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ETHIOPIA, a country study
Federal Research Division
Library of Congress
Edited by Thomas P. Ofcansky and LaVerle Berry
Research Completed 1991
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Acknowledgments
The authors would like to acknowledge their use and adaptation of information in the 1981 edition of Ethiopia: A Country Study, edited by Harold D. Nelson and Irving Kaplan. The authors are also grateful to numerous individuals in various government agencies and private institutions who generously shared their time, expertise, and knowledge about Ethiopia. These people include Paul B. Henze, The Rand Corporation; Thomas L. Kane, Department of Defense; Thomas Collelo, Department of Defense; Carol Boger, Department of Defense; Major Dale R. Endreson, United States Army; and Ralph K. Benesch, who oversees the Country Studies Area Handbook Program for the Department of the Army. None of these individuals is in any way responsible for the work of the authors, however.
The authors also wish to thank those who contributed directly to the preparation of the manuscript. These include Sandra W. Meditz, who reviewed all textual and graphic materials and served as liaison with the sponsoring agency; Marilyn Majeska, who managed the editing; Vincent Ercolano, who edited the chapters; Joshua Sinai, who helped prepare the manuscript for prepublication review; and Barbara Edgerton, Janie L. Gilchrist, and Izella Watson, who did the word processing. Andrea T. Merrill performed the final prepublication editorial review and managed production. Joan C. Cook compiled the index.
David P. Cabitto provided invaluable graphics support. Harriett R. Blood and Greenhorne and O'Mara prepared the maps, which were drafted by Tim Merrill and reviewed by David P. Cabitto. The charts were prepared by David P. Cabitto and Greenhorne and O'Mara. Wayne Horne deserves special thanks for designing the illustration for the book's cover. Deborah A. Clement designed the illustrations for the chapter title pages.
Finally, the authors acknowledge the generosity of the individuals and public and private agencies who allowed their photographs to be used in this study. They are indebted especially to those who contributed work not previously published.
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
Preface
Country Profile
Introduction
Chapter 1. Historical Setting
.....Origins and the Early Periods
Early Populations and Neighboring States
The Aksumite State
Ethiopia and the Early Islamic Period
The Zagwe Dynasty
The "Restoration" of the "Solomonic" Line
Amhara Ascendancy
.....The Trials of the Christian Kingdom and the Decline of Imperial Power
Growth of Regional Muslim States
Oromo Migrations and Their Impact
Contact with European Christendom
The Gonder State and the Ascendancy of the Nobility
.....The Making of Modern Ethiopia
The Reestablishment of the Ethiopian Monarchy
From Tewodros II to Menelik II, 1855-89
The Interregnum
Haile Selassie: The Prewar Period, 1930-36
. . . . . . Italian Rule and World War II
Italian Administration in Eritrea
Mussolini's Invasion and the Italian Occupation
Ethiopia in World War II
. . . . . The Postwar Period, 1945-60: Reform and Opposition
Change and Resistance
Administrative Change and the 1955 Constitution
The Attempted Coup of 1960 and Its Aftermath
. . . . . Growth of Secessionist Threats
The Liberation Struggle in Eritrea
Discontent in Tigray
The Ogaden and the Haud
. . . . . Revolution and Military Government
Background to Revolution, 1960-74
The Establishment of the Derg
The Struggle for Power, 1974-77
Ethiopia's Road to Socialism
. . . . . The Mengistu Regime and Its Impact
Political Struggles Within the Government
War in the Ogaden and the Turn to the Soviet Union
Eritrean and Tigrayan Insurgencies
Social and Political Changes
. . . . . Ethiopia in Crisis: Famine and Its Aftermath,
Famine and Economic Collapse
Government Defeats in Eritrea and Tigray
The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
Changes in Soviet Policy and New International Horizons
Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment
. . . . . Physical Setting
Boundaries: International and Administrative
Topography and Drainage
Population
Size, Distribution, and Growth
Urbanization
Resettlement and Villagization
. . . . . Refugees, Drought, and Famine
. . . . . Ethiopia's Peoples
Ethnic Groups, Ethnicity, and Language
Ethio-Semitic Language Groups
Cushitic Language Groups
Omotic Language Groups
Nilo-Saharan Language Groups
Occupational Castes
Ethnic and Social Relations
Interethnic Relations
Social Relations
. . . . . Social System
Rural Society
Urban Society
The Role of Women
. . . . . Religious Life
Demography and Geography of Religious Affiliation
Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity
Organization of the Church and the Clergy
Faith and Practice
Islam
Basic Teachings of Islam
Local Character of Belief and Practice
Indigenous Religions
Foreign Missions
. . . . . Education
Education During Imperial Rule
Primary and Secondary Education since 1975
Higher and Vocational Education since 1975
Literacy
Foreign Educational Assistance
. . . . . Health and Welfare
Chapter 3. The Economy
. . . . . Growth and Structure of the Economy
Developments up to l974
Postrevolution Period
. . . . . Role of Government
The Budgetary Process
Revenue and Expenditures
Banking and Monetary Policy
. . . . . Labor Force
Unemployment
Labor Unions
Wages and Prices
. . . . . Agriculture
Land Use and Land Reform
Land Use
Land Reform
Government Rural Programs
Peasant Associations and Rural Development
Cooperatives and State Farms
Resettlement and Villagization
Agricultural Production
Major Cash Crops
Major Staple Crops
Livestock
Fishing
Forestry
Government Marketing Operations
. . . . . Industry and Energy
Manufacturing
Industrial Development Policy
Energy Resources
Mining
. . . . . Transportation and Telecommunications
Roads
Railroads
Ports
Air Transport
Telecommunications
. . . . . Foreign Trade
Exports
Imports
Balance of Payments and Foreign Assistance
. . . . . Economic Prospects
Chapter 4. Government and Politics
. . . . . The Workers' Party of Ethiopia
Toward Party Formation
The Vanguard Party
. . . . . The 1987 Constitution
The Social Order
Citizenship, Freedoms, Rights, and Duties
National Shengo (National Assembly)
Council of State
The President
Council of Ministers
Judicial System
. . . . . Regional and Local Government
Regional Administration
Peasant Associations
Cash for Work" project sponsored by United Nations Children's
Kebeles
. . . . . . Civil Service
. . . . . The Politics of Development
The Politics of Drought and Famine
The Politics of Villagization
. . . . . Political Dynamics
Political Participation and Repression
The Eritrean Movement
Eritrea and the Imperial Regime
Eritrea and the Mengistu Regime
The Tigrayan Movement
Other Movements and Fronts
Oromo Groups
Afar Groups
Somali Groups
Leftist Groups
Regime Stability and Peace Negotiations
. . . . . Mass Media
. . . . . Foreign Policy
Diplomacy and State Building in Imperial Ethiopia
The Foreign Policy of the Derg
The Derg, the Soviet Union, and the Communist World
The Derg and the West
Ethiopia's Border Politics
Addis Ababa and the Middle East
. . . . . The Demise of the Military Government
Chapter 5. National Security
. . . . . Military Tradition in National Life
. . . . . The Armed Forces
The 1987 Constitution and the Armed Forces
Command and Force Structure
Army
Air Force
Navy
People's Militia
Training
Morale and Discipline
Manpower Considerations
Defense Costs
. . . . . Foreign Military Assistance
United States
Soviet Union
Cuba
East Germany
North Korea
Israel
The Eritreans
The Tigray
The Oromo
The Somali
. . . . . Public Order and Internal Security
The National Police
People's Protection Brigades
. . . . . Crime and Punishment
The Legal System
Prisons
. . . . . Human Rights
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Ethiopia: Preface
This study replaces Ethiopia: A Country Study, which was
completed in 1980--six years after a group of military
officers overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie I and eventually
established a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship. By 1990 this
regime, led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, was on the verge of
collapse, largely because of its inability to defeat two
insurgencies in the northern part of the country.
This edition of Ethiopia: A Country Study examines the
revolutionary government's record until a few months before
its demise. Subsequent events are discussed in the
Introduction. Like its predecessor, this study investigates
the historical, social, economic, political, and national
security forces that helped determine the nature of
Ethiopian society. Sources of information used in the
study's preparation included scholarly books, journals, and
monographs; official reports of governments and
international organizations; numerous periodicals; the
authors' previous research and observations; and interviews
with individuals who have special competence in Ethiopian
and African affairs. Chapter bibliographies appear at the
end of the book; brief comments on sources recommended for
further reading appear at the end of each chapter.
The available materials on Ethiopia frequently presented
problems because of the different transliterations of place-
names and personal names used by scholars and other writers.
No standardized and universally accepted system has been
developed for the transliteration of Amharic (the most
widely used language in the country), and even the Ethiopian
government's official publications vary in their English
spellings of proper names. Insofar as possible, the authors
have attempted to reduce the confusion with regard to place-
names by adhering to the system adopted by the United States
Board on Geographic Names (BGN), except that diacritical
markings are eliminated in this study. With regard to
personal names, the authors have attempted to use the most
common English spellings. The authors also have followed the
Amharic tradition of referring only to the first element of
a name when using it in a second reference. Thus, Mengistu
Haile Mariam becomes Mengistu after the first use.
The reader should exercise caution with regard to dates
cited in relation to Ethiopia. Dates used in this book
generally are according to the standard, Gregorian (Western)
calendar. But life in Ethiopia is actually governed by the
Ethiopian calendar, which consists of twelve months of
thirty days each and one month of five days (six in leap
years) running from September 11 to September 10 according
to the Gregorian calendar. The sequence of years in the
Ethiopian calendar also differs from the Gregorian calendar,
running seven years behind the Gregorian calendar at the
beginning of an Ethiopian year and eight years behind at its
end.
The reader will note the frequent use in this book of
double years, such as 1989/90 or 1990/91, especially in
Chapters 2 and 3. These dates do not mean that a two-year
period is covered. Rather, they reflect the conversion of
Ethiopian calendar years to the Gregorian system. When
1990/91 is used, for example, the date refers to September
11, 1990, to September 10, 1991, or the equivalent of the
Ethiopian calendar year of 1983. Some economic data are
based on the Ethiopian fiscal year, which runs from July 8
to the following July 7 in the Gregorian calendar, but eight
years behind the Gregorian year. Hence, Ethiopian fiscal
year 1990/91 (also seen as EFY 1990/91) corresponds to July
11, 1990, to July 10, 1991, or the equivalent of Ethiopian
fiscal year 1983. Concerning economic data in general, it
must be noted that there has been a dearth of new statistics
since 1988, reflecting the state of affairs within the
Ethiopian government since then.
All measurements in this study are presented in the metric
system. A conversion table is provided to assist those
readers who may not be familiar with metric equivalents (see
Appendix). The book also includes a Glossary to
explain terms with which the reader may not be familiar.
Finally, readers will note that the body of the text
reflects information available as of July 1991. Certain
other portions of the text, however, have been updated: the
Introduction discusses significant events that have occurred
since the information cutoff date; the Country Profile
includes updated statistics when such information is
available; and the Bibliography lists recently published
sources thought to be particularly helpful to the reader.
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COUNTRY
Formal Name: Ethiopia.
Short Form: Ethiopia.
Term for Citizens: Ethiopian(s).
Capital: Addis Ababa.
GEOGRAPHY
Size: About 1,221,900 square kilometers; major portion of
easternmost African landmass known as Horn of Africa.
NOTE--The Country Profile contains updated information as
available.
Topography: Massive highland complex of mountains and
dissected plateaus divided by Great Rift Valley running
generally southwest to northeast and surrounded by lowlands,
steppes, or semidesert; northeastern coastline of about 960
kilometers along the Red Sea. Great terrain diversity
determines wide variations in climate, soils, natural
vegetation, and settlement patterns.
Climate: Elevation and geographic location produce three
climatic zones: cool zone above 2,400 meters where
temperatures range from near freezing to 16 C; temperate
zone at elevations of 1,500 to 2,400 meters with
temperatures from 16 C to 30 C; and hot zone below 1,500
meters with both tropical and arid conditions and daytime
temperatures ranging from 27 C to 50 C. Normal rainy season
from mid-June to mid-September (longer in the southern
highlands) preceded by intermittent showers from February or
March; remainder of year generally dry.
SOCIETY
Population: Mid-1992 population estimated at 54 million,
with a 3 percent or higher annual growth rate. Urban
population estimated at about 11 percent of total
population.
Ethnic Groups and Languages: Distinguishable ethnolinguistic
entities, some speaking the same language, estimated at more
than 100; at least seventy languages spoken as mother
tongues. Largest group is the Oromo, about 40 percent of
total population. Roughly 30 percent of total population
consists of the Amhara, whose native language--Amharic--is
also spoken by additional 20 percent of population as second
tongue. Amharic is Ethiopia's official language. The Tigray,
speaking Tigrinya, constitute 12 to 15 percent of total
population. Large number of smaller groups include Somali,
Gurage, Awi, Afar, Welamo, Sidama, and Beja.
Religion: About 50 percent of population Ethiopian Orthodox;
Orthodoxy identified mainly with Amhara and Tigray peoples
but accepted by other groups as well. About 2 percent
Protestant and Roman Catholic combined. Approximately 40
percent adherents of Islam. Remainder of population
practiced various indigenous religions.
Education: In 1985/86 (Ethiopian calendar year--see
Glossary), 3.1 million children were enrolled in grades one
through twelve. Nearly 2.5 million, or 42 percent, of
primary school-age children enrolled in 7,900 primary
schools (grades one through six); 363,000 students attended
964 junior secondary schools (grades seven and eight); more
than 292,000, or 5.3 percent of secondary school-age
children, enrolled in 245 secondary schools (grades nine
through twelve). Vocational schools emphasized technical
education; in 1985/86 more than 4,200 attended nine
technical schools. Intense competition for admission to
approximately twelve colleges and universities; more than
18,400 students in various institutions of higher education.
Literacy: Less than 10 percent during imperial regime; had
increased to 63 percent by 1984, according to Ethiopian
government. Revolutionary government undertook major
national literacy campaign, which made significant gains,
especially among women.
Health: Malaria and tuberculosis major endemic diseases;
also health problems from parasitic and gastroenteritis
infections, leprosy, venereal diseases, typhus, typhoid,
trachoma, conjunctivitis, and childhood diseases. All
complicated by insufficient health facilities, shortage of
medical personnel, unsanitary practices, and nutritional
deficiencies. Acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS)
becoming a greater problem.
Life Expectancy: Fifty years for males and fifty-three for
females in 1992.
ECONOMY
Salient Features: Socialist oriented after 1974 revolution,
with strong state controls. Thereafter, large part of
economy transferred to public sector, including most modern
industry and large-scale commercial agriculture, all
agricultural land and urban rental property, and all
financial institutions; some private enterprise and capital
participation permitted in certain sectors. Since mid-1991,
a decentralized, market-oriented economy emphasizing
individual initiative, designed to reverse a decade of
economic decline. In 1993 gradual privatization of business,
industry, banking, agriculture, trade, and commerce under
way.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): US$6 billion in 1990; per
capita GDP about US$120. Economy grew during late 1970s but
declined in early 1980s and stagnated thereafter. GDP in
Ethiopian fiscal year (EFY) 1990/91 fell by 5 to 6 percent
in real terms, after a 1 percent decline in EFY 1989/90.
Agriculture registered modest gains after 1989.
Agriculture and Livestock: Accounted for approximately 40
percent of gross domestic product (GDP), 80 percent of
exports, and 80 percent of labor force in 1991; other
activities dependent on marketing, processing, and exporting
of agricultural products. Production overwhelmingly of
subsistence nature with large part of commodity exports
provided by small agricultural monetized sector. Principal
crops coffee, pulses, oilseeds, cereals, potatoes,
sugarcane, and vegetables. Livestock population believed
largest in Africa. Livestock alone accounted for about 15
percent of GDP in 1987.
Industry: Manufacturing severely affected by economic
dislocation following revolution. Growth of sector low after
1975. Primary subsectors cement, textiles, food processing,
and oil refining. In 1993 smaller enterprises being
privatized; larger ones still under state control. Most
industry functioning well below capacity.
Energy Sources: Hydroelectric power most important developed
and potential source of energy. Domestic mineral fuel
resources in 1991 included low-grade lignite and traces of
petroleum and natural gas. Potentially important geothermal
power exists in Great Rift Valley.
Foreign Trade: Little foreign trade by international
standards. Exports almost entirely agricultural commodities;
coffee largest foreign exchange earner. Value of imports
regularly greater than export receipts. Wide range of
trading partners, but most important in 1992 included United
States, Germany, Britain, and Japan.
Currency: Birr (pl., birr; no symbol). Prior to October 1,
1992, US$1 equaled 2.07 birr. After devaluation on that date
US$1 equaled 4.94 birr. Significant parallel currency market
existed before devaluation.
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
Roads: Construction of adequate road system greatly hampered
by rugged terrain of highlands and normally heavy seasonal
rainfall. Approximately 18,000 kilometers of roads in 1991,
of which 13,000 kilometers were all-weather roads. Road
density lowest in Africa; perhaps three-fourths of farms
more than one-half day's walk from an all-weather road.
Railroads: One line operating in 1993 from Addis Ababa to
city of Djibouti. Second line from Akordat to Mitsiwa
discontinued operation in 1976 because of unprofitability
and partly destroyed in later fighting.
Ports: Two major ports--Aseb and Mitsiwa--both in Eritrea;
further access to ocean transport through port of Djibouti;
all usable by deep-sea vessels.
Civil Aviation: Important in domestic communications because
of underdeveloped state of other means of transportation.
International airports at Addis Ababa, Asmera, and Dire
Dawa; major airports at a few other towns; remaining
airfields little more than landing strips. In 1993 Ethiopian
Airlines provided domestic service to some forty-five
destinations and international service to Africa, western
Europe, India, and China.
Telecommunications: Minimal system. Radio-relay links
connected Addis Ababa with Nairobi and Djibouti; other
international service via Atlantic Ocean satellite of
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
(Intelsat). Limited local telephone service and equipment;
four AM radio stations, one shortwave transmitter;
television service in ten cities.
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
Party and Government: Until 1974 revolution ruled by an
imperial regime whose last emperor was Haile Selassie I.
Following revolution, a socialist state based on principles
of Marxism-Leninism, led by Workers' Party of Ethiopia.
Constitution promulgated in 1987 created People's Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia. In theory, National Shengo (National
Assembly) highest organ of political power, but real power
centered in hands of Mengistu Haile Mariam, president and
commander in chief of armed forces.
In May 1991, Mengistu regime overthrown by coalition of
forces led by Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic
Front (EPRDF). A National Conference in July 1991 created
Transitional Government of Ethiopia, consisting of a
president and a prime minister, a seventeen-member Council
of Ministers, and an eighty-seven-member Council of
Representatives. Transitional government to last not longer
than two-and-one-half years. Meles Zenawi, former head of
EPRDF, elected president by Council of Representatives. In
mid-1993 new constitution being drafted to come into force
not later than early 1994.
After May 1991, Eritrea controlled by Eritrean People's
Liberation Front (EPLF). EPLF set up Provisional Government
of Eritrea under its leader, Issaias Afwerki. In a
referendum held April 23-25, 1993, more than 98 percent of
registered voters favored independence from Ethiopia. In May
1993, Government of Eritrea was formed, consisting of a
National Assembly with supreme authority, a State Council
with executive powers, and a president. Issaias Afwerki
elected president by National Assembly. New government to
last not longer than four years, during which democratic
constitution is to be written.
Judicial System: As of mid-1993, new judicial system in
process of being established.
Administrative Divisions: In mid-1991 Transitional
Government of Ethiopia created twelve autonomous regions on
basis of ethnic identity, plus two multiethnic chartered
cities (Addis Ababa and Harer). Each region broken into
districts (weredas), the basic unit of administration. On
June 21, 1992, elections were held to fill seats on wereda
and regional councils.
Foreign Relations: In late 1980s, Ethiopia relied on Soviet
Union, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea),
Israel, and various East European countries for military
assistance and on Western nations for humanitarian aid and
small amounts of economic assistance. After mid-1991,
transitional government reoriented Ethiopia's foreign
relations from East to West, establishing warm relations
with United States and western Europe and seeking
substantial economic aid from Western countries and World
Bank. Ethiopia also active in attempts to mediate the civil
war in Somalia
International Agreements and Memberships: Numerous,
including Organization of African Unity and United Nations
and a number of its specialized agencies, such as World Bank
and International Monetary Fund.
NATIONAL SECURITY
Armed Forces: In mid-1991, combined strength of Ethiopian
armed forces about 438,000. Ground forces estimated at
430,000 (including about 200,000 members of People's
Militia). Air force estimated at 4,500. Navy estimated at
3,500. After downfall of Mengistu regime, armed forces
collapsed and were dismantled by EPRDF. In mid-1993, EPRDF
had 100,000 to 120,000 guerrillas under arms; EPLF had
between 85,000 and 100,000. Both planned to transform their
forces into conventional armies and also to reconstitute air
forces and navies.
Combat Units and Major Equipment: Before mid-1991, ground
forces organized into five revolutionary armies comprising
thirty-one infantry divisions supported by thirty-two tank
battalions, forty artillery battalions, twelve air defense
battalions, and eight commando brigades. Major weapons
systems included T-54/55 and T-62 tanks, various caliber
howitzers and guns, antiaircraft guns, and surface-to-air
missiles. Air force organized into seven fighter-ground
attack squadrons, one transport squadron, and one training
squadron. Equipment included 150 combat aircraft. Navy
equipment included two frigates and twenty-four patrol and
coastal combatants.
After downfall of Mengistu government, several insurgent
groups, including EPRDF, EPLF, and Oromo Liberation Front,
captured a considerable amount of ground equipment; former
soldiers sold an unknown quantity of small arms and light
equipment throughout Horn of Africa. Naval crews with their
vessels and an unknown number of pilots with their aircraft
scattered to neighboring countries. Information on military
organization, personnel strength, and equipment types and
numbers in both Ethiopia and Eritrea unavailable as of mid-
1993.
Defense Budge: Estimated at US$472 million in 1987-88. No
figures available for defense expenditures for Ethiopia or
Eritrea as of mid-1993.
Police Agencies and Paramilitary Forces: National police
included paramilitary Mobile Emergency Police Force,
estimated at 9,000. Paramilitary frontier guards. Local law
enforcement delegated to civilian paramilitary People's
Protection Brigades. By mid-1993, national police force
functioning throughout Ethiopia in place of EPRDF soldiers.
EPLF personnel performed police duties throughout Eritrea.
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Ethiopia: Introduction
FEW AFRICAN COUNTRIES have had such a long, varied, and
troubled history as Ethiopia. The Ethiopian state originated
in the Aksumite kingdom, a trading state that emerged about
the first century A.D. The Askumites perfected a written
language; maintained relations with the Byzantine Empire,
Egypt, and the Arabs; and, in the mid-fourth century,
embraced Christianity. After the rise of Islam in the
seventh century, the Aksumite kingdom became internationally
isolated as Arabs gradually gained control of maritime trade
in the Red Sea. By the early twelfth century, the successors
of the Aksumites had expanded southward and had established
a new capital and a line of kings called the Zagwe. A new
dynasty, the so-called "Solomonic" line, which came to power
about 1270, continued this territorial expansion and pursued
a more aggressive foreign policy. In addition, this
Christian state, with the help of Portuguese soldiers,
repelled a near-overpowering Islamic invasion.
Starting about the mid-sixteenth century, the Oromo people,
migrating from the southwest, gradually forced their way
into the kingdom, most often by warfare. The Oromo, who
eventually constituted about 40 percent of Ethiopia's
population, possessed their own culture, religion, and
political institutions. As the largest national group in
Ethiopia, the Oromo significantly influenced the course of
the country's history by becoming part of the royal family
and the nobility and by joining the army or the imperial
government. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
religious and regional rivalries gradually weakened the
imperial state until it was little more than a collection of
independent and competing fiefdoms.
Ethiopia's modern period (1855 to the present)--represented
by the reigns of Tewodros II, Yohannis IV, Menelik II,
Zawditu, and Haile Selassie I; by the Marxist regime of
Mengistu Haile Mariam; and, since mid-1991, by the
Transitional Government of Ethiopia under Meles Zenawi--has
been been characterized by nation-building as well as by
warfare. Tewodros II started the process of recreating a
cohesive Ethiopian state by incorporating Shewa into his
empire and by suppressing revolts in the country's other
provinces. Yohannis IV battled to keep Ethiopia free from
foreign domination and to retard the growing power of the
Shewan king, Menelik. Eventually, Menelik became emperor and
used military force to more than double Ethiopia's size. He
also defeated an Italian invasion force that sought to
colonize the country.
Struggles over succession to the throne characterized the
reign of Zawditu--struggles won by Haile Selassie, the next
ruler. After becoming emperor in 1930, Haile Selassie
embarked on a nationwide modernization program. However, the
1935-36 Italo-Ethiopian war halted his efforts and forced
him into exile. After returning to Addis Ababa in 1941,
Haile Selassie undertook further military and political
changes and sought to encourage social and economic
development. Although he did initiate a number of
fundamental reforms, the emperor was essentially an
autocrat, who to a great extent relied on political
manipulation and military force to remain in power and to
preserve the Ethiopian state. Even after an unsuccessful
1960 coup attempt led by the Imperial Bodyguard, Haile
Selassie failed to pursue the political and economic
policies necessary to improve the lives of most Ethiopians.
In 1974 a group of disgruntled military personnel overthrew
the Ethiopian monarchy. Eventually, Mengistu Haile Mariam,
who participated in the coup against Haile Selassie, emerged
at the head of a Marxist military dictatorship. Almost
immediately, the Mengistu regime unleashed a military and
political reign of terror against its real and imagined
opponents. It also pursued socialist economic policies that
reduced agricultural productivity and helped bring on
famine, resulting in the deaths of untold tens of thousands
of people. Thousands more fled or perished as a result of
government schemes to villagize the peasantry and to
relocate peasants from drought-prone areas of the north to
better-watered lands in the south and southwest.
Aside from internal dissent, which was harshly suppressed,
the regime faced armed insurgencies in the northern part of
the country. The longest-running of these was in Eritrea,
where the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and its
predecessors had been fighting control by the central
government since 1961. In the mid-1970s, a second major
insurgency arose in Tigray, where the Tigray People's
Liberation Front (TPLF), a Marxist-Leninist organization
under the leadership of Meles Zenawi, opposed not only the
policies of the military government but also the very
existence of the government itself.
In foreign affairs, the regime aligned itself with the
Soviet Union. As long as the Soviet Union and its allies
provided support to Ethiopia's armed forces, the Mengistu
government remained secure. In the late 1980s, however,
Soviet support waned, a major factor in undermining the
ability of government forces to prosecute the wars against
the Eritreans and the Tigray. Gradually, the insurgent
movements gained the upper hand. By May 1991, the EPLF
controlled almost all of Eritrea, and the TPLF, operating as
the chief member of a coalition called the Ethiopian
People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), had overrun
much of the center of the country. Faced with impending
defeat, on May 21 Mengistu fled into exile in Zimbabwe; the
caretaker government he left behind collapsed a week later.
The EPLF completed its sweep of Eritrea on May 24 and 25,
and a few days later EPLF chairman Issaias Afwerki announced
the formation of the Provisional Government of Eritrea
(PGE). Meanwhile, on May 27-28, EPRDF forces marched into
Addis Ababa and assumed control of the national government.
After seizing power, Tigrayan and Eritrean leaders
confronted an array of political, economic, and security
problems that threatened to overwhelm both new governments.
Meles Zenawi and Issaias Afwerki committed themselves to
resolving these problems and to remaking their respective
societies. To achieve these goals, both governments adopted
similar strategies, which concentrated on national
reconciliation, eventual democratization, good relations
with the West, and social and economic development. Each
leader, however, pursued different tactics to implement his
respective strategy.
The first task facing the new rulers in Addis Ababa was the
creation of an interim government. To this end, a so-called
National Conference was convened in Addis Ababa from July 1
to July 5. Many political groups from across a broad
spectrum were invited to attend, but the EPRDF barred those
identified with the former military regime, such as the
Workers' Party of Ethiopia and the All-Ethiopia Socialist
Movement, as well as those that were opposed to the EPRDF,
such as the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party and the
Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces. A number of
international observers also attended, including delegations
from the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United
Nations (UN).
Although it received accolades for running an open
conference, the EPRDF tightly controlled the proceedings.
The conference adopted a National Charter, which was signed
by representatives of some thirty-one political groups; it
established the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE),
consisting of executive and legislative branches; and it
sanctioned an EPLF-EPRDF agreement that converted Aseb into
a free port in exchange for a referendum on Eritrean self-
determination to be held within two years. The transitional
government was to consist of the offices of president and
prime minister and a seventeen-member multiethnic Council of
Ministers. To ensure broad political representation, an
eighty-seven member Council of Representatives was created,
which was to select the new president, draft a new
constitution, and oversee a transition to a new national
government. The EPRDF occupied thirty-two of the eighty-
seven council seats. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)
received twelve seats, and the TPLF, the Oromo People's
Democratic Organization, and the Ethiopian People's
Democratic Movement each occupied ten seats. Twenty-seven
other groups shared the remaining seats.
The National Charter enshrined the guiding principles for
what was expected to be a two-and-one-half-year transitional
period. The charter called for creation of a commission to
draft a new constitution to come into effect by early 1994.
It also committed the transitional government to conduct
itself in accordance with the UN Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and to pursue a foreign policy based on
noninterference in the internal affairs of neighboring
states. Perhaps its most significant provisions concerned a
new system of internal administration in which the principle
of ethnicity was to constitute the basis of local and
regional government. The charter recognized the right of all
of Ethiopia's nationalities to self-determination, a right
that was to be exercised within the context of a federated
Ethiopia, and called for creation of district and regional
councils on the basis of nationality.
Essentially, the National Conference was a first, basic
step in the reconstruction of a viable, legitimate central
government. With the end of civil wars all over the country,
the aim was to create a balance of competing ethnic and
political groups at the center of the state that would allow
the wounds of war to heal and economic recovery to begin.
Additionally, there was the task of reconciling some
segments of the population to the impending loss of Eritrea
and of Ethiopia's Red Sea ports.
As the new order got under way, the Council of
Representatives elected Meles Zenawi president of the TGE.
Then, in order to implement the administrative provisions of
the National Charter, the TGE drew up twelve autonomous
regions based on ethnic identification and recognized two
multiethnic chartered cities--Addis Ababa and Harer. The
largest nationalities--the Amhara, Oromo, Somali, and
Tigray--were grouped into their own regions, while an
attempt was made to put culturally related smaller groups
together. Each region was composed of a number of districts
(weredas), intended to be the basic administrative unit. The
largest region--that of the Oromo--contained some 220
weredas; the next largest region--that of the Amhara--
contained 126, out of a total of 600 weredas in all of
Ethiopia. Under this system, each wereda exercised
executive, legislative, and judicial authority over local
communities, while the central government remained supreme
in matters of defense, foreign affairs, economic policy,
citizenship requirements, and currency.
In order to staff these new administrative units, the TGE
scheduled national elections. Originally foreseen for later
1991, these elections were postponed for administrative and
political reasons into 1992. By then, the authorities had
registered almost 200 political parties; few of them,
however, had a significant membership or any real influence
in shaping government policies. The TGE held preliminary
elections for local governing committees beginning in April
and for wereda and regional councils on June 21, 1992.
Security problems prevented elections from being held in
some areas, notably among the Afar and the Somali and in
Harer. More important, a corps of some 250 UN observers
concluded that the June elections suffered from a number of
serious shortcomings, including an absence of genuine
competition, intimidation of nongovernment parties and
candidates, closure of political party offices, and jailing
and even shooting of candidates. Numerous observers also
claimed that various administrative and logistical problems
impaired the electoral process and that many Ethiopians
failed to understand the nature of multiparty politics. As a
result, several political parties, including the OLF, the
All-Amhara People's Organization, and the Gideo People's
Democratic Organization, withdrew a few days before the
elections. On June 22, the OLF withdrew from the government
and prepared to take up arms once again. Nonetheless, the
TGE accepted the results of the elections, although it
appointed a commission to investigate irregularities and to
take corrective steps.
In the economic arena, the TGE inherited a shattered
country. In his first public speech after the EPRDF had
captured Addis Ababa, Meles Zenawi indicated that Ethiopia's
coffers were empty; moreover, some 7 million people were
threatened with starvation because of drought and civil war.
Economic performance statistics reflected this gloomy
assessment. In Ethiopian fiscal year (EFY--see Glossary)
1990/91, for example, the gross domestic product (GDP--see
Glossary) declined by 5.6 percent, the greatest fall since
the 1984-85 drought. Preliminary figures indicated a further
decline in GDP in 1991/92, although some gains were
registered for agriculture.
To resolve these problems, the TGE abandoned the failed
policies of the Mengistu regime. It began dismantling the
country's command economic system and shifted toward a
market-oriented economy with emphasis upon private
initiative. In December 1992, it adopted a new economic
policy whereby the government would maintain control over
essential economic sectors such as banking, insurance,
petroleum, mining, and chemical industries. However, retail
trade, road transport, and a portion of foreign trade was
placed in private hands; and farmers could sell their
produce at free-market prices, although land remained under
government control. While smaller businesses were to be
privatized, agriculture was to receive the most attention
and investment. By 1993 the state farms of the Mengistu era
were being dismantled and turned over to private farmers;
similarly, the agricultural cooperatives of prior years had
almost all disappeared. A major effort was also being made
to steer large numbers of ex-soldiers into farming as a way
of increasing production and of providing much-needed
employment.
Meanwhile, on October 1, 1992, the TGE devalued Ethiopia's
currency to encourage exports and to aid in correcting a
chronic balance of payments deficit. The country had in
addition begun to receive economic aid from several sources,
including the European Community, the World Bank (see
Glossary), Japan, Canada, and the United States.
Developments such as these provided a solid foundation for
future economic improvement--gains that in mid-1993 were
still very much in the realm of anticipation. It seemed
clear that Ethiopia would remain one of the world's poorest
nations for the foreseeable future.
Since the downfall of the Mengistu regime, Ethiopia's human
rights record has improved. At the same time, the TGE has
failed to end human rights abuses. In the absence of a
police force, the TGE delegated policing functions to the
EPRDF and to so-called Peace and Stability Committees. On
occasion, personnel belonging to these organizations were
alleged to have killed, wounded, or tortured criminal
suspects. There were also allegations of extrajudicial
killings in many areas of the country.
Several incidents in early 1993 raised further questions
about human rights in Ethiopia. On January 4, security
forces opened fire on university students protesting UN and
EPRDF policies toward Eritrea and the upcoming independence
referendum. At least one person, and possibly several
others, died during the fracas. In early April, the Council
of Representatives suspended five southern political parties
from council membership for having attended a conference in
Paris at which the parties criticized the security situation
in the country and the entire transitional process. A few
days later, on April 9, more than forty instructors at Addis
Ababa University were summarily dismissed. The TGE alleged
lack of attention to teaching duties as the reason for its
action, but the instructors asserted that they were being
punished for having spoken out against TGE policies. These
developments came on top of United States Department of
State allegations that more than 2,000 officials of the
Mengistu regime remained in detention without having been
charged after almost twenty months.
One of the most serious dilemmas confronting the TGE
concerned its inability to restore security throughout
Ethiopia. After the EPRDF assumed power, it dismantled the
440,000-man Ethiopian armed forces. As a result, several
hundred thousand ex-military personnel had to fend for
themselves. The government's inability to find jobs for
these soldiers forced many of them to resort to crime as a
way of life. Many of these ex-soldiers contributed to the
instability in Addis Ababa and parts of southern, eastern,
and western Ethiopia.
To help resolve these problems, the TGE created the
Commission for the Rehabilitation of Ex-Soldiers and War
Veterans. By mid-1993 this organization claimed that it had
assisted in the rehabilitation of more than 159,000 ex-
soldiers in various rural areas. Additionally, commission
officials maintained that they were continuing to provide
aid to 157,000 ex-soldiers who lived in various urban
centers.
Apart from the difficulties caused by former soldiers and
criminal elements, several insurgent groups hampered the
TGE's ability to maintain stability in eastern and western
Ethiopia. The situation was particularly troublesome with
the OLF. For example, in mid-1991 government forces clashed
with OLF units southwest of Dire Dawa over the rights to
collect qat revenues. Qat is a plant that produces a mild
narcotic intoxication when chewed and that is consumed
throughout the eastern Horn of Africa and in Yemen. Although
the two groups signed a peace agreement in August, tensions
still existed, and fighting continued around Dire Dawa and
Harer at year's end. In early 1992, EPRDF-OLF relations
continued to deteriorate, with armed clashes occurring at
several locations throughout eastern and western Ethiopia.
After the OLF withdrew from the elections and the government
in late June, full-scale fighting broke out in the south and
southwest, but OLF forces were too weak to sustain the
effort for more than a few weeks. Even so, in April 1993 the
OLF announced that it was once again expanding its
operations, but many observers doubted this claim and the
OLF's ability to launch effective military campaigns against
government forces.
