operations Section oversaw normal police operations. It was segmented into several functional departments, including robbery investigation, homicide investigation, felonies and misdemeanors against private property, highway patrol, and narcotics and dangerous drugs. Police patrolled on foot, on horseback, and by motorcycle and automobile. The customs and harbor police employed a small number of boats.
The deputy director of police functioned as the immediate superior of five regional directors. These officers, usually police brigadier generals, were responsible for five territorial zones: the Northeastern Zone (headquartered at San Francisco de Macorís), the Northern Zone (Santiago), the Southern Zone (Barahona), the Central Zone (San Cristóbal), and the Eastern Zone (San Pedro de Marcorís). The police regions each covered several provinces; forces within the regions were broken down into provincial, company, detachment, and local police post divisions.
The Special Operations Section was responsible for the administration of the secret service, which in 1989 was headed by a police brigadier general. The secret service performed undercover surveillance of domestic political groups and foreigners suspected of espionage or of inciting political or economic disorder. In this capacity, the secret service coordinated its efforts with the National Department of Investigations (Departamento Nacional de Investigaciones--DNI), which was under the direct control of the president. Created in 1962, the DNI was authorized to "investigate any act committed by persons, groups, or associations that conflict with the Constitution, laws, or state institutions, or that attempt to establish any totalitarian form of government." The DNI was an investigative body and, unlike the police, it did not generally have arrest authority. The functions of the DNI were closely coordinated with those of the armed forces' intelligence units, as well as with the functions of the police. In 1989 the DNI was commanded by a retired army general.
Approximately half of all police personnel were stationed in the capital area, both because Santo Domingo was by far the nation's largest city and because police headquarters, as well as several special police units, were located there. Among the special units garrisoned in the capital was a paramilitary special operations battalion with some 1,000 personnel. The unit was used for riot-control in Santo Domingo, although elements could also be deployed rapidly to any section of the country. Other specialized police units included a specialized bank guard corps and a sappers corps that performed firefighting and civil defense duties.
Like the armed forces, the police participated actively in civic-action projects. Police medical and dental teams provided services for poor residents throughout the country. The police also made donations to organizations set up to assist the poor.
The public image of the police had improved since the 1970s, but excesses on the part of police personnel, including beatings of suspects, continued to receive media publicity. Both government and police officials had announced their intent to monitor such activities and to take corrective measures, but complaints about such abuses continued to surface during the late 1980s. The role of the police in quelling disturbances and in supporting the government's political agenda also continued to spark controversy.
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The Criminal Justice System
The Dominican criminal justice system was basically an inquisitorial arrangement in which a court and its staff took general charge of a criminal case, and the judge gathered evidence to supplement that produced by the prosecution and the defense. Evidence was largely committed to writing, and the final stage of the proceedings consisted of the judge's examining all the combined written material and then deciding whether or not he was convinced, beyond doubt, of the guilt of the accused. The nation's criminal courts did not, therefore, operate under a system of trial by jury.
The 1966 Constitution guarantees several basic legal rights to all citizens. These include the rights to due process, to public trial, and to habeas corpus protection. An accused person is also guaranteed protection against double jeopardy and selfincrimination . A written order from a competent judicial authority is required, if any person is to be detained more than forty-eight hours or if an individual's home or property is to be searched. In practice, the police and other officials generally honored these guarantees during the 1980s.
In addition to the Supreme Court of Justice, the Constitution establishes four basic types of courts: courts of appeal, the Lands Tribunal, courts of first instance, and justice of the peace courts. Criminal cases were tried in all courts except the Lands Tribunal. There were also a few special courts that heard criminal cases, including one for minors. Most misdemeanor offenses were tried by the justice of the peace courts, of which there were about 100, in 1989, one in each municipality or township. The courts of first instance had original jurisdiction for criminal felony cases. There were twenty-nine of these, one for each province. Decisions could be, and regularly were, appealed to one of the nation's seven courts of appeal. These courts also had original jurisdiction over cases against judges of courts of first instance, government attorneys, provincial governors, and other specified officials.