The TGE also experienced problems with the Afar
pastoralists who inhabit the lowlands along Ethiopia's Red
Sea coast, particularly during its first year in power. In
early September 1991, some Afar attacked a food relief truck
column near the town of Mile on the Addis Ababa--Aseb road
and killed at least seven drivers. The EPRDF restored
security in this region by shooting armed Afar on sight.
Since then, EPRDF-Afar relations have remained tense. Some
Afar have associated themselves with the OLF, but many
others joined the Afar Liberation Movement, which by early
1993 claimed to have 2,500 members under arms.
Elsewhere in eastern Ethiopia, the TGE experienced problems
with the Isa and Gurgura Liberation Front (IGLF). On October
4, 1991, clashes between government forces and IGLF rebels
resulted in the temporary closure of the Addis Ababa-
Djibouti railroad near Dire Dawa and the disruption of trade
between the two countries. The fighting also disrupted
famine relief distribution to nearly 1 million refugees in
eastern Ethiopia. By early 1992, the IGLF still had refused
to recognize the EPRDF's right to maintain security in the
Isa-populated area around Dire Dawa. By 1993, nonetheless,
improved conditions allowed the Addis Ababa-Djibouti
railroad to operate on a fairly regular basis.
In western Ethiopia, during the July-September 1991 period,
the EPRDF engaged in several battles in Gojam and Gonder
with the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), the
only major political group excluded from power.
Additionally, in Gambela, the EPRDF battled the Gambela
People's Liberation Front, which claimed the right to
administer Gambela without EPRDF interference. The downfall
of the Mengistu regime also created a crisis for
approximately 500,000 southern Sudanese who lived in refugee
camps in and around Gambela. Although the new government
claimed they could remain in Ethiopia, nearly all of the
refugees, fearing reprisals for belonging to or supporting
southern Sudanese insurgents that the EPRDF opposed, fled
toward southern Sudan. As a result, by early 1992 fewer than
15,000 Sudanese refugees remained in western Ethiopia.
In southern Ethiopia, crime was the main security problem.
In late March 1992, EPRDF troops reportedly arrested 1,705
armed bandits and captured thousands of weapons, including
machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades. Despite this and
similar sweeps, many Western observers believed that
security problems would continue to plague the EPRDF regime
for the foreseeable future because of the large number of
available arms and unemployed ex-fighters in the south.
In contrast with the political divisiveness in Ethiopia,
nearly all Eritreans appeared to support the EPLF and its
goals. As a result, in the first two years after military
victory, the PGE was able to move swiftly on a number of
fronts. As one of its first acts, the new government
expelled thousands of soldiers and personnel of the former
Ethiopian army and government in Eritrea, together with
their dependents, forcing them across the border into
Tigray. The PGE maintained that the expulsions were
necessary to free up living quarters and jobs for returning
Eritreans and to help reduce budgetary outlays. In October
1992, the government opened schools across Eritrea. A few
weeks later, the PGE announced new criminal and civil codes
and appointed dozens of judges to run the court system. A
National Service Decree made it mandatory for all Eritreans
between the ages of eighteen and forty to perform twelve to
eighteen months of unpaid service in the armed forces,
police, government, or in fields such as education or
health.
Perhaps most important, the PGE honored the agreement it
had reached with the EPRDF and the OLF in 1991 to postpone a
referendum on the question of Eritrean independence for two
years. By early 1993, given the general popularity of the
PGE and the desire among Eritreans to be free of control
from Addis Ababa, the outcome of the referendum was a
foregone conclusion. On April 23-25, 1993, the PGE carried
out the poll. In a turnout of 98.5 percent of the
approximately 1.1 million registered voters, 99.8 percent
voted for independence. A 121-member UN observer mission
certified that the referendum was free and fair. Within
hours, the United States, Egypt, Italy, and Sudan extended
diplomatic recognition to the new country. Thereafter,
Eritrea joined the UN, the Organization of Africa Unity, and
the Lom‚ Convention (see Glossary).
A month after the referendum, the EPLF transformed the PGE
into the Government of Eritrea, composed of executive,
legislative, and judicial branches. Supreme power resided
with a new National Assembly, comprised of the EPLF's former
central committee augmented by sixty additional
representatives from the ten provinces into which Eritrea
was divided. Aside from formulating internal and external
policies and budgetary matters, the assembly was charged
with electing a president, who would be head of state and
commander in chief of the armed forces. The executive branch
consisted of a twenty-four-member State Council, chaired by
the president. The judiciary, already in place, continued as
before. At its initial meeting on May 21, the assembly
elected Issaias Afwerki president. This new political
configuration was to last not longer than four years, during
which time a democratic constitution was to be drafted and
all members of the EPLF would continue to work for the state
without salary.
In the months following independence, the Eritrean
government enjoyed almost universal popular support. Even
such former adversaries as the Eritrean Liberation Front
(ELF), the Eritrean Liberation Front-United Organization,
and the Eritrean Liberation Front-Revolutionary Council
issued statements of support for the referendum and for the
new regime. During his first press conference after the
referendum, President Issaias stressed that his government
would pursue pragmatic and flexible policies. He also
discussed prospects for close economic cooperation with
Ethiopia and raised the prospects of a future confederation
between the two countries. Meanwhile, the president pledged
that Aseb would remain a free port for goods in transit to
Ethiopia. Additionally, he reaffirmed the EPLF's commitment
to the eventual establishment of a multiparty political
system, but there would be no political parties based on
ethnicity or religion.
Its popularity notwithstanding, the Eritrean government
faced many problems and an uncertain future. Economically,
the country suffered from the devastation of thirty years of
war. Eritrea's forty publicly owned factories operated at no
more than one-third capacity, and many of its more than 600
private companies had ceased operations. War damage and
drought had caused agricultural production to decline by as
much as 40 percent in some areas; as a result, about 80
percent of the population required food aid in 1992. The
fighting also had wrecked schools, hospitals, government
offices, roads, and bridges throughout the country, while
bombing had destroyed economically important towns like
Mitsiwa and Nakfa.
To resolve these problems, Eritrea implemented a
multifaceted strategy that concentrated on restarting basic
economic activities and rehabilitating essential
infrastructure; encouraging the return and reintegration of
nearly 500,000 Eritrean refugees from neighboring Sudan; and
establishing the Recovery and Rehabilitation Project for
Eritrea. Additionally, the Eritrean government reaffirmed
its commitment to a liberal investment code, the response to
which by mid-1993 was encouraging. Even so, the Eritrean
government estimated that it needed at least US$2 billion to
rehabilitate the economy and to finance development
programs--aid that it sought largely from Western countries
and financial institutions.
Another serious issue confronting the new government
concerned the status of the country's armed forces. Since
the country's liberation in 1991, the government had lacked
the funds to pay salaries. Nevertheless, officials adopted a
compulsory national service act that required all former
fighters to labor without pay for two years on various
public works projects. When the new Government of Eritrea
extended unpaid compulsory national service for an
additional four years on May 20, 1993, thousands of
frustrated former fighters who wanted to be paid and to
return at last to their families demonstrated in Asmera. The
government responded by promising to begin paying the
fighters and by instituting a military demobilization
program that would allow volunteers who could fend for
themselves to return to their homes.
Eritrea's long-term well-being also depended on President
Issaias's ability to preserve the country's unity. Achieving
this goal will be difficult. Eritrea's 3.5 million
population is split equally between Christians and Muslims;
it also is divided into nine ethnic groups, each of which
speaks a different language. A reemergence of the historical
divisions between the Muslim-dominated ELF and the largely
Christian EPLF is possible and could prove to be the young
country's undoing. Also, at least some Eritreans doubted
President Issaias's pledge to establish a multiparty
democracy and viewed with skepticism his determination to
prevent the establishment of political parties based on
ethnic group or religion. However, as of mid-1993, Eritrea
remained at peace, and the government enjoyed considerable
support. As a result, most Western observers maintained that
the country had a good chance of avoiding the turbulence
that plagued much of the rest of the Horn of Africa.
The ultimate fates of Ethiopia and Eritrea are inevitably
intertwined. For economic reasons, Ethiopia needs to
preserve its access to Eritrean ports, and Eritrea needs
food from Ethiopia as well as the revenue and jobs that will
be generated by acting as a transshipment point for
Ethiopian goods. Also, political and military cooperation
well be necessary to prevent conflict between the two
nations.
Despite this obvious interdependence, Ethiopia and Eritrea
face a difficult future. Many Ethiopians, primarily those
who are Amhara, and some Eritreans, largely from the Muslim
community, remain opposed to Eritrean independence and the
EPLF-dominated government. These malcontents could become a
catalyst for antigovernment activities in both countries.
Within Ethiopia, the TGE's concept of ethnicity as the basis
for organizing political life has aroused controversy and
has stymied many of the TGE's policies and programs, thereby
reducing chances for the emergence of a democratic
government. Additionally, if the EPRDF does not broaden its
ethnic base of support and bring such groups as the Amhara
and the Oromo into the political process, the likelihood of
violence will increase. As of mid-1993, it was unclear
whether the TGE's plans for a new constitution and national
government would resolve these problems or would founder on
the shoals of ethnic politics and economic despair.
September 10, 1993 Thomas P. Ofcansky
********************
Chapter 1. Historical Setting
by John W. Turner (An African analyst with the Department of
Defense)
.
MODERN ETHIOPIA IS THE PRODUCT of many millennia of
interaction among peoples in and around the Ethiopian
highlands region. From the earliest times, these groups
combined to produce a culture that at any given time
differed markedly from that of surrounding peoples. The
evolution of this early "Ethiopian" culture was driven by a
variety of ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups.
One of the most significant influences on the formation and
evolution of culture in northern Ethiopia consisted of
migrants from Southwest Arabia. They arrived during the
first millennium B.C. and brought Semitic speech, writing,
and a distinctive stone-building tradition to northern
Ethiopia. They seem to have contributed directly to the rise
of the Aksumite kingdom, a trading state that prospered in
the first centuries of the Christian era and that united the
shores of the southern Red Sea commercially and at times
politically. It was an Aksumite king who accepted
Christianity in the mid-fourth century, a religion that the
Aksumites bequeathed to their successors along with their
concept of an empire-state under centralized rulership.
The establishment of what became the Ethiopian Orthodox
Church was critical in molding Ethiopian culture and
identity. The spread of Islam to the coastal areas of the
Horn of Africa in the eighth century, however, led to the
isolation of the highlands from European and Middle Eastern
centers of Christendom. The appearance of Islam was partly
responsible for what became a long-term rivalry between
Christians and Muslims--a rivalry that exacerbated older
tensions between highlanders and lowlanders and
agriculturalists and pastoralists that have persisted to the
present day.
Kingship and Orthodoxy, both with their roots in Aksum,
became the dominant institutions among the northern
Ethiopians in the post-Aksumite period. In the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries, a dynasty known as the Zagwe ruled
from their capital in the northern highlands. The Zagwe era
is one of the most artistically creative periods in
Ethiopian history, involving among other things the carving
of a large number of rock-hewn churches.
The Zagwe heartland was well south of the old Aksumite
domain, and the Zagwe interlude was but one phase in the
long-term southward shift of the locus of political power.
The successors of the Zagwe after the mid-thirteenth
century--the members of the so-called "Solomonic" dynasty--
located themselves in the central highlands and involved
themselves directly in the affairs of neighboring peoples
still farther south and east.
In these regions, the two dominant peoples of what may be
termed the "Christian kingdom of Ethiopia," the Amhara of
the central highlands and the Tigray of the northern
highlands, confronted the growing power and confidence of
Muslim peoples who lived between the eastern edge of the
highlands and the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. In religious and
ethnic conflicts that reached their climax in the mid-
sixteenth century, the Amhara and Tigray turned back a
determined Muslim advance with Portuguese assistance, but
only after the northern highlands had been overrun and
devastated. The advent of the Portuguese in the area marked
the end of the long period of isolation from the rest of
Christendom that had been near total, except for contact
with the Coptic Church of Egypt. The Portuguese, however,
represented a mixed blessing, for with them they brought
their religion--Roman Catholicism. During the early
seventeenth century, Jesuit and kindred orders sought to
impose Catholicism on Ethiopia, an effort that led to civil
war and the expulsion of the Catholics from the kingdom.
By the mid-sixteenth century, the Oromo people of
southwestern Ethiopia had begun a prolonged series of
migrations during which they overwhelmed the Muslim states
to the east and began settling in the central highlands. A
profound consequence of the far-flung settlement of the
Oromo was the fusion of their culture in some areas with
that of the heretofore dominant Amhara and Tigray.
The period of trials that resulted from the Muslim
invasions, the Oromo migrations, and the challenge of Roman
Catholicism had drawn to a close by the middle of the
seventeenth century. During the next two-and-one-half
centuries, a reinvigorated Ethiopian state slowly
reconsolidated its control over the northern highlands and
eventually resumed expansion to the south, this time into
lands occupied by the Oromo.
By the mid-nineteenth century, the Ethiopian state under
Emperor Tewodros II (reigned 1855-68) found itself beset by
a number of problems, many of them stemming from the
expansion of European influence in northeastern Africa.
Tewodros's successors, Yohannis IV (reigned 1872-89) and
Menelik II (reigned 1889-1913), further expanded and
consolidated the state, fended off local enemies, and dealt
with the encroachments of European powers, in particular
Italy, France, and Britain. Italy posed the greatest threat,
having begun to colonize part of what would become its
future colony of Eritrea in the mid-1880s.
To one of Menelik's successors, Haile Selassie I (reigned
1930-74), was left the task of dealing with resurgent
Italian expansionism. The disinclination of the world
powers, especially those in the League of Nations, to
counter Italy's attack on Ethiopia in 1935 was in many ways
a harbinger of the indecisiveness that would lead to World
War II. In the early years of the war, Ethiopia was retaken
from the Italians by the British, who continued to dominate
the country's external affairs after the war ended in 1945.
A restored Haile Selassie attempted to implement reforms and
modernize the state and certain sectors of the economy. For
the most part, however, mid-twentieth century Ethiopia
resembled what could loosely be termed a "feudal" society.
The later years of Haile Selassie's rule saw a growing
insurgency in Eritrea, which had been federated with and
eventually annexed by the Ethiopian government following
World War II. This insurgency, along with other internal
pressures, including severe famine, placed strains on
Ethiopian society that contributed in large part to the 1974
military rebellion that ended the Haile Selassie regime and,
along with it, more than 2,000 years of imperial rule. The
most salient results of the coup d'‚tat were the eventual
emergence of Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam as
head of state and the reorientation of the government and
national economy from capitalism to Marxism.
A series of crises immediately consumed the revolutionary
regime. First, domestic political violence erupted as groups
maneuvered to take control of the revolution. Then, the
Eritrean insurgency flared at the same time that an uprising
in the neighboring region of Tigray began. In mid-1977
Somalia, intent upon wresting control of the Ogaden region
from Ethiopia and sensing Addis Ababa's distractions,
initiated a war on Ethiopia's eastern frontier. Mengistu, in
need of military assistance, turned to the Soviet Union and
its allies, who supplied vast amounts of equipment and
thousands of Cuban combat troops, which enabled Ethiopia to
repulse the Somali invasion.
Misery mounted throughout Ethiopia in the 1980s. Recurrent
drought and famine, made worse in the north by virtual civil
war, took an enormous human toll, necessitating the infusion
of massive amounts of international humanitarian aid. The
insurgencies in Eritrea, Tigray, and other regions
intensified until by the late 1980s they threatened the
stability of the regime. Drought, economic mismanagement,
and the financial burdens of war ravaged the economy. At the
same time, democratic reform in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union threatened to isolate the revolutionary
government politically, militarily, and economically from
its allies.
***************
Ethiopia: Early Populations and Neighboring States
Details on the origins of all the peoples that make up the
population of highland Ethiopia were still matters for
research and debate in the early 1990s. Anthropologists
believe that East Africa's Great Rift Valley is the site of
humankind's origins. (The valley traverses Ethiopia from
southwest to northeast.) In 1974 archaeologists excavating
sites in the Awash River valley discovered 3.5-million-year-
old fossil skeletons, which they named Australopithecus
afarensis. These earliest known hominids stood upright,
lived in groups, and had adapted to living in open areas
rather than in forests.
Coming forward to the late Stone Age, recent research in
historical linguistics--and increasingly in archaeology as
well--has begun to clarify the broad outlines of the
prehistoric populations of present-day Ethiopia. These
populations spoke languages that belong to the Afro-Asiatic
super-language family, a group of related languages that
includes Omotic, Cushitic, and Semitic, all of which are
found in Ethiopia today. Linguists postulate that the
original home of the Afro-Asiatic cluster of languages was
somewhere in northeastern Africa, possibly in the area
between the Nile River and the Red Sea in modern Sudan. From
here the major languages of the family gradually dispersed
at different times and in different directions--these
languages being ancestral to those spoken today in northern
and northeastern Africa and far southwestern Asia.
The first language to separate seems to have been Omotic,
at a date sometime after 13,000 B.C. Omotic speakers moved
southward into the central and southwestern highlands of
Ethiopia, followed at some subsequent time by Cushitic
speakers, who settled in territories in the northern Horn of
Africa, including the northern highlands of Ethiopia. The
last language to separate was Semitic, which split from
Berber and ancient Egyptian, two other Afro-Asiatic
languages, and migrated eastward into far southwestern Asia.
By about 7000 B.C. at the latest, linguistic evidence
indicates that both Cushitic speakers and Omotic speakers
were present in Ethiopia. Linguistic diversification within
each group thereafter gave rise to a large number of new
languages. In the case of Cushitic, these include Agew in
the central and northern highlands and, in regions to the
east and southeast, Saho, Afar, Somali, Sidamo, and Oromo,
all spoken by peoples who would play major roles in the
subsequent history of the region. Omotic also spawned a
large number of languages, Welamo (often called Wolayta) and
Gemu-Gofa being among the most widely spoken of them, but
Omotic speakers would remain outside the main zone of ethnic
interaction in Ethiopia until the late nineteenth century.
Both Cushitic- and Omotic-speaking peoples collected wild
grasses and other plants for thousands of years before they
eventually domesticated those they most preferred. According
to linguistic and limited archaeological analyses, plough
agriculture based on grain cultivation was established in
the drier, grassier parts of the northern highlands by at
least several millennia before the Christian era. Indigenous
grasses such as teff (see Glossary) and eleusine were the
initial domesticates; considerably later, barley and wheat
were introduced from Southwest Asia. The corresponding
domesticate in the better watered and heavily forested
southern highlands was ensete, a root crop known locally as
false banana. All of these early peoples also kept
domesticated animals, including cattle, sheep, goats, and
donkeys. Thus, from the late prehistoric period,
agricultural patterns of livelihood were established that
were to be characteristic of the region through modern
times. It was the descendants of these peoples and cultures
of the Ethiopian region who at various times and places
interacted with successive waves of migrants from across the
Red Sea. This interaction began well before the modern era
and has continued through contemporary times.
During the first millennium B.C. and possibly even earlier,
various Semitic-speaking groups from Southwest Arabia began
to cross the Red Sea and settle along the coast and in the
nearby highlands. These migrants brought with them their
Semitic speech (Sabaean and perhaps others) and script (Old
Epigraphic South Arabic) and monumental stone architecture.
A fusion of the newcomers with the indigenous inhabitants
produced a culture known as pre-Aksumite. The factors that
motivated this settlement in the area are not known, but to
judge from subsequent history, commercial activity must have
figured strongly. The port city of Adulis, near modern-day
Mitsiwa, was a major regional entrep"t and probably the main
gateway to the interior for new arrivals from Southwest
Arabia. Archaeological evidence indicates that by the
beginning of the Christian era this pre-Aksumite culture had
developed western and eastern regional variants. The former,
which included the region of Aksum, was probably the polity
or series of polities that became the Aksumite state.
****************
The Aksumite State
The Aksumite state emerged at about the beginning of the
Christian era, flourished during the succeeding six or seven
centuries, and underwent prolonged decline from the eighth
to the twelfth century A.D. Aksum's period of greatest power
lasted from the fourth through the sixth century. Its core
area lay in the highlands of what is today southern Eritrea,
Tigray, Lasta (in present-day Welo), and Angot (also in
Welo); its major centers were at Aksum and Adulis. Earlier
centers, such as Yeha, also continued to flourish. At the
kingdom's height, its rulers held sway over the Red Sea
coast from Sawakin in present-day Sudan in the north to
Berbera in present-day Somalia in the south, and inland as
far as the Nile Valley in modern Sudan. On the Arabian side
of the Red Sea, the Aksumite rulers at times controlled the
coast and much of the interior of modern Yemen. During the
sixth and seventh centuries, the Aksumite state lost its
possessions in southwest Arabia and much of its Red Sea
coastline and gradually shrank to its core area, with the
political center of the state shifting farther and farther
southward.
Inscriptions from Aksum and elsewhere date from as early as
the end of the second century A.D. and reveal an Aksumite
state that already had expanded at the expense of
neighboring peoples. The Greek inscriptions of King Zoskales
(who ruled at the end of the second century A.D.) claim that
he conquered the lands to the south and southwest of what is
now Tigray and controlled the Red Sea coast from Sawakin
south to the present-day Djibouti and Berbera areas. The
Aksumite state controlled parts of Southwest Arabia as well
during this time, and subsequent Aksumite rulers continually
involved themselves in the political and military affairs of
Southwest Arabia, especially in what is now Yemen. Much of
the impetus for foreign conquest lay in the desire to
control the maritime trade between the Roman Empire and
India and adjoining lands. Indeed, King Zoskales is
mentioned by name in the Periplus of the Erythrean Sea (the
Latin term for the Red Sea is Mare Erythreum), a Greek
shipping guide of the first to third centuries A.D., as
promoting commerce with Rome, Arabia, and India. Among the
African commodities that the Aksumites exported were gold,
rhinoceros horn, ivory, incense, and obsidian; in return,
they imported cloth, glass, iron, olive oil, and wine.
During the third and fourth centuries, the traditions
related to Aksumite rule became fixed. Gedara, who lived in
the late second and early third centuries, is referred to as
the king of Aksum in inscriptions written in Gi'iz (also
seen as Ge'ez), the Semitic language of the Aksumite
kingdom. The growth of imperial traditions was concurrent
with the expansion of foreign holdings, especially in
Southwest Arabia in the late second century A.D. and later
in areas west of the Ethiopian highlands, including the
kingdom of Meroë .
Meroë was centered on the Nile north of the confluence of
the White Nile and Blue Nile. Established by the sixth
century B.C. or earlier, the kingdom's inhabitants were
black Africans who were heavily influenced by Egyptian
culture. It was probably the people of Meroë who were the
first to be called Aithiopiai ("burnt faces") by the ancient
Greeks, thus giving rise to the term Ethiopia that
considerably later was used to designate the northern
highlands of the Horn of Africa and its inhabitants. No
evidence suggests that Meroë had any political influence
over the areas included in modern Ethiopia; economic
influence is harder to gauge because ancient commercial
networks in the area were probably extensive and involved
much long-distance trade.
Sometime around A.D. 300, Aksumite armies conquered Meroë
or forced its abandonment. By the early fourth century A.D.,
King Ezana (reigned 325-60) controlled a domain extending
from Southwest Arabia across the Red Sea west to Meroë and
south from Sawakin to the southern coast of the Gulf of
Aden. As an indication of the type of political control he
exercised, Ezana, like other Aksumite rulers, carried the
title negusa nagast (king of kings), symbolic of his rule
over numerous tribute-paying principalities and a title used
by successive Ethiopian rulers into the mid-twentieth
century.
The Aksumites created a civilization of considerable
distinction. They devised an original architectural style
and employed it in stone palaces and other public buildings.
They also erected a series of carved stone stelae at Aksum
as monuments to their deceased rulers. Some of these stelae
are among the largest known from the ancient world. The
Aksumites left behind a body of written records, that,
although not voluminous, are nonetheless a legacy otherwise
bequeathed only by Egypt and Meroë among ancient African
kingdoms. These records were written in two languages--Gi'iz
and Greek. Gi'iz is assumed to be ancestral to modern
Amharic and Tigrinya, although possibly only indirectly.
Greek was also widely used, especially for commercial
transactions with the Hellenized world of the eastern
Mediterranean. Even more remarkable and wholly unique for
ancient Africa was the minting of coins over an
approximately 300-year period. These coins, many with inlay
of gold on bronze or silver, provide a chronology of the
rulers of Aksum.
One of the most important contributions the Aksumite state
made to Ethiopian tradition was the establishment of the
Christian Church. The Aksumite state and its forebears had
certainly been in contact with Judaism since the first
millennium B.C. and with Christianity beginning in the first
century A.D. These interactions probably were rather
limited. However, during the second and third centuries,
Christianity spread throughout the region. Around A.D. 330-
40, Ezana was converted to Christianity and made it the
official state religion. The variant of Christianity adopted
by the Aksumite state, however, eventually followed the
Monophysite belief, which embraced the notion of one rather
than two separate natures in the person of Christ as defined
by the Council of Chalcedon in 451 (see Ethiopian Orthodox
Christianity, ch. 2).
Little is known about fifth-century Aksum, but early in the
next century Aksumite rulers reasserted their control over
Southwest Arabia, though only for a short time. Later in the
sixth century, however, Sassanian Persians established
themselves in Yemen, effectively ending any pretense of
Aksumite control. Thereafter, the Sassanians attacked
Byzantine Egypt, further disrupting Aksumite trade networks
in the Red Sea area. Over the next century and a half, Aksum
was increasingly cut off from its overseas entrep"ts and as
a result entered a period of prolonged decline, gradually
relinquishing its maritime trading network and withdrawing
into the interior of northern Ethiopia.
****************
Ethiopia and the Early Islamic Period
The rise of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula had a
significant impact on Aksum during the seventh and eighth
centuries. By the time of the Prophet Muhammad's death (A.D.
632), the Arabian Peninsula, and thus the entire opposite
shore of the Red Sea, had come under the influence of the
new religion. The steady advance of the faith of Muhammad
through the next century resulted in Islamic conquest of all
of the former Sassanian Empire and most of the former
Byzantine dominions.
Despite the spread of Islam by conquest elsewhere, the
Islamic state's relations with Aksum were not hostile at
first. According to Islamic tradition, some members of
Muhammad's family and some of his early converts had taken
refuge with the Aksumites during the troubled years
preceding the Prophet's rise to power, and Aksum was
exempted from the jihad, or holy war, as a result. The Arabs
also considered the Aksumite state to be on a par with the
Islamic state, the Byzantine Empire, and China as one of the
world's greatest kingdoms. Commerce between Aksum and at
least some ports on the Red Sea continued, albeit on an
increasingly reduced scale.
Problems between Aksum and the new Arab power, however,
soon developed. The establishment of Islam in Egypt and the
Levant greatly reduced Aksum's relations with the major
Christian power, the Byzantine Empire. Although contact with
individual Christian churches in Egypt and other lands
continued, the Muslim conquests hastened the isolation of
the church in Aksum. Limited communication continued, the
most significant being with the Coptic Church in Egypt,
which supplied a patriarch to the Aksumites, but such
contacts were insufficient to counter an ever-growing
ecclesiastical isolation. Perhaps more important, Islamic
expansion threatened Aksum's maritime contacts, already
under siege by Sassanian Persians. Red Sea and Indian Ocean
trade, formerly dominated by the Byzantine Empire, Aksum,
and Persia, gradually came under the control of Muslim
Arabs, who also propagated their faith through commercial
activities and other contacts.
Aksum lost its maritime trade routes during and after the
mid-seventh century, by which time relations with the Arabs
had deteriorated to the point that Aksumite and Muslim
fleets raided and skirmished in the Red Sea. This situation
led eventually to the Arab occupation of the Dahlak Islands,
probably in the early eighth century and, it appears, to an
attack on Adulis and the Aksumite fleet. Later, Muslims
occupied Sawakin and converted the Beja people of that
region to Islam.
By the middle of the ninth century, Islam had spread to the
southern coast of the Gulf of Aden and the coast of East
Africa, and the foundations were laid for the later
extensive conversions of the local populace to Islam in
these and adjacent regions. East of the central highlands, a
Muslim sultanate, Ifat, was established by the beginning of
the twelfth century, and some of the surrounding Cushitic
peoples were gradually converted. These conversions of
peoples to the south and southeast of the highlands who had
previously practiced local religions were generally brought
about by the proselytizing efforts of Arab merchants. This
population, permanently Islamicized, thereafter contended
with the Amhara-Tigray peoples for control of the Horn of
Africa.
In response to Islamic expansion in the Red Sea area and
the loss of their seaborne commercial network, the Aksumites
turned their attention to the colonizing of the northern
Ethiopian highlands. The Agew peoples, divided into a number
of groups, inhabited the central and northern highlands, and
it was these peoples who came increasingly under Aksumite
influence. In all probability, this process of acculturation
had been going on since the first migrants from Southwest
Arabia settled in the highlands, but it seems to have
received new impetus with the decline of Aksum's overseas
trade and consequent dependence upon solely African
resources. As early as the mid-seventh century, the old
capital at Aksum had been abandoned; thereafter, it served
only as a religious center and as a place of coronation for
a succession of kings who traced their lineage to Aksum. By
then, Aksumite cultural, political, and religious influence
had been established south of Tigray in such Agew districts
as Lasta, Wag, Angot, and, eventually, Amhara.
This southward expansion continued over the next several
centuries. The favored technique involved the establishment
of military colonies, which served as core populations from
which Aksumite culture, Semitic language, and Christianity
spread to the surrounding Agew population. By the tenth
century, a post-Aksumite Christian kingdom had emerged that
controlled the central northern highlands from modern
Eritrea to Shewa and the coast from old Adulis to Zeila in
present-day Somalia, territory considerably larger than the
Aksumites had governed. Military colonies were also
established farther afield among the Sidama people of the
central highlands. These settlers may have been the
forerunners of such Semitic-speaking groups as the Argobba,
Gafat (extinct), Gurage, and Hareri, although independent
settlement of Semitic speakers from Southwest Arabia is also
possible. During the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the
Shewan region was the scene of renewed Christian expansion,
carried out, it appears, by one of the more recently
Semiticized peoples--the Amhara.
About 1137 a new dynasty came to power in the Christian
highlands. Known as the Zagwe and based in the Agew district
of Lasta, it developed naturally out of the long cultural
and political contact between Cushitic- and Semitic-speaking
peoples in the northern highlands. Staunch Christians, the
Zagwe devoted themselves to the construction of new churches
and monasteries. These were often modeled after Christian
religious edifices in the Holy Land, a locale the Zagwe and
their subjects held in special esteem. Patrons of literature
and the arts in the service of Christianity, the Zagwe kings
were responsible, among other things, for the great churches
carved into the rock in and around their capital at Adefa.
In time, Adefa became known as Lalibela, the name of the
Zagwe king to whose reign the Adefa churches' construction
has been attributed.
By the time of the Zagwe, the Ethiopian church was showing
the effects of long centuries of isolation from the larger
Christian and Orthodox worlds. After the seventh century,
when Egypt succumbed to the Arab conquest, the highlanders'
sole contact with outside Christianity was with the Coptic
Church of Egypt, which periodically supplied a patriarch, or
abun, upon royal request. During the long period from the
seventh to the twelfth century, the Ethiopian Orthodox
Church came to place strong emphasis upon the Old Testament
and on the Judaic roots of the church. Christianity in
Ethiopia became imbued with Old Testament belief and
practice in many ways, which differentiated it not only from
European Christianity but also from the faith of other
Monophysites, such as the Copts. Under the Zagwe, the
highlanders maintained regular contact with the Egyptians.
Also, by then the Ethiopian church had demonstrated that it
was not a proselytizing religion but rather one that by and
large restricted its attention to already converted areas of
the highlands. Not until the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries did the church demonstrate real interest in
proselytizing among nonbelievers, and then it did so via a
reinvigorated monastic movement.
****************
The "Restoration" of the "Solomonic" Line
The Zagwe's championing of Christianity and their artistic
achievements notwithstanding, there was much discontent with
Lastan rule among the populace in what is now Eritrea and
Tigray and among the Amhara, an increasingly powerful people
who inhabited a region called Amhara to the south of the
Zagwe center at Adefa. About 1270, an Amhara noble, Yekuno
Amlak, drove out the last Zagwe ruler and proclaimed himself
king. His assumption of power marked yet another stage in
the southward march of what may henceforth be termed the
"Christian kingdom of Ethiopia" and ushered in an era of
increased contact with the Levant, the Middle East, and
Europe.
The new dynasty that Yekuno Amlak founded came to be known
as the "Solomonic" dynasty because its scions claimed
descent not only from Aksum but also from King Solomon of
ancient Israel. According to traditions that were eventually
molded into a national epic, the lineage of Aksumite kings
originated with the offspring of an alleged union between
Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, whose domains Ethiopians
have variously identified with parts of Southwest Arabia
and/or Aksum. Consequently, the notion arose that royal
legitimacy derived from descent in a line of Solomonic
kings. The Tigray and Amhara, who saw themselves as heirs to
Aksum, denied the Zagwe any share in that heritage and
viewed the Zagwe as usurpers. Yekuno Amlak's accession thus
came to be seen as the legitimate "restoration" of the
Solomonic line, even though the Amhara king's northern
ancestry was at best uncertain. Nonetheless, his assumption
of the throne brought the Solomonic dynasty to power, and
all subsequent Ethiopian kings traced their legitimacy to
him and, thereby, to Solomon and Sheba.
Under Yekuno Amlak, Amhara became the geographical and
political center of the Christian kingdom. The new king
concerned himself with the consolidation of his control over
the northern highlands and with the weakening and, where
possible, destruction of encircling pagan and Muslim states.
He enjoyed some of his greatest success against Ifat, an
Islamic sultanate to the southeast of Amhara that posed a
threat to trade routes between Zeila and the central
highlands (see fig. 3).
Upon his death in 1285, Yekuno Amlak was succeeded by his
son, Yagba Siyon (reigned 1285-94). His reign and the period
immediately following were marked by constant struggles
among the sons and grandsons of Yekuno Amlak. This
internecine conflict was resolved sometime around 1300, when
it became the rule for all males tracing descent from Yekuno
Amlak (except the reigning emperor and his sons) to be held
in a mountaintop prison that was approachable only on one
side and that was guarded by soldiers under a commandant
loyal to the reigning monarch. When that monarch died, all
his sons except his heir were also permanently imprisoned.
This practice was followed with some exceptions until the
royal prison was destroyed in the early sixteenth century.
The royal prison was one solution to a problem that would
plague the Solomonic line throughout its history: the
conflict over succession among those who had any claim to
royal lineage.
****************
Amhara Ascendancy
Yekuno Amlak's grandson, Amda Siyon (reigned 1313-44),
distinguished himself by at last establishing firm control
over all of the Christian districts of the kingdom and by
expanding into the neighboring regions of Shewa, Gojam, and
Damot and into Agew districts in the Lake Tana area. He also
devoted much attention to campaigns against Muslim states to
the east and southeast of Amhara, such as Ifat, which still
posed a powerful threat to the kingdom, and against Hadya, a
Sidama state southwest of Shewa. These victories gave him
control of the central highlands and enhanced his influence
over trade routes to the Red Sea. His conquests also helped
facilitate the spread of Christianity i
n the southern
highlands.
Zara Yakob (reigned 1434-68) was without a doubt one of the
greatest Ethiopian rulers. His substantial military
accomplishments included a decisive victory in 1445 over the
sultanate of Adal and its Muslim pastoral allies, who for
two centuries had been a source of determined opposition to
the Christian highlanders. Zara Yakob also sought to
strengthen royal control over what was a highly
decentralized administrative system. Some of his most
notable achievements were in ecclesiastical matters, where
he sponsored a reorganization of the Orthodox Church,
attempted to unify its religious practices, and fostered
proselytization among nonbelievers. Perhaps most remarkable
was a flowering of Gi'iz literature, in which the king
himself composed a number of important religious tracts.
Beginning in the fourteenth century, the power of the
negusa nagast (king of kings), as the emperor was called,
was in theory unlimited, but in reality it was often
considerably less than that. The unity of the state depended
on an emperor's ability to control the local governors of
the various regions that composed the kingdom, these rulers
being self-made men with their own local bases of support.
In general, the court did not interfere with these rulers so
long as the latter demonstrated loyalty through the
collection and submission of royal tribute and through the
contribution of armed men as needed for the king's
campaigns. When the military had to be used, it was under
central control but was composed of provincial levies or
troops who lived off the land, or who were supported by the
provincial governments that supplied them (see Military
Tradition in National Life, ch. 5). The result was that the
expenses borne by the imperial administration were small,
whereas the contributions and tribute provided by the
provinces were substantial.
In theory, the emperor had unrestrained control of
political and military affairs. In actuality, however, local
and even hereditary interests were recognized and respected
so long as local rulers paid tribute, supplied levies of
warriors, and, in general, complied with royal dictates.
Failure to honor obligations to the throne could and often
did bring retribution in the form of battle and, if the
emperor's forces won, plunder of the district and removal of
the local governor. Ethiopian rulers continually moved
around the kingdom, an important technique for assertion of
royal authority and for collection--and consumption--of
taxes levied in kind. The emperor was surrounded by ceremony
and protocol intended to enhance his status as a descendant
of King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba. He lived in
seclusion and was shielded, except on rare occasions, from
the gaze of all but his servants and high court officials.
Most other subjects were denied access to his person.
The emperor's judicial function was of primary importance.
The administration of justice was centralized at court and
was conditioned by a body of Egyptian Coptic law known as
the Fetha Nagast (Law of Kings), introduced into Ethiopia in
the mid-fifteenth century (see The Legal System, ch. 5).
Judges appointed by the emperor were attached to the
administration of every provincial governor. They not only
heard cases but also determined when cases could be referred
to the governor or sent on appeal to the central government.
*****************
The Trials of the Christian Kingdom and the Decline of Imperial Power
From the mid-fifteenth through the mid-seventeenth century,
Christian Ethiopians were confronted by the aggressiveness
of the Muslim states, the far-reaching migrations of the
Oromo, and the efforts of the Portuguese--who had been
summoned to aid in the fight against the forces of Islam--to
convert them from Monophysite Christianity to Roman
Catholicism. The effects of the Muslim and Oromo activities
and of the civil strife engendered by the Portuguese left
the empire much weakened by the mid-seventeenth century. One
result was the emergence of regional lords essentially
independent of the throne, although in principle subject to
it.
Beginning in the thirteenth century, one of the chief
problems confronting the Christian kingdom, then ruled by
the Amhara, was the threat of Muslim encirclement. By that
time, a variety of peoples east and south of the highlands
had embraced Islam, and some had established powerful
sultanates (or shaykhdoms). One of these was the sultanate
of Ifat in the northeastern Shewan foothills, and another
was centered in the Islamic city of Harer farther east. In
the lowlands along the Red Sea were two other important
Muslim peoples--the Afar and the Somali. As mentioned
previously, Ifat posed a major threat to the Christian
kingdom, but it was finally defeated by Amda Siyon in the
mid-fourteenth century after a protracted struggle. During
this conflict, Ifat was supported by other sultanates and by
Muslim pastoralists, but for the most part, the Islamicized
peoples inhabited small, independent states and were divided
by differences in language and culture. Many of them spoke
Cushitic languages, unlike the Semitic speakers of Harer.
Some were sedentary cultivators and traders, while others
were pastoralists. Consequently, unity beyond a single
campaign or even the coordination of military activities was
difficult to sustain.
Their tendency toward disunity notwithstanding, the Muslim
forces continued to pose intermittent threats to the
Christian kingdom. By the late fourteenth century,
descendants of the ruling family of Ifat had moved east to
the area around Harer and had reinvigorated the old Muslim
sultanate of Adal, which became the most powerful Muslim
entity in the Horn of Africa. Adal came to control the
important trading routes from the highlands to the port of
Zeila, thus posing a threat to Ethiopia's commerce and, when
able, to christian control of the highlands.
Although the Christian state was unable to impose its rule
over the Muslim states to the east, it was strong enough to
resist Muslim incursions through the fourteenth century and
most of the fifteenth. As the long reign of Zara Yakob came
to an end, however, the kingdom again experienced succession
problems. It was the monarchs' practice to marry several
wives, and each sought to forward the cause of her sons in
the struggle for the throne. In those cases where the sons
of the deceased king were too young to take office, there
could also be conflict within the council of advisers at
court. In a polity that had been held together primarily by
a strong warrior king, one or more generations of dynastic
conflict could lead to serious internal and external
problems. Only the persistence of internal conflicts among
Muslims generally and within the sultanate of Adal in
particular prevented a Muslim onslaught. Through the first
quarter of the sixteenth century, relations between
Christian and Muslim powers took the form of raids and
counterraids. Each side sought to claim as many slaves and
as much booty as possible, but neither side attempted to
bring the other firmly under its rule.
By the second decade of the sixteenth century, however, a
young soldier in the Adali army, Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al Ghazi,
had begun to acquire a strong following by virtue of his
military successes and in time became the de facto leader of
Adal. Concurrently, he acquired the status of a religious
leader. Ahmad, who came to be called Grañ (the "Lefthanded")
by his Christian enemies, rallied the ethnically diverse
Muslims, including many Afar and Somali, in a jihad intended
to break Christian power. In 1525 Grañ led his first
expedition against a Christian army and over the next two or
three years continued to attack Ethiopian territory, burning
churches, taking prisoners, and collecting booty. At the
Battle of Shimbra Kure in 1529, according to historian
Taddesse Tamrat, "Imam Ahmad broke the backbone of Christian
resistance against his offensives." The emperor, Lebna
Dengel (reigned 1508-40), was unable to organize an
effective defense, and in the early 1530s Grañ 's armies
penetrated the heartland of the Ethiopian state--northern
Shewa, Amhara, and Tigray, devastating the countryside and
thereafter putting much of what had been the Christian
kingdom under the rule of Muslim governors.
It was not until 1543 that the emperor Galawdewos (reigned
1540-49), joining with a small number of Portuguese soldiers
requested earlier by Lebna Dengel, defeated the Muslim
forces and killed Grañ . The death of the charismatic Grañ
destroyed the unity of the Muslim forces that had been
created by their leader's successes, skill, and reputation
as a warrior and religious figure. Christian armies slowly
pushed the Muslims back and regained control of the
highlands. Ethiopians had suffered extraordinary material
and moral losses during the struggle against Grañ , and it
would be decades or even centuries before they would recover
fully. The memory of the bitter war against Grañ remains
vivid even today.
**************
Oromo Migrations and Their Impact
In the mid-sixteenth century, its political and military
organization already weakened by the Muslim assault, the
Christian kingdom began to be pressured on the south and
southeast by movements of the Oromo (called Galla by the
Amhara). These migrations also affected the Sidama, Muslim
pastoralists in the lowlands, and Adal. At this time, the
Oromo, settled in far southern Ethiopia, were an egalitarian
pastoral people divided into a number of competing segments
or groups but sharing a type of age-set system (see
Glossary) of social organization called the gada system (see
Glossary), which was ideally suited for warfare. Their
predilection toward warfare, apparently combined with an
expanding population of both people and cattle, led to a
long-term predatory expansion at the expense of their
neighbors after about 1550. Unlike the highland Christians
or on occasion the lowland Muslims, the Oromo were not
concerned with establishing an empire or imposing a
religious system. In a series of massive but uncoordinated
movements during the second half of the sixteenth century,
they penetrated much of the southern and northern highlands
as well as the lowlands to the east, affecting Christians
and Muslims equally.
These migrations also profoundly affected the Oromo.
Disunited in the extreme, they attacked and raided each
other as readily as neighboring peoples in their quest for
new land and pastures. As they moved farther from their
homeland and encountered new physical and human
environments, entire segments of the Oromo population
adapted by changing their mode of economic life, their
political and social organization, and their religious
adherence. Many mixed with the Amhara (particularly in
Shewa), became Christians, and eventually obtained a share
in governing the kingdom. In some cases, royal family
members came from the union of Amhara and Oromo elements. In
other cases, Oromo, without losing their identity, became
part of the nobility. But no matter how much they changed,
Oromo groups generally retained their language and sense of
local identity. So differentiated and dispersed had they
become, however, that few foreign observers recognized the
Oromo as a distinct people until the twentieth century.
In a more immediate sense, the Oromo migration resulted in
a weakening of both Christian and Muslim power and drove a
wedge between the two faiths along the eastern edge of the
highlands. In the Christian kingdom, Oromo groups
infiltrated large areas in the east and south, with large
numbers settling in Shewa and adjacent parts of the central
highlands. Others penetrated as far north as eastern Tigray.
The effect of the Oromo migrations was to leave the
Ethiopian state fragmented and much reduced in size, with an
alien population in its midst. Thereafter, the Oromo played
a major role in the internal dynamics of Ethiopia, both
assimilating and being assimilated as they were slowly
incorporated into the Christian kingdom. In the south, the
Sidama fiercely resisted the Oromo, but, as in the central
and northern highlands, they were compelled to yield at
least some territory. In the east, the Oromo swept up to and
even beyond Harer, dealing a devastating blow to what
remained of Adal and contributing in a major way to its
decline.
*******************
Contact with European Christendom
Egyptian Muslims had destroyed the neighboring Nile River
valley's Christian states in the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries. Tenuous relations with Christians in Western
Europe and the Byzantine Empire continued via the Coptic
Church in Egypt. The Coptic patriarchs in Alexandria were
responsible for the assignment of Ethiopian patriarchs--a
church policy that Egypt's Muslim rulers occasionally tried
to use to their advantage. For centuries after the Muslim
conquests of the early medieval period, this link with the
Eastern churches constituted practically all of Ethiopia's
administrative connection with the larger Christian world.
A more direct if less formal contact with the outside
Christian world was maintained through the Ethiopian
Monophysite community in Jerusalem and the visits of
Ethiopian pilgrims to the Holy Land. Ethiopian monks from
the Jerusalem community attended the Council of Florence in
1441 at the invitation of the pope, who was seeking to
reunite the Eastern and Western churches. Westerners learned
about Ethiopia through the monks and pilgrims and became
attracted to it for two main reasons. First, many believed
Ethiopia was the long-sought land of the legendary Christian
priest-king of the East, Prester John. Second, the West
viewed Ethiopia as a potentially valuable ally in its
struggle against Islamic forces that continued to threaten
southern Europe until the Turkish defeat at the Battle of
Lepanto in 1571.
Portugal, the first European power to circumnavigate Africa
and enter the Indian Ocean, displayed initial interest in
this potential ally by sending a representative to Ethiopia
in 1493. The Ethiopians, in turn, sent an envoy to Portugal
in 1509 to request a coordinated attack on the Muslims.
Europe received its first written accounts of the country
from Father Francisco Alvarez, a Franciscan who accompanied
a Portuguese diplomatic expedition to Ethiopia in the 1520s.
His book, The Prester John of the Indies, stirred further
European interest and proved a valuable source for future
historians. The first Portuguese forces responded to a
request for aid in 1541, although by that time the
Portuguese were concerned primarily with strengthening their
hegemony over the Indian Ocean trade routes and with
converting the Ethiopians to Roman Catholicism.
Nevertheless, joining the forces of the Christian kingdom,
the Portuguese succeeded eventually in helping to defeat and
kill Grañ .
Portuguese Roman Catholic missionaries arrived in 1554.
Efforts to induce the Ethiopians to reject their Monophysite
beliefs and accept Rome's supremacy continued for nearly a
century and engendered bitterness as pro- and anti-Catholic
parties maneuvered for control of the state. At least two
emperors in this period allegedly converted to Roman
Catholicism. The second of these, Susenyos (reigned 1607-
32), after a particularly fierce battle between adherents of
the two faiths, abdicated in 1632 in favor of his son,
Fasiladas (reigned 1632-67), to spare the country further
bloodshed. The expulsion of the Jesuits and all Roman
Catholic missionaries followed. This religious controversy
left a legacy of deep hostility toward foreign Christians
and Europeans that continued into the twentieth century. It
also contributed to the isolation that followed for the next
200 years.
*******************
The Gonder State and the Ascendancy of the Nobility
Emperor Fasiladas kept out the disruptive influences of the
foreign Christians, dealt with sporadic Muslim incursions,
and in general sought to reassert central authority and to
reinvigorate the Solomonic monarchy and the Orthodox Church.
He revived the practice of confining royal family members on
a remote mountaintop to lessen challenges to his rule and
distinguished himself by reconstructing the cathedral at
Aksum (destroyed by Grañ ) and by establishing his camp at
Gonder--a locale that gradually developed into a permanent
capital and that became the cultural and political center of
Ethiopia during the Gonder period.
Although the Gonder period produced a flowering of
architecture and art that lasted more than a century, Gonder
monarchs never regained full control over the wealth and
manpower that the nobility had usurped during the long wars
against Grañ and then the Oromo. Many nobles, commanding the
loyalty of their home districts, had become virtually
independent, especially those on the periphery of the
kingdom. Moreover, during Fasiladas's reign and that of his
son Yohannis I (reigned 1667-82), there were substantial
differences between the two monastic orders of the Orthodox
Church concerning the proper response to the Jesuit
challenge to Monophysite doctrine on the nature of Christ.
The positions of the two orders were often linked to
regional opposition to the emperor, and neither Fasiladas
nor Yohannis was able to settle the issue without alienating
important components of the church.
Iyasu I (reigned 1682-1706) was a celebrated military
leader who excelled at the most basic requirement of the
warrior-king. He campaigned constantly in districts on the
south and southeast of the kingdom and personally led
expeditions to Shewa and beyond, areas from which royal
armies had long been absent. Iyasu also attempted to mediate
the doctrinal quarrel in the church, but a solution eluded
him. He sponsored the construction of several churches,
among them Debre Birhan Selassie, one of the most beautiful
and famous of the churches in Gonder.
Iyasu's reign also saw the Oromo begin to play a role in
the affairs of the kingdom, especially in the military
sense. Iyasu co-opted some of the Oromo groups by enlisting
them into his army and by converting them to Christianity.
He came gradually to rely almost entirely upon Oromo units
and led them in repeated campaigns against their countrymen
who had not yet been incorporated into the Amhara-Tigray
state. Successive Gonder kings, particularly Iyasu II
(reigned 1730-55), likewise relied upon Oromo military units
to help counter challenges to their authority from the
traditional nobility and for purposes of campaigning in far-
flung Oromo territory. By the late eighteenth century, the
Oromo were playing an important role in political affairs as
well. At times during the first half of the nineteenth
century, Oromo was the primary language at court, and Oromo
leaders came to number among the highest nobility of the
kingdom.
During the reign of Iyoas (reigned 1755-69), son of Iyasu
II, the most important political figure was Ras Mikael
Sehul, a good example of a great noble who made himself the
power behind the throne. Mikael's base was the province of
Tigray, which by now enjoyed a large measure of autonomy and
from which Mikael raised up large armies with which he
dominated the Gonder scene. In 1769 he demonstrated his
power by ordering the murder of two kings (Iyoas and
Yohannis II) and by placing Tekla Haimanot II (son of
Yohannis II) on the throne, a weak ruler who did Mikael's
bidding. Mikael continued in command until the early 1770s,
when a coalition of his opponents compelled him to retire to
Tigray, where he eventually died of old age.
Mikael's brazen murder of two kings and his undisguised
role as kingmaker in Gonder signaled the beginning of what
Ethiopians have long termed the Zemene Mesafint (Era of the
Princes), a time when Gonder kings were reduced to
ceremonial figureheads while their military functions and
real power lay with powerful nobles. During this time,
traditionally dating from 1769 to 1855, the kingdom no
longer existed as a united entity capable of concerted
political and military activity. Various principalities were
ruled by autonomous nobles, and warfare was constant.
The five-volume work Travels to Discover the Source of the
Nile by James Bruce, the Scottish traveler who lived in
Ethiopia from 1769 to 1772, describes some of the bloody
conflicts and personal rivalries that consumed the kingdom.
During the most confused period, around 1800, there were as
many as six rival emperors. Provincial warlords were masters
of the territories they controlled but were subject to raids
from other provinces. Peasants often left the land to become
soldiers or brigands. In this period, too, Oromo nobles,
often nominally Christian and in a few cases Muslim, were
among those who struggled for hegemony over the highlands.
The church, still riven by theological controversy,
contributed to the disunity that was the hallmark of the
Zemene Mesafint.
******************
The Making of Modern Ethiopia
After the mid-nineteenth century, the different regions of
the Gonder state were gradually reintegrated to form the
nucleus of a modern state by strong monarchs such as
Tewodros II, Yohannis IV, and Menelik II, who resisted the
gradual expansion of European control in the Red Sea area
and at the same time staved off a number of other challenges
to the integrity of the reunited kingdom.
******************
The Reestablishment of the Ethiopian Monarchy
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Gonder
state consisted of the northern and central highlands and
the lower elevations immediately adjacent to them. This area
was only nominally a monarchy, as rival nobles fought for
the military title of ras (roughly, marshal; literally, head
in Amharic) or the highest of all nonroyal titles, ras-
bitwoded, that combined supreme military command with the
duties of first minister at court. These nobles often were
able to enthrone and depose princes who carried the empty
title of negusa nagast.
The major peoples who made up the Ethiopian state were the
Amhara and the Tigray, both Semitic speakers, and Cushitic-
speaking peoples such as the Oromo and those groups speaking
Agew languages, many of whom were Christian by the early
1800s. In some cases, their conversion had been accompanied
by their assimilation into Amhara culture or, less often,
Tigray culture; in other cases, they had become Christian
but had retained their languages. The state's largest ethnic
group was the Oromo, but the Oromo were neither politically
nor culturally unified. Some were Christian, spoke Amharic,
and had intermarried with the Amhara. Other Christian Oromo
retained their language, although their modes of life and
social structure had changed extensively from those of their
pastoral kin. At the eastern edge of the highlands, many had
converted to Islam, especially in the area of the former
sultanates of Ifat and Adal. The Oromo people, whether or
not Christian and Amhara in culture, played important
political roles in the Zemene Mesafint--often as allies of
Amhara aspirants to power but sometimes as rases and
kingmakers in their own right.
Meanwhile, to the south of the kingdom, segments of the
Oromo population--cultivators and suppliers of goods
exportable to the Red Sea coast and beyond--had developed
kingdoms of their own, no doubt stimulated in part by the
examples of the Amhara to the north and the Sidama kingdoms
to the south. The seventeenth through nineteenth century was
a period not only of migration but also of integration, as
groups borrowed usable techniques and institutions from each
other. In the south, too, Islam had made substantial
inroads. Many Oromo chieftains found Islam a useful tool in
the process of centralization as well as in the building of
trade networks.
By the second quarter of the nineteenth century, external
factors once more affected the highlands and adjacent areas,
at least in part because trade among the Red Sea states was
being revived. Egypt made incursions along the coast and
sought at various times to control the Red Sea ports.
Europeans, chiefly British and French, showed interest in
the Horn of Africa. The competition for trade, differences
over how to respond to Egypt's activities, and the readier
availability of modern arms were important factors in the
conflicts of the period.
In the mid-nineteenth century, a major figure in Gonder was
Kasa Haylu, son of a lesser noble from Qwara, a district on
the border with Sudan. Beginning about 1840, Kasa alternated
between life as a brigand and life as a soldier of fortune
for various nobles, including Ras Ali, a Christian of Oromo
origin who dominated the court in Gonder. Kasa became
sufficiently effective as an army commander to be offered
the governorship of a minor province. He also married Ali's
daughter, Tawabech. Nevertheless, Kasa eventually rebelled
against Ali, occupied Gonder in 1847, and compelled Ali to
recognize him as chief of the western frontier area. In 1848
he attacked the Egyptians in Sudan; however, he suffered a
crushing defeat, which taught him to respect modern
firepower. Kasa then agreed to a reconciliation with Ali,
whom he served until 1852, when he again revolted. The
following year, he defeated Ali's army and burned his
capital, Debre Tabor. In 1854 he assumed the title negus
(king), and in February 1855 the head of the church crowned
him Tewodros II.
****************
From Tewodros II to Menelik II, 1855-89
Tewodros II's origins were in the Era of the Princes, but
his ambitions were not those of the regional nobility. He
sought to reestablish a cohesive Ethiopian state and to
reform its administration and church. He did not initially
claim Solomonic lineage but did seek to restore Solomonic
hegemony, and he considered himself the "Elect of God."
Later in his reign, suspecting that foreigners considered
him an upstart and seeking to legitimize his reign, he added
"son of David and Solomon" to his title.
Tewodros's first task was to bring Shewa under his control.
During the Era of the Princes, Shewa was, even more than
most provinces, an independent entity, its ruler even
styling himself negus. In the course of subduing the
Shewans, Tewodros imprisoned a Shewan prince, Menelik, who
would later become emperor himself. Despite his success
against Shewa, Tewodros faced constant rebellions in other
provinces. In the first six years of his reign, the new
ruler managed to put down these rebellions, and the empire
was relatively peaceful from about 1861 to 1863, but the
energy, wealth, and manpower necessary to deal with regional
opposition limited the scope of Tewodros's other activities.
By 1865 other rebels had emerged, including Menelik, who had
escaped from prison and returned to Shewa, where he declared
himself negus.
In addition to his conflicts with rebels and rivals,
Tewodros encountered difficulties with the European powers.
Seeking aid from the British government (he proposed a joint
expedition to conquer Jerusalem), he became unhappy with the
behavior of those Britons whom he had counted on to advance
his request, and he took them hostage. In 1868, as a British
expeditionary force sent from India to secure release of the
hostages stormed his stronghold, Tewodros committed suicide.
Tewodros never realized his dream of restoring a strong
monarchy, although he took some important initial steps. He
sought to establish the principle that governors and judges
must be salaried appointees. He also established a
professional standing army, rather than depending on local
lords to provide soldiers for his expeditions. He also
intended to reform the church, believing the clergy to be
ignorant and immoral, but he was confronted by strong
opposition when he tried to impose a tax on church lands to
help finance government activities. His confiscation of
these lands gained him enemies in the church and little
support elsewhere. Essentially, Tewodros was a talented
military campaigner but a poor politician.
The kingdom at Tewodros's death was disorganized, but those
contending to succeed him were not prepared to return to the
Zemene Mesafint system. One of them, crowned Tekla Giorgis,
took over the central part of the highlands. Another, Kasa
Mercha, governor of Tigray, declined when offered the title
of ras in exchange for recognizing Tekla Giorgis. The third,
Menelik of Shewa, came to terms with Tekla Giorgis in return
for a promise to respect Shewa's independence. Tekla
Giorgis, however, sought to bring Kasa Mercha under his rule
but was defeated by a small Tigrayan army equipped with more
modern weapons than those possessed by his Gonder forces. In
1872 Kasa Mercha was crowned negusa nagast in a ceremony at
the ancient capital of Aksum, taking the throne name of
Yohannis IV.
Yohannis was unable to exercise control over the nearly
independent Shewans until six years later. From the
beginning of his reign, he was confronted with the growing
power of Menelik, who had proclaimed himself king of Shewa
and traced his Solomonic lineage to Lebna Dengel. While
Yohannis was struggling against opposing factions in the
north, Menelik consolidated his power in Shewa and extended
his rule over the Oromo to the south and west. He garrisoned
Shewan forces among the Oromo and received military and
financial support from them. Despite the acquisition of
European firearms, in 1878 Menelik was compelled to submit
to Yohannis and to pay tribute; in return, Yohannis
recognized Menelik as negus and gave him a free hand in
territories to the south of Shewa. This agreement, although
only a truce in the long-standing rivalry between Tigray and
Shewa, was important to Yohannis, who was preoccupied with
foreign enemies and pressures. In many of Yohannis's
external struggles, Menelik maintained separate relations
with the emperor's enemies and continued to consolidate
Shewan authority in order to strengthen his own position. In
a subsequent agreement designed to ensure the succession in
the line of Yohannis, one of Yohannis's younger sons was
married to Zawditu, Menelik's daughter.
In 1875 Yohannis had to meet attacks from Egyptian forces
on three fronts. The khedive in Egypt envisioned a "Greater
Egypt" that would encompass Ethiopia. In pursuit of this
goal, an Egyptian force moved inland from present-day
Djibouti but was annihilated by Afar tribesmen. Other
Egyptian forces occupied Harer, where they remained for
nearly ten years, long after the Egyptian cause had been
lost. Tigrayan warriors defeated a more ambitious attack
launched from the coastal city of Mitsiwa in which the
Egyptian forces were almost completely destroyed. A fourth
Egyptian army was decisively defeated in 1876 southwest of
Mitsiwa.
Italy was the next source of danger. The Italian government
took over the port of Aseb in 1882 from the Rubattino
Shipping Company, which had purchased it from a local ruler
some years before. Italy's main interest was not the port
but the eventual colonization of Ethiopia. In the process,
the Italians entered into a long-term relationship with
Menelik. The main Italian drive was begun in 1885 from
Mitsiwa, which Italy had occupied. From this port, the
Italians began to penetrate the hinterland, with British
encouragement. In 1887, after the Italians were soundly
defeated at Dogali by Ras Alula, the governor of
northeastern Tigray, they sent a stronger force into the
area.
Yohannis was unable to attend to the Italian threat because
of difficulties to the west in Gonder and Gojam. In 1887
Sudanese Muslims, known as Mahdists, made incursions into
Gojam and Begemdir and laid waste parts of those provinces.
In 1889 the emperor met these forces in the Battle of Metema
on the Sudanese border. Although the invaders were defeated,
Yohannis himself was fatally wounded, and the Ethiopian
forces disintegrated. Just before his death, Yohannis
designated one of his sons, Ras Mengesha Yohannis of Tigray,
as his successor, but this gesture proved futile, as Menelik
successfully claimed the throne in 1889.
The Shewan ruler became the dominant personality in
Ethiopia and was recognized as Emperor Menelik II by all but
Yohannis's son and Ras Alula. During the temporary period of
confusion following Yohannis's death, the Italians were able
to advance farther into the hinterland from Mitsiwa and
establish a foothold in the highlands, from which Menelik
was unable to dislodge them. From 1889 until after World War
II, Ethiopia was deprived of its maritime frontier and was
forced to accept the presence of an ambitious European power
on its borders.
****************
The Reign of Menelik II, 1889-1913
By 1900 Menelik had succeeded in establishing control over
much of present-day Ethiopia and had, in part at least,
gained recognition from the European colonial powers of the
boundaries of his empire. Although in many respects a
traditionalist, he introduced several significant changes.
His decision in the late 1880s to locate the royal
encampment at Addis Ababa ("New Flower") in southern Shewa
led to the gradual rise of a genuine urban center and a
permanent capital in the 1890s, a development that
facilitated the introduction of new ideas and technology.
The capital's location symbolized the empire's southern
reorientation, a move that further irritated Menelik's
Tigrayan opponents and some Amhara of the more northerly
provinces who resented Shewan hegemony. Menelik also
authorized a French company to build a railroad, not
completed until 1917, that eve
ntually would link Addis Ababa
and Djibouti.
Menelik embarked on a program of military conquest that
more than doubled the size of his domain (see fig. 4).
Enjoying superior firepower, his forces overran the Kembata
and Welamo regions in the southern highlands. Also subdued
were the Kefa and other Oromo- and Omotic-speaking peoples.
Expanding south, Menelik introduced a system of land rights
considerably modified from that prevailing in the Amhara-
Tigray highlands. These changes had significant implications
for the ordinary cultivator in the south and ultimately were
to generate quite different responses there to the land
reform programs that would follow the revolution of 1974
(see The Struggle for Power, 1974-77, this ch.). In the
central and northern highlands, despite regional variations,
most peasants had substantial inheritable (broadly, rist--
see Glossary) rights in land. In addition to holding rights
of this kind, the nobility held or were assigned certain
economic rights in the land, called gult (see Glossary)
rights, which entitled them to a portion of the produce of
the land in which others held rist rights and to certain
services from the rist holders. The Ethiopian Orthodox
Church also held land of its own and gult rights in land to
which peasants held rist rights. In the south, all land
theoretically belonged to the emperor. He in turn allocated
land rights to those he appointed to office and to his
soldiers. The rights allocated by the king were more
extensive than the gult rights prevailing in the north and
left most of the indigenous peoples as tenants, with far
fewer rights than Amhara and Tigray peasants. Thus, the new
landowners in the south were aliens and remained largely so.
At the same time that Menelik was extending his empire,
European colonial powers were showing an interest in the
territories surrounding Ethiopia. Menelik considered the
Italians a formidable challenge and negotiated the Treaty of
Wuchale with them in 1889 (see Diplomacy and State Building
in Imperial Ethiopia, ch. 4). Among its terms were those
permitting the Italians to establish their first toehold on
the edge of the northern highlands and from which they
subsequently sought to expand into Tigray. Disagreements
over the contents of the treaty eventually induced Menelik
to renounce it and repay in full a loan Italy had granted as
a condition. Thereafter, relations with Italy were further
strained as a result of the establishment of Eritrea as a
colony and Italy's penetration of the Somali territories.
Italian ambitions were encouraged by British actions in
1891, when, hoping to stabilize the region in the face of
the Mahdist threat in Sudan, Britain agreed with the Italian
government that Ethiopia should fall within the Italian
sphere of influence. France, however, encouraged Menelik to
oppose the Italian threat by delineating the projected
boundaries of his empire. Anxious to advance French economic
interests through the construction of a railroad from Addis
Ababa to the city of Djibouti in French Somaliland, France
accordingly reduced the size of its territorial claims there
and recognized Ethiopian sovereignty in the area.
Italian-Ethiopian relations reached a low point in 1895,
when Ras Mengesha of Tigray, hitherto reluctant to recognize
the Shewan emperor's claims, was threatened by the Italians
and asked for the support of Menelik. In late 1895, Italian
forces invaded Tigray. However, Menelik completely routed
them in early 1896 as they approached the Tigrayan capital,
Adwa. This victory brought Ethiopia new prestige as well as
general recognition of its sovereign status by the European
powers. Besides confirming the annulment of the Treaty of
Wuchale, the peace agreement ending the conflict also
entailed Italian recognition of Ethiopian independence; in
return, Menelik permitted the Italians to retain their
colony of Eritrea.
In addition to attempts on the part of Britain, France, and
Italy to gain influence within the empire, Menelik was
troubled by intrigues originating in Russia, Germany, and
the Ottoman Empire. But, showing a great capacity to play
one power off against another, the emperor was able to avoid
making any substantial concessions. Moreover, while pursuing
his own territorial designs, Menelik joined with France in
1898 to penetrate Sudan at Fashoda and then cooperated with
British forces in British Somaliland between 1900 and 1904
to put down a rebellion in the Ogaden by Somali leader
Muhammad Abdullah Hassan. By 1908 the colonial powers had
recognized Ethiopia's borders except for those with Italian
Somaliland.
After Menelik suffered a disabling stroke in May 1906, his
personal control over the empire weakened. Apparently
responding to that weakness and seeking to avoid an outbreak
of conflict in the area, Britain, France, and Italy signed
the Tripartite Treaty, which declared that the common
purpose of the three powers was to maintain the political
status quo and to respect each other's interests. Britain's
interest, it was recognized, lay around Lake Tana and the
headwaters of the Abay (Blue Nile). Italy's chief interest
was in linking Eritrea with Italian Somaliland. France's
interest was the territory to be traversed by the railroad
from Addis Ababa to Djibouti in French Somaliland.
Apparently recognizing that his political strength was
ebbing, Menelik established a Council of Ministers in late
1907 to assist in the management of state affairs. The
foremost aspirants to the throne, Ras Mekonnen and Ras
Mengesha, had died in 1906. In June 1908, the emperor
designated his thirteen-year-old nephew, Lij Iyasu, son of
Ras Mikael of Welo, as his successor. After suffering
another stroke in late 1908, the emperor appointed Ras
Tessema as regent. These developments ushered in a decade of
political uncertainty. The great nobles, some with foreign
financial support, engaged in intrigues anticipating a time
of troubles as well as of opportunity upon Menelik's death.
Empress Taytu, who had borne no children, was heavily
involved in court politics on behalf of her kin and friends,
most of whom lived in the northern provinces and included
persons who either had claims of their own to the throne or
were resentful of Shewan hegemony. However, by 1910 her
efforts had been thwarted by the Shewan nobles; thereafter,
the empress withdrew from political activity.
**********
The Interregnum
The two years of Menelik's reign that followed the death of
Ras Tessema in 1911 found real power in the hands of Ras
(later Negus) Mikael of Welo, an Oromo and former Muslim,
who had converted to Christianity under duress. Mikael could
muster an army of 80,000 in his predominantly Muslim
province and commanded the allegiance of Oromo outside it.
In December 1913, Menelik died, but fear of civil war
induced the court to keep his death secret for some time.
Although recognized as emperor, Menelik's nephew, Lij Iyasu,
was not formally crowned. The old nobility quickly attempted
to reassert its power, which Menelik had undercut, and
united against Lij Iyasu. At the outbreak of World War I,
encouraged by his father and by German and Turkish
diplomats, Lij Iyasu adopted the Islamic faith. Seeking to
revive Muslim-Oromo predominance, Lij Iyasu placed the
eastern half of Ethiopia under Ras Mikael's control,
officially placed his country in religious dependence on the
Ottoman sultan-caliph, and established cordial relations
with Somali leader Muhammad Abdullah Hassan.
The Shewan nobility immediately secured excommunicating Lij
Iyasu and deposing him as emperor from the head of the
Ethiopian Orthodox Church a proclamation. Menelik's
daughter, Zawditu, was declared empress. Tafari Mekonnen,
the son of Ras Mekonnen of Harer (who was a descendant of a
Shewan negus and a supporter of the nobles), was declared
regent and heir to the throne and given the title of ras. By
virtue of the power and prestige he derived from his
achievements as one of Menelik's generals, Habte Giorgis,
the minister of war and a traditionalist, continued to play
a major role in government affairs until his death in 1926.
Although Lij Iyasu was captured in a brief military campaign
in 1921 and imprisoned until his death in 1936, his father,
Negus Mikael, continued for some time to pose a serious
challenge to the government in Addis Ababa. The death of
Habte Giorgis in 1926 left Tafari in effective control of
the government. In 1928 he was crowned negus. When the
empress died in 1930, Tafari succeeded to the throne without
contest. Seventeen years after the death of Menelik, the
succession struggle thus ended in favor of Tafari.
Well before his crowning as negus, Tafari began to
introduce a degree of modernization into Ethiopia. As early
as 1920, he ordered administrative regulations and legal
code books from various European countries to provide models
for his newly created bureaucracy. Ministers were also
appointed to advise the regent and were given official
accommodations in the capital. To ensure the growth of a
class of educated young men who might be useful in
introducing reforms in the years ahead, Tafari promoted
government schooling. He enlarged the school Menelik had
established for the sons of nobles and founded Tafari
Mekonnen Elementary School in 1925. In addition, he took
steps to improve health and social services.
Tafari also acted to extend his power base and to secure
allies abroad. In 1919, after efforts to gain membership in
the League of Nations were blocked because of the existence
of slavery in Ethiopia, he (and Empress Zawditu) complied
with the norms of the international community by banning the
slave trade in 1923. That same year, Ethiopia was
unanimously voted membership in the League of Nations.
Continuing to seek international approval of the country's
internal conditions, the government enacted laws in 1924
that provided for the gradual emancipation of slaves and
their offspring and created a government bureau to oversee
the process. The exact degree of servitude was difficult to
determine, however, as the majority of slaves worked in
households and were considered, at least among Amhara and
Tigray, to be second-class family members.
Ethiopia signed a twenty-year treaty of friendship with
Italy in 1928, providing for an Ethiopian free-trade zone at
Aseb in Eritrea and the construction of a road from the port
to Dese in Welo. A joint company controlled road traffic.
Contact with the outside world expanded further when the
emperor engaged a Belgian military mission in 1929 to train
the royal bodyguards (see Training, ch. 5). In 1930
negotiations started between Ethiopia and various
international banking institutions for the establishment of
the Bank of Ethiopia. In the same year, Tafari signed the
Arms Traffic Act with Britain, France, and Italy, by which
unauthorized persons were denied the right to import arms.
The act also recognized the government's right to procure
arms against external aggression and to maintain internal
order.
*************
Haile Selassie: The Prewar Period, 1930-36
Although Empress Zawditu died in April 1930, it was not
until November that Negus Tafari was crowned Haile Selassie
I, "Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, Elect of God, and
King of Kings of Ethiopia." As emperor, Haile Selassie
continued to push reforms aimed at modernizing the country
and breaking the nobility's authority. Henceforth, the great
rases were forced either to obey the emperor or to engage in
treasonable opposition to him.
In July 1931, the emperor granted a constitution that
asserted his own status, reserved imperial succession to the
line of Haile Selassie, and declared that "the person of the
Emperor is sacred, his dignity inviolable, and his power
indisputable." All power over central and local government,
the legislature, the judiciary, and the military remained
with the emperor. The constitution was essentially an effort
to provide a legal basis for replacing the traditional
provincial rulers with appointees loyal to the emperor.
The new strength of the imperial government was
demonstrated in 1932 when a revolt led by Ras Hailu Balaw of
Gojam in support of Lij Iyasu was quickly suppressed and a
new nontraditional governor put in Hailu's place. By 1934
reliable provincial rulers had been established throughout
the traditional Amhara territories of Shewa, Gojam, and
Begemdir, as well as in Kefa and Sidamo--well outside the
core Amhara area. The only traditional leader capable of
overtly challenging central rule at this point was the ras
of Tigray. Other peoples, although in no position to
confront the emperor, remained almost entirely outside the
control of the imperial government.