The Supreme Court served as the nation's ultimate court of appeal. It exercised original jurisdiction in cases involving the president, the vice president, members of the cabinet and Congress, and judges and prosecutors of the higher courts (see The Judiciary , ch. 4). The court consisted of nine members, one of whom was designated president of the Supreme Court. The court also administered all of the nation's lower courts. The attorney general, who had the same rank as the president of the Supreme Court, represented the government's case and oversaw the system of government prosecutors. An accused person was entitled to be represented by an attorney. Indigent persons under accusation generally were provided free counsel in felony cases.
Although the judiciary was organizationally a separate branch of government, several observers have noted that the constitutional provisions governing the appointment and the tenure of judges in practice undermined judicial independence. All judges, from the Supreme Court to the justice of the peace courts, were appointed by the Senate, and they served four-year terms concurrent with the terms of elected officials. This system effectively made a judge's continued service subject to the approval of the dominant party in the Senate. Critics both inside and outside the government asserted that this arrangement subjected judges to undue political influence. This method of appointment and replacement also frequently resulted in a wholesale turnover of judicial personnel, especially when control of the Senate changed hands. Such turnovers affected the consistency of the judiciary's application and interpretation of the law.
The Constitution requires all judges to have law degrees, and judges at each level of the judiciary are required to have practiced law for a specified number of years. Supreme Court justices, for instance, must have a minimum of twelve years of experience, and judges of the courts of first instance are required to have two years of experience. Justices of the peace are also required to have a law degree; exceptions were permitted, however, in rural areas where it might be impossible to appoint a trained lawyer. Despite these requirements, during the mid-1980s the government admitted that the poor quality of some personnel, as well as corruption within the judiciary, affected public attitudes toward the justice system as a whole. In 1985 the president of the national bar association and the attorney general's office led a campaign against the low wages and the poor working conditions that, they claimed, greatly contributed to the poor quality of judges and to the practice, by some, of accepting money or preferential treatment in return for a favorable decision. The government responded to the campaign, which included cancelled hearings and demonstrations, by raising wages and by declaring its determination to rid the judiciary of corrupt judges.
One other factor that undermined public confidence in the criminal justice system was the prolonged delay before trial that characterized virtually every case. Preventive detention was legal, and it was commonly employed. A 1987 study revealed that over 85 percent of the nation's prison population was still awaiting trial. Many of these prisoners had been in jail for years.
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Penal Law and Procedure
After independence the country adopted the French penal and criminal proceedings codes that had been in use during the Haitian occupation. Spanish translations were mandated by law in 1867. As of 1989, the most recent codes, adaptations of the original French documents to local traditions, had been adopted in 1884.
The 1884 Penal Code was composed of four books containing 487 articles. The first book dealt with penalties for crimes and provided for exile, imprisonment, temporary confinement, loss of civil rights, and assessment of fines. The death penalty--carried out by firing squad--was abolished in 1924 in favor of a maximum penalty of thirty years' imprisonment at forced labor. The second book dealt with criminal responsibility and liability, addressing such issues as mental competence, self-defense, and the ages at which perpetrators incur adult liability. The third book dealt with various felonies and misdemeanors, and it established punishments for each. The fourth book covered infractions of police regulations and their penalties.
The Code of Criminal Procedure consisted of two books. The first set forth rules governing the role of the police in judicial proceedings. The second established various practices for dealing with accused criminals; it provided for the involvement of different judicial bodies, according to the severity of the crime.
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The Prison System
The code of criminal procedure also covered the operations of the nation's prison system. The law required each judicial district, or province, to maintain one prison for convicted offenders and another for accused individuals awaiting trial. Provincial governors bore responsibility for the maintenance of these prisons and for their security. The national penitentiary was La Victoria Penitentiary in Santo Domingo; all individuals sentenced to more than two years of imprisonment served their sentences in La Victoria. This penitentiary had shoe, carpenter, tailor, and barber shops, as well as other facilities where convicts could be taught a useful trade. Prisoners able to take advantage of such opportunities received wages for their labor. Police officers ran the nation's prisons. In the late 1980s, the head of La Victoria Penitentiary was a police brigadier general.
In practice, the corrections system received inadequate financing, and it suffered from unsanitary conditions and overcrowding. The government publicly acknowledged this problem in 1988 and announced its intention to develop a solution. As a first step, badly needed repairs were begun on La Victoria. These long overdue measures were prompted in part by a riot at the prison in June 1988 in which two inmates were killed. Reports in the local press cited two conflicting causes of the riot. One version held that the prisoners rioted to protest a move to limit visiting hours. The second explanation, offered by the government, suggested that the violence was instigated by drug traffickers angered by government's pressure on the narcotics trade.
Although the Dominican Republic's domestic situation was much more stable in the late 1980s than that of neighboring Haiti, the potential existed for localized, or even generalized, disturbances. Economic conditions--inflation, devaluation, food shortages--usually underlay most riots or demonstrations. Marxist and other radical leftist groups, however, often sought to exacerbate such upheavals in order to discredit the government. This situation placed considerable pressure on the police and the armed forces to respond to civil unrest in a professional manner and to minimize attendant injuries to civilians. Furthermore, this role as the institutional bulwark of elected civilian government was one that the leadership of the police and the armed forces took very seriously, particularly because it constituted their primary mission in the late twentieth century.
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As of mid-1989, no definitive studies dealing comprehensively with national security matters in the contemporary Dominican Republic had been published. A general treatment of modern Dominican political life, touching on the military and its place in national life, can be found in G. Pope Atkins's Arms and Politics in the Dominican Republic. The most complete coverage of the history and development of the armed forces is contained in the section on the Dominican Republic in Adrian English's Armed Forces of Latin America. For developments since the early 1980s, the reader must search through issues of the Latin American Report, prepared by the Joint Publications Research Service, and the Daily Report: Latin Report, put out by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Current order of battle data are available in the International Institute of Strategic Studies' excellent annual, The Military Balance. The best overview of conditions of public order is contained in the section on the Dominican Republic in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, a report submitted annually by the United States Department of State to the United States Congress. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
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CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE
The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), enacted by the United States Congress in 1982-83, represented one of the major United States foreign economic policies toward Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1980s. Mainly a trade promotion program, the Initiative provided duty-free access to the United States market for about 3,000 products; it expanded bilateral economic assistance; and it allowed some limited tax breaks for new United States investors in the region. A number of United States agencies contributed to the formulation and implementation of the policy. As a result of the early failure of the CBI to stimulate exports from many of the countries involved, legislators attempted to amplify the program, and by 1990 Congress and the White House were expected to approve an expanded version. Whereas the CBI had improved the region's prosperity only slightly, by 1989 it had served nonetheless as a catalyst toward economic diversification in a number of Caribbean Basin countries.
The Reagan Administration's Proposal and Congressional Amendments
On February 24, 1982, in a speech before the Organization of American States, President Ronald Reagan unveiled a new proposal for the economic recovery of Central America and the Caribbean. The Reagan plan expanded duty-free entry of Caribbean Basin exports, for up to twelve years, as well as increased economic assistance and tax incentives for new United States investment in the region. The administration's proposal arose in the political context of a successful revolution in Nicaragua, active insurgencies in El Salvador and Guatemala, and coups in Grenada and Suriname that had established radical leftist regimes. Dramatic political change, coupled with an international economic crisis characterized by high oil prices, unprecedented interest rates, and declining commodity prices, rekindled the interest of United States policy makers in the region.