Although Haile Selassie placed administrators of his own
choosing wherever he could and thus sought to limit the
power of the rases and other nobles with regional power
bases, he did not directly attack the systems of land tenure
that were linked to the traditional political order.
Abolition of the pattern of gult rights in the Amhara-Tigray
highlands and the system of land allocation in the south
would have amounted to a social and economic revolution that
Haile Selassie was not prepared to undertake.
The emperor took nonmilitary measures to promote loyalty to
the throne and to the state. He established new elementary
and secondary schools in Addis Ababa, and some 150
university-age students studied abroad. The government
enacted a penal code in 1930, imported printing presses to
provide nationally oriented newspapers, increased the
availability of electricity and telephone services, and
promoted public health. The Bank of Ethiopia, founded in
1931, commenced issuing Ethiopian currency
*******************
Italian Administration in Eritrea
A latecomer to the scramble for colonies in Africa, Italy
established itself first in Eritrea (its name was derived
from the Latin term for the Red Sea, Mare Erythreum) in the
1880s and secured Ethiopian recognition of its claim in
1889. Despite its failure to penetrate Tigray in 1896, Italy
retained control over Eritrea. A succession of Italian chief
administrators, or governors, maintained a degree of unity
and public order in a region marked by cultural, linguistic,
and religious diversity. Eritrea also experienced material
progress in many areas before Ethiopia proper did so.
One of the most important developments during the post-1889
period was the growth of an Eritrean public administration.
The Italians employed many Eritreans to work in public
service--particularly the police and public works--and
fostered loyalty by granting Eritreans emoluments and status
symbols. The local population shared in the benefits
conferred under Italian colonial administration, especially
through newly created medical services, agricultural
improvements, and the provision of urban amenities in Asmera
and Mitsiwa.
After Benito Mussolini assumed power in Italy in 1922, the
colonial government in Eritrea changed. The new
administration stressed the racial and political superiority
of Italians, authorized segregation, and relegated the local
people to the lowest level of public employment. At the same
time, Rome implemented agricultural improvements and
established a basis for commercial agriculture on farms run
by Italian colonists.
State control of the economic sphere was matched by tighter
political control. Attempts at improving the management of
the colony, however, did not transform it into a self-
sufficient entity. The colony's most important function was
to serve as a strategic base for future aggrandizement.
*****************
Mussolini's Invasion and the Italian Occupation
As late as September 29, 1934, Rome affirmed its 1928
treaty of friendship with Ethiopia. Nonetheless, it became
clear that Italy wished to expand and link its holdings in
the Horn of Africa (see fig. 5). Moreover, the international
climate of the mid-1930s provided Italy with the expectation
that aggression could be undertaken with impunity.
Determined to provoke a casus belli, the Mussolini regime
began deliberately exploiting the minor provocations that
arose in its relations with Ethiopia.
In December 1934, an incident took place at Welwel in the
Ogaden, a site of wells used by Somali nomads regularly
traversing the borders between Ethiopia and British
Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. The Italians had built
fortified positions in Welwel in 1930 and, because there had
been no protests, assumed that the international community
had recognized their rights over this area. However, an
Anglo-Ethiopian boundary commission challenged the Italian
position when it visited Welwel in late November 1934 on its
way to set territorial boundary markers. On encountering
Italian belligerence, the commission's members withdrew but
left behind their Ethiopian military escort, which
eventually fought a battle with Italian units.
In September 1935, the League of Nations exonerated both
parties in the Welwel incident. The long delay and the
intricate British and French maneuverings persuaded
Mussolini that no obstacle would be placed in his path. An
Anglo-French proposal in August 1935--just before the League
of Nations ruling--that the signatories to the 1906
Tripartite Treaty collaborate for the purpose of assisting
in the modernization and reorganization of Ethiopian
internal affairs, subject to the consent of Ethiopia, was
flatly rejected by the Italians. On October 3, 1935, Italy
attacked Ethiopia from Eritrea and Italian Somaliland
without a declaration of war. On October 7, the League of
Nations unanimously declared Italy an aggressor but took no
effective action.
In a war that lasted seven months, Ethiopia was outmatched
by Italy in armaments--a situation exacerbated by the fact
that a League of Nations arms embargo was not enforced
against Italy. Despite a valiant defense, the next six
months saw the Ethiopians pushed back on the northern front
and in Harerge. Acting on long-standing grievances, a
segment of the Tigray forces defected, as did Oromo forces
in some areas. Moreover, the Italians made widespread use of
chemical weapons and air power. On March 31, 1936, the
Ethiopians counterattacked the main Italian force at Maychew
but were defeated. By early April 1936, Italian forces had
reached Dese in the north and Harer in the east. On May 2,
Haile Selassie left for French Somaliland and exile--a move
resented by some Ethiopians who were accustomed to a warrior
emperor. The Italian forces entered Addis Ababa on May 5.
Four days later, Italy announced the annexation of Ethiopia.
On June 30, Haile Selassie made a powerful speech before
the League of Nations in Geneva in which he set forth two
choices--support for collective security or international
lawlessness. The emperor stirred the conscience of many and
was thereafter regarded as a major international figure.
Britain and France, however, soon recognized Italy's control
of Ethiopia. Among the major powers, the United States and
the Soviet Union refused to do so.
In early June 1936, Rome promulgated a constitution
bringing Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland together
into a single administrative unit divided into six
provinces. On June 11, 1936, Marshal Rodolfo Graziani
replaced Marshal Pietro Badoglio, who had commanded the
Italian forces in the war. In December the Italians declared
the whole country to be pacified and under their effective
control. Ethiopian resistance nevertheless continued.
After a failed assassination attempt against Graziani on
February 19, 1937, the colonial authorities executed 30,000
persons, including about half of the younger, educated
Ethiopian population. This harsh policy, however, did not
pacify the country. In November 1937, Rome therefore
appointed a new governor and instructed him to adopt a more
flexible line. Accordingly, large-scale public works
projects were undertaken. One result was the construction of
the country's first system of improved roads. In the
meantime, however, the Italians had decreed miscegenation to
be illegal. Racial separation, including residential
segregation, was enforced as thoroughly as possible. The
Italians showed favoritism to non-Christian Oromo (some of
whom had supported the invasion), Somali, and other Muslims
in an attempt to isolate the Amhara, who supported Haile
Selassie.
Ethiopian resistance continued, nonetheless. Early in 1938,
a revolt broke out in Gojam led by the Committee of Unity
and Collaboration, which was made up of some of the young,
educated elite who had escaped the reprisal after the
attempt on Graziani's life. In exile in Britain, the emperor
sought to gain the support of the Western democracies for
his cause but had little success until Italy entered World
War II on the side of Germany in June 1940. Thereafter,
Britain and the emperor sought to cooperate with Ethiopian
and other indigenous forces in a campaign to dislodge the
Italians from Ethiopia and from British Somaliland, which
the Italians seized in August 1940, and to resist the
Italian invasion of Sudan. Haile Selassie proceeded
immediately to Khartoum, where he established closer liaison
with both the British headquarters and the resistance forces
within Ethiopia.
************
Ethiopia in World War II
The wresting of Ethiopia from the occupying Italian forces
involved British personnel, composed largely of South
African and African colonial troops penetrating from the
south, west, and north, supported by Ethiopian guerrillas.
It was the task of an Anglo-Ethiopian mission, eventually
commanded by Colonel Orde Wingate, to coordinate the
activities of the Ethiopian forces in support of the
campaign. The emperor arrived in Gojam on January 20, 1941,
and immediately undertook the task of bringing the various
local resistance groups under his control.
The campaigns of 1940 and 1941 were based on a British
strategy of preventing Italian forces from attacking or
occupying neighboring British possessions, while at the same
time pressing northward from East Africa through Italian
Somaliland and eastern Ethiopia to isolate Italian troops in
the highlands. This thrust was directed at the Harer and
Dire Dawa area, with the objective of cutting the rail link
between Addis Ababa and Djibouti. At the same time, British
troops from Sudan penetrated Eritrea to cut off Italian
forces from the Red Sea. The campaign in the north ended in
February and March of 1941 with the Battle of Keren and the
defeat of Italian troops in Eritrea. By March 3, Italian
Somaliland had fallen to British forces, and soon after the
Italian governor initiated negotiations for the surrender of
the remaining Italian forces. On May 5, 1941, Haile Selassie
reentered Addis Ababa, but it was not until January 1942
that the last of the Italians, cut off near Gonder,
surrendered to British and Ethiopian forces.
During the war years, British military officials left
responsibility for internal affairs in the emperor's hands.
However, it was agreed that all acts relating to the war
effort--domestic or international--required British
approval. Without defining the limits of authority, both
sides also agreed that the emperor would issue
"proclamations" and the British military administration
would issue "public notices." Without consulting the
British, Haile Selassie appointed a seven-member cabinet and
a governor of Addis Ababa, but for tactical reasons he
announced that they would serve as advisers to the British
military administration.
This interim Anglo-Ethiopian arrangement was replaced in
January 1942 by a new agreement that contained a military
convention. The convention provided for British assistance
in the organization of a new Ethiopian army that was to be
trained by a British military mission (see Military
Tradition in National Life, ch. 5). In addition to attaching
officers to Ethiopian army battalions, the British assigned
advisers to most ministries and to some provincial
governors. British assistance strengthened the emperor's
efforts to substitute, as his representatives in the
provinces, experienced administrators for the traditional
nobility. But such help was rejected whenever proposed
reforms threatened to weaken the emperor's personal control.
The terms of the agreement confirmed Ethiopia's status as a
sovereign state. However, the Ogaden and certain strategic
areas, such as the French Somaliland border, the Addis
Ababa-Djibouti railroad, and the Haud (collectively termed
the "Reserved Areas"), remained temporarily under British
administration. Other provisions set forth recruitment
procedures for additional British advisers should they be
requested. About the same time, a United States economic
mission arrived, thereby laying the groundwork for an
alliance that in time would significantly affect the
country's direction.
A British-trained national police administration and police
force gradually took the place of the police who had served
earlier in the retinues of the provincial governors.
Opposition to these changes was generally minor except for a
revolt in 1943 in Tigray--long a stronghold of resistance to
the Shewans--and another in the Ogaden, inhabited chiefly by
the Somali. British aircraft brought from Aden helped quell
the Tigray rebellion, and two battalions of Ethiopian troops
suppressed the Ogaden uprising. The 1942 Anglo-Ethiopian
agreement enabled the British military to disarm the Somali
rebels and to patrol the region.
After Haile Selassie returned to the throne in 1941, the
British assumed control over currency and foreign exchange
as well as imports and exports. Additionally, the British
helped Ethiopia to rehabilitate its national bureaucracy.
These changes, as well as innovations made by the Italians
during the occupation, brought home to many Ethiopians the
need to modernize--at least in some sectors of public life--
if the country were to survive as an independent entity.
In addition, the emperor made territorial demands, but
these met with little sympathy from the British. Requests
for the annexation of Eritrea, which the Ethiopians claimed
to be racially, culturally, and economically inseparable
from Ethiopia, were received with an awareness on the part
of the British of a growing Eritrean sense of separate
political identity. Similarly, Italian Somaliland was
intended by the British to be part of "Greater Somalia";
thus, the emperor's claims to that territory were also
rejected
*******************
The Postwar Period, 1945-60: Reform and Opposition
Despite criticism of the emperor's 1936 decision to go into
exile, the concept of the monarchy remained widely accepted
after World War II. The country's leaders and the church
assumed that victory over the Italians essentially meant the
restoration of their traditional privileges. Before long,
however, new social classes stirred into life by Haile
Selassie's centralizing policies, as well as a younger
generation full of frustrated expectations, clashed with
forces bent on maintaining the traditional system.
**************
Change and Resistance
The expansion of central authority by appointed officials
required a dependable tax base, and that in turn encroached
on the established prerogatives of those who had been
granted large holdings in the south and of gult-holders of
the Amhara-Tigray highlands. Consequently, in March 1942,
without reference to the restored parliament, the emperor
decreed a taxation system that divided all land into one of
three categories: fertile, semifertile, and poor. A fixed
levy, depending on category, was imposed for each gasha
(forty hectares) of land.
The nobles of Gojam, Tigray, and Begemdir refused to accept
any limitation upon the prevailing land tenure system and
successfully battled the government over the issue. The
emperor acknowledged defeat by excluding those provinces
from the tax. When landlords elsewhere also protested the
tax, the emperor exempted them as well, contenting himself
with a flat 10 percent tithe on all but church land. But
this tax, traditionally collected by landlords, was simply
passed on to the tenants. In short, the emperor pursued
policies that did not infringe on the rights of the nobility
and other large landholders. In 1951, in response to
additional pressure from the landlords, Haile Selassie
further reduced the land tax payable by landlords and not
covered by previous exemptions; the peasant cultivator, as
in centuries past, continued to carry the entire taxation
burden.
Some reform was also effected within the Ethiopian Orthodox
Church. In July 1948, Haile Selassie initiated steps,
completed in 1956, by which he, rather than the patriarch of
Alexandria, would appoint the abun, or patriarch, of the
Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Thus, for the first time in
sixteen centuries of Ethiopian Christianity, an Ethiopian
rather than an Egyptian served as head of the national
church. The Ethiopian church, however, continued to
recognize the primacy of the Alexandrian
see. This appointment was followed by the creation of enough
new bishoprics to allow the Ethiopians to elect their own
patriarch. Abuna Basilios, the first Ethiopian archbishop,
was elevated to the status of patriarch in 1959. The postwar
years also saw a change in the church-state relationship;
the vast church landholdings became subject to tax
legislation, and the clergy lost the right to try fellow
church officials for civil offenses in their own court.
Acutely aware of his international image, Haile Selassie
also was active on the diplomatic front (see Foreign Policy,
ch. 4). Ethiopia was a founding member of the United Nations
(UN) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). After the
postwar relationship with Britain wound down, the emperor in
1953 asked the United States for military assistance and
economic support. Although his dependence on Washington
grew, Haile Selassie diversified the sources of his
international assistance, which included such disparate
nations as Italy, China, the Federal Republic of Germany
(West Germany), Taiwan, Yugoslavia, Sweden, and the Soviet
Union.
*************
Administrative Change and the 1955 Constitution
In pursuit of reform, Haile Selassie faced the
recalcitrance of the provincial nobility, other great
landholders, and church officials--all of whom intended to
maintain their power and privileges. Moreover, some
provincial nobility opposed the emperor because of their own
long-held claims to the throne. Whatever his intentions as a
reformer, Haile Selassie was a political realist and
recognized that, lacking a strong military, he had to
compromise with the Amhara and Tigray nobility and with the
church. And, where required, he made his peace with other
ethnic groups in the empire. For example, he eventually
granted autonomy over Afar areas that Addis Ababa could not
dominate by armed force to the sultan of Aussa. In general,
political changes were few and were compromised at the first
sign of substantial opposition. In the 1950s, despite his
many years as emperor and his international stature, there
was almost no significant section of the Ethiopian
population on which Haile Selassie could rely to support him
in such efforts.
The emperor sought to gain some control over local
government by placing it in the hands of the central
administration in Addis Ababa. He revised the administrative
divisions and established political and administrative
offices corresponding to them. The largest of these
administrative units were the provinces (teklay ghizats), of
which there were fourteen in the mid-1960s, each under a
governor general appointed directly by Haile Selassie. Each
province was subdivided into subprovinces (awrajas),
districts (weredas), and subdistricts (mikitil weredas).
Although the structure outwardly resembled a modern state
apparatus, its impact was largely dissipated by the fact
that higher-ranking landed nobles held all the important
offices. Younger and better educated officials were little
more than aides to the governors general, and their advice
more often than not was contemptuously set aside by their
superiors.
The emperor also attempted to strengthen the national
government. A new generation of educated Ethiopians was
introduced to new enlarged ministries, the powers of which
were made more specific. The emperor established a national
judiciary and appointed its judges. Finally, in 1955 he
proclaimed a revised constitution. Apparently, he sought to
provide a formal basis for his efforts at centralization and
to attract the loyalty of those who gained their livelihood
from relatively modern economic activities or who were
better educated than most Ethiopians.
The younger leaders were mostly the sons of the traditional
elite. Having been educated abroad, they were favorably
disposed toward reform and were frequently frustrated and in
some cases alienated by their inability to initiate and
implement it. The remnants of the small number of educated
Ethiopians of an earlier generation had been appointed to
high government positions. But whatever their previous
concern with reform, they had little impact on traditional
methods, and by the mid-1950s even this earlier reformist
elite was considered conservative by the succeeding
generation.
The new elite was drawn largely from the postwar generation
and was generally the product of a half-dozen secondary
schools operated by foreign staffs. A majority of the
students continued to come from families of the landed
nobility, but they were profoundly affected by the presence
of students from less affluent backgrounds and by their more
democratically oriented Western teachers.
The 1955 constitution was prompted, like its 1931
predecessor, by a concern with international opinion. Such
opinion was particularly important at a time when some
neighboring African states were rapidly advancing under
European colonial tutelage and Ethiopia was pressing its
claims internationally for the incorporation of Eritrea,
where an elected parliament and more modern administration
had existed since 1952.
The bicameral Ethiopian parliament played no part in
drawing up the 1955 constitution, which, far from limiting
the emperor's control, emphasized the religious origins of
imperial power and extended the centralization process. The
Senate remained appointive, but the Chamber of Deputies was,
at least nominally, elected. However, the absence of a
census, the near total illiteracy of the population, and the
domination of the countryside by the nobility meant that the
majority of candidates who sought election in 1957 were in
effect chosen by the elite. The Chamber of Deputies was not
altogether a rubber stamp, at times discussing bills and
questioning state ministers. However, provisions in the
constitution that guaranteed personal freedoms and
liberties, including freedom of assembly, movement, and
speech, and the due process of law, were so far removed from
the realities of Ethiopian life that no group or individual
sought to act upon them publicly.
******************
The Attempted Coup of 1960 and Its Aftermath
Haile Selassie's efforts to achieve a measure of change
without jeopardizing his own power stimulated rising
expectations, some of which he was unwilling or unable to
satisfy. Impatient with the rate or form of social and
political change, several groups conspired to launch a coup
d'‚tat on December 13, 1960, while the emperor was abroad on
one of his frequent trips. The leadership of the 1960 revolt
came from three groups: the commander of the Imperial
Bodyguard Mengistu Neway, and his followers; a few security
officials, including the police chief; and a handful of
radical intellectuals related to the officials, including
Girmame Neway, Mengistu's brother.
The coup was initially successful in the capital, as the
rebels seized the crown prince and more than twenty cabinet
ministers and other government leaders. The support of the
Imperial Bodyguard, the backbone of the revolt, was obtained
without informing the enlisted men--or even a majority of
the officers--of the purpose of the rebels' actions. The
proclaimed intent of the coup leaders was the establishment
of a government that would improve the economic, social, and
political position of the general population, but they also
appealed to traditional authority in the person of the crown
prince. No mention was made of the emperor.
The coup's leaders failed to achieve popular support for
their actions. Although university students demonstrated in
favor of the coup, army and air force units remained loyal
to the emperor, who returned to the capital on December 17.
The patriarch of the church, who condemned the rebels as
antireligious traitors and called for fealty to the emperor,
supported the loyalists. Despite the coup's failure, it
succeeded in stripping the monarchy of its claim to
universal acceptance and led to a polarization of
traditional and modern forces
*****************
Growth of Secessionist Threats
Outside the Amhara-Tigray heartland, the two areas posing
the most consistent problems for Ethiopia's rulers were
Eritrea and the largely Somali-occupied Ogaden and adjacent
regions.
*******************
The Liberation Struggle in Eritrea
Eritrea had been placed under British military
administration in 1941 after the Italian surrender. In
keeping with a 1950 decision of the UN General Assembly,
British military administration ended in September 1952 and
was replaced by a new autonomous Eritrean government in
federal union with Ethiopia. Federation with the former
Italian colony restored an unhindered maritime frontier to
the country. The new arrangement also enabled the country to
gain limited control of a territory that, at least in its
inland areas, was more advanced politically and
economically.
The Four Power Inquiry Commission established by the World
War II Allies (Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the
United States) had failed to agree in its September 1948
report on a future course for Eritrea. Several countries had
displayed an active interest in the area. In the immediate
postwar years, Italy had requested that Eritrea be returned
as a colony or as a trusteeship. This bid was supported
initially by the Soviet Union, which anticipated a communist
victory at the Italian polls. The Arab states, seeing
Eritrea and its large Muslim population as an extension of
the Arab world, sought the establishment of an independent
state. Some Britons favored a division of the territory,
with the Christian areas and the coast from Mitsiwa
southward going to Ethiopia and the northwest area going to
Sudan.
A UN commission, which arrived in Eritrea in February 1950,
eventually approved a plan involving some form of
association with Ethiopia. In December the UN General
Assembly adopted a resolution affirming the commission's
plan, with the provision that Britain, the administering
power, should facilitate the UN efforts and depart from the
colony no later than September 15, 1952. Faced with this
constraint, the British administration held elections on
March 16, 1952, for a Representative Assembly of sixty-eight
members. This body, made up equally of Christians and
Muslims, accepted the draft constitution advanced by the UN
commissioner on July 10. The constitution was ratified by
the emperor on September 11, and the Representative
Assembly, by prearrangement, was transformed into the
Eritrean Assembly three days before the federation was
proclaimed.
The UN General Assembly resolution of September 15, 1952,
adopted by a vote of forty-seven to ten, provided that
Eritrea should be linked to Ethiopia through a loose federal
structure under the emperor's sovereignty but with a form
and organization of internal self-government. The federal
government, which for all intents and purposes was the
existing imperial government, was to control foreign
affairs, defense, foreign and interstate commerce,
transportation, and finance. Control over domestic affairs
(including police, local administration, and taxation to
meet its own budget) was to be exercised by an elected
Eritrean assembly on the parliamentary model. The state was
to have its own administrative and judicial structure and
its own flag.
Almost from the start of federation, the emperor's
representative undercut the territory's separate status
under the federal system. In August 1955, Tedla Bairu, an
Eritrean who was the chief executive elected by the
assembly, resigned under pressure from the emperor, who
replaced Tedla with his own nominee. He made Amharic the
official language in place of Arabic and Tigrinya,
terminated the use of the Eritrean flag, and moved many
businesses out of Eritrea. In addition, the central
government proscribed all political parties, imposed
censorship, gave the top administrative positions to Amhara,
and abandoned the principle of parity between Christian and
Muslim officials. In November 1962, the Eritrean Assembly,
many of whose members had been accused of accepting bribes,
voted unanimously to change Eritrea's status to that of a
province of Ethiopia. Following his appointment of the arch-
conservative Ras Asrate Kasa as governor general, the
emperor was accused of "refeudalizing" the territory.
The extinction of the federation consolidated internal and
external opposition to union (see The Eritrean Movement, ch.
4; The Eritreans, ch. 5). Four years earlier, in 1958, a
number of Eritrean exiles had founded the Eritrean
Liberation Movement (ELM) in Cairo, under Hamid Idris
Awate's leadership. This organization, however, soon was
neutralized. A new faction, the Eritrean Liberation Front
(ELF), emerged in 1960. Initially a Muslim movement, the ELF
was nationalist rather than Marxist and received Iraqi and
Syrian support. As urban Christians joined, the ELF became
more radical and anticapitalist. Beginning in 1961, the ELF
turned to armed struggle and by 1966 challenged imperial
forces throughout Eritrea.
The rapid growth of the ELF also created internal divisions
between urban and rural elements, socialists and
nationalists, and Christians and Muslims. Although these
divisions did not take any clear form, they were magnified
as the ELF extended its operations and won international
publicity. In June 1970, Osman Salah Sabbe, former head of
the Muslim League, broke away from the ELF and formed the
Popular Liberation Forces (PLF), which led directly to the
founding of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) in
early 1972. Both organizations initially attracted a large
number of urban, intellectual, and leftist Christian youths
and projected a strong socialist and nationalist image. By
1975 the EPLF had more than 10,000 members in the field.
However, the growth of the EPLF was also accompanied by an
intensification of internecine Eritrean conflict,
particularly between 1972 and 1974, when casualties were
well over 1,200. In 1976 Osman broke with the EPLF and
formed the Eritrean Liberation Front-Popular Liberation
Front (ELF-PLF), a division that reflected differences
between combatants in Eritrea and representatives abroad as
well as personal rivalries and basic ideological
differences, factors important in earlier splits within the
Eritrean separatist movement.
Encouraged by the imperial regime's collapse and attendant
confusion, the guerrillas extended their control over the
whole region by 1977. Ethiopian forces were largely confined
to urban centers and controlled the major roads only by day.
*************
Discontent in Tigray
Overt dissidence in Tigray during Haile Selassie's reign
centered on the 1943 resistance to imperial rule known as
the Weyane. The movement took advantage of popular
discontent against Amhara rule but was primarily a localized
resistance to imperial rule that depended on three main
sources of support. These were the semipastoralists of
eastern Tigray, including the Azebo and Raya, who believed
their traditional Oromo social structure to be threatened;
the local Tigray nobility, who perceived their position to
be endangered by the central government's growth; and the
peasantry, who felt victimized by government officials and
their militias.
The course of the Weyane was relatively brief, lasting from
May 22 to October 14, 1943. Although the rebels made some
initial gains, the imperial forces, supported by British
aircraft, soon took the offensive. Poor military leadership,
combined with disagreements among the rebel leaders,
detracted from the effectiveness of their efforts. After the
fall of Mekele, capital of Tigray, on October 14, 1943,
practically all organized resistance collapsed. The
government exiled or imprisoned the leaders of the revolt.
The emperor took reprisals against peasants suspected of
supporting the Weyane.
Although a military resolution of the Weyane restored
imperial authority to Tigray, the harsh measures used by the
Ethiopian military to do so created resentment of imperial
rule in many quarters. This resentment, coupled with a long-
standing feeling that Shewan Amhara rule was of an upstart
nature, lasted through the end of Haile Selassie's reign.
After Haile Selassie's demise in 1974, separatist feelings
again emerged throughout Tigray.
***************
The Ogaden and the Haud
Ethiopia's entry into the Somali region in modern times
dated from Menelik's conquest of Harer in the late 1890s,
the emperor basing his actions on old claims of Ethiopian
sovereignty. In 1945 Haile Selassie, fearing the possibility
of British support for a separate Somali state that would
include the Ogaden, claimed Italian Somaliland as a "lost
province." In Italian Somaliland, the Somali Youth League
(SYL) resisted this claim and in its turn demanded
unification of all Somali areas, including those in
Ethiopia.
After the British evacuated the Ogaden in 1948, Ethiopian
officers took over administration in the city of Jijiga, at
one point suppressing a demonstration led by the SYL, which
the government subsequently outlawed. At the same time,
Ethiopia renounced its claim to Italian Somaliland in
deference to UN calls for self-determination. The
Ethiopians, however, maintained that self-determination was
not incompatible with eventual union.
Immediately upon the birth of the Republic of Somalia in
1960, which followed the merger of British Somaliland and
Italian Somaliland, the new country proclaimed an
irredentist policy. Somalia laid claim to Somali-populated
regions of French Somaliland (later called the French
Territory of the Afars and Issas, and Djibouti after
independence in 1977), the northeastern corner of Kenya, and
the Ogaden, a vast, ill-defined region occupied by Somali
nomads extending southeast from Ethiopia's southern
highlands that includes a separate region east of Harer
known as the Haud. The uncertainty over the precise location
of the frontier between Ethiopia and the former Italian
possessions in Somalia further complicated these claims.
Despite UN efforts to promote an agreement, none was made in
the colonial or the Italian trusteeship period.
In the northeast, an Anglo-Ethiopian treaty determined the
frontier's official location. However, Somalia contended
that it was unfairly placed so as to exclude the herders
resident in Somalia from vital seasonal grazing lands in the
Haud. The British had administered the Haud as an integral
part of British Somaliland, although Ethiopian sovereignty
had been recognized there. After it was disbanded in the
rest of Ethiopia, the British military administration
continued to supervise the area from Harer eastward and did
not withdraw from the Haud until 1955. Even then, the
British stressed the region's importance to Somalia by
requiring the Ethiopians to guarantee the Somali free access
to grazing lands.
Somalia refused to recognize any pre-1960 treaties defining
the Somali-Ethiopian borders because colonial governments
had concluded the agreements. Despite the need for access to
pasturage for local herds, the Somali government even
refused to acknowledge the British treaty guaranteeing
Somali grazing rights in the Haud because it would have
indirectly recognized Ethiopian sovereignty over the area.
Within six months after Somali independence, military
incidents occurred between Ethiopian and Somali forces along
their mutual border. Confrontations escalated again in 1964,
when the Ethiopian air force raided Somali villages and
encampments inside the Somali border. Hostilities were ended
through mediation by the OAU and Sudan. However, Somalia
continued to promote irredentism by supporting the Western
Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), which was active in the
Ogaden. Claims of oil discoveries prompted the resurgence of
fighting in 1973.
***************
Revolution and Military Government
In early 1974, Ethiopia entered a period of profound
political, economic, and social change, frequently
accompanied by violence. Confrontation between traditional
and modern forces erupted and changed the political,
economic, and social nature of the Ethiopian state.
**************
Background to Revolution, 1960-74
The last fourteen years of Haile Selassie's reign witnessed
growing opposition to his regime. After the suppression of
the 1960 coup attempt, the emperor sought to reclaim the
loyalty of coup sympathizers by stepping up reform. Much of
this effort took the form of land grants to military and
police officers, however, and no coherent pattern of
economic and social development appeared.
In 1966 a plan emerged to confront the traditional forces
through the implementation of a modern tax system. Implicit
in the proposal, which required registration of all land,
was the aim of destroying the power of the landed nobility.
But when progressive tax proposals were submitted to
parliament in the late 1960s, they were vigorously opposed
by the members, all of whom were property owners. Parliament
passed a tax on agricultural produce in November 1967, but
in a form vastly altered from the government proposal. Even
this, however, was fiercely resisted by the landed class in
Gojam, and the entire province revolted. In 1969, after two
years of military action, the central government withdrew
its troops, discontinued enforcement of the tax, and
canceled all arrears of taxation going back to 1940.
The emperor's defeat in Gojam encouraged defiance by other
provincial landowners, although not on the same scale. But
legislation calling for property registration and for
modification of landlord-tenant relationships was more
boldly resisted in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.
Debate on these proposals continued until the mid-1970s.
At the same time the emperor was facing opposition to
change, other forces were exerting direct or indirect
pressure in favor of reform. Beginning in 1965, student
demonstrations focused on the need to implement land reform
and to address corruption and rising prices. Peasant
disturbances, although on a small scale, were especially
numerous in the southern provinces, where the imperial
government had traditionally rewarded its supporters with
land grants. Although it allowed labor unions to organize in
1962, the government restricted union activities. Soon, even
the Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions (CELU) was
criticized as being too subservient to the government. Faced
with such a multiplicity of problems, the aging emperor
increasingly left domestic issues in the care of his prime
minister, Aklilu Habte Wold (appointed in 1961), and turned
his attention to foreign affairs.
****************
The Establishment of the Derg
The government's failure to effect significant economic and
political reforms over the previous fourteen years--combined
with rising inflation, corruption, a famine that affected
several provinces (but especially Welo and Tigray) and that
was concealed from the outside world, and the growing
discontent of urban interest groups--provided the backdrop
against which the Ethiopian revolution began to unfold in
early 1974. Whereas elements of the urban-based, modernizing
elite previously had sought to establish a parliamentary
democracy, the initiation of the 1974 revolution was the
work of the military, acting essentially in its own
immediate interests. The unrest that began in January of
that year then spread to the civilian population in an
outburst of general discontent.
The Ethiopian military on the eve of the revolution was
riven by factionalism; the emperor promoted such division to
prevent any person or group from becoming too powerful.
Factions included the Imperial Bodyguard, which had been
rebuilt since the 1960 coup attempt; the Territorial Army
(Ethiopia's national ground force), which was broken into
many factions but which was dominated by a group of senior
officers called "The Exiles" because they had fled with
Haile Selassie in 1936 after the Italian invasion; and the
air force. The officer graduates of the Harer Military
Academy also formed a distinct group in opposition to the
Holeta Military Training Center graduates (see Training, ch.
5).
Conditions throughout the army were frequently substandard,
with enlisted personnel often receiving low pay and
insufficient food and supplies. Enlisted personnel as well
as some of the Holeta graduates came from the peasantry,
which at the time was suffering from a prolonged drought and
resulting famine. The general perception was that the
central government was deliberately refusing to take special
measures for famine relief. Much popular discontent over
this issue, plus the generally perceived lack of civil
freedoms, had created widespread discontent among the middle
class, which had been built up and supported by the emperor
since World War II.
The revolution began with a mutiny of the Territorial
Army's Fourth Brigade at Negele in the southern province of
Sidamo on January 12, 1974. Soldiers protested poor food and
water conditions; led by their noncommissioned officers,
they rebelled and took their commanding officer hostage,
requesting redress from the emperor. Attempts at
reconciliation and a subsequent impasse promoted the spread
of the discontent to other units throughout the military,
including those stationed in Eritrea. There, the Second
Division at Asmera mutinied, imprisoned its commanders, and
announced its support for the Negele mutineers. The Signal
Corps, in sympathy with the uprising, broadcast information
about events to the rest of the military. Moreover, by that
time, general discontent had resulted in the rise of
resistance throughout Ethiopia. Opposition to increased fuel
prices and curriculum changes in the schools, as well as low
teachers' salaries and many other grievances, crystalized by
the end of February. Teachers, workers, and eventually
students--all demanding higher pay and better conditions of
work and education--also promoted other causes, such as land
reform and famine relief. Finally, the discontented groups
demanded a new political system. Riots in the capital and
the continued military mutiny eventually led to the
resignation of Prime Minister Aklilu. He was replaced on
February 28, 1974, by another Shewan aristocrat,
Endalkatchew Mekonnen, whose government would last only
until July 22.
On March 5, the government announced a revision of the 1955
constitution--the prime minister henceforth would be
responsible to parliament. The new government probably
reflected Haile Selassie's decision to minimize change; the
new cabinet, for instance, represented virtually all of
Ethiopia's aristocratic families. The conservative
constitutional committee appointed on March 21 included no
representatives of the groups pressing for change. The new
government introduced no substantial reforms (although it
granted the military several salary increases). It also
postponed unpopular changes in the education system and
instituted price rollbacks and controls to check inflation.
As a result, the general discontent subsided somewhat by
late March.
By this time, there were several factions within the
military that claimed to speak for all or part of the armed
forces. These included the Imperial Bodyguard under the old
high command, a group of "radical" junior officers, and a
larger number of moderate and radical army and police
officers grouped around Colonel Alem Zewd Tessema, commander
of an airborne brigade based in Addis Ababa. In late March,
Alem Zewd became head of an informal, inter-unit
coordinating committee that came to be called the Armed
Forces Coordinating Committee (AFCC). Acting with the
approval of the new prime minister, Alem Zewd arrested a
large number of disgruntled air force officers and in
general appeared to support the Endalkatchew government.
Such steps, however, did not please many of the junior
officers, who wished to pressure the regime into making
major political reforms. In early June, a dozen or more of
them broke away from the AFCC and requested that every
military and police unit send three representatives to Addis
Ababa to organize for further action. In late June, a body
of men that eventually totaled about 120, none above the
rank of major and almost all of whom remained anonymous,
organized themselves into a new body called the Coordinating
Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army
that soon came to be called the Derg (Amharic for
"committee" or "council," see Glossary). They elected Major
Mengistu Haile Mariam chairman and Major Atnafu Abate vice
chairman, both outspoken proponents of far-reaching change.
This group of men would remain at the forefront of
political and military affairs in Ethiopia for the next
thirteen years. The identity of the Derg never changed after
these initial meetings in 1974. Although its membership
declined drastically during the next few years as individual
officers were eliminated, no new members were admitted into
its ranks, and its deliberations and membership remained
almost entirely unknown. At first, the Derg's officers
exercised their influence behind the scenes; only later,
during the era of the Provisional Military Administrative
Council, did its leaders emerge from anonymity and become
both the official as well as the de facto governing
personnel.
Because its members in effect represented the entire
military establishment, the Derg could henceforth claim to
exercise real power and could mobilize troops on its own,
thereby depriving the emperor's government of the ultimate
means to govern. Although the Derg professed loyalty to the
emperor, it immediately began to arrest members of the
aristocracy, military, and government who were closely
associated with the emperor and the old order. Colonel Alem
Zewd, by now discredited in the eyes of the young radicals,
fled.
In July the Derg wrung five concessions from the emperor--
the release of all political prisoners, a guarantee of the
safe return of exiles, the promulgation and speedy
implementation of the new constitution, assurance that
parliament would be kept in session to complete the
aforementioned task, and assurance that the Derg would be
allowed to coordinate closely with the government at all
levels of operation. Hereafter, political power and
initiative lay with the Derg, which was increasingly
influenced by a wide-ranging public debate over the future
of the country. The demands made of the emperor were but the
first of a series of directives or actions that constituted
the "creeping coup" by which the imperial system of
government was slowly dismantled. Promoting an agenda for
lasting changes going far beyond those proposed since the
revolution began in January, the Derg proclaimed Ethiopia
Tikdem (Ethiopia First) as its guiding philosophy. It forced
out Prime Minister Endalkatchew and replaced him with Mikael
Imru, a Shewan aristocrat with a reputation as a liberal.
The Derg's agenda rapidly diverged from that of the
reformers of the late imperial period. In early August, the
revised constitution, which called for a constitutional
monarchy, was rejected when it was forwarded for approval.
Thereafter, the Derg worked to undermine the authority and
legitimacy of the emperor, a policy that enjoyed much public
support. The Derg arrested the commander of the Imperial
Bodyguard, disbanded the emperor's governing councils,
closed the private imperial exchequer, and nationalized the
imperial residence and the emperor's other landed and
business holdings. By late August, the emperor had been
directly accused of covering up the Welo and Tigray famine
of the early 1970s that allegedly had killed 100,000 to
200,000 people. After street demonstrations took place
urging the emperor's arrest, the Derg formally deposed Haile
Selassie on September 12 and imprisoned him. The emperor was
too old to resist, and it is doubtful whether he really
understood what was happening around him. Three days later,
the Armed Forces Coordinating Committee (i.e., the Derg)
transformed itself into the Provisional Military
Administrative Council (PMAC) under the chairmanship of
Lieutenant General Aman Mikael Andom and proclaimed itself
the nation's ruling body.
************
The Struggle for Power, 1974-77
Although not a member of the Derg per se, General Aman had
been associated with the Derg since July and had lent his
good name to its efforts to reform the imperial regime. He
was a well-known, popular commander and hero of a war
against Somalia in the 1960s. In accordance with the Derg's
wishes, he now became head of state, chairman of the Council
of Ministers, and minister of defense, in addition to being
chairman of the PMAC. Despite his standing, however, General
Aman was almost immediately at odds with a majority of the
Derg's members on three major issues: the size of the Derg
and his role within it, the Eritrean insurgency, and the
fate of political prisoners. Aman claimed that the 120-
member Derg was too large and too unwieldy to function
efficiently as a governing body; as an Eritrean, he urged
reconciliation with the insurgents there; and he opposed the
death penalty for former government and military officials
who had been arrested since the revolution began.
The Derg immediately found itself under attack from
civilian groups, especially student and labor groups who
demanded the formation of a "people's government" in which
various national organizations would be represented. These
demands found support in the Derg among a faction composed
mostly of army engineers and air force officers. On October
7, the Derg arrested dissidents supporting the civilian
demands. By mid-November, Aman, opposed by the majority of
the Derg, was attempting unsuccessfully to appeal directly
to the army for support as charges, many apparently
fabricated, mounted against him within the Derg. He retired
to his home and on November 23 was killed resisting arrest.
The same evening of what became known as "Bloody Saturday,"
fifty-nine political prisoners were executed. Among them
were prominent civilians such as Aklilu and Endalkatchew,
military officers such as Colonel Alem Zewd and General
Abiye Abebe (the emperor's son-in-law and defense minister
under endalkatchew), and two Derg members who had supported
Aman.
Following the events of Bloody Saturday, Brigadier General
Tafari Banti, a Shewan, became chairman of the PMAC and head
of state on November 28, but power was retained by Major
Mengistu, who kept his post as first vice chairman of the
PMAC, with Major Atnafu as second vice chairman. Mengistu
hereafter emerged as the leading force in the Derg and took
steps to protect and enlarge his power base. Preparations
were made for a new offensive in Eritrea, and social and
economic reform was addressed; the result was the
promulgation on December 20 of the first socialist
proclamation for Ethiopia.
In keeping with its declared socialist path, the Derg
announced in March 1975 that all royal titles were revoked
and that the proposed constitutional monarchy was to be
abandoned. In August Haile Selassie died under questionable
circumstances and was secretly buried. One of the last major
links with the past was broken in February 1976, when the
patriarch of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, Abuna Tewoflos,
an imperial appointee, was deposed.
In April 1976, the Derg at last set forth its goals in
greater detail in the Program for the National Democratic
Revolution (PNDR). As announced by Mengistu, these
objectives included progress toward socialism under the
leadership of workers, peasants, the petite bourgeoisie, and
all antifeudal and anti-imperialist forces. The Derg's
ultimate aim was the creation of a one-party system. To
accomplish its goals, the Derg established an intermediary
organ called the Provisional Office for Mass Organization
Affairs (POMOA). Designed to act as a civilian political
bureau, POMOA was at first in the hands of the All-Ethiopia
Socialist Movement (whose Amharic acronym was MEISON),
headed by Haile Fida, the Derg's chief political adviser.
Haile Fida, as opposed to other leftists who had formed the
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), had
resourcefully adopted the tactic of working with the
military in the expectation of directing the revolution from
within (see Political Participation and Repression, ch. 4).
By late 1976, the Derg had undergone an internal
reconfiguration as Mengistu's power came under growing
opposition and as Mengistu, Tafari, and Atnafu struggled for
supremacy. The instability of this arrangement was resolved
in January and February of 1977, when a major shootout at
the Grand (Menelik's) Palace in Addis Ababa took place
between supporters of Tafari and those of Mengistu, in which
the latter emerged victorious. With the death of Tafari and
his supporters in the fighting, most internal opposition
within the Derg had been eliminated, and Mengistu proceeded
with a reorganization of the Derg. This action left Mengistu
as the sole vice chairman, responsible for the People's
Militia, the urban defense squads, and the modernization of
the armed forces--in other words, in effective control of
Ethiopia's government and military. In November 1977,
Atnafu, Mengistu's last rival in the Derg, was eliminated,
leaving Mengistu in undisputed command.
**************
Ethiopia's Road to Socialism
Soon after taking power, the Derg promoted Ye-Itiopia
Hibretesebawinet (Ethiopian Socialism). The concept was
embodied in slogans such as "self-reliance," "the dignity of
labor," and "the supremacy of the common good." These
slogans were devised to combat the widespread disdain of
manual labor and a deeply rooted concern with status. A
central aspect of socialism was land reform. Although there
was common agreement on the need for land reform, the Derg
found little agreement on its application. Most proposals--
even those proffered by socialist countries--counseled
moderation in order to maintain production. The Derg,
however, adopted a radical approach, with the Land Reform
Proclamation of March 1975, which nationalized all rural
land, abolished tenancy, and put peasants in charge of
enforcement. No family was to have a plot larger than ten
hectares, and no one could employ farm workers. Farmers were
expected to organize peasant associations, one for every 800
hectares, which would be headed by executive committees
responsible for enforcement of the new order. Implementation
of these measures caused considerable disruption of local
administration in rural areas. In July 1975, all urban land,
rentable houses, and apartments were also nationalized, with
the 3 million urban residents organized into urban dwellers'
associations, or kebeles (see Glossary), analogous in
function to the rural peasant associations (see Peasant
Associations; Kebeles, ch. 4).
Although the government took a radical approach to land
reform, it exercised some caution with respect to the
industrial and commercial sectors. In January and February
1975, the Derg nationalized all banks and insurance firms
and seized control of practically every important company in
the country. However, retail trade and the wholesale and
export-import sectors remained in private hands.
Although the Derg ordered national collective ownership of
land, the move was taken with little preparation and met
with opposition in some areas, especially Gojam, Welo, and
Tigray. The Derg also lost much support from the country's
left wing, which had been excluded from power and the
decision-making process. Students and teachers were
alienated by the government's closure of the university in
Addis Ababa and all secondary schools in September 1975 in
the face of threatened strikes, as well as the forced
mobilization of students in the Development Through
Cooperation Campaign (commonly referred to as zemecha--see
Glossary) under conditions of military discipline. The
elimination of the Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions
(CELU) in favor of the government-controlled All-Ethiopia
Trade Union (AETU) in December 1975 further disillusioned
the revolution's early supporters. Numerous officials
originally associated with the revolution fled the country.
*********************
The Mengistu Regime and Its Impact
The transition from imperial to military rule was
turbulent. In addition to increasing political discontent,
which was particularly intense in the late 1970s, the Derg
faced powerful insurgencies and natural calamities
throughout the 1980s.
*************
Political Struggles Within the Government
Following the establishment of his supremacy through the
elimination of Tafari Banti, Mengistu declared himself Derg
chairman in February 1977 and set about consolidating his
power. However, several internal and external threats
prevented Mengistu from doing this. Various insurgent groups
posed the most serious threat to the Derg. The EPRP
challenged the Derg's control of the revolution itself by
agitating for a broad-based democratic government run by
civilians, not by the military. In February 1977, the EPRP
initiated terrorist attacks--known as the White Terror--
against Derg members and their supporters. This violence
immediately claimed at least eight Derg members, plus
numerous Derg supporters, and soon provoked a government
counteraction--the Red Terror (see Glossary). During the Red
Terror, which lasted until late 1978, government security
forces systematically hunted down and killed suspected EPRP
members and their supporters, especially students. Mengistu
and the Derg eventually won this latest struggle for control
of the Ethiopian revolution, at a cost to the EPRP of
thousands of its members and supporters imprisoned, dead, or
missing.
Also slated for destruction was MEISON, proscribed in mid-
1978. In coordination with the government, MEISON had
organized the kebeles and the peasant associations but had
begun to act independently, thus threatening Derg dominance
of local governments throughout the country. In response to
the political vacuum that would be left as a result of the
purging of MEISON, the Derg in 1978 promoted the union of
several existing Marxist-Leninist organizations into a
single umbrella group, the Union of Ethiopian Marxist-
Leninist Organizations (whose Amharic acronym was EMALEDEH).
The new organization's duty was similar to that of MEISON--
promoting control of Ethiopian socialism and obtaining
support for government policies through various political
activities. The creation of EMALEDEH symbolized the victory
of the Derg in finally consolidating power after having
overcome these challenges to its control of the Ethiopian
revolution.
War in the Ogaden and the Turn to the Soviet Union
The year 1977 saw the emergence of the most serious
external challenge to the revolutionary regime that had yet
materialized. The roots of the conflict lay with Somali
irredentism and the desire of the Somali government of
Mahammad Siad Barre to annex the Ogaden area of Ethiopia.
Somalia's instrument in this process was the Western Somali
Liberation Front (WSLF), a Somali guerrilla organization,
which by February 1977 had begun to take advantage of the
Derg's political problems as well as its troubles in Eritrea
to attack government positions throughout the Ogaden (see
The Somali, ch. 5). The Somali government provided supplies
and logistics support to the WSLF. Through the first half of
the year, the WSLF made steady gains, penetrating and
capturing large parts of the Ogaden from the Dire Dawa area
southward to the Kenya border.
The increasingly intense fighting culminated in a series of
actions around Jijiga in September, at which time Ethiopia
claimed that Somalia's regular troops, the Somali National
Army (SNA), were supporting the WSLF. In response, the
Somali government admitted giving "moral, material, and
other support" to the WSLF. Following a mutiny of the
Ethiopian garrison at Jijiga, the town fell to the WSLF. The
Mengistu regime, desperate for help, turned to the Soviet
Union, its ties to its former military supplier, the United
States, having foundered in the spring over the Derg's poor
human rights record. The Soviet Union had been supplying
equipment and some advisers for months. When the Soviet
Union continued to aid Ethiopia as a way of gaining
influence in the country, Somalia, which until then had been
a Soviet client, responded by abrogating its Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow and by expelling all
Soviet advisers.
The Soviet turnaround immediately affected the course of
the war. Starting in late November, massive Soviet military
assistance began to pour into Ethiopia, with Cuban troops
deploying from Angola to assist the Ethiopian units. By the
end of the year, 17,000 Cubans had arrived and, with
Ethiopian army units, halted the WSLF momentum. On February
13, 1978, Mogadishu dispatched the SNA to assist the WSLF,
but the Somali forces were driven back toward the border.
After the Ethiopian army recapture of Jijiga in early March,
the Somali government decided to withdraw its forces from
the Ogaden, leaving the Ethiopian army in control of the
region. However, in the process of eliminating the WSLF
threat, Addis Ababa had become a military client of Moscow
and Havana, a situation that had significant international
repercussions and that resulted in a major realignment of
power in the Horn of Africa.
*************
Eritrean and Tigrayan Insurgencies
After 1974, insurgencies appeared in various parts of the
country, the most important of which were centered in
Eritrea and Tigray (see Political Dynamics, ch. 4; External
and Internal Opponents, ch. 5). The Eritrean problem,
inherited from Haile Selassie's regime, was a matter of
extensive debate within the Derg. It was a dispute over
policy toward Eritrea that resulted in the death of the
PMAC's first leader, General Aman, an Eritrean, on November
23, 1974, so-called "Bloody Saturday." Hereafter, the Derg
decided to impose a military settlement on the Eritean
Liberation Front (ELF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation
Front (EPLF). Attempts to invade rebel-held Eritrea failed
repeatedly, and by mid-1978 the insurgent groups controlled
most of the countryside but not major towns such as Keren,
Mitsiwa, Aseb, and a few other places. Despite large
commitments of arms and training from communist countries,
the Derg failed to suppress the Eritrean rebellion.
By the end of 1976, insurgencies existed in all of the
country's fourteen administrative regions (the provinces
were officially changed to regions in 1974 after the
revolution). In addition to the Eritrean secessionists,
rebels were highly active in Tigray, where the Tigray
People's Liberation Front (TPLF), formed in 1975, was
demanding social justice and self-determination for all
Ethiopians. In the southern regions of Bale, Sidamo, and
Arsi, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Somali Abo
Liberation Front (SALF), active since 1975, had gained
control of parts of the countryside, and the WSLF was active
in the Ogaden. Under Ali Mirah's leadership, the Afar
Liberation Front (ALF) began armed operations in March 1975,
and in 1976 it coordinated some actions with the EPLF and
the TPLF.
Despite an influx of military aid from the Soviet Union and
its allies after 1977, the government's counterinsurgency
effort in Eritrea progressed haltingly. After initial
government successes in retaking territory around the major
towns and cities and along some of the principal roads in
1978 and 1979, the conflict ebbed and flowed on an almost
yearly basis. Annual campaigns by the Ethiopian armed forces
to dislodge the EPLF from positions around the northern town
of Nakfa failed repeatedly and proved costly to the
government. Eritrean and Tigrayan insurgents began to
cooperate, the EPLF providing training and equipment that
helped build the TPLF into a full-fledged fighting force.
Between 1982 and 1985, the EPLF and the Derg held a series
of talks to resolve the Eritrean conflict, but to no avail.
By the end of 1987, dissident organizations in Eritrea and
Tigray controlled at least 90 percent of both regions.
***************
Social and Political Changes
Although Addis Ababa quickly developed a close relationship
with the communist world, the Soviet Union and its allies
had consistent difficulties working with Mengistu and the
Derg. These difficulties were largely the result of the
Derg's preoccupation with internal matters and the promotion
of Ethiopian variations on what Marxist-Leninist
theoreticians regarded as preordained steps on the road to a
socialist state. The Derg's status as a military government
was another source of concern. Ethiopia's communist allies
made an issue of the need to create a civilian "vanguard
party" that would rule a people's republic. In a move geared
to ensure continued communist support, the Derg formed the
Commission to Organize the Party of the Workers of Ethiopia
(COPWE) in December 1979, with Mengistu as its chairman. At
COPWE's second congress, in January 1983, it was announced
that COPWE would be replaced by a genuine communist party.
Accordingly, the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE) was
proclaimed on September 12, 1984 (see The Workers' Party of
Ethiopia, ch. 4).
About the same time, work continued on a new constitution
for the planned people's republic. On February 1, 1987, the
proposed constitution, which had been submitted to the
public for popular debate and changes the prior year, was
finally put to a vote. Although the central government
claimed an 81 percent approval of the new constitution (with
modifications proposed by the public), the circumstances of
its review and approval by the general population were
called into question. The task of publicizing the document
had been entrusted to the kebeles and the peasant
associations--organizations that had a state security
mission as well as local administrative duties. Observers
noted that little commentary or dissent was possible under
such circumstances. Additional criticism included the charge
that the proposed constitution was not designed to address
or even understand Ethiopian needs; in fact, many noted that
the constitution was "almost an abridged translation of the
Soviet Constitution of 1977" (see The 1987 Constitution, ch.
4.)
***************
Ethiopia in Crisis: Famine and Its Aftermath,
1984-88
Toward the end of the 1980s, several crises, including
famine, economic collapse, and military setbacks in Eritrea
and Tigray, confronted the Derg. In addition, as democratic
reform swept through the communist world, it became evident
that Addis Ababa no longer could rely on its allies for
support.
*****************
Famine and Economic Collapse
Ethiopia had never recovered from the previous great famine
of the early 1970s, which was the result of a drought that
affected most of the countries of the African Sahel. The
late 1970s again brought signs of intensifying drought. By
the early 1980s, large numbers of people in central Eritrea,
Tigray, Welo, and parts of Gonder and Shewa were beginning
to feel the effects of renewed famine.
By mid-1984 it was evident that another drought and
resulting famine of major proportions had begun to affect
large parts of northern Ethiopia. Just as evident was the
government's inability to provide relief. The almost total
failure of crops in the north was compounded by fighting in
and around Eritrea, which hindered the passage of relief
supplies. Although international relief organizations made a
major effort to provide food to the affected areas, the
persistence of drought and poor security conditions in the
north resulted in continuing need as well as hazards for
famine relief workers. In late 1985, another year of drought
was forecast, and by early 1986 the famine had spread to
parts of the southern highlands, with an estimated 5.8
million people dependent on relief food. Exacerbating the
problem in 1986 were locust and grasshopper plagues.
The government's inability or unwillingness to deal with
the 1984-85 famine provoked universal condemnation by the
international community. Even many supporters of the
Ethiopian regime opposed its policy of withholding food
shipments to rebel areas. The combined effects of famine and
internal war had by then put the nation's economy into a
state of collapse.
The primary government response to the drought and famine
was the decision to uproot large numbers of peasants who
lived in the affected areas in the north and to resettle
them in the southern part of the country. In 1985 and 1986,
about 600,000 people were moved, many forcibly, from their
home villages and farms by the military and transported to
various regions in the south. Many peasants fled rather than
allow themselves to be resettled; many of those who were
resettled sought later to return to their native regions.
Several human rights organizations claimed that tens of
thousands of peasants died as a result of forced
resettlement (see The Politics of Resettlement, ch. 4).
Another government plan involved villagization, which was a
response not only to the famine but also to the poor
security situation. Beginning in 1985, peasants were forced
to move their homesteads into planned villages, which were
clustered around water, schools, medical services, and
utility supply points to facilitate distribution of those
services. Many peasants fled rather than acquiesce in
relocation, which in general proved highly unpopular.
Additionally, the government in most cases failed to provide
the promised services. Far from benefiting agricultural
productivity, the program caused a decline in food
production. Although temporarily suspended in 1986,
villagization was subsequently resumed.
**************
Government Defeats in Eritrea and Tigray
In March 1988, the EPLF initiated one of its most
successful military campaigns by striking at Ethiopian army
positions on the Nakfa front north of the town of Afabet,
where the Derg had established a base for a new attack
against the insurgents. In two days of fighting, the
Eritrean rebels annihilated three Ethiopian army divisions,
killing or capturing at least 18,000 government troops and
seizing large amounts of equipment, including armor and
artillery. Subsequently, the town of Afabet, with its
military stores, fell to the EPLF, which then threatened all
remaining Ethiopian military concentrations in northern
Eritrea.
The Ethiopian army's defeat in Eritrea came after setbacks
during the preceding week in Tigray. Using the same tactics
employed by the EPLF, the TPLF preempted a pending Ethiopian
offensive in Tigray with a series of attacks on government
positions there in early March. A government attack against
central Tigray failed disastrously, with four Ethiopian army
divisions reportedly destroyed and most of their equipment
captured. In early April, the TPLF took the town of Adigrat
in northern Tigray, cutting the main road link between Addis
Ababa and Eritrea.
The March 1988 defeats of the Ethiopian army were
catastrophic in terms of their magnitude and crippling in
their effect on government strategy in Eritrea and Tigray.
The capability of government forces in both regions
collapsed as a result. Subsequently, Ethiopian government
control of Eritrea was limited to the Keren-Asmera-Mitsiwa
triangle and the port of Aseb to the southeast. The TPLF's
victories in Tigray ultimately led to its total conquest by
the rebels and the expansion of the insurgency into Gonder,
Welo, and even parts of Shewa the following year.
***************
The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
On September 10, 1987, after thirteen years of military
rule, the nation officially became the People's Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) under a new constitution
providing for a civilian government. The PMAC was abolished,
and in June of that year Ethiopians had elected the National
Shengo (National Assembly), a parliament. Despite these
changes, members of the now-defunct Derg still ran the
government but with different titles. For example, the
National Shengo elected Mengistu to be the country's first
civilian president; he remained, however, the WPE's general
secretary. Other high-ranking Derg and WPE members received
similar posts in the new government, including the Derg
deputy chairman, Fikre-Selassie Wogderes, who became
Ethiopia's prime minister, and Fisseha Desta, WPE deputy
general secretary, who became the country's vice president.
Despite outward appearances, little changed in the way the
country was actually run. Old Derg members still were in
control, and the stated mission of the WPE allowed continued
close supervision by the government over much of the urban
population. Despite the granting of "autonomy" to Eritrea,
Aseb, Tigray, Dire Dawa, and the Ogaden, the 1987
constitution was ambiguous on the question of self-
determination for national groups such as the Eritreans,
except within the framework of the national government. And
although the constitution contained provisions to protect
the rights of citizens, the power of peasant associations
and kebeles was left intact.
****************
Changes in Soviet Policy and New International Horizons
The Soviet Union policies changed toward its allies among
the developing countries in the late 1980s--changes that
appeared likely to result in significant reductions in it's
hitherto extensive support of Ethiopia. By then it was
evident that the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship had undergone
a fundamental reorientation. The change was partly the
result of the new directions in Soviet foreign policy
undertaken by Mikhail Gorbachev. But other contributing
factors were strong undercurrents of Soviet disapproval of
Ethiopia's conduct of its internal affairs and of Addis
Ababa's inability to make effective use of the aid that
Moscow sent. The implications of this changed policy for
Ethiopia were likely to be profound, inasmuch as continued
high levels of military assistance were vital to the pursuit
of Mengistu's military solution in Eritrea as well as to the
fight against other internal insurgencies.
* * *
The literature on Ethiopia is relatively rich and deep, the
consequence of Ethiopia's indigenous written tradition,
mostly in Gi'iz, and of the extraordinary interest in the
country shown by Europeans over the last five centuries. For
the early historical period, two works are fundamental:
Aksum: An African Civilisation of Late Antiquity by Stuart
Munro-Hay, and Church and State in Ethiopia, 1270-1527 by
Taddesse Tamrat. Each is the best work on its respective
subject and period and likely to remain so for the
foreseeable future. In nearly the same league is John
Spencer Trimingham's Islam in Ethiopia, a standard work and
a starting point for the history, culture, and religion of
Ethiopia's Muslim peoples, despite its age (published in
1952).
A comprehensive, up-to-date survey of the country remains
to be written, but an older work by Edward Ullendorff, The
Ethiopians: An Introduction to Country and People (1973), is
still quite useful, despite its emphasis on the northern,
Semitic-speaking population. As a supplement, the reader
might consult the relevant chapters in the eight volumes of
The Cambridge History of Africa, edited by J.D. Fage and
Roland Oliver. Two books by Mordechai Abir, Ethiopia and the
Red Sea and Ethiopia: The Era of the Princes, cover subjects
or periods otherwise almost totally neglected, including
trade, commerce, and the contributions of the Oromo. Richard
K. Pankhurst's Economic History of Ethiopia, 1800-1935
contains a wealth of information on a wide variety of
topics, as do other works by this scholar. Two books by
Donald N. Levine, Wax and Gold and Greater Ethiopia: The
Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society, provide stimulating and
at times provocative analyses of Amhara, Tigray, and (in the
latter volume) Oromo cultures but should be consulted only
after basics in the field have been mastered. A highly
useful reference is the Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia by
Chris Prouty and Eugene Rosenfeld, which provides a lexicon
of Ethiopian topics as well as an extensive bibliography.
Bahru Zewde's A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1974
surveys the last century of imperial rule, with an emphasis
on the twentieth century. Two biographical histories on
nineteenth-century emperors are recommended: Yohannes IV of
Ethiopia by Zewde Gabre-Sellassie, and The Life and Times of
Menelik II by Harold G. Marcus. The following are among
outstanding works on the reign of Haile Selassie: George W.
Baer's The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War; Christopher
S. Clapham's Haile Selassie's Government; John Markakis's
Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity; and Harold G.
Marcus's Haile Selassie I: The Formative Years, 1892-1936. A
new work by Gebru Tareke, Ethiopia: Power and Protest,
analyzes three major peasant revolts and the response of the
imperial government.
An excellent discussion of contemporary Ethiopia that
treats both the Haile Selassie era and the revolutionary
years is Ethiopia: Transition and Development in the Horn of
Africa by Mulatu Wubneh and Yohannis Abate. Among the best
sources on the military government and its policies are
Marina and David Ottaway's Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution,
still the basic source on the early years of the Derg, and
Christopher S. Clapham's Transformation and Continuity in
Revolutionary Ethiopia. Among periodicals, the Journal of
African History and Northeast African Studies are
particularly valuable for scholarly coverage of Ethiopia and
the Horn. (For further information and complete citations,
see Bibliography.)
*****************
Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment
by Yohannis Abate (A Geographer and African Analyst with the
Department of Defence)
THE ETHIOPIAN PEOPLE ARE ETHNICALLY heterogeneous,
comprising more than 100 groups, each speaking a dialect of
one of more than seventy languages. The Amhara, Oromo, and
Tigray are the largest groups. With the accession of Menelik
II to the throne in 1889, the ruling class consisted
primarily of the Amhara, a predominantly Christian group
that constitutes about 30 percent of the population and
occupies the central highlands. The Oromo, who constitute
about 40 percent of the population, are half Orthodox
Christians and half Muslims whose traditional alliance with
the Amhara in Shewa included participation in public
administration and the military. Predominantly Christian,
the Tigray occupy the far northern highlands and make up 12
to 15 percent of the population. They or their Eritrean
neighbors had been battling the government for nearly three
decades and by 1991 had scored many battlefield successes.
According to estimates based on the first census (1984),
Ethiopia's population was 51.7 million in 1990 and was
projected to reach more than 67 million by the year 2000.
About 89 percent of the people live in rural areas, large
sectors of which have been ravaged by drought, famine, and
war. The regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam embarked on
controversial villagization and resettlement programs to
combat these problems. Villagization involved the relocation
of rural people into villages, while resettlement moved
people from drought-prone areas in the north to sparsely
populated and resource-rich areas in the south and
southwest. The international community criticized both
programs for poor implementation and the consequent toll in
human lives.
The traditional social system in the northern highlands
was, in general, based on landownership and tenancy. After
conquest, Menelik II (reigned 1889-1913) imposed the north's
imperial system on the conquered south. The government
appointed many Amhara administrators, who distributed land
among themselves and relegated the indigenous peasants to
tenancy. The 1974 revolution swept away this structure of
ethnic and class dominance. The Provisional Military
Administrative Council (PMAC; also known as the Derg--see
Glossary) appointed representatives of the Workers' Party of
Ethiopia and the national system of peasant associations to
implement land reform. Additionally, the government
organized urban centers into a hierarchy of urban dwellers'
associations (kebeles--see Glossary). Despite these reforms,
however, dissatisfaction and covert opposition to the regime
continued in the civilian and military sectors.
Prior to the 1974 revolution, the state religion of
Ethiopia had been Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity, whose
adherents comprised perhaps 40 to 50 percent of the
population, including a majority of the Amhara and Tigray.
Islam was the faith of about 40 percent of the population,
including large segments (perhaps half) of the Oromo and the
people inhabiting the contiguous area of the northern and
eastern lowlands, such as the Beja, Saho, Afar, and Somali.
Adherents of indigenous belief systems were scattered among
followers of the two major religions and could be found in
more concentrated numbers on the western peripheries of the
highlands. In line with its policy that all religions were
equally legitimate, the regime in 1975 declared several
Muslim holy days national holidays, in addition to the
Ethiopian Orthodox holidays that were already observed.
Declaring education one of its priorities, the PMAC
expanded the education system at the primary level,
especially in small towns and rural areas, which had never
had modern schools during the imperial era. The new policy
relocated control and operation of primary and secondary
schools to the subregion (awraja) level, where officials
reoriented curricula to emphasize agriculture, handicrafts,
commercial training, and other practical subjects. The
regime also embarked on a national literacy campaign.
The regime's health policy included expansion of rural
health services, promotion of community involvement, self-
reliance in health activities, and emphasis on the
prevention and control of disease. As with education, the
PMAC decentralized health care administration to the local
level as part of its effort to encourage community
involvement. Despite an emphasis on rural health services,
less than a third of the total population had effective
health coverage in mid-1991.
*********************
Physical Setting
Ethiopia occupies most of the Horn of Africa. The country
covers approximately 1,221,900 square kilometers and shares
frontiers with Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, and Djibouti. Its Red
Sea coastline is about 960 kilometers long. The major
physiographic features are a massive highland complex of
mountains and plateaus divided by the Great Rift Valley and
surrounded by lowlands along the periphery. The diversity of
the terrain is fundamental to regional variations in
climate, natural vegetation, soil composition, and
settlement patterns.
**************
Boundaries: International and Administrative
Except for the Red Sea coastline, only limited stretches of
the country's borders are defined by natural features. Most
of Ethiopia's borders have been delimited by treaty. The
Ethiopia-Somalia boundary has long been an exception,
however. One of its sectors has never been definitively
demarcated, thanks to disputed interpretations of 1897 and
1908 treaties signed by Britain, Italy, and Ethiopia. This
sector was delimited by a provisional "Administrative Line"
that was defined by a 1950 Anglo-Ethiopian agreement, when
the United Nations (UN) established Somalia as a trust
territory. After it became independent in 1960, Somalia
refused to recognize any of the border treaties signed
between Ethiopia and the former colonial powers. The Somali
government also demanded a revision of the boundary that
would ensure self-determination for Somali living in the
Ogaden. Consequently, the frontier became the scene of
recurrent violence and open warfare between Ethiopia and
Somalia.
************
Topography and Drainage
Much of the Ethiopian landmass is part of the East African
Rift Plateau. Ethiopia has a general elevation ranging from
1,500 to 3,000 meters above sea level. Interspersed on the
landscape are higher mountain ranges and cratered cones, the
highest of which, at 4,620 meters, is Ras Dashen Terara
northeast of Gonder. The northernmost part of the plateau is
Ethiopia's historical core and is the location of the
ancient kingdom of Aksum. The national capital of Addis
Ababa ("New Flower") is located in the center of the country
on the edge of the central plateau (see fig. 6).
Millennia of erosion have produced steep valleys, in places
1,600 meters deep and several kilometers wide. In these
valleys flow rapid streams unsuitable for navigation but
possessing potential as sources of hydroelectric power and
water for irrigation.
The highlands that comprise much of the country are often
referred to as the Ethiopian Plateau and are usually thought
of as divided into northern and southern parts. In a strict
geographical sense, however, they are bisected by the Great
Rift Valley into the northwestern highlands and the
southeastern highlands, each with associated lowlands. The
northwestern highlands are considerably more extensive and
rugged and are divided into northern and southern sections
by the valley of the Abay (Blue Nile).
North of Addis Ababa, the surface of the plateau is
interspersed with towering mountains and deep chasms that
create a variety of physiography, climate, and indigenous
vegetation. The plateau also contains mountain ranges such
as the Chercher and Aranna. Given the rugged nature of these
mountains and the surrounding tableland, foreigners receive
a false impression of the country's topography when
Ethiopians refer to the landform as a plateau. Few of these
peaks' surfaces are flat except for a scattering of
level-topped mountains known to Ethiopians as ambas.
Southwest of Addis Ababa, the plateau also is rugged, but
its elevation is slightly lower than in its northern
section. To the southeast of Addis Ababa, beyond the Ahmar
and Mendebo mountain ranges and the higher elevations of the
southeastern highlands, the plateau slopes gently toward the
southeast. The land here is rocky desert and, consequently,
is sparsely populated.
The Great Rift Valley forms a third physiographic region.
This extensive fault system extends from the Jordan Valley
in the Middle East to the Zambezi River's Shire tributary in
Mozambique. The segment running through central Ethiopia is
marked in the north by the Denakil Depression and the
coastal lowlands, or Afar Plain, as they are sometimes
known. To the south, at approximately 9ø north latitude, the
Great Rift Valley becomes a deep trench slicing through the
plateau from north to south, its width averaging fifty
kilometers. The southern half of the Ethiopian segment of
the valley is dotted by a chain of relatively large lakes.
Some hold fresh water, fed by small streams from the east;
others contain salts and minerals.
In the north, the Great Rift Valley broadens into a
funnel-shaped saline plain. The Denakil Depression, a large,
triangle-shaped basin that in places is 115 meters below sea
level, is one of the hottest places on earth. On the
northeastern edge of the depression, maritime hills border a
hot, arid, and treeless strip of coastal land sixteen to
eighty kilometers wide. These coastal hills drain inland
into saline lakes, from which commercial salt is extracted.
Along the Red Sea coast are the Dahlak Islands, which are
sparsely inhabited.
In contrast with the plateau's steep scarps along the Great
Rift Valley and in the north, the western and southwestern
slopes descend somewhat less abruptly and are broken more
often by river exits. Between the plateau and the Sudanese
border in the west lies a narrow strip of sparsely populated
tropical lowland that belongs politically to Ethiopia but
whose inhabitants are related to the people of Sudan (see
Ethiopia's Peoples, this ch.). These tropical lowlands on
the periphery of the plateau, particularly in the far north
and along the western frontier, contrast markedly with the
upland terrain.
The existence of small volcanoes, hot springs, and many
deep gorges indicates that large segments of the landmass
are still geologically unstable. Numerous volcanoes occur in
the Denakil area, and hot springs and steaming fissures are
found in other northern areas of the Great Rift Valley. A
line of seismic faults extends along the length of Eritrea
and the Denakil Depression, and small earthquakes have been
recorded in the area in recent times.
All of Ethiopia's rivers originate in the highlands and
flow outward in many directions through deep gorges. Most
notable of these is the Blue Nile, the country's largest
river. It and its tributaries account for two-thirds of the
Nile River flow below Khartoum in Sudan. Because of the
general westward slope of the highlands, many large rivers
are tributaries of the Nile system, which drains an
extensive area of the central portion of the plateau. The
Blue Nile, the Tekez‚, and the Baro are among them and
account for about half of the country's water outflow. In
the northern half of the Great Rift Valley flows the Awash
River, on which the government has built several dams to
generate power and irrigate major commercial plantations.
The Awash flows east and disappears in the saline lakes near
the boundary with Djibouti. The southeast is drained by the
Genale and Shebele rivers and their tributaries, and the
southwest is drained by the Omo.
*************
Climate
Diverse rainfall and temperature patterns are largely the
result of Ethiopia's location in Africa's tropical zone and
the country's varied topography. Altitude-induced climatic
conditions form the basis for three environmental zones--
cool, temperate, and hot--which have been known to
Ethiopians since antiquity as the dega, the weina dega, and
the kolla, respectively.
The cool zone consists of the central parts of the western
and eastern sections of the northwestern plateau and a small
area around Harer. The terrain in these areas is generally
above 2,400 meters in elevation; average daily highs range
from near freezing to 16øC, with March, April, and May the
warmest months. Throughout the year, the midday warmth
diminishes quickly by afternoon, and nights are usually
cold. During most months, light frost often forms at night
and snow occurs at the highest elevations.
Lower areas of the plateau, between 1,500 and 2,400 meters
in elevation, constitute the temperate zone. Daily highs
there range from 16øC to 30øC.
The hot zone consists of areas where the elevation is lower
than 1,500 meters. This area encompasses the Denakil
Depression, the Eritrean lowlands, the eastern Ogaden, the
deep tropical valleys of the Blue Nile and Tekez‚ rivers,
and the peripheral areas along the Sudanese and Kenyan
borders. Daytime conditions are torrid, and daily
temperatures vary more widely here than in the other two
regions. Although the hot zone's average annual daytime
temperature is about 27øC, midyear readings in the arid and
semiarid areas along the Red Sea coast often soar to 50øC
and to more than 40øC in the arid Ogaden. Humidity is
usually high in the tropical valleys and along the seacoast.