In September 1982, the 97th Congress passed the foreign aid portion of the president's plan in the form of Public Law 97-257, after scaling back some portions of the proposal, most notably the amount of aid earmarked for El Salvador. Even with congressional amendments, the overwhelming share of the US$350 million in supplemental assistance under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, the bill's official name, went toward the most strategically important nations in the region: El Salvador, Costa Rica, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras. Impoverished Haiti, for example, received only US$10 million in supplementary aid.As a result of opposition from domestic labor and industrial interests, the 98th Congress did not pass the trade provisions of the Act (as Public Law 98-67) until July 1983. The bill's final version, however, excluded the following items from duty-free coverage: petroleum and petroleum products, sugar, canned tuna, luggage, handbags, certain other leather goods, flat goods, rubber and plastic gloves, footwear, textiles and apparel subject to the Multifiber Agreement, and watches or watch parts manufactured in communist countries. Critics of the Initiative argued that with or without these exclusions, it represented more a political policy than a developmental one because new duty-free provisions would provide only limited economic benefits. Congressional sentiment ran against the investment tax exemptions originally included in the bill, and these measures were never approved. Some tax breaks were extended, however, to companies holding business meetings in certain countries.
Section 212 of the Act provided the president with the authority to designate beneficiary countries. To qualify, countries had to have a noncommunist government, had to meet specific requirements concerning the expropriation of United States property, had to cooperate in regional antinarcotics efforts, had to recognize arbitral awards to United States citizens, could not provide preferential treatment to the products of developing countries in such a manner as to adversely affect United States trade, had to abstain from the illegal broadcast of United States copyrighted material, and had to maintain an extradition treaty with the United States. In addition, the Act authorized the president to consider eleven discretionary criteria to qualify potential beneficiaries. These included such considerations as the use of subsidies, acceptance of the rules of international trade, and guarantees of workers' rights. President Reagan initially announced twenty-one beneficiary nations or territories from the Caribbean, Central America, and the Northern coast of South America. Countries excluded from the list included Cuba, Nicaragua, Guyana, Suriname, Anguilla, the Cayman Islands, and the Turks and Caicos Islands, none of which applied for designation. The Bahamas became a beneficiary nation in March 1985; Aruba became one in January 1986 (its independence date); and Guyana, in November 1988. In March 1988, President Reagan suspended Panama's eligibility because of reported links between that country's government and international narcotic traffickers.
The CBI legislation also encompassed other important provisions. Section 213 stipulated the basic product eligibility rule that at least 35 percent of the value-added of the imported product had to originate in a beneficiary country for that country to qualify for duty-free treatment. This section also empowered the president to withdraw duty-free treatment in case of injury to domestic industries resulting from CBI imports. As a result of complaints from Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands that the CBI extended benefits previously reserved for United States overseas territories, section 214 set forth special benefits under the law. These included an increase in foreign content for product eligibility of up to 70 percent, as well as other more technical exemptions. Section 221 also transferred all rum taxes proceeds to the treasuries of the two United States possessions. Puerto Rico also benefited from the twin plant plan (see Glossary), which encouraged United States investors to operate complementary factories in Puerto Rico and in other beneficiary countries. This framework enabled investors to tap funds accumulated under section 936 (see Glossary) of the United States Internal Revenue Code in order to develop complementary operations if the recipient country had signed a Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA) with the United States. Finally, Section 222 permitted tax deductions for business conventions in the region if the country had signed a TIEA.
The CBI Network
The United States Department of State played a central role in designing and implementing the Initiative, but many other executive-branch agencies contributed extensively to the policy. The United States Agency for International Development (AID) administered most economic assistance flows, concentrating its efforts on the private sector. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Peace Corps, the Department of Transportation, the Export-Import Bank, and the Customs Service of the Department of the Treasury all enhanced and complemented AID's endeavors. The Department of Commerce, through its Caribbean Basin Information Center and its normal regional offices, provided information packages, investment climate statements, economic trend reports, special product advice, investment missions, a monthly networking newsletter, and other information and services for potential investors. The Department of Agriculture similarly promoted the CBI through frequent agribusiness marketing workshops and technical assistance missions, and by supplying important regulatory information on United States import standards. The International Trade Commission and the Department of Labor took part by issuing in-depth annual reports on the progress of the CBI and its impact on the United States. The Office of the United States Trade Representative oversaw bilateral investment and textile agreements; and, beginning in 1987, that office hired an ombudsman to direct the CBI Operations Committee, an interagency task force dedicated to the policy's success. Finally, public and private monies helped to create a strong private business and advocacy network to further the aims of the CBI.