Variations in precipitation throughout the country are the
result of differences in elevation and seasonal changes in
the atmospheric pressure systems that control the prevailing
winds. Because of these factors, several regions receive
rainfall throughout most of the year, but in other areas
precipitation is seasonal. In the more arid lowlands,
rainfall is always meager.
In January the high pressure system that produces monsoons
in Asia crosses the Red Sea. Although these northeast trade
winds bring rain to the coastal plains and the eastern
escarpment in Eritrea, they are essentially cool and dry and
provide little moisture to the country's interior. Their
effect on the coastal region, however, is to create a
Mediterranean-like climate. Winds that originate over the
Atlantic Ocean and blow across Equatorial Africa have a
marked seasonal effect on much of Ethiopia. The resulting
weather pattern provides the highlands with most of its
rainfall during a period that generally lasts from mid-June
to mid-September.
The main rainy season is usually preceded in April and May
by converging northeast and southeast winds that produce a
brief period of light rains, known as balg. These rains are
followed by a short period of hot dry weather, and toward
the middle of June violent thunderstorms occur almost daily.
In the southwest, precipitation is more evenly distributed
and also more abundant. The relative humidity and rainfall
decrease generally from south to north and also in the
eastern lowlands. Annual precipitation is heaviest in the
southwest, scant in the Great Rift Valley and the Ogaden,
and negligible in the Denakil Depression
****************
Population
Size, Distribution, and Growth
Source: Based on information from United Nations, Demographic
Yearbook, 1989, New York, 1991, 116-67.
Ethiopia's population was estimated at 51.7 million in
1990. According to the nation's only census, conducted in
1984, Ethiopia's population was about 42 million. But the
census was far from comprehensive. The rural areas of
Eritrea and Tigray were excluded because of hostilities. In
addition, the population in the southern parts of Bale and
Harerge could only be estimated because of the prevalence of
pastoral nomadism.
The 1984 census revealed that Ethiopia's population was
about 89 percent rural, and this percentage did not appear
to have changed by the late 1980s (see table 2,Appendix).
This segment included many nomadic and seminomadic peoples.
The Ethiopian population always has been predominantly
rural, engaging in sedentary agricultural activities such as
the cultivation of crops and livestock-raising in the
highlands. In the lowlands, the main activities
traditionally have been subsistence farming by seminomadic
groups and seasonal grazing of livestock by nomadic people.
The distribution of Ethiopia's population generally is
related to altitude, climate, and soil. These physical
factors explain the concentration of population in the
highlands, which are endowed with moderate temperatures,
rich soil, and adequate rainfall. About 14 percent of the
population lives in areas above 2,400 meters (cool climatic
zone), about 75 percent between 1,500 and 2,400 meters
(temperate zone), and only 11 percent below 1,500 meters
(hot climatic zone), although the hot zone encompasses more
than half of Ethiopia's territory. Localities with
elevations above 3,000 meters and below 1,500 meters are
sparsely populated, the first because of cold temperatures
and rugged terrain, which limit agricultural activity, and
the second because of high temperatures and low rainfall,
except in the west and southwest.
Although census data indicated that overall density was
about thirty-seven people per square kilometer, density
varied from over 100 per square kilometer for Shewa and
seventy-five for Arsi to fewer than ten in the Ogaden, Bale,
the Great Rift Valley, and the western lowlands adjoining
Sudan. There was also great variation among the populations
of the various administrative regions (see table 3,
Appendix).
In 1990 officials estimated the birth rate at forty-five
births per 1,000 population and the total fertility rate
(the average number of children that would be born to a
woman during her lifetime) at about seven per 1,000
population. Census findings indicated that the birth rate
was higher in rural areas than in urban areas. Ethiopia's
birth rate, high even among developing countries, is
explained by early and universal marriage, kinship and
religious beliefs that generally encourage large families, a
resistance to contraceptive practices, and the absence of
family planning services for most of the population. Many
Ethiopians believe that families with many children have
greater financial security and are better situated to
provide for their elderly members.
In the absence of a national population policy or the
provision of more than basic health services, analysts
consider the high birth rate likely to continue. A
significant consequence of the high birth rate is that the
population is young; children under fifteen years of age
made up nearly 50 percent of the population in 1989 (see
fig. 7). Thus, a large segment of the population was
dependent and likely to require heavy expenditures on
education, health, and social services.
In 1990 the death rate was estimated at fifteen per 1,000
population (down from 18.1 per 1,000 in 1984). This also was
a very high rate but typical of poor developing countries.
The high death rate was a reflection of the low standard of
living, poor health conditions, inadequate health
facilities, and high rates of infant mortality (116 per
1,000 live births in 1990; 139 per 1,000 in 1984) and child
mortality. Additional factors contributing to the high death
rate include infectious diseases, poor sanitation,
malnutrition, and food shortages. Children are even more
vulnerable to such deprivations. In Ethiopia half of the
total deaths involve children under five years of age. In
addition, drought and famine in the 1980s, during which more
than 7 million people needed food aid, interrupted the
normal evolution of mortality and fertility and undoubtedly
left many infants and children with stunted physical and
mental capabilities. Life expectancy in 1990 was estimated
at forty-nine years for males and fifty-two years for
females.
Generally, birth rates, infant mortality rates, and overall
mortality rates were lower in urban areas than in rural
areas. As of 1990, urban residents had a life expectancy of
just under fifty-three years, while rural residents had a
life expectancy of forty-eight years. The more favorable
statistics for urban areas can be explained by the wider
availability of health facilities, greater knowledge of
sanitation, easier access to clean water and food, and a
slightly higher standard of living.
There has been a steady increase in the population growth
rate since 1960. Based on 1984 census data, population
growth was estimated at about 2.3 percent for the 1960-70
period, 2.5 percent for the 1970-80 period, and 2.8 percent
for the 1980-85 period. Population projections compiled in
1988 by the Central Statistical Authority (CSA) projected a
2.83 percent growth rate for 1985-90 and a 2.96 percent
growth rate for 1990-95. This would result in a population
of 57.9 million by 1995. Estimated annual growth for
1995-2000 varied from 3.03 percent to 3.16 percent.
Population estimates ranged from 67.4 million to 67.8
million by the year 2000. The CSA projected that Ethiopia's
population could range from 104 million to 115 million by
the year 2015. The International Development Association
(IDA) provided a more optimistic estimate. Based on the
assumption of a gradual fertility decline, such as might be
caused by steady economic development without high priority
given to population and family planning programs, the
population growth rate might fall to about 2.8 percent per
annum in 1995-2000 and to 2.1 percent in 2010-15, resulting
in a population of 93 million in 2015.
Analysts believed that reducing the population growth rate
was a pressing need, but one that could only be addressed
through a persistent and comprehensive nationwide effort
over the long term. As of early 1991, the Ethiopian regime
had shown no commitment to such a program.
Variations in population growth existed among
administrative regions. Kefa, Sidamo, and Shewa had the
highest average growth rates for the 1967-84 period, ranging
from 4.2 percent for Kefa to 3.5 percent for Sidamo and
Shewa. Whereas Shewa's population growth was the result of
Addis Ababa's status as the administrative, commercial, and
industrial center of Ethiopia, Kefa and Sidamo grew
primarily because of agricultural and urban development. The
population in administrative regions such as Harerge, Welo,
and Tigray, which had been hard hit by famine and
insurrection, grew at slow rates: 1.3 percent, 1 percent,
and 0.2 percent, respectively. Generally, the population of
most central and western administrative regions grew more
rapidly than did the population of the eastern and northern
administrative regions.
**************
Urbanization
Ethiopia was under-urbanized, even by African standards.
In the late 1980s, only about 11 percent of the population
lived in urban areas of at least 2,000 residents. There were
hundreds of communities with 2,000 to 5,000 people, but
these were primarily extensions of rural villages without
urban or administrative functions. Thus, the level of
urbanization would be even lower if one used strict urban
structural criteria. Ethiopia's relative lack of
urbanization is the result of the country's history of
agricultural self-sufficiency, which has reinforced rural
peasant life. The slow pace of urban development continued
until the 1935 Italian invasion. Urban growth was fairly
rapid during and after the Italian occupation of 1936-41.
Urbanization accelerated during the 1960s, when the average
annual growth rate was about 6.3 percent. Urban growth was
especially evident in the northern half of Ethiopia, where
most of the major towns are located.
Addis Ababa was home to about 35 percent of the country's
urban population in 1987. Another 7 percent resided in
Asmera, the second largest city. Major industrial,
commercial, governmental, educational, health, and cultural
institutions were located in these two cities, which
together were home to about 2 million people, or one out of
twenty-five Ethiopians. Nevertheless, many small towns had
emerged as well. In 1970 there were 171 towns with
populations of 2,000 to 20,000; this total had grown to 229
by 1980.
The period 1967-75 saw rapid growth of relatively new urban
centers (see Appendix). The population of six
towns--Akaki, Arba Minch, Awasa, Bahir Dar, Jijiga, and
Shashemene--more than tripled, and that of eight others more
than doubled. Awasa, Arba Minch, Metu, and Goba were newly
designated capitals of administrative regions and important
agricultural centers. Awasa, capital of Sidamo, had a
lakeshore site and convenient location on the Addis
Ababa-Nairobi highway. Bahir Dar was a newly planned city on
Lake Tana and the site of several industries and a
polytechnic institute. Akaki and Aseb were growing into
important industrial towns, while Jijiga and Shashemene had
become communications and service centers.
Urban centers that experienced moderate growth tended to be
more established towns, such as Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, and
Debre Zeyit. A few old provincial capitals, such as Gonder,
also experienced moderate growth, but others, such as Harer,
Dese, Debre Markos, and Jima, had slow growth rates because
of competition from larger cities. By the 1990s, Harer was
being overshadowed by Dire Dawa, Dese by Kembolcha, and
Debre Markos by Bahir Dar.
Overall, the rate of urban growth declined from 1975 to
1987. With the exception of Aseb, Arba Minch, and Awasa,
urban centers grew an average of about 40 percent over that
twelve-year period. This slow growth is explained by several
factors. Rural-to-urban migration had been largely
responsible for the rapid expansion during the 1967-75
period, whereas natural population growth may have been
mostly responsible for urban expansion during the 1975-84
period. The 1975 land reform program provided incentives and
opportunities for peasants and other potential migrants to
stay in rural areas. Restrictions on travel, lack of
employment, housing shortages, and social unrest in some
towns during the 1975-80 period also contributed to a
decline in rural-to-urban migration.
Although the male and female populations were about equal,
men outnumbered women in rural areas. More women migrated to
the urban centers for a variety of reasons, including
increased job opportunities.
As a result of intensified warfare in the period 1988-91,
all urban centers received a large influx of population,
resulting in severe overcrowding, shortages of housing and
water, overtaxed social services, and unemployment. In
addition to beggars and maimed persons, the new arrivals
comprised large numbers of young people. These included not
only primary and secondary school students but also an
alarming number of orphans and street children, estimated at
well over 100,000. Although all large towns shared in this
influx, Addis Ababa, as the national capital, was most
affected. This situation underscored the huge social
problems that the Mengistu regime had neglected for far too
long.
***************
Resettlement and Villagization
Drought and famine have been frequent occurrences in
Ethiopia. In fact, it was the imperial government's attempt
to hide the effects of the 1973-74 famine that aroused world
indignation and eventually contributed to Haile Selassie I's
demise (see The Establishment of the Derg, ch. 1). Between
1984 and 1986, drought and famine again hit Ethiopia and may
have claimed as many as 1 million lives and threatened
nearly 8 million more (see The Politics of Drought and
Famine, ch. 4). Even worse disaster was averted when the
international community mounted a massive effort to airlift
food and medical supplies to famine victims.
The government embarked on forced resettlement and
villagization in the mid-1980s as part of a national program
to combat drought, avert famine, and increase agricultural
productivity. Resettlement, the regime's long-term solution
to the drought problem, involved the permanent relocation of
about 1.5 million people from the drought-prone areas of the
north to the south and southwest, where population was
relatively sparse and so-called virgin, arable land was
plentiful (see Government Rural Programs, ch. 3; The
Politics of Resettlement, ch. 4).
Development specialists agreed on the need for resettlement
of famine victims in Ethiopia, but once the process had
begun, there was widespread criticism that resettlement was
poorly planned and haphazardly executed and thus increased
the number of famine deaths. Moreover, critics charged that
the government forcibly relocated peasants, in the process
breaking up thousands of families. Thousands also died of
malaria and sleeping sickness because of poor sanitation and
inadequate health care in newly settled areas. A Paris-based
international doctors' organization, Doctors Without Borders
(M‚decins sans FrontiŠres), estimated that the forced
resettlement and mass deportation of peasants for purposes
of resettlement endangered the lives of 300,000 because of
shortages of food, water, and medicine. Other international
organizations accused the Ethiopian government of moving
peasants to resettlement areas without adequate preparation
of such basic items as housing, water, seeds, and tools.
Because of widespread criticism, the Mengistu regime
temporarily halted the resettlement program in mid-1986
after 600,000 people had been relocated, but the program
resumed in November 1987.
Some sources voiced suspicion that the regime's primary
motive in resettlement was to depopulate the northern areas
where it faced insurgencies. Resettlement, the argument
went, would reduce the guerrillas' base of support.
But this argument did not take into account
the strength of the Tigray People's
Liberation Front (TPLF) (see The Tigrayan Movement, ch. 4;
The Tigray, ch. 5). Another Western objection to the
resettlement program related to the long-term government
policy concerning peasant farms. Western countries, on whose
support the resettlement program depended, did not want to
sponsor a plan in which recruits labored for communist-style
collectives and state farms.
The villagization program, the regime's plan to transform
rural society, started in earnest in January 1985 (see The
Politics of Villagization, ch. 4). If completed, the program
might have uprooted and relocated more than 30 million
peasants over a nine-year period. The regime's rationale for
the program was that the existing arrangement of dispersed
settlements made it difficult to provide social services and
to use resources, especially land and water, efficiently.
The relocation of the peasants into larger villages (with
forty to 300 families, or 200 to 2,500 people) would give
rural people better access to amenities such as agricultural
extension services, schools, clinics, water, and electricity
cooperative services and would strengthen local security and
the capacity for self-defense. Improved economic and social
services would promote more efficient use of land and other
natural resources and would lead to increased agricultural
production and a higher standard of living.
More specifically, the Ethiopian government perceived
villagization as a way to hasten agricultural
collectivization. Most peasant farming in Ethiopia was still
based on a traditional smallholding system, which produced
90 percent of farm output, employed about 80 percent of the
labor force, and accounted for 94 percent of cultivable land
in 1985. State farms and cooperative farms were responsible
for only 4 percent and 2 percent, respectively, of
cultivated land.
By the end of 1988, more than 12 million people had been
relocated in villages in twelve of the fourteen
administrative regions. The exceptions were Eritrea and
Tigray, where insurgents were waging war against the regime.
In 1989 the total reached about 13 million people. Some
regions implemented villagization more rapidly than others.
In Harerge, where the program began in 1985, more than 90
percent of the population had been relocated to villages by
early 1987, whereas in Gonder and Welo the program was just
beginning. In Ilubabor more than 1 million peasants had been
relocated to 2,106 villages between December 1985 and March
1989. Nomadic peoples and shifting cultivators were not
affected by villagization.
The verdict on villagization was not favorable. Thousands
of people fled to avoid villagization; others died or lived
in deplorable conditions after being forcibly resettled.
Moreover, the program's impact on rural peasants and their
social and economic well-being remained to be assessed.
There were indications that in the short term, villagization
may have further impoverished an already poor peasantry. The
services that were supposed to be delivered in new villages,
such as water, electricity, health care clinics, schools,
transportation, and agricultural extension services, were
not being provided because the government lacked the
necessary resources. Villagers therefore resorted to
improvised facilities or reverted to old ways of doing
things. Villagization also reduced the productive capacity
of the peasants by depriving them of the opportunity for
independent organization and action. By increasing the
distance peasants had to travel to work on their land and
graze their cattle, villagization wasted time and effort.
Denied immediate access to their fields, the peasants were
also prevented from guarding their crops from birds and
other wild animals.
In the long run, analysts believed that villagization would
be counterproductive to a rational land use system and would
be damaging ecologically. Concentrating people in a central
area would, in time, intensify pressure on available water
and grazing and lead to a decline in soil fertility and to a
poorer peasantry. The ecological damage could be averted by
the application of capital investment in infrastructure,
such as irrigation and land-intensive agricultural
technology and strict application of land rotation to avert
overgrazing. But resources were unavailable for such
agricultural investment.
The most bitter critics of villagization, such as Survival
International, a London-based human rights organization,
argued that the Mengistu regime's noneconomic objective in
villagization was control of the population. Larger villages
would facilitate the regime's control over the population,
cut rebels off from peasant support, and discourage
dissident movements. Indeed, some observers believed that
the reason for starting villagization in Harerge and Bale
was nothing less than to suppress support of the Oromo
Liberation Front (OLF).
After the government's announcement of the new economic
policy in March 1990, peasants were given the freedom to
join or abandon cooperatives and to bring their produce to
market. Hence, the Mengistu regime abandoned one of the
strong rationales for villagization and, in effect, the
whole program as well.
******************
Refugees, Drought, and Famine
In Ethiopia, a predominantly rural society, the life of
peasants is rooted in the land, from which they eke out a
meager existence. Through the ages, they have faced frequent
natural disasters, armed conflict, and political repression,
and in the process they have suffered hunger, societal
disruption, and death.
Periodic crop failures and losses of livestock often occur
when seasonal rains fail or when unusually heavy storms
cause widespread flooding. Pastoral nomads, who move
seasonally in search of water and grazing, often are trapped
when drought inhibits rejuvenation of the denuded
grasslands, which their overgrazing produces. During such
times, a family's emergency food supplies diminish rapidly,
and hunger and starvation become commonplace until weather
conditions improve and livestock herds are subsequently
rejuvenated. For centuries, this has been the general
pattern of life for most Ethiopian peasants; the insurgent
movements in Eritrea, Tigray, and the Ogaden have only
served to exacerbate the effects of these natural calamities
(see The Eritreans; The Tigray; The Somali, ch. 5).
A drought that began in 1969 continued as dry weather
brought disaster to the Sahel and swept eastward through the
Horn of Africa. By 1973 the attendant famine had threatened
the lives of hundreds of thousands of Ethiopian nomads, who
had to leave their home grounds and struggle into Somalia,
Djibouti, Kenya, and Sudan, seeking relief from starvation.
By the end of 1973, famine had claimed the lives of about
300,000 peasants of Tigray and Welo, and thousands more had
sought relief in Ethiopian towns and villages.
After assuming power in 1974, the military regime embarked
on a program to improve the condition of peasants, but
famine and hunger continued despite this effort, which was
supplemented by substantial foreign assistance. Moreover,
the escalation of the military campaign against the
insurgent movements in Eritrea, Tigray, and the Ogaden
forced thousands of Ethiopians to flee into neighboring
countries.
The 1977-78 Ogaden War and the 1978 drought in eastern
Ethiopia forced large numbers of people across the
southeastern frontier into Somalia. After the defeat of
Somali forces in the Ogaden, the government launched a
counteroffensive against Eritrean guerrillas, and several
hundred thousand Ethiopians sought refuge in Sudan.
Meanwhile, in the Ogaden, international relief agencies
estimated the number of refugees entering Somali refugee
camps at more than 1,000 a day. Most were women and
children, and many suffered from dehydration, malnutrition,
and diseases such as dysentery, malaria, and tuberculosis.
There were more than 700,000 reported refugees scattered in
twenty-six makeshift camps, where the absence of sanitation
and inadequate medical assistance were compounding the
misery created by the food shortages.
By mid-1980 most observers considered the refugee crisis in
the Horn of Africa to be the world's worst. During the
1980s, the crisis intensified, as 2.5 million people in the
region abandoned their homes and sought asylum in
neighboring countries. Although drought, famine, government
repression, and conflict with insurgents were the principal
causes of large-scale refugee migrations, other factors such
as resettlement and villagization in Ethiopia and conflicts
in southern Sudan and northern Somalia also generated
refugees. Sudan's war against the Sudanese People's
Liberation Army (SPLA) forced many Sudanese into Ethiopia.
In northern Somalia, the Somali National Movement (SNM) had
been fighting Somali government forces, and in the process
hundreds of thousands of Somali fled into Ethiopia.
Several factors were responsible for the refugee crisis in
Ethiopia. The repressive Mengistu regime was ruthless in its
treatment of both real and imagined opponents (see Human
Rights, ch. 5). During the so-called Red Terror (see
Glossary) of 1977-78, government security forces killed
thousands of students and urban professionals. Because human
rights violations characterized the government's policy
toward dissidents, there was a constant exodus of young and
educated people. The regime also found itself engaged in
continuous civil war with one or more of the insurgent
groups, which had a devastating impact on the people, the
land, and the economy. The fighting not only generated
hundreds of thousands of refugees but also displaced
thousands of other people from their farms and villages.
Forcible villagization and resettlement also generated
refugees. In Harerge alone, the forced imposition of
villagization prompted 33,000 people to flee to Somalia.
Famine also contributed to Ethiopia's refugee crises. The
1984-85 famine resulted in the death or displacement of
hundreds of thousands of people within Ethiopia and forced
about 100,000 into Somalia, 10,000 into Djibouti, and more
than 300,000 into Sudan.
In 1987 another drought threatened 5 million people in
Eritrea and Tigray. This time, however, the international
community was better prepared to get food to the affected
areas in time to prevent starvation and massive population
movements. However, insurgents belonging to the TPLF and the
Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) attacked convoys
carrying food supplies or denied them access to rebel-held
areas because they believed the government would use relief
convoys to cover the movement of military supplies. The
consequence was more deaths and more refugees.
International relief agencies considered the 1990 famine
more critical because of the scarcity of rain since 1987.
Mitsiwa was one of the Eritrean ports where ships unloaded
food and medical supplies for distribution to famine victims
in Eritrea. Following the EPLF's capture of Mitsiwa in
February 1990 and the government's bombing of the city in an
effort to dislodge the insurgents, the port was out of
action. A few months later, however, the EPLF and the
Ethiopian government reached an agreement that allowed the
port to reopen. In addition, the government lost control of
Tigray in early 1989 and was reluctant to allow food
shipments to go through rebel-held territory until May 1990,
when the rebels, the government, the UN, and donor officials
agreed to move grain supplies from Dese to Tigray. Food
could not be airlifted into Tigray because fighting had
destroyed the airport in Mekele, capital of Tigray. Sudan
was the only nation through which food shipments could come
to Tigray and Eritrea. Both the Relief Society of Tigray and
the Eritrean Relief Association--arms of the TPLF and EPLF,
respectively--operated food convoys from Sudan to Tigray and
Eritrea. But poor road conditions and the fact that convoys
had to operate at night to avoid Ethiopian air force attacks
prevented adequate supplies from reaching affected regions.
Consequently, about 3 million people were threatened with
death and starvation in Eritrea and Tigray.
Disagreements persist concerning the number of Ethiopian
refugees in Somalia in the late 1980s. A UN survey estimated
the number of Ethiopian refugees in Somalia at 450,000 to
620,000. The United States Catholic Relief Services (USCRS),
however, estimated that about 410,000 refugees had returned
to Ethiopia, leaving about 430,000 in Somali refugee camps.
At the same time, more than 350,000 Somali of the Isaaq
clan-family (see Glossary) fled northern Somalia for
Ethiopia after mid-1988. Most of these people remained in
camps run by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
Djibouti was home to about 45,000 Ethiopian refugees from
the Ogaden by late 1978. These people had fled after
Somalia's defeat in the Ogaden War. In 1983 the UNHCR began
a repatriation program, which resulted in the departure of
15,000 former refugees by mid-1984. But the 1984 drought in
Ethiopia brought an additional influx of 10,000 refugees
into Djibouti. Slow, steady repatriation continued through
1989, by which time there were only 1,500 Ethiopian refugees
in Djibouti.
A large influx of Ethiopian refugees into Sudan occurred in
1978, during the escalation of the conflict between Eritrean
insurgents and the Mengistu regime. The influx continued
into 1983, when the refugees numbered about 132,500. The
1984 drought and famine forced 160,000 refugees into Sudan
in 1984 and more than 300,000 by April 1985. By June 1985,
in anticipation of summer rains in Tigray, about 55,000
Tigray left Sudan, followed by another 65,000 in 1986, but
only a small percentage of refugee Eritreans returned to
Ethiopia.
Ethiopia also had been host to refugees from southern Sudan
since 1983. As the conflict in southern Sudan between the
SPLA and the Sudanese regime intensified, more refugees fled
into western Ethiopia, where the Sudanese refugees numbered
about 250,000 in early 1988 and perhaps 400,000 by early
1991
******************
Ethiopia's Peoples
A simple ethnic classification of Ethiopia's population is
not feasible. People categorized on the basis of one
criterion, such as language, may be divided on the basis of
another. Moreover, ethnicity--a people's insistence that it
is distinctive and its behavior on the basis of that
insistence--is a subjective response to both historical
experience and current situations. A group thus
distinguished may not be the same as that established on the
basis of objective criteria.
Historically, entities defining themselves in ethnic terms
reacted or adapted to Amhara domination in various ways.
Affecting their adaptation was the degree of Amhara
domination--in some areas Amhara were present in force,
while in others they established a minimal administrative
presence--and the extent of ethnic mixing. In some areas,
historical differences and external conditions led to
disaffection and attempts at secession, as in multiethnic
Eritrea and in the Ogaden. In others, individuals adapted to
the Amhara. Often they understood the change not so much as
a process of becoming Amhara as one of taking on an
Ethiopian (and urban) identity.
***************
Ethnic Groups, Ethnicity, and Language
One way of segmenting Ethiopia's population is on the basis
of language. However, the numbers in each category are
uncertain, and estimates are often in conflict. At present,
at least seventy languages are spoken as mother tongues, a
few by many millions, others by only a few hundred persons.
The number of distinct social units exceeds the number of
languages because separate communities sometimes speak the
same language. More than fifty of these languages--and
certainly those spoken by the vast majority of Ethiopia's
people--are grouped within three families of the
Afro-Asiatic super-language family: Semitic (represented by
the branch called Ethio-Semitic and by Arabic), Cushitic,
and Omotic. In addition, about 2 percent of the population
speaks the languages of four families--East Sudanic, Koman,
Berta, and Kunema--of the Nilo-Saharan super-language
family.
Most speakers of Ethio-Semitic languages live in the
highlands of the center and north. Speakers of East Cushitic
languages are found in the highlands and lowlands of the
center and south, and other Cushitic speakers in the center
and north; Omotic speakers live in the south; and
Nilo-Saharan speakers in the southwest and west along the
border with Sudan. Of the four main ethno-linguistic groups
of Ethiopia, three--the Amhara, Tigray, and Oromo--generally
live in the highlands; the fourth--the Somali--live in the
lowlands to the southeast (see fig. 8).
****************
Ethio-Semitic Language Groups
The most important Ethio-Semitic language is Amharic. It
was the empire's official language and is still widely used
in government and in the capital despite the Mengistu
regime's changes in language policy. Those speaking Amharic
as a mother tongue numbered about 8 million in 1970, a
little more than 30 percent of the population. A more
accurate count might show them to constitute a lesser
proportion. The total number of Amharic speakers, including
those using Amharic as a second language, may constitute as
much as 50 percent of the population.
The Amhara are not a cohesive group, politically or
otherwise. From the perspective of many Amhara in the core
area of Gonder, Gojam, and western Welo, the Amhara of Shewa
(who constituted the basic ruling group under Menelik II and
Haile Selassie) are not true descendants of the northern
Amhara and the Tigray and heirs to the ancient kingdom of
Aksum. Regional variations notwithstanding, the Amhara do
not exhibit the differences of religion and mode of
livelihood characteristic of the Oromo, for example, who
constitute Ethiopia's largest linguistic category. With a
few exceptions, the Amhara are Ethiopian Orthodox Christians
and are highland plow agriculturists.
The Tigray (whose language is Tigrinya) constitute the
second largest category of Ethio-Semitic speakers. They made
up about 14 percent of the population in 1970. Like the
Amhara, the Tigray are chiefly Ethiopian Orthodox
Christians, and most are plow agriculturists. Despite some
differences in dialect, Tigray believe, as anthropologist
Dan Franz Bauer has noted, "that they have a common tenuous
kinship with other Tigray regardless of their place of
residence."
The number of persons speaking other Ethio-Semitic
languages is significantly smaller than the number who speak
Amharic and Tigrinya. Moreover, unlike the Amhara and
Tigray, members of other Ethio-Semitic groups do not share
the Aksumite heritage and Orthodox Christianity, and their
traditional economic base is different.
Of the seven Ethio-Semitic languages found among the Gurage
of southern Shewa, four are single tongues and three are
dialect clusters, each encompassing four or five dialects.
All correspond to what anthropologist William A. Shack calls
tribes, which, in turn, consist of independent clan (see
Glossary) chiefdoms. Although most people accept the name
Gurage, they are likely to specify a tribal name in
addition.
The traditional social organization and religion of the
Gurage resemble those of the neighboring East
Cushitic-speaking Sidama and related peoples. In some cases,
Orthodox Christianity or Islam has displaced the traditional
religious system, in whole or in part. The Gurage
traditionally depended on the ensete plant (known locally as
false banana) rather than grain for their staple food and
used the hoe rather than the plow.
In 1970 there were more than 500,000 speakers of Gurage
tongues, but no single group numbered more than 100,000.
Substantial numbers, perhaps 15 to 20 percent of all Gurage,
live in urban centers, particularly Addis Ababa, where they
work at a range of manual tasks typically avoided by the
Amhara and the Tigray.
In 1970 a total of 117,000 persons were estimated to speak
Tigre, which is related to Tigrinya; but that figure was
likely an underestimate. The ten or so Eritrean groups or
clusters of groups speaking the language do not constitute
an ethnic entity, although they share an adherence to Islam.
Locally, people traditionally used the term Tigre to refer
to what has been called the serf class, as opposed to the
noble class, in most Tigre-speaking groups.
Perhaps the most numerous of the Tigre-speaking peoples are
the Beni Amir, a largely pastoral people living in the
semiarid region of the north and west along the Sudanese
border. A large number of the Beni Amir also speak Beja, a
North Cushitic language. Other groups are, in part at least,
cultivators, and some, who live along the Red Sea coast and
on nearby islands, gain some of their livelihood from
fishing.
Except for the fact that the distinction between nobles and
serfs seems at one time to have been pervasive, little is
known of early social and political organization among these
groups except for the Beni Amir, who were organized in a
tribal federation with a paramount chief. The other groups
seem to have been autonomous units.
The Hareri are of major historical importance, and their
home was in that part of Ethiopia once claimed by Somali
irredentists. The Hareri ("people of the city") established
the walled city of Harer as early as the thirteenth century
A.D. Harer was a major point from which Islam spread to
Somalia and then to Ethiopia.
The Argobba consist of two groups. Living on the hilly
slopes of the Great Rift Valley escarpment are small groups
of Northern Argobba. The Southern Argobba live southwest of
Harer. Northern Argobba villages, interspersed among
Amharic- or Oromo-speaking communities, stretch from an area
at roughly the latitude of Addis Ababa to southeasternmost
Welo. Most Argobba speak either Amharic or Oromo in addition
to their native tongue.
***************
Cushitic Language Groups
The Oromo, called Galla by the Amhara, constitute the
largest and most ubiquitous of the East Cushitic-speaking
peoples. Oromo live in many regions as a result of expansion
from their homeland in the central southern highlands
beginning in the sixteenth century. Although they share a
common origin and a dialectically varied language, Oromo
groups changed in a variety of ways with respect to economic
base, social and political organization, and religion as
they adapted to different physical and sociopolitical
environments and economic opportunities.
Even more uncertain than estimates of the Amhara population
are estimates for the Oromo. The problem stems largely from
the imperial government's attempts to downplay the country's
ethnic diversity. Government estimates put the number of
Oromo speakers at about 7 million in 1970--about 28 percent
of the total population of Ethiopia. By contrast, the OLF
claimed there were 18 million Oromo in 1978, well over half
of a total population roughly estimated that year at 31
million. Anthropologist P.T.W. Baxter, taking into account
the lack of a census (until 1984) and the political biases
affecting estimates, asserted that the Oromo were almost
certainly the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, making up
somewhere between a third and just over half its population.
A widely accepted estimate in the late 1980s was 40 percent.
The Oromo provide an example of the difficulties of
specifying the boundaries and nature of an ethnic group.
Some Oromo groups, such as the Borana, remain pastoralists.
But others, the great majority of the people, have become
plow cultivators or are engaged in mixed farming. A few
groups, particularly the pastoralists, retain significant
features of the traditional mode of social and political
organization marked by generation and age-set systems (see
Glossary) and the absence of a centralized political
structure; others, such as those who established kingdoms
along the Gib‚ River, developed hierarchial systems. Cutting
across the range of economic and political patterns are
variations in religious belief and practice. Again, the
pastoralists usually adhere to the indigenous system. Other
groups, particularly those in Shewa and Welega, have been
influenced by Orthodox Christianity, and still others have
been converted to Islam. Here and there, missionary
Protestantism has had minor successes. Moreover, the Oromo
sections and subsections have a long history of conflict.
Sometimes this conflict has been the outcome of competition
for land; sometimes it has resulted from strife between
those allied with Amhara and those resisting the expansion
of the empire. Some Oromo adapted to Amhara dominance, the
growth of towns, and other changes by learning Amharic and
achieving a place in the empire's political and economic
order. But they had not thereby become Amhara or lost their
sense of being Oromo.
In the far south live several groups speaking languages of
the Oromic branch of Lowland East Cushitic and in many cases
sharing features of Oromo culture. Most have been
cultivators or mixed farmers, and some have developed
peculiar features, such as the highlands-dwelling Konso, who
live in walled communities of roughly 1,500 persons. All
these groups are small and are often subdivided. With an
estimated population of 60,000 in 1970, the Konso are the
largest of these groups.
Three other Lowland East Cushitic groups--the Somali, Afar,
and Saho--share a pastoral tradition (although some sections
of each group have been cultivators for some time),
commitments of varying intensity to Islam, and social
structures composed of autonomous units defined as descent
groups (see Glossary). In addition, all have a history of
adverse relations with the empire's dominant Orthodox
Christian groups and with Ethiopian governments in general.
The largest of the three groups are the Somali, estimated
to number nearly 900,000 in 1970. Many Somali clans and
lineages living predominantly in Ethiopia have close links
with or are members of such groups in Somalia. The number of
Somali in Ethiopia in the late 1980s--given the Ogaden War
and the movement of refugees--was uncertain.
Somali society is divided into groups of varying
genealogical depth based on putative or traceable common
patrilineal descent. The largest of these groups is the
clan-family (see Glossary), which is in turn divided into
clans, which are further divided into lineages (see
Glossary) and sublineages (see Glossary). The clan-family
has no concrete political, economic, or social functions.
The other groups do, however, and these functions often
entail political and economic competition and sometimes
conflict between parallel social units.
The government estimated that the Afar (called Denakil or
Adal by their neighbors) numbered no more than 363,000 in
1970. Despite their relatively small numbers, they were of
some importance because of their location between the
highlands and the Red Sea, their antipathy to Ethiopian
rule, and the quasi-autonomy of a part of the Afar under the
sultan of Aussa before the 1974 revolution.
Except for several petty centralized states under sultans
or shaykhs, the Afar are fragmented among tribes, subtribes,
and still smaller divisions and are characterized by a
distinction between noble and commoner groups, about which
little is known. Most Afar are pastoralists but are
restricted in their nomadism by the need to stay close to
permanent wells in extremely arid country. A number of them
in the former sultan of Aussa's territory have long been
settled cultivators in the lower Awash River valley,
although the imperial government initiated a program to
settle others along the middle Awash.
Saho is a linguistic rather than an ethnic category. The
groups speaking the language include elements from the Afar,
the Tigray, Tigre speakers, and others, including some
Arabs. Almost all are pastoralists. Most are Muslims, but
several groups--those heavily influenced by the Tigray--are
Ethiopian Orthodox Christians.
Little is known about the political and social systems of
the ten or so groups making up the total estimated Saho-
speaking population of 120,000, but each group seems to be
divided into segments. None was ever marked by the noble-
serf distinction characteristic of Tigre speakers to their
north, and all were said to elect their chiefs.
The speakers of the Highland East Cushitic languages
(sometimes called the Sidamo languages after a version of
the name of their largest component) numbered more than 2
million in 1970. The two largest groups were the Sidama
(857,000) and the Hadya-Libido speakers (700,000). Kembata-
Timbaro-Alaba speakers and the Deresa made up the rest. Each
of these two groups numbered about 250,000 in 1970. As the
hyphenated names suggest, two or more autonomous groups
speaking dialects of the same language have been grouped
together. In fact, most Sidama, although calling themselves
by a single name in some contexts, traditionally are divided
into a number of localized and formerly politically
autonomous patrilineal clans, each under a chief.