The United States government also generated a certain amount of multilateral and bilateral support for the Initiative. Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and the European Economic Community supported the CBI in a limited way, mainly through the extension of existing programs. Japan increased its aid to the region, as did Canada; on February 17, 1986, the Canadian government offered its own import preference program for the region, a package it dubbed Caribcan. Multilaterals such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank (see Glossary), and the International Monetary Fund (see Glossary) also cooperated with the Initiative through a variety of programs, particularly policy reform efforts coordinated with AID.
Expansion of CBI Benefits and Programs
Visiting the island of Grenada on February 20, 1986, President Reagan announced increased access to the United States market for apparel assembled in the Caribbean Basin in an effort to enlarge the impact of the CBI. The program, referred to either as 807-A (see 807 program, Glossary) or "Super 807" provided guaranteed access levels for CBI beneficiary countries through import quota negotiations based on previous exports and expected growth. The proposal was the direct result of regional discontent with the limited benefits of the Initiative and the expressed fears of regional leaders with regard to mounting protectionist sentiment in the United States. A group of leaders of the English-speaking Caribbean had expressed their dissatisfaction through a detailed letter to President Reagan in late 1985. Regional leaders generally welcomed the small improvement made through the 807-A announcement because of the extraordinary growth in textile production since the inauguration of the CBI.
After a series of regional and Washington-based hearings, in 1987 members of Congress introduced legislation to improve further the benefits of the Initiative. By mid-1989, a number of proposals had been combined under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Expansion Act of 1989 (H.R. 1233), most of which was expected to become law. Stating that "the existing program has not fully achieved the positive results that were intended," the House's Expansion Act, dubbed CBI II, proposed an indefinite time extension for duty-free entry of CBI covered products (previously scheduled to expire September 30, 1995) and the addition of several specific garments and fabrics to be provided reduced or exempted duties. It also guaranteed market access for textiles and footwear via bilateral agreements with all beneficiary nations; potential increases for beneficiary countries in their sugar quotas, through reallocations from other countries that did not reach their allotted share; increased duty-free allowances for United States tourists visiting the region; more flexible criteria for ethanol imports; increased postsecondary scholarships for study in the United States; greater promotion of tourist development; and the trial establishment of preinspection customs facilities to expedite exports. CBI II also sought special measures to enable the Eastern Caribbean and Belize to reap greater benefits from the program, as well as the application of new rules of origin for determining the content of duty-free imports, the employment of internationally recognized workers' rights criteria in evaluating the compliance of beneficiary countries, and a requirement that the president report to Congress every three years on the progress of the Initiative.
An Assessment of the First Five Years
One of the major aims of the plan was to increase economic assistance in order to foster sustained economic growth through stimulation of the private sector and the expansion of exports. Beneficiary nations sought increased aid to cushion the impact of the recession of the early 1980s and to provide support during the difficult economic adjustment period of the mid-1980s. The US$350 million in assistance to the region, provided under the auspices of the CBI as a supplement to annual allocations, contributed to a dramatic increase in United States assistance to Central America and the Caribbean, from US$300 million in 1981 to nearly US$1.5 billion in 1985. A large portion of this assistance, however, was motivated by United States strategic concerns rather than developmental ones. For example, El Salvador, engaged in a war against leftist insurgents, received nearly one-third of all assistance throughout this period. Similarly, some strategic countries received allocations in excess of their absorptive capacities while other countries pursued additional United States support. Increased assistance gave the United States significant leverage in encouraging recipient countries to reform their economic policies in such areas as exchange rates, the promotion of increased and diversified exports, the expansion of light manufacturing, reductions in import controls, privatization of state-owned enterprises, the balancing of fiscal accounts, promotion of small business development, and the upgrading of infrastructure. Evidence of the impact of these reforms continued to be inconclusive at the close of the decade, but several countries had begun to open and to diversify their economies, thereby setting the stage, it was hoped, for sustained future growth.