The Sidama and other Highland East Cushitic speakers are
cultivators of ensete and of coffee as a cash crop. In areas
below 1,500 meters in elevation, however, the Sidama keep
cattle.
The Sidama and other groups have retained their traditional
religious systems, although some have been responsive to
Protestant missionaries. Others, such as the Alaba, the
Hadya, and the Timbaro, have accepted Islam. Only the
Kembata are converts to Orthodox Christianity.
There are six groups of Central Cushitic (Agew) speakers,
five of which live in the central highlands surrounded by
Amhara. The Bilen in the extreme northern highlands form an
enclave between the Tigray and the Tigre speakers. Agew-
speaking groups total between 100,000 and 125,000 persons.
They are the remnants of a population thought to have been
the inhabitants of much of the central and northern
highlands when Semitic-speaking migrants arrived millennia
ago to begin the process that led to the formation of such
groups as the Tigray and the Amhara. It is likely that Agew
speakers provided much of the basic stock from which the
Amhara and Tigray were drawn.
The largest of the Agew-speaking groups are the Awi (whose
language is Awngi), estimated to number 50,000 in 1970. The
linguistically related but geographically separate Kunfel
numbered no more than 2,000. The Awi and the Qimant,
numbering about 17,000, retain their traditional religious
system; but the Kunfel and the Xamtanga, totaling about
5,000, are apparently Orthodox Christians. The Bilen have
been much influenced by Islam, and many have begun to speak
the Tigre of their Islamic neighbors as a second tongue.
A special case is the Beta Israel (their own name; others
call them Falasha or Kayla), who numbered about 20,000 in
1989, most of whom emigrated to Israel in late 1984 and in
May 1991. Perhaps preceding the arrival of Christianity in
the fourth century A.D., a group of Agew speakers adopted a
form of Judaism, although their organization and many of
their religious practices resemble those of their Orthodox
Christian neighbors. The precise origins and nature of the
Judaic influence are matters of dispute. Most Beta Israel
speak Amharic as a first language. Agew occurs in their
liturgy, but the words are not understood.
Except for the Beta Israel, all Agew-speaking groups are
plow agriculturists (the Kunfel augment their livelihood by
hunting). The Beta Israel had been cultivators until
deprived of their right to hold land after a major conflict
with the Amhara and their refusal to convert to Christianity
in the fifteenth century. They then became craftsmen,
although many later returned to the land as tenants.
The sole group speaking a Northern Cushitic tongue is the
Beja, a Muslim pastoral group that numbered about 20,000 in
1970. (Many more live in neighboring Sudan.) Their language
is influenced by Arabic, and the Beja have come to claim
Arab descent since their conversion to Islam. Like many of
the other nomadic pastoralists in the area, they
traditionally were segmented into tribes and smaller units,
based on actual or putative descent from a common male
ancestor and characterized by considerable autonomy,
although federated under a paramount chief.
******************
Omotic Language Groups
Between the lakes of southern Ethiopia's Great Rift Valley
and the Omo River (in a few cases west of the Omo) live many
groups that speak languages of the Omotic family. As many as
eighty groups have been distinguished, but various sets of
them speak dialects of the same language. Together they were
estimated to number 1,278,100 in 1970. Of these, the Welamo
(often called Wolayta) are the most numerous, estimated to
number more than 500,000 in 1970. Gemu-Gofa is a language
spoken by perhaps forty autonomous groups, estimated at
295,000 in 1970 in the Gemu highlands. Kefa-Mocha, spoken by
an estimated 170,000, is the language of two separate groups
(one, commonly called Mocha, calls itself Shekatcho). Of the
two, Kefa is the larger.
The relatively limited area in which they live, the
diversity of their languages, and other linguistic
considerations suggest that the ancestors of the speakers of
Omotic languages have been in place for many millennia.
Omotic speakers have been influenced linguistically and
otherwise by Nilo-Saharan groups to the west and by East
Cushitic groups surrounding them. As a result of the early
formation of ancestral Omotic-speaking groups, external
influences, and the demands of varied physical and social
environments, the Omotic speakers have developed not only
linguistic diversity but also substantial differences in
other respects. Most Omotic-speaking peoples, for example,
are hoe cultivators, relying on the cultivation of ensete at
higher altitudes and of grains below approximately 1,500
meters. They also practice animal husbandry. Many in the
Gemu highlands are artisans, principally weavers. Their
craftwork has become attractive as the demand for their work
in Addis Ababa and other urban centers has increased. In the
capital these people are commonly called Dorze, although
that is the name of just one of their groups.
Except for the Kefa--long influenced by Orthodox
Christianity--and a small number of Muslims, Omotic speakers
have retained their indigenous religious systems, although a
few have been influenced by European missionaries. Most of
these groups originally had chiefs or kings. Among the
exceptions are larger entities such as the Welamo and the
Kefa, both characterized by centralized political systems
that exacted tribute from neighboring peoples.
*************
Nilo-Saharan Language Groups
In the far southwest and along the country's western border
live several peoples speaking Nilo-Saharan languages. The
most numerous of these are the Nuer and Anuak, both members
of the East Sudanic family. Most Nuer are found in Sudan,
whereas the Anuak live almost entirely in Ethiopia. Most of
these people are hoe cultivators of grains, but many have
cattle. A few, such as the Nuer, are seminomadic.
The Kunema are found in western Tigray. Perhaps because of
the long Italian influence in Eritrea, they have been most
affected by foreign religious influences. Although Orthodox
Christianity had little or no impact on them, the Kunema
often accepted the teachings of Protestant and Roman
Catholic missionaries. Two other groups, the Berta and the
Nara, have been influenced by Islam. Otherwise, these
peoples have retained their traditional religious systems.
Koman speakers consist of several groups who live along the
Ethio-Sudan border in western Welega. Among these little-
known peoples are the Gumuz, who, along with the Berta, are
also called Bani Shangul. In the past, these peoples were
often the object of slave raids by their neighbors in
************
Ethiopia and Sudan.
Sixty to seventy groups scattered throughout Ethiopia
traditionally were on the periphery of local social systems.
Many authorities refer to them as occupational castes.
Characterized by endogamy and also by specialization in one
or more occupations considered unclean or degrading, they
have been excluded from ordinary interaction with members of
the host community, although one group acted as ritual
functionaries for its host. The members of a caste group
typically speak the local language, but some also have a
language of their own or speak a variation on the local one.
They also tend to be physically distinguishable from members
of the host group. Their most common occupational
specialties are woodworking, beekeeping, and ritual
functions. Another group, consisting primarily of hunters,
at one time provided royal guards for the traditional ruler
of one host society.
*****************
Ethnic and Social Relations
Interethnic Relations
Ethnicity in Ethiopia is an enormously complex concept. No
ethnic entity has been untouched by others. Groups in
existence in the twentieth century are biological and social
amalgams of several preexisting entities. The ingredients
are often discernible only by inference, particularly if the
mixing took place long ago. Nonetheless, such mixing led to
the formation of groups that think of themselves and are
considered by others as different. For instance, in the
prerevolutionary period there were thousands of non-Amhara
who had acquired the wherewithal to approximate the life-
style of wealthy Amhara and had in fact gained recognition
as Amhara. Such mixing has continued, and the boundaries of
ethnic groups also continue to change.
Interethnic relations in prerevolutionary Ethiopia did not
conform to a single model and were complex because of the
nature of Amhara contact with other groups and the internal
social and economic dynamics of the groups. Each group
reacted differently to Amhara dominance. What makes this
analysis even more complex is that the Amhara themselves do
not constitute a cohesive group. Indeed, the tendency to see
Ethiopia before (and, by some accounts, after) the
revolution as dominated by Amhara has obscured the
complexity of interethnic relations.
The Amhara are found predominantly in Gojam, Gonder, in
parts of Welo such as Lasta and Wag, and in parts of Shewa
such as Menz. Amhara from one area view those from other
areas as different, and there is a long history of conflicts
among Amhara nobles aspiring to be kings or kingmakers.
Intraprovincial and interprovincial conflict between Amhara
nobles and their followers was quite common. Some aspects of
intra-Amhara friction may be seen in the relations of Shewan
Amhara to other Amhara and to other Ethiopians. Shewan
Amharic speakers are on the southern periphery of the
territory occupied by the Amhara. They made their presence
felt in much of the Shewa region relatively late, except in
areas such as Menz, which had always been Amhara. Thus, the
Shewans over the centuries developed a culture and a society
that emerged from Oromo, Amhara, and perhaps other groups.
Whereas the southern people considered Shewan Orthodox
Christians as Amhara, people from older Amhara areas such as
Gojam and Gonder thought of such persons as Shewans or
sometimes even as Oromo.
During the imperial regime, Amhara dominance led to the
adoption of Amharic as the language of government, commerce,
and education. Other forms of Amhara dominance occurred in
local government, where Amhara served as representatives of
the central government or became landholders.
Reaction to the Amhara varied even within individual ethnic
groups. Some resisted the Amhara bitterly, while others
aided them. In its most extreme form, resistance to Amhara
dominance resulted in enduring separatist movements,
particularly in Eritrea, Tigray, and the Ogaden. The
separatist movement in Eritrea reflects a somewhat different
historical experience from that of other areas of Ethiopia.
Despite Eritrea's seeming unity, ethnic and religious
differences among Eritreans abounded. For example, the
Kunema, a Nilo-Saharan-speaking people who formed an enclave
among Eritrea's Muslims and Christians and who have long
been treated as inferior by some groups that make up the
Eritrean independence movement, historically have provided
an island of support for the central government.
Perhaps the only region to which the Amhara did not bring
their sense of superiority was Tigray, home of the people
who lay claim to the Aksumite heritage. The Amhara did not
come to Tigray as receivers of land grants, and government
administrators were often Tigrayan themselves. Tigray
perspectives on the Amhara were, however, influenced
negatively by a number of historical factors. For example,
the son of the only emperor of Tigray origin to have ruled
Ethiopia, Yohannis IV (reigned 1872-89), was deprived of the
throne by Menelik II, an Amhara. In 1943 the imperial regime
brutally repressed a Tigray rebellion called the Weyane.
Ethiopia's Ogaden region, inhabited primarily by ethnic
Somali, was the scene of a series of Ethiopian-Somali
struggles in 1964, 1977-78, and intermittently after that
until 1987. Somalia supported self-determination for Ogaden
Somali. Although Somalia and Ethiopia signed a joint
communiqu‚ in 1988 to end hostilities, Mogadishu refused to
abandon its claim to the Ogaden. Moreover, in 1989 and 1990,
the Ogaden region was home to about 350,000 Isaaq Somali
from northern Somalia who had escaped persecution by the
regime of Mahammad Siad Barre.
In April 1976, the PMAC promulgated its Program for the
National Democratic Revolution (PNDR), which accepted the
notions of self-determination for nationalities and regional
autonomy. In compliance with the program, the PMAC created
the Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities in
1983 to develop administrative and political proposals to
accommodate all the country's major nationalities. As a
result of the institute's findings, the government expressed
a desire to abolish Ethiopia's fourteen administrative
regions and to create thirty regions, of which five--
Eritrea, Tigray, Aseb, Dire Dawa, and the Ogaden--were to be
autonomous. Eritrean and Tigrayan leaders denounced the plan
as nothing more than an attempt to perpetuate government
control of Eritrea and Tigray. Their military campaigns to
wrest control of the two regions from the Mengistu regime
eventually succeeded.
The PMAC undermined the patterns of ethnic relations
prevailing in imperial Ethiopia and eliminated the basis for
Amhara dominance. However, postrevolutionary Ethiopia
continued to exhibit ethnic tension. Traits based on
ethnicity and religion are deeply ingrained and are not
susceptible to elimination by ideology.
************
Social Relations
Ethiopia's ethnic and cultural diversity has affected
social relations. Most lowland people are geographically and
socially isolated from the highland population. Moreover,
rural inhabitants, who constitute about 89 percent of the
total population, generally live their lives without coming
into contact with outsiders. Exposure to other ethnic groups
usually occurs by means of relatively limited contact with
administrators, tax collectors, and retail merchants. By
contrast, the towns are a mosaic of social and ethnic
diversity. Since the early 1940s, towns fulfilling
administrative and economic functions have proliferated. In
Addis Ababa, it is common for families and groups from
disparate social and economic classes to live side by side.
Only in recent years, with unprecedented urbanization, have
upper-income residential zones emerged. Smaller urban
centers have tended to be fairly homogeneous in ethnic and
religious makeup. But with increasing urbanization, towns
are expected to be the scene of increased interaction among
different ethnic groups and social classes.
Traditionally, among the most important factors in social
relations in Ethiopia has been religion (see Religious Life,
this ch.). Ethiopian emperors nurtured the country's
identity with Christianity, although there were at least as
many Muslims as Christians in the country. Although the
imperial regime did not impose Orthodox Christianity on
Muslims and pagans, very few non-Christians held high
positions in government and the military. In many cases,
Muslims gravitated to commerce and trade, occupations
relatively untainted by religious discrimination.
The Mengistu regime downplayed the role of religion in the
state's life and disestablished the Ethiopian Orthodox
Church. Moreover, the 1987 constitution guaranteed freedom
of religion. In principle, all religions had equal status in
relation to the state.
Muslims live throughout Ethiopia, but large concentrations
can be found in Bale, Eritrea, Harerge, and Welo. Muslims
also belong to many ethnic groups, a factor that may prevent
them from exerting political influence commensurate with
their numbers. Centuries of conflict between the Christian
kingdom and its Muslim antagonists, recent apprehensions
about Arab nationalism, and Arab support for Eritrean
separatism and Somali irredentism all continue to perpetuate
Ethiopian historical fears of "Islamic encirclement." Such
historically rooted religious antagonism has persisted in
creating a social barrier between Christians and Muslims.
Those who profess traditional religious beliefs are
interspersed among Christians and Muslims. Such groups
include the Sidama, the Gurage, the Oromo of Arsi and
Borana, and the Nilotic groups along the Ethiopia-Sudan
border. They have no political influence and are scorned
socially by Muslims and Christians.
The existence of more than seventy languages has been
another barrier to social communication and national
integration. The imperial government, recognizing the
importance of a national language, adopted Amharic as the
official tongue. The use of Amharic became mandatory in
government, education, radiobroadcasts, and newspapers. But
the government's promotion of Amharic entailed the
suppression of other major languages, which aroused
opposition and accusations of cultural imperialism. Language
policy changed under the Mengistu regime, which attempted to
reverse the trend by dropping Amharic as a requirement in
schools for non-Amharic speakers. The new policy recognized
several languages widely spoken in specific areas--such as
Oromo, Tigrinya, Welamo, and Somali--for use in schools at
the lower levels (see Primary and Secondary Education since
1975, this ch.). Addis Ababa also authorized the use of the
five languages mentioned above, as well as Afar, in
radiobroadcasts and literacy campaigns. Nevertheless,
Amharic remained the language of government, and anyone who
aspired to a national role had to learn to speak and write
Amharic.
The most preferred occupations traditionally have been in
government, the military, the clergy, and farming, with
commerce and trade considered less important and
consequently usually left to Muslims and foreigners. All
major Ethiopian ethnic units include hereditary groups of
artisans and craftsmen. Their occupations historically have
been held in low esteem by the dominant groups. Prior to
1974, artisans and craftsmen could not own land or hold
political office and could not participate in local meetings
or assemblies. Dominant groups in their respective areas
generally treated them as subjects.
Social status in Ethiopia during the centuries of imperial
rule depended on one's landholdings, which provided the
basis for class formation and social stratification. The
emperor, the nobility, and landlords occupied the social
hierarchy's highest positions. Under them were smallholding
farmers, followed by millions of landless peasants who
cultivated rented land. In the twentieth century, most of
the southern landlord class consisted of Christian settlers
from the north, whereas the tenants were mostly non-
Christians and natives of the area. Thus, ethnic and
cultural differences exacerbated class distinctions, which,
in turn, adversely affected social relations (see Rural
Society, this ch.).
With the dissolution of the imperial system and the
nationalization of urban and rural land, social
stratification and community relations based on landholding
largely disappeared. The military regime wanted to create a
classless society, but the social hierarchy based on
landholdings simply was replaced by one based on political
power and influence. National and regional party members,
government ministers, military officers, and senior civil
servants had enormous political sway and enjoyed the
economic perquisites that the nobility and landlords once
possessed.
After Ethiopia's liberation from Italian occupation in
1941, education played an important role in social relations
by creating a "new nobility" and a middle class whose
position and status were largely independent of
landownership. This new group consisted of educated children
of the nobility, commoners who had achieved distinction for
their loyalty to the emperor, and others with advanced
education whose skills were needed to modernize the
bureaucracy and military. The postwar education system, the
new government bureaucracy, and the modern sector of the
economy also encouraged the growth of a middle class
employed in the public and private sectors. Members of the
small educated class that filled the bureaucracy and the
professions during the postwar imperial period by and large
retained their positions under Mengistu, although many left
the country because of disenchantment with his regime.
The educated group was generally less attached to religion
and tradition than was the rest of Ethiopian society.
Members' education, income, occupation, and urban life-style
likewise set them apart. They had more in common with
educated people from other ethnic groups and frequently
married across ethnic lines, although rarely across
religious lines. Nevertheless, in the last decade or so
before the 1974 revolution, some younger and better-educated
non-Amhara expressed continued, even heightened, ethnic
awareness through membership in urban-based self-help
associations, which the Mengistu regime later banned.
Although this educated group played a vital role in the
emperor's downfall, it had little influence on the military
government.
Many of the PMAC's policies were perceived as inimical to
the interests of major ethnic and class groups. Despite the
regime's tentative efforts--such as land reform--to defuse
some longstanding grievances, opposition based on ethnic,
religious, and class interests continued
*************
Social System
Rural areas, which contain an estimated 89 percent of the
population, make up most of the country; it is the urban
centers, however, that generate most of the country's
political, administrative, cultural, and commercial
activities. The towns and cities are also home to a variety
of people forced to live on the margins of society by the
Mengistu regime--absentee landlords whose rural lands and
urban property had been confiscated by the state, as well as
erstwhile activists who had aspired to genuine democratic
reforms and had seen their hopes dashed.
Prior to the 1974 revolution, most Ethiopians conducted
their daily lives in accordance with norms peculiar to each
community or region. Ethnic groups characterized by common
features of social organization and values were, on closer
examination, actually quite diverse. As important as local
structures were, the societies they characterized were not
autonomous. Those that came closest to self-sufficiency were
the eastern nomads. In the inaccessible and inhospitable
areas inhabited by these groups, representatives of the
central government were scarce. Elsewhere, each community
was bound to a region and through it to the imperial center
by layers of social and political strata. Binding these
strata together even tighter was a complex system of land
rights.
Modifications introduced after World War II, particularly
with respect to land rights, had little effect on the
essential characteristics of the social order. The regime
that took power in 1974 attempted to replace the old rural
order with a new one based on the principle that land should
be distributed equitably. Even though most rural areas
supported the government's efforts to bring about such a
change, the ultimate shape of the social and economic order
remained uncertain as the 1990s began.
**************
Rural Society
Political scientist John Markakis has observed, "The social
structure of traditional Amhara-Tigray society [represented]
the classic trinity of noble, priest, and peasant. These
groups [were] distinguished not only through the division of
labor, distinct social status, and a clear awareness of such
distinctions expressed and justified in ideological terms,
but also through differences in their relationships to the
only means of production: land." In the northern highlands,
land was usually held by the kin group, the state, and the
church and, through each of these, by individuals. Private
ownership in the Western sense came later and was abolished
in 1975.
Anthropologist Allan Hoben is considered to have made the
most thorough analysis of Amhara land tenure and its
relation to social structure. According to his findings, the
cognatic descent group (see Glossary), comprising men and
women believed to be descended from a common ancestor
through both males and females, ultimately held a block of
land. As in cognatic descent systems elsewhere, men and
women could belong to several such landholding groups. The
descent group and each of its segments had a representative
who looked after its collective interests. This agent, the
respected elders, and politically influential members of the
group or its segments acted in disputes over rights to land.
The land was called rist (see Glossary) land, and the rights
held or claimed in it were rist rights. An Amhara had claims
not to a specific piece of land but to a portion of it
administered by the descent group or a segment of this
group. The person holding such rights was called ristegna.
In principle, rist rights guaranteed security of tenure.
Litigation over such rights was common, however. Most
northern highland peasants held at least some rist land, but
some members of pariah groups and others were tenants.
Peasants were subject to claims for taxes and labor from
those above them, including the church. The common term for
peasant, derived from the word for tribute, was gebbar.
Taxes and fees were comprehensive, multiple, and burdensome.
In addition, the peasant had to provide labor to a hierarchy
of officials for a variety of tasks. It was only after World
War II that administrative and fiscal reforms ended many of
these exactions.
The state exercised another set of rights over land,
including land held in rist. The emperor was the ultimate
and often immediate arbiter of such rights, called gult (see
Glossary) rights, and the recipient was called gultegna.
There was considerable variation in the content and duration
of the gult rights bestowed on any person.
Gult rights were the typical form of compensation for an
official until the government instituted salaries in the
period after World War II. Many gult grants were for life,
or were hereditary, and did not depend on the performance of
official duties. The grants served to bind members of noble
families and the local gentry to the emperor.
The emperor also granted hereditary possession (rist gult)
of state land to members of the higher nobility or the royal
family. Peasants on such land became tenants of the grantee
and paid rent in addition to the usual taxes and fees.
Lieutenants who shared in the tribute represented the
absentee landlords.
Those who benefited from the allocation of gult rights
included members of the royal family (masafint, or princes),
the nobility (makuannent), the local gentry, low-level
administrators, and persons with local influence. Until the
twentieth century, the chief duties of the makuannent were
administrative and military. Membership in the makuannent
was not fixed, and local gentry who proved able and loyal
often assumed higher office and were elevated to the
nobility. It was possible for a commoner to become a noble
and for the son of a noble--even one with a hereditary
title--to lose status and wealth unless he demonstrated
military or other capabilities. Although there was a gap in
living standards between peasant and noble, cultural
differences were not profound. Consequently, the Amhara and
Tigray lacked the notion of a hereditary class of nobles.
Although it is possible to divide the Amhara and Tigray
populations of the late nineteenth and much of the twentieth
centuries in terms of rank, social status, power, and
wealth, those who fell into various categories did not
necessarily constitute distinct strata.
The pattern of land allocation in the southern territories
incorporated into the empire by Menelik II differed in
important ways from the pattern in the north. Moreover, the
consequences of allocation and the administrative regime
imposed by Menelik II and Haile Selassie varied, depending
on the way in which particular ethnic groups or regions
became subject to Ethiopian rule, on the nature of the
preexisting sociopolitical structure, and on the territory's
economic appeal.
Supposedly, the government divided conquered land in the
south on the one-third (siso) principle, by which two-thirds
went to the state and the remainder to the indigenous
population. In fact, the proportion of the land taken by the
state ranged from virtually none to more than two-thirds. In
areas such as Jima, which had capitulated to Menelik II
without resistance, the state took no occupied land,
although it later took over unoccupied land and granted much
of it to leading imperial officials. Other northerners,
attracted by the coffee-growing potential of the Jima area,
bought land in that region. In areas inhabited by nomads,
all the land was state land, little was granted, and the
pastoralists used it as before.
The government allocated state-held land to a variety of
claimants. The emperor retained a substantial portion of the
most fertile land. Churches also received large amounts of
land in the south as northern governors implemented the
imperial policy of establishing Orthodox Christian churches
in conquered territory and as northern clergy came in
numbers to serve them. Each church received samon grants,
according to which the church held the rights to tribute in
perpetuity, and the tribute from those working the land went
solely to the support of the church (or local monastery). No
part of it went through the secular hierarchy to the
emperor. The nobility, including the leaders of Menelik's
conquering armies (many of whom became governors in the
south), received rist gult rights over large areas occupied
by peasants. Rist gult holders, secure in their rights,
allocated land rights of various kinds to kinsmen and
retainers. The government granted rist gult rights over
smaller parcels of land to officials at any level for loyal
service. Remaining land was divided between the indigenous
population and traditional leaders (balabats--see Glossary),
who acquired some of the best land. People who had been on
the land thus became tenants (gebbars).
Peasants from the north went south as soldiers and
settlers. If the soldiers and their heirs continued to
perform military or other service, they received land that
remained in the family. If they arrived as settlers, the
government gave them small parcels of land or allowed them
to buy land from the state at low cost. Such land,
unencumbered by the residual rights of a kin group but
requiring the payment of state taxes, was thus held in an
arrangement much like that applied to freehold land.
Generally, settlers were armed and were expected to support
local officials with force.
Most of the southern population consisted of indigenous
peoples, largely deprived of the rights they had held under
local systems. They, like Amhara and Tigray peasants, were
called gebbars, but they held no rist land and therefore had
little security of tenure. The situation of the southern
gebbars depended on the rights granted by the state over the
land on which they lived. Those working land granted to a
minor official paid tribute through him. If the land
reverted to state control, the gebbar became a tributary of
the state. As salaries for officials became the rule after
World War II, the land that formerly served as compensation
in lieu of salary was granted in permanent possession (in
effect, became freehold land) to those holding contingent
rights or to others. In these circumstances, the gebbars
became tenants.
The basis of southern social stratification was, as in the
north, the allocation of political office and rights in land
by the emperor. The method of allocating rights in land and
of appointing government officials in the south gave rise to
a structure of status, power, and wealth that differed from
the arrangement in the north and from the earlier forms of
sociopolitical organization in the area. Those appointed as
government officials in the south were northerners--mainly
Amhara, Tigray, and educated Oromo--virtually all of whom
were Orthodox Christians who spoke Amharic. This meant that
social stratification coincided with ethnicity. However, the
path to social mobility and higher status, as in the north,
was education and migration to urban areas.
In 1966, under growing domestic pressure for land reform,
the imperial government abolished rist gult in the north and
south and siso gult in the south. Under the new system, the
gultegna and the gebbar paid taxes to the state. In effect,
this established rights of private ownership. The abolition
of rist gult left the northern Amhara and Tigray peasant a
rist holder, still dependent on the cognatic descent group
to verify his rights to rist land. But at least he was
formally freed of obligations to the gult holder.
Typically, the landholders and many northern provincial
officials came from families with at least several
generations of status, wealth, and power in the province--
situations they owed not to Menelik II or to Haile Selassie
but to earlier emperors or to great provincial lords. These
nobles had some claim to the peasants' loyalty, inasmuch as
all belonged to the same ethnic group and shared the same
values. Peasants often saw attacks on the northern nobility
as challenges to the entire system of which they were a
part, including their right to rist land.
By contrast, whether or not they were descended from the
older nobility, southern landholders were more dependent on
the central government for their status and power. They were
confronted with an ethnically different peasantry and lacked
a base in the culture and society of the locality in which
they held land.
In 1975 the revolution succeeded in eliminating the
nobility and landlord classes. Those individual group
members who avoided being killed, exiled, or politically
isolated were able to do so because they had in some way
already modified or surrendered their rights and privileges.
Land reform affected huge numbers of people throughout
Ethiopia. However, there were regional differences in its
execution. Peasant associations carried out land
redistribution in the south, motivated not only by economic
need but also by their antipathy toward the landlords. In
the north, the government preserved rist tenure, and the
peasant associations concerned themselves mainly with
litigation over rist rights. Moreover, northern peasants
were not driven by the ethnic and class hatred
characteristic of southern peasants.
The 1975 Peasant Associations Organization and
Consolidation Proclamation granted local self-government to
peasant associations. Subsequently, peasant associations
established judicial tribunals to deal with certain criminal
and civil cases, including those involving violations of
association regulations. Armed units, known as peasant
defense squads, enforced decisions. Additionally, peasant
associations had economic powers, including the right to
establish service cooperatives as a prelude to collective
ownership (although there was little peasant enthusiasm for
the latter). The revolutionary government also established a
hierarchy of administrative and development committees in
districts, regions, and subregions to coordinate the work of
the bodies at each administrative level. The Workers' Party
of Ethiopia (WPE) later supplemented the work of these
committees. Only a few officials spoke for peasants at the
district and subregional levels, and rarely, if at all, were
peasants represented in regional organizations, where
civilians and military members of the central government
were in control (see Peasant Associations, ch. 4).
**************
Urban Society
After World War II, towns, commerce, and bureaucracy
gradually became more significant in Ethiopia. Except for
Addis Ababa and some Red Sea ports, towns were small, and
urbanization had proceeded more slowly than in many other
African countries. City and town life had not been a feature
of Ethiopian society, and trade was not a full-time
occupation for Ethiopians except for itinerant Muslims and
Arabized peoples on the Red Sea coast. Manufacturing had
arrived only recently, and the role of Ethiopians, except as
unskilled laborers, was minimal. Ownership and management,
with relatively few exceptions, were in the hands of
foreigners.
Most Ethiopians who entered into occupations not associated
with the land or with traditional methods of administration
worked for the central government, which had expanded to
bring Ethiopia under the emperor's control, to provide
essential services, and to generate economic development.
During the 1940s, Ethiopia's few educated persons, who
usually came from families of the nobility and gentry,
joined the government.
Beginning in the 1950s, relatively younger Ethiopians with
higher education developed hopes and expectations for
democratic institutions. Still small in number, perhaps
7,000 to 8,000 by 1970, they were more ethnically varied in
origin than the older educated group, although Amhara and
Tigray were still represented disproportionately (as they
were even among secondary school graduates). These would-be
reformers were frequently frustrated by the older ways of
the senior officials, who were dependent on Haile Selassie
and beholden to him. Nevertheless, sustained opposition to
the regime did not occur, largely because even middle- and
lower-level government employees were better off than the
peasants, small traders, and some of the gentry.
Small traders and craftsmen, below educated government
workers in income and status, had little influence on the
government, which tended to encourage larger-scale capital-
intensive ventures typically requiring foreign investment
and management. Although an increasing number of Christians
were involved in commercial activities, small traders
remained largely a Muslim group. Skilled craftsmen who were
not of the traditional pariah groups often belonged to small
ethnic groups, such as the weavers (often called Dorze) of
Gamo Gofa.
At the bottom of the urban social scale were workers of
varied ethnic origins, generally unskilled in a labor market
crowded with unskilled workers ready to replace them.
Neither government policy, the weak labor unions, nor the
condition of the labor market gave them social or political
leverage. By the late 1960s, inflation and a lack of jobs
for university and secondary school graduates intensified
disgruntlement. Urban-based agitation by students, labor,
and the military eventually toppled the imperial regime.
Those who had served in senior positions in the imperial
government and the military establishment were dismissed,
imprisoned, executed, or they fled the country. The
survivors of the old social structure were younger persons
in government service: bureaucrats, teachers, and
technicians. Some benefited from the nationalization of
private enterprises and expansion of the government
apparatus, filling posts held by senior officials or foreign
specialists before the revolution. But this group was
excluded from power, and some became militant opponents of
the new regime's radical policies.
The position of the middle class--traders and artisans--
varied. Generally, the status of Muslim traders rose after
the new regime disestablished the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.
As economic conditions worsened and consumer goods became
scarce, however, traders became scapegoats and subject to
violent attacks.
Notwithstanding allusions to the proletariat's
revolutionary role, the urban working class--mainly in Addis
Ababa and its environs--gained neither status nor power. The
military government replaced the Confederation of Ethiopian
Labor Unions (CELU) with the All-Ethiopia Trade Union (AETU)
when the CELU leadership started opposing the direction of
the revolution. The AETU focused its activities on
supporting the government policy of emphasizing production
rather than on advancing worker rights. The AETU--unlike the
CELU--was a hierarchy rather than a confederation; unions at
the base accepted policy decisions made at higher levels. In
the next few years, the government had difficulty enforcing
this policy. Deteriorating economic conditions caused
strikes and demonstrations. In addition, violence often
broke out between workers and government officials (see
Labor Unions, ch. 3).
The urban equivalents of the peasant associations were the
kebeles (see Kebeles, ch. 4). Initially, mid- and lower-
level bureaucrats were elected to posts in these
associations, but the military government soon purged them
for opposing the revolutionary regime. New laws excluded
from elective office for one year those who had owned rental
property and members of their households. Thus, not only
were the wealthy excluded from participation, but also many
middle-class investors who had built and rented low-cost
housing and who were far from rich were excluded as well.
This exclusion also deprived many students and other young
people of a role in the kebeles. Those who worked full time
away from the neighborhood tended to be unwilling to take on
kebele positions. Partly by default and partly with the
PMAC's encouragement, elections in 1976 filled kebeles posts
with (in the words of John Markakis and Nega Ayele) "persons
of dubious character, indeterminate occupation, busybodies
and opportunists of all sorts . . . . Militia units
[attached to the urban associations] charged with local
security mustered the perennially unemployed, the shiftless
and hangers-on, young toughs and delinquents, who were
instantly transformed into revolutionary proletarian
fighters." These individuals perpetrated crimes against
people they disliked or disagreed with.
The kebeles engaged in some of the revolution's most brutal
bloodletting. Increasing criticism eventually forced the
regime to restrain them. After the populace recognized the
PMAC's permanence, more people participated in kebele
administration. By 1990 the kebeles were part of the grass-
roots WPE organization.
****************
The Role of Women
There have been few studies concerning women in Ethiopia,
but many observers have commented on the physical hardship
that Ethiopian women experience throughout their lives. Such
hardship involves carrying loads over long distances,
grinding corn manually, working in the homestead, raising
children, and cooking. Ethiopian women traditionally have
suffered sociocultural and economic discrimination and have
had fewer opportunities than men for personal growth,
education, and employment. Even the civil code affirmed the
woman's inferior position, and such rights as ownership of
property and inheritance varied from one ethnic group to
another.
As in other traditional societies, a woman's worth is
measured in terms of her role as a mother and wife. Over 85
percent of Ethiopian women reside in rural areas, where
peasant families are engaged primarily in subsistence
agriculture. Rural women are integrated into the rural
economy, which is basically labor intensive and which exacts
a heavy physical toll on all, including children. The
revolution had little impact on the lives of rural women.
Land reform did not change their subordinate status, which
was based on deep-rooted traditional values and beliefs. An
improvement in economic conditions would improve the
standard of living of women, but real change would require a
transformation of the attitudes of governments and men
regarding women.
There have been some changes for women in urban areas,
where education, health care, and employment outside the
home have become more available. Although a few women with
higher education have found professional employment, most
hold low-paying jobs. About 40 percent of employed women in
urban areas worked in the service sector, mainly in hotels,
restaurants, and bars, according to a 1976 government
survey. Employment in production and related areas (such as
textiles and food processing) accounted for 25 percent of
the female work force, followed by sales, which accounted
for about 11 percent. The survey also showed that women
factory workers in Addis Ababa earned about a quarter of the
wages men earned for the same type of work. These
differences existed despite a 1975 proclamation stipulating
equal pay for equal work for men and women.
Following the revolution, women made some gains in economic
and political areas. The Revolutionary Ethiopia Women's
Association (REWA), which claimed a membership of over 5
million, took an active part in educating women. It
encouraged the creation of women's organizations in
factories, local associations, and in the civil service.
Some women participated in local organizations and in
peasant associations and kebeles. However, the role of women
was limited at the national level. In 1984, for example, the
government selected only one woman as a full member of the
Central Committee of the WPE. Of the 2,000 delegates who
attended the WPE's inaugural congress in 1984, only 6
percent were women.
On a more positive note, the Mengistu regime could claim
success in increasing literacy among women (see Literacy,
this ch.). The enrollment of women in primary and secondary
schools increased from about 32 percent in 1974/75 to 39
percent in 1985/86, although the rate of enrollment of urban
women far exceeded the rate for rural women.
*************
Religious Life
The 1955 constitution stated, "The Ethiopian Orthodox
Church, founded in the fourth century on the doctrines of
Saint Mark, is the established church of the Empire and is,
as such, supported by the state." The church was the bulwark
of the state and the monarchy and became an element in the
ethnic identity of the dominant Amhara and Tigray. By
contrast, Islam spread among ethnically diverse and
geographically dispersed groups at different times and
therefore failed to provide the same degree of political
unity to its adherents. Traditional belief systems were
strongest in the lowland regions, but elements of such
systems characterized much of the popular religion of
Christians and Muslims as well. Beliefs and rituals varied
widely, but fear of the evil eye, for example, was
widespread among followers of all religions.
Officially, the imperial regime tolerated Muslims. For
example, the government retained Muslim courts, which dealt
with family and personal law according to Islamic law.
However, the imperial authorities gradually took over Muslim
schools and discouraged the teaching of Arabic.
Additionally, the behavior of Amhara administrators in local
communities and the general pattern of Christian dominance
tended to alienate Muslims.