The promotion of increased foreign investment, although not part of the final CBI legislation, continued to be one of the overall goals of the Initiative. In 1988 the United States Department of Commerce surveyed Caribbean investment trends in a comprehensive manner, after a previously unsuccessful attempt to quantify CBI-related ventures in 1986. The 1988 survey revealed that significant new investment had taken place in the region during the 1984-88 period, despite the lack of tax credits for United States companies. The 642 United States companies participating in the study accounted for US$1.6 billion in new investment in CBI countries (excluding Panama) and for 116,000 new jobs. Only 150 of these firms (23 percent), however, exported CBI- eligible products; therefore, the CBI was directly related to the creation of only 15 percent of the new jobs. Furthermore, the new investment was highly concentrated; five countries accounted for 67 percent of all new investment. By 1988 the Dominican Republic had surpassed Jamaica as the prime investment location, and it received one-fifth of all the Caribbean Basin's new investment because of the vibrant growth of its industrial free zones. By contrast, Haiti suffered disinvestment because of political unrest, high nonwage costs, and increased regional competition for investment in labor- intensive industry. More than half of all foreign investment was from the United States, followed by the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Canada, and Hong Kong. Although new CBI-related and other foreign investment helped the balance-of-payments positions of several countries and provided badly needed jobs in manufacturing and tourism, foreign exchange remained scarce in the late 1980s, and unemployment continued to hover at dangerously high levels in most countries.
The centerpiece of the Initiative, however, was neither aid nor investment, but one-way duty-free trade with the United States. An assessment of CBI trade data demonstrated both negative and positive trends. On the negative side, the value of total Caribbean Basin exports generally declined throughout the 1980s because of dwindling prices for the region's traditional exports, such as petroleum, sugar, and bauxite. Except in the case of sugar, this poor performance was attributable almost solely to the vagaries of primary product prices. United States policy clearly damaged sugar exports, however, through the reimposition of sugar quotas in 1981 and through the 75 percent reduction in Caribbean and Central America quotas from 1981 to 1987, a trend that offset export growth among CBI-exempted products. Not only did the region's total exports drop by US$2.7 billion from 1983 to 1988, but its share of the United States market weakened, dropping from 6.5 percent of United States imports in 1980 to 1.6 percent by 1987. As was true of investment, only a small percentage (less than 20 percent) of the growth in nontraditional exports resulted from duty-free entry extended through the CBI. Furthermore, only ten items accounted for the great majority of products that entered the United States market duty-free. Moreover, exports, like investments, were concentrated; only a handful of countries generated the overwhelming share of CBI 806.3 (see 807 program, Glossary) and 807 exports, while some countries suffered substantial declines in exports. Overall, despite import exemptions in the United States market, the United States ran a trade surplus with the region from 1987 to 1989. After years of pursuing the goal of "trade, not aid," United States policy through the CBI in 1989 continued to provide fewer economic benefits from trade than from aid.
Despite some negative trends, Caribbean Basin countries experienced substantial growth in nontraditional exports during the 1980s. For example, although the Basin's total exports lagged behind other regions, growth in manufactures and other nontraditional exports far surpassed that of other regions. In fact, some Basin countries outperformed even the newly industrialized countries of Asia. The composition of trade shifted markedly away from agricultural commodities and raw materials in favor of nontraditional exports, textiles, and apparel. In 1983 the region's exports broke down as being 78 percent traditional commodities, 17 percent nontraditional ones, and 4 percent textiles and apparel; by 1988, however, traditional exports represented only 37 percent of total exports, compared with 44 percent for nontraditionals, and 19 percent for textiles and apparel. This shift was particularly true of United States imports covered under the 807 provisions; the value of these imports more than doubled from 1983 to 1988. Judging by these statistics, it appeared that although the CBI directly stimulated only limited export growth, its emphasis on nontraditional exports contributed to the restructuring of much of the region's external trade. Such restructuring was especially found among Caribbean countries because of the larger share of depressed primary products in their export baskets relative to those of Central America.
After an initial lag period, CBI trade statistics improved markedly in 1988, and observers expected continued growth in trade and investment. Although many of the structural obstacles to development in the region endured, the broadening of the productive and export base improved long-term prospects for economic growth.
**********
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Estadístico [Sant |