The revolution brought a major change in the official
status of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and other religions.
In 1975 the Mengistu regime disestablished the church, which
was a substantial landholder during the imperial era, and
early the next year removed its patriarch. The PMAC declared
that all religions were equal, and a number of Muslim holy
days became official holidays in addition to the Christian
holidays already honored. Despite these changes, divisions
between Muslims and Christians persisted.
******************
Demography and Geography of Religious Affiliation
Statistical data on religious affiliation, like those on
ethnic groups, are unreliable. Most Orthodox Christians are
Amhara and Tigray, two groups that together constitute more
than 40 percent of the population. When members of these two
groups are combined with others who have accepted Orthodoxy,
the total Christian population might come to roughly 50
percent of all Ethiopians.
Muslims have been estimated to constitute 40 percent of the
population. The largest ethnic group associated with Islam
is the Somali. Several other much smaller Islamic groups
include the Afar, Argobba, Hareri, Saho, and most Tigre-
speaking groups in northern Eritrea (see Ethiopia's Peoples,
this ch.). Oromo also constitute a large proportion of the
total Muslim population. There are also Muslims in other
important ethnic categories, e.g., the Sidamo speakers and
the Gurage. In the far north and the east, and to some
extent in the south, Islamic peoples surround Orthodox
Christians.
The only people (variously estimated at 5 to 15 percent of
the population) who have had little if any contact with
Orthodox Christianity or Islam live in the far south and the
west. Included among adherents of indigenous religions are
most of those speaking Nilo-Saharan languages and many of
those speaking Omotic and Cushitic, including sections of
the Oromo, such as the pastoral Borana. It is among these
peoples that the few converts to missionary Christianity--
Protestant and Roman Catholic--are to be found.
******************
Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity
John Markakis has remarked of Ethiopia that "the dominant
element in this culture and its major distinguishing feature
is the Christian religion." Yet almost all of the analysis
of Orthodox Christianity as practiced by Ethiopians has
focused on the Amhara and Tigray. The meaning of that
religion for the Oromo and others is not clear. For some
Oromo who achieved significant political power in Amhara
kingdoms in the eighteenth century and after, adherence to
Christianity seemed to be motivated by nothing more than
expediency.
By the mid-twentieth century, some educated Amhara and
Tigray had developed skepticism, not so much of doctrine--
although that also occurred--as of the church's political
and economic role. They had developed similar feelings
toward the clergy, most of whom were poorly educated.
Nevertheless, the effects of the church's disestablishment
and of the continuing social upheaval and political
repression impelled many Ethiopians to turn to religion for
solace.
************
Organization of the Church and the Clergy
The Ethiopian Orthodox Church's headquarters was in Addis
Ababa. The boundaries of the dioceses, each under a bishop,
followed provincial boundaries; a patriarch (abun) headed
the church. The ultimate authority in matters of faith was
the Episcopal Synod. In addition, the Church Council, a
consultative body that included clergy and laity, reviewed
and drafted administrative policy.
Beginning in 1950, the choice of the abun passed from the
Coptic Church of Egypt in Alexandria to the Episcopal Synod
in Addis Ababa. When Abuna Tewoflos was ousted by the
government in 1976, the church announced that nominees for
patriarch would be chosen from a pool of bishops and monks--
archbishops were disqualified--and that the successful
candidate would be chosen on the basis of a vote by clergy
and laity. The new abun was a fifty-eight-year-old monk who
took the name of Tekla Haimanot, after a fourteenth-century
Ethiopian saint.
From the Christian peasant's point of view, the important
church figures are the local clergy. The priest has the most
significant role. An estimated 10 to 20 percent of adult
male Amhara and Tigray were priests in the 1960s--a not
extraordinary figure, considering that there were 17,000 to
18,000 churches and that the celebration of the Eucharist
required the participation of at least two priests and three
deacons, and frequently included more. Large churches had as
many as 100 priests; one was said to have 500.
There are several categories of clergy, collectively
referred to as the kahinat (priests, deacons, and some
monks) and the debteras (priests who have lost their
ordination because they are no longer ritually pure, or
individuals who have chosen not to enter the priesthood). A
boy between the ages of seven and ten who wishes to become a
deacon joins a church school and lives with his teacher--a
priest or debtera who has achieved a specified level of
learning--and fellow students near a church. After about
four years of study, the diocesan bishop ordains him a
deacon.
After three or four years of service and additional study,
a deacon can apply to be ordained a priest. Before doing so,
he has to commit himself to celibacy or else get married.
Divorce and remarriage or adultery result in a loss of
ritual purity and loss of one's ordination.
A priest's chief duty is to celebrate the Eucharist, a task
to which he is assigned for a fixed period of weeks or
months each year. He also officiates at baptisms and funeral
services and attends the feasts (provided by laymen)
associated with these and other events. His second important
task is to act as confessor, usually by arrangement with
specific families.
Most priests come from the peasantry, and their education
is limited to what they acquire during their training for
the diaconate and in the relatively short period thereafter.
They are, however, ranked according to their learning, and
some acquire far more religious knowledge than others.
Debteras often have a wider range of learning and skills
than what is required for a priest. Debteras act as
choristers, poets, herbalists, astrologers, fortune-tellers,
and scribes (for those who cannot read).
Some monks are laymen, usually widowers, who have devoted
themselves to a pious life. Other monks undertake a celibate
life while young and commit themselves to advanced religious
education. Both kinds of monks might lead a hermit's life,
but many educated monks are associated with the great
monastic centers, which traditionally were the sources of
doctrinal innovation or dispute that had sometimes riven the
Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Nuns are relatively few, usually
older women who perform largely domestic tasks in the
churches.
***************
Faith and Practice
The faith and practice of most Orthodox Christians combine
elements from Monophysite Christianity as it has developed
in Ethiopia over the centuries and from a non-Christian
heritage rejected by more educated church members but
usually shared by the ordinary priest. According to
Monophysite doctrine, Christ is a divine aspect of the
trinitarian God. Broadly, the Christian elements are God (in
Amharic, Egziabher), the angels, and the saints. A hierarchy
of angelic messengers and saints conveys the prayers of the
faithful to God and carries out the divine will. When an
Ethiopian Christian is in difficulty, he or she appeals to
these angels and saints as well as to God. In more formal
and regular rituals, priests communicate on behalf of the
community, and only priests may enter the inner sanctum of
the usually circular or octagonal church where the ark
(tabot) dedicated to the church's patron saint is housed. On
important religious holidays, the ark is carried on the head
of a priest and escorted in procession outside the church.
The ark, not the church, is consecrated. Only those who feel
pure, have fasted regularly, and have generally conducted
themselves properly may enter the middle ring to take
communion. At many services, most parish members remain in
the outer ring, where debteras sing hymns and dance.
Weekly services constitute only a small part of an
Ethiopian Orthodox Christian's religious observance. Several
holy days require prolonged services, singing and dancing,
and feasting. An important religious requirement, however,
is the keeping of fast days. Only the clergy and the very
devout maintain the full schedule of fasts, comprising 250
days, but the laity is expected to fast 165 days per year,
including every Wednesday and Friday and the two months that
include Lent and the Easter season.
In addition to standard holy days, most Christians observe
many saint's days. A man might give a small feast on his
personal saint's day. The local voluntary association
(called the maheber) connected with each church honors its
patron saint with a special service and a feast two or three
times a year.
Belief in the existence of active spirits--many malevolent,
some benevolent--is widespread among Ethiopians, whether
Christian, Muslim, or pagan. The spirits called zar can be
male or female and have a variety of personality traits.
Many peasants believe they can prevent misfortune by
propitiating the zar.
The protective adbar spirits belong to the community rather
than to the individual or family. The female adbar is
thought to protect the community from disease, misfortune,
and poverty, while the male adbar is said to prevent
fighting, feuds, and war and to bring good harvests. People
normally pay tribute to the adbars in the form of honey,
grains, and butter.
Myths connected with the evil eye (buda) vary, but most
people believe that the power rests with members of lowly
occupational groups who interact with Amhara communities but
are not part of them. To prevent the effects of the evil
eye, people wear amulets or invoke God's name. Because one
can never be sure of the source of illness or misfortune,
the peasant has recourse to wizards who can make diagnoses
and specify cures. Debteras also make amulets
and charms
designed to ward off satanic creatures.
The belief system, Christian and other, of peasant and
priest was consonant with the prerevolutionary social order
in its stress on hierarchy and order. The long-range effects
on this belief system of a Marxist-Leninist regime that
ostensibly intended to destroy the old social order were
difficult to evaluate in mid-1991. Even though the regime
introduced some change in the organization of the church and
clergy, it was not likely that the regime had succeeded in
significantly modifying the beliefs of ordinary Christians.
**********
Islam
Basic Teachings of Islam
Islam is a system of religious beliefs and an all-
encompassing way of life. Muslims believe that God (Allah)
revealed to the Prophet Muhammad the rules governing society
and the proper conduct of society's members. Therefore, it
is incumbent on the individual to live in a manner
prescribed by the revealed law and incumbent on the
community to build the perfect human society on earth
according to holy injunctions. Islam recognizes no
distinctions between church and state. The distinction
between religious and secular law is a recent development
that reflects the more pronounced role of the state in
society and of Western economic and cultural penetration.
Religion has a greater impact on daily life in Muslim
countries than it has had in the largely Christian West
since the Middle Ages.
Islam came to Ethiopia by way of the Arabian Peninsula,
where in A.D. 610, Muhammad--a merchant of the Hashimite
branch of the ruling Quraysh tribe in the Arabian town of
Mecca--began to preach the first of a series of revelations
he said had been granted him by God through the angel
Gabriel. A fervent monotheist, Muhammad denounced the
polytheism of his fellow Meccans. Because the town's economy
was based in part on a thriving pilgrimage business to the
shrine called the Kaaba and to numerous other pagan
religious sites in the area, Muhammad's censure earned him
the enmity of the town's leaders. In 622 he and a group of
followers accepted an invitation to settle in the town of
Yathrib, later known as Medina (the city), because it was
the center of Muhammad's activities. The move, or hijra,
known in the West as the hegira, marks the beginning of the
Islamic era and of Islam as a force in history; indeed, the
Muslim calendar begins in 622. In Medina, Muhammad continued
to preach, and he eventually defeated his detractors in
battle. He consolidated the temporal and the spiritual
leadership in his person before his death in 632. After
Muhammad's death, his followers compiled those of his words
regarded as coming directly from God into the Quran, the
holy scriptures of Islam. Others of his sayings and
teachings, recalled by those who had known him, became the
hadith. The precedent of Muhammad's personal behavior is
called the sunna. Together, these works form a comprehensive
guide to the spiritual, ethical, and social life of the
orthodox Sunni Muslim.
The duties of Muslims form the five pillars of Islam, which
set forth the acts necessary to demonstrate and reinforce
the faith. These are the recitation of the shahada ("There
is no god but God [Allah], and Muhammad is his prophet."),
salat (daily prayer), zakat (almsgiving), sawm (fasting),
and hajj (pilgrimage). The believer is to pray in a
prescribed manner after purification through ritual
ablutions each day at dawn, midday, midafternoon, sunset,
and nightfall. Prescribed genuflections and prostrations
accompany the prayers, which the worshiper recites facing
toward Mecca. Whenever possible, men pray in congregation at
the mosque with an imam, or prayer leader, and on Fridays
they make a special effort to do so. The Friday noon prayers
provide the occasion for weekly sermons by religious
leaders. Women may also attend public worship at the mosque,
where they are segregated from the men, although women
usually pray at home. A special functionary, the muezzin,
intones a call to prayer to the entire community at the
appropriate hour. Those out of earshot determine the time by
the position of the sun.
The ninth month of the Muslim calendar is Ramadan, a
period of obligatory fasting in commemoration of Muhammad's
receipt of God's revelation. Throughout the month, all but
the sick and weak, pregnant or lactating women, soldiers on
duty, travelers on necessary journeys, and young children
are enjoined from eating, drinking, smoking, or sexual
intercourse during the daylight hours. Those adults who are
excused are obliged to endure an equivalent fast at their
earliest opportunity. A festive meal breaks the daily fast
and inaugurates a night of feasting and celebration. The
pious well-to-do usually perform little or no work during
this period, and some businesses close for all or part of
the day. Because the months of the lunar year revolve
through the solar year, Ramadan falls at various seasons in
different years. A considerable test of discipline at any
time of the year, a fast that falls in summertime imposes
severe hardship on those who must do physical work.
All Muslims, at least once in their lifetimes, are strongly
encouraged to make the hajj to Mecca to participate in
special rites held there during the twelfth month of the
lunar calendar. Muhammad instituted this requirement,
modifying pre-Islamic custom, to emphasize sites associated
with God and Abraham (Ibrahim), considered the founder of
monotheism and father of the Arabs through his son Ismail.
Other tenets of the Muslim faith include the jihad (holy
war), and the requirement to do good works and to avoid all
evil thoughts, words, and deeds. In addition, Muslims agree
on certain basic principles of faith based on the teachings
of the Prophet Muhammad: there is one God, who is a unitary
divine being, in contrast to the trinitarian belief of
Christians; Muhammad, the last of a line of prophets
beginning with Abraham and including Moses (Musa) and Jesus
(Isa), was chosen by God to present His message to humanity;
and there is to be a general resurrection on the last, or
judgment, day.
During his lifetime, Muhammad was spiritual and temporal
leader of the Muslim community. Religious and secular law
merged, and all Muslims traditionally have been subject to
sharia, or religious law. A comprehensive legal system,
sharia developed gradually through the first four centuries
of the Islamic era, primarily through the accretion of
interpretations and precedents set by various judges and
scholars.
After Muhammad's death, Muslim community leaders chose Abu
Bakr, the Prophet's father-in-law and one of his earliest
followers, to succeed him. At that time, some persons
favored Ali ibn Abu Talib, Muhammad's cousin and the husband
of his daughter Fatima, but Ali and his supporters (the
Shiat Ali, or Party of Ali) eventually recognized the
community's choice. The next two caliphs (successors)--Umar,
who succeeded in A.D. 634, and Uthman, who took power in
644--enjoyed the recognition of the entire community. When
Ali finally succeeded to the caliphate in 656, Muawiyah,
governor of Syria, rebelled in the name of his murdered
kinsman Uthman. After the ensuing civil war, Ali moved his
capital to the area of present-day Iraq, where he was
murdered shortly thereafter.
Ali's death ended the last of the so-called four orthodox
caliphates and the period in which the entire community of
Islam recognized a single caliph. Muawiyah proclaimed
himself caliph from Damascus. The Shiat Ali refused to
recognize him or his line, the Umayyad caliphs, and withdrew
in the great schism to establish the dissident sect, known
as the Shia, who supported the claims of Ali's line to the
caliphate based on descent from the Prophet. The larger
faction, the Sunnis, adhered to the position that the caliph
must be elected, and over the centuries they have
represented themselves as the orthodox branch.
Early in Islam's history the Sufism movement emerged. It
stressed the possibility of emotional closeness to God and
mystical knowledge of God in contrast to the intellectual
and legalistic emphasis of orthodox Sunni theology. By the
twelfth century, this tendency had taken a number of forms.
Orders, each emphasizing specific disciplines (ways) of
achieving that closeness and knowledge, were organized.
Disdained by orthodox Islamic theologians, Sufi orders
nevertheless became an integral part of Islam, although
their importance varied regionally.
******************
Local Character of Belief and Practice
Ethiopian Muslims are adherents of the dominant Sunni, or
orthodox, branch of Islam. Shia are not represented in
Ethiopia. The beliefs and practices of Ethiopian Muslims are
embodied in a more or less integrated amalgam of three
elements: the Islam of the Quran and the sharia, the worship
of saints and the rituals and organization of religious
orders, and the still-important remnant of pre-Islamic
patterns. Islam in the traditional sense is dominant only on
the Eritrean coast among Arab and Arab-influenced
populations and in Harer and a few other towns.
In general, the most important practices of the Islamic
faith, particularly regular prayer and fasting during the
month of Ramadan, are observed in urban centers rather than
in the smaller towns and villages and more among settled
peoples than among nomads. Records of the pilgrimage to
Mecca by Ethiopian Muslims are scarce.
Under Haile Selassie, Muslim communities could bring
matters of personal and family law and inheritance before
Islamic courts; many did so and probably continued to do so
under the revolutionary regime. However, many Muslims dealt
with such matters in terms of customary law. For example,
the Somali and other pastoralists tended not to follow the
requirement that daughters inherit half as much property as
sons, particularly when livestock was at issue. In parts of
Eritrea, the tendency to treat land as the corporate
property of a descent group (lineage or clan) precluded
following the Islamic principle of division of property
among one's heirs.
In Ethiopia's Muslim communities, as in neighboring Sudan
and Somalia, the faithful are associated with, but not
necessarily members of, specific orders. Nevertheless,
although formal and informal attachment to Sufi orders is
widespread, the emphasis is less on contemplative and
disciplined mysticism than on the powers of the founders and
other leaders of local branches of the orders. Most believe
that these persons possess extraordinary powers to intercede
with God and have the ability to promote the fertility of
women and cure illness. In many cases, these individuals are
recognized as saints. People visit their tombs to pray for
their help or their intercession with God.
*************
Indigenous Religions
Among indigenous religious systems, the names of certain
deities and spirits recur frequently, especially among
groups speaking related languages. Certain features of these
traditional belief systems are broadly similar--for example,
the existence of a supreme god identified with the sky and
relatively remote from the everyday concerns of the people
and addressed through spirits. Surface similarities
notwithstanding, the configuration of the accepted roster of
spirits, the rituals addressed to them, the social units
(some based on the territorial community, others on common
descent, generation, or sex) participating in specific
rituals, and the nature and functions of religious
specialists are peculiar to each ethnic group or subsection.
Common to almost all indigenous systems is a range of
spirits, some closely resembling in name and function the
spirits recognized by neighboring Christians or Muslims.
Among the Oromo, especially those not fully Christianized,
there is a belief in a supreme god called Waka, represented
by spirits known as ayana. The ayana are mediators between
the high god and human beings and are themselves approached
through the kallu, a ritual specialist capable of being
possessed by these spirits. The kallu is said to communicate
directly with Waka and bless the community in his name. By
contrast, some pastoral Oromo, such as the Guji and Borana,
are regarded as monotheists.
***************
Foreign Missions
In a 1944 decree, Haile Selassie forbade missionaries from
attempting to convert Ethiopian Orthodox Christians, and
they had little success in proselytizing among Muslims. Most
missionaries focused their activities on adherents of local
religions--but still with only little success. In the 1960s,
there were about 900 foreign missionaries in Ethiopia, but
many were laypersons. This fact was consistent with the
emphasis of many such missions on the education and
vocational training of the people they sought to serve. One
obstacle to the missions' success in the rural areas may
have been the imperial government's insistence that Amharic
be used as the medium of religious instruction except in the
earliest stages of missionary activity. There was also some
evidence that Ethiopian Orthodox priests residing outside
the Amhara and Tigray heartland, as well as local
administrators, were hostile to the missionaries.
In the late 1960s, there were 350,000 to 400,000
Protestants and Catholics in Ethiopia, roughly 1.5 percent
of the population. About 36 percent of these were Catholics,
divided among those adhering to the Ethiopian rite (about 60
percent) and those following the Latin rite. The three
bishops were Ethiopians. Protestants were divided among a
number of denominations. The largest, nearly equaling in
number the size of the Catholic congregation, consisted of
adherents to the Fellowship of Evangelical Believers, the
Ethiopian branch of the Sudan Interior Mission. The next
largest group, about half as large, was the Ethiopian
Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus, an entity that was fostered
jointly by Scandinavian, German, and American Lutheran
groups. This group claimed 400,000 members in the late 1970s
and had an Ethiopian head. Several other groups, including
the Bethel Evangelical Church (sponsored by the American
United Presbyterian Church) and the Seventh-Day Adventists,
had between 5,000 and 15,000 members each.
Many missionaries and other observers claimed that the
revolutionary regime opposed missions and harassed the
clergy and communicants. Although the government denied
these accusations, its approach to those accused of not
accepting its authority suggests that the mission churches
and the regime had not reached a modus vivendi.
****************
Education
Education in Ethiopia was oriented toward religious
learning until after World War II, when the government began
to emphasize secular learning as a means to achieve social
mobility and national development. By 1974, despite efforts
by the government to improve the situation, less than 10
percent of the total population was literate. There were
several reasons for this lack of progress. According to
Teshome G. Wagaw, a former educator at Haile Selassie I
University, the primary failure of the education system was
its inability to "satisfy the aspirations of the majority of
the people and to prepare in any adequate way those passing
through its ranks." Teshome described the system as elitist,
inflexible, and unresponsive to local needs. He was equally
critical of the distribution of educational opportunity,
which favored a few administrative regions and urban centers
at the expense of a predominantly illiterate rural
population. The education system also suffered from
inadequate financing.
In the early 1990s, the problems Ethiopians faced in making
their education system responsive to national needs remained
formidable. Social and political change had affected many
traditional elements of national life, but it was too soon
to predict what effect the changes would have on the
progress of education.
****************
Education During Imperial Rule
Until the early 1900s, formal education was confined to a
system of religious instruction organized and presented
under the aegis of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Church
schools prepared individuals for the clergy and for other
religious duties and positions. In the process, these
schools also provided religious education to the children of
the nobility and to the sons of limited numbers of tenant
farmers and servants associated with elite families. Such
schools mainly served Amhara and Tigray inhabitants of the
central highlands. Toward the end of the nineteenth century,
Menelik II had also permitted the establishment of European
missionary schools. At the same time, Islamic schools
provided some education for a small part of the Muslim
population.
<p> At the beginning of the twentieth century, the education
system's failure to meet the needs of people involved in
statecraft, diplomacy, commerce, and industry led to the
introduction of government-sponsored secular education. The
first public school was established in Addis Ababa in 1907,
and a year later a primary school opened in Harer. Foreign
languages, elementary mathematics, and rudimentary science
were taught in French to a limited number of students, along
with Amharic and religious subjects.
<p> In 1925 the government adopted a plan to expand secular
education, but ten years later there were only 8,000
students enrolled in twenty public schools. A few students
also studied abroad on government scholarships. Schools
closed during the Italian occupation of 1936-41. After the
restoration of Ethiopian independence, schools reopened, but
the system faced shortages of teachers, textbooks, and
facilities. The government recruited foreign teachers for
primary and secondary schools to offset the teacher
shortage. By 1952 a total of 60,000 students were enrolled
in 400 primary schools, eleven secondary schools, and three
institutions offering college-level courses. In the 1960s,
310 mission and privately operated schools with an
enrollment of 52,000 supplemented the country's public
school system.
In May 1961, Ethiopia hosted the United Nations-sponsored
Conference of African States on the Development of
Education. Among other things, the conference highlighted
Ethiopia's educational deficiencies. The Ethiopian education
system, especially in primary and secondary education, was
ranked the bottom among African nations. There were school
and teacher shortages, a high dropout rate, and low overall
attendance rates (about 10 percent among all school-age
children in the country), especially among females, non-
Christians, and rural children. Embarrassed by this record,
the Ministry of Education developed a new education policy,
which was in effect until 1974. Designed in conjunction with
the objectives of the government's second and third five-
year development plans, extending from 1962 to 1973, the
policy gave precedence to the establishment of technical
training schools, although academic education also was
expanded. Curriculum revisions introduced a mix of academic
and nonacademic subjects. But Amharic became the language of
instruction for the entire primary cycle, which handicapped
any child who had a different primary language.
Under the revised system, the two-year junior secondary
schools offered a general academic program for individuals
who wished to continue their education. A number of
vocational subjects prepared others to enter technical or
vocational schools. Some practical experience in the use of
tools was provided, which qualified graduates as semiskilled
workers. The curriculum in the four-year senior secondary
schools prepared students for higher education in Ethiopia
or abroad. Successful completion of the cycle also qualified
some for specialized agricultural or industrial institutes.
Others were qualified for intermediate positions in the
civil service, the armed forces, or private enterprises.
<p> There were two institutions of higher education: Haile
Selassie I University in Addis Ababa, formed by imperial
charter in 1961, and the private University of Asmera,
founded by a Roman Catholic religious order based in Italy.
Between 1961 and 1971, the government expanded the public
school system more than fourfold, and it declared universal
primary education a long-range objective. In 1971 there were
1,300 primary and secondary schools and 13,000 teachers, and
enrollment had reached 600,000. In addition, many families
sent their children to schools operated by missionary groups
and private agencies. But the system suffered from a
shortage of qualified personnel, a lack of funds, and
overcrowded facilities. Often financed with foreign aid,
school construction usually proceeded faster than the
training and certification of teachers. Moreover, many
teachers did not stay long in the profession. Sources such
as the United States Peace Corps and teachers from the
National Service program (university students who taught for
one year after completing their junior year) served only as
stopgaps. In addition, most schools were in the major towns.
Crowded and understaffed, those schools in small towns and
rural areas provided a poor education.
The inadequacies of public education before the mid-1970s
resulted partly from the school financing system. To finance
primary education, the government levied a special tax on
agricultural land. Local boards of education supervised the
disbursement of tax receipts. (The central government
financed secondary and higher education.) The system's
inequities fostered the expansion of primary education in
wealthier regions rather than in poorer ones. Moreover,
urban inhabitants, who did not have to pay the tax but who
were predominantly represented in the schools, sent their
children at the expense of the taxpaying rural landowners
and poor peasants. The government attempted to rectify this
imbalance in 1970 by imposing an education tax on urban
landowners and a 2 percent tax on the personal income of
urban residents. But the Ministry of Finance treated the
funds collected as part of the general revenue and never
spent the money for its intended purpose.
Despite the fact that money spent on education increased
from 10 percent of total government expenditures in 1968 to
20 percent in the early 1970s, funding remained inadequate.
Expenditure on education was only 1.4 to 3 percent of the
gross national product (GNP--see Glossary) between 1968 and
1974, compared with 2.5 to 6 percent for other African
countries during the same period.
Under the pressure of growing public dissatisfaction and
mounting student activism in the university and secondary
schools, the imperial government initiated a comprehensive
study of the education system. Completed in July 1972, the
Education Sector Review (ESR) recommended attaining
universal primary education as quickly and inexpensively as
possible, ruralizing the curricula through the inclusion of
informal training, equalizing educational opportunities, and
relating the entire system to the national development
process.
The ESR criticized the education system's focus on
preparing students for the next level of academic study and
on the completion of rigid qualifying examinations. Also
criticized was the government's lack of concern for the
young people who dropped out before learning marketable
skills, a situation that contributed to unemployment. The
report stated that, by contrast, "The recommended system
would provide a self-contained program at each level that
would be terminal for most students."
The report was not published until February 1974, which
gave time for rumors to generate opposition among students,
parents, and the teachers' union to the ESR recommendations.
Most resented what they considered the removal of education
from its elite position. Many teachers also feared salary
reductions. Strikes and widespread disturbances ensued, and
the education crisis became a contributing factor in the
imperial regime's fall later that year.
***************
Primary and Secondary Education since 1975
After the overthrow of imperial rule, the provisional
military government dismantled the feudal socioeconomic
structure through a series of reforms that also affected
educational development. By early 1975, the government had
closed Haile Selassie I University and all senior secondary
schools and had deployed some 60,000 students and teachers
to rural areas to participate in the government's
Development Through Cooperation Campaign (commonly referred
to as zemecha--see Glossary). The campaign's stated purposes
were to promote land reform and improve agricultural
production, health, and local administration and to teach
peasants about the new political and social order.
In 1975 the new regime nationalized all private schools,
except church-affiliated ones, and made them part of the
public school system. Additionally, the government
reorganized Haile Selassie I University and renamed it Addis
Ababa University. It also initiated reforms of the education
system based partly on ESR recommendations and partly on the
military regime's socialist ideology. However, no meaningful
education occurred (except at the primary level) from 1975
to 1978 because of the social turmoil, which pitted the
regime against numerous opposition forces, including
students.
Beginning in 1975, a new education policy emphasized
improving learning opportunities in the rural areas as a
means of increasing economic productivity. In the mid-1980s,
the education system was still based on a structure of
primary, secondary, and higher education levels, much as it
was during the imperial regime. However, the government's
objective was to establish an eight-year unified education
system at the primary level. Preliminary to implementing
this program, officials tested a new curriculum in seventy
pilot schools. This curriculum emphasized expanded
opportunities for nonacademic training. The new approach
also decentralized control and operation of primary and
secondary schools to the subregional level, where the
curriculum addressed local requirements. In each case,
committees drawn from the peasant associations and kebeles
and augmented by at least one teacher and one student over
the age of sixteen from each school administered the public
schools. Students used free textbooks in local languages. In
late 1978, the government expanded the program to include
nine languages, and it adopted plans to add five others.
There were also changes in the distribution and number of
schools and the size and composition of the student body.
The military regime worked toward a more even distribution
of schools by concentrating its efforts on small towns and
rural areas that had been neglected during the imperial
regime. With technical assistance from the Ministry of
Education, individual communities performed all primary
school construction. In large part because of such community
involvement, the number of primary schools grew from 3,196
in 1974/75 to 7,900 in 1985/86 (the latest years for which
figures were available in mid-1991), an average increase of
428 schools annually (see table 5, Appendix). The number of
primary schools increased significantly in all regions
except three, including Eritrea and Tigray, where there was
a decline because of continuing insurgencies. In Addis
Ababa, the number of primary schools declined because of the
closure or absorption of nongovernment schools, especially
religious ones, into the government system.
Primary school enrollment increased from about 957,300 in
1974/75 to nearly 2,450,000 in 1985/86. There were still
variations among regions in the number of students enrolled
and a disparity in the enrollment of boys and girls.
Nevertheless, while the enrollment of boys more than
doubled, that of girls more than tripled (see table 6,
Appendix). Urban areas had a higher ratio of children
enrolled in schools, as well as a higher proportion of
female students, compared with rural areas.
The number of junior secondary schools almost doubled, with
fourfold increases in Gojam, Kefa, and Welega. Most junior
secondary schools were attached to primary schools.
The number of senior secondary schools almost doubled as
well, with fourfold increases in Arsi, Bale, Gojam, Gonder,
and Welo. The prerevolutionary distribution of schools had
shown a concentration in the urban areas of a few
administrative regions. In 1974/75 about 55 percent of
senior secondary schools were in Eritrea and Shewa,
including Addis Ababa. In 1985/86 the figure was down to 40
percent. Although there were significantly fewer girls
enrolled at the secondary level, the proportion of females
in the school system at all levels and in all regions
increased from about 32 percent in 1974/75 to 39 percent in
1985/86.
The number of teachers also increased, especially in senior
secondary schools (see table 7 Appendix). However, this
increase had not kept pace with student enrollment. The
student-teacher ratio went from forty-four to one in 1975 to
fifty-four to one in 1983 in primary schools and also
increased from thirty-five to one in 1975 to forty-four to
one in 1983 in secondary schools.
Although the government achieved impressive improvements in
primary and secondary education, prospects for universal
education in the near future were not bright. In 1985/86,
the latest year for which government statistics were
available, enrollment in the country's primary, junior
secondary, and senior secondary schools totaled 3.1 million
students, up from the nearly 785,000 enrolled a decade
earlier. Only about 2.5 million (42 percent) of the 6
million primary school-age children were enrolled in school
in 1985/86. Junior secondary school enrollments (grades
seven and eight) amounted to 363,000, while at the secondary
school level (grades nine through twelve), only 292,385 out
of 5.5 million, or 5.3 percent, attended school. In
addition, prospects for continued study for most primary
school graduates were slim. In 1985/86 there was only one
junior secondary school for every eight primary schools and
only one senior secondary school for every four junior
secondary schools. There were many primary school students
for whom space would not be available and who therefore
would most likely end up on the job market, where work
already was scarce for people with limited educations.
School shortages also resulted in crowding, a situation
aggravated by the rural-urban influx of the late 1980s. Most
schools operated on a morning and afternoon shift system,
particularly in urban areas. A teacher shortage exacerbated
the problems created by crowded classrooms. In addition to
these problems were those of the destruction and looting of
educational facilities as a result of fighting in northern
regions. By 1990/91 destruction was especially severe in
Eritrea, Tigray, and Gonder, but looting of schools was
reported in other parts of the country as well.
***************
Higher and Vocational Education since 1975
In 1977 the revolutionary regime issued Proclamation No.
109, which created the Commission for Higher Education. This
document also outlined the main objectives of higher
education institutions as follows: to train individuals for
high-level positions in accordance with the national plan of
development and to provide qualified medium-level personnel
to meet the immediate needs of the economy; to improve the
quality of education, strengthen and expand tertiary-level
institutions, and establish new research and training
centers; and to contribute to a better standard of living
among the masses by developing science, technology, the
arts, and literature.
Additionally, Addis Ababa reoriented institutions of higher
education to reflect the new regime's objectives and
modified admission criteria to benefit students from small
towns and rural areas. But the government also assigned many
students to specialize in certain fields, which denied them
the opportunity to decide on careers of their choosing.
Higher education expanded modestly in the period after
1975. The College of Agriculture at Alemaya, which was part
of Addis Ababa University, was granted independent
university status in 1985. A postgraduate studies program
was established in 1978, which had an enrollment of 246
students in 1982/83, of whom 15 were women. Graduate
programs were offered in several fields, including
engineering, natural science, agriculture, the social
sciences, and medicine. Several research institutes
supported these institutions of higher education. Addis
Ababa University also provided an evening extension program
offering courses in many fields.
Other diploma-granting independent colleges trained middle-
level manpower in several fields. These included the College
of Teacher Education, the Junior College of Commerce, and
the Municipal Technical College, all in Addis Ababa. There
were also junior colleges of agriculture in Ambo and Jima,
the Institute of Animal Health Assistants in Debre Zeyit,
and the Institute of Health Sciences in Jima. Altogether,
there were approximately twelve colleges or universities in
the country in the early 1990s, with intense competition
among students for admission.
Enrollment in higher education grew from 4,500 in 1970 to
more than 18,400 in 1985/86, of whom nearly 11 percent were
women. But enrollment was low, considering the size of the
population. Space limitations at the colleges and
universities caused the government to raise admission
standards. To narrow the gap somewhat, the number of
students sent abroad on scholarships and fellowships grew
from an annual average of 433 during 1969-73 to about 1,200
during 1978-82.
The number of Ethiopians on teaching staffs also grew. The
faculty of Addis Ababa University increased from 437 in 1970
to 1,296 in 1983, with a corresponding increase in Ethiopian
faculty from 48 percent to 74 percent of this total during
the same period.
There was also more emphasis on the creation of technical
and vocational schools, most of which were operated by the
government. The Ministry of Education operated or supervised
nine such schools scattered around the country. These
schools had an enrollment of more than 4,200 in 1985/86, and
their graduates were in great demand by industries. With
Soviet assistance, Ethiopia established its first
polytechnic institute, in Bahir Dar, in the 1960s. It
trained personnel in agromechanics, industrial chemistry,
electricity, and textile and metal-working technology. In
addition, a system of general polytechnic education had been
introduced into the senior secondary school curriculum so
that those who did not continue their education still could
venture into the skilled job market.
The government also introduced vocational training to
upgrade peasant skills. The peasant training centers,
operated by the Ministry of Agriculture, provided training
in vocational trades related to agriculture for periods
ranging from three weeks to six months. The country had
twelve such centers, which trained more than 200,000 farmers
from 1974 to 1988.
*****************
Literacy
Among the revolutionary regime's few successes was the
national literacy campaign. The literacy rate, under 10
percent during the imperial regime, increased to about 63
percent by 1984, according to government figures. Others
sources, however, estimated it at around 37 percent. In
1990/91 an adult literacy rate of just over 60 percent was
still being reported in government as well as in some
international reports. As with the 1984 data, it several
wise to exercise caution with regard to the latest figure.
As some observers pointed out, defining just what the term
"literacy" means presented a problem; in addition, the
military government's desire to report as high a literacy
rate as possible had to be taken into account.
The national literacy campaign began in early 1975 when the
government mobilized more than 60,000 students and teachers,
sending them all over the country for two-year terms of
service. This experience was crucial to the creation in 1979
of the National Literacy Campaign Coordinating Committee
(NLCCC) and a nationwide effort to raise literacy levels.
The government organized the campaign in rounds, which began
in urban centers and spread outward to the remote parts of
the country up to Round 12. Officials originally conducted
the literacy training in five languages: Amharic, Oromo,
Tigrinya, Welamo, and Somali. The number of languages was
later expanded to fifteen, which represented about 93
percent of the population. By the end of Round 12, in the
late 1980s, about 17 million people had been registered, of
whom 12 million had passed the literacy test. Women
represented about half of those enrolled.
According to government sources, about 1.5 million people
eventually worked in the campaign. They included students,
civil servants, teachers, military personnel, housewives,
and members of religious groups, all of whom, it was
claimed, offered their services freely. Adult literacy
classes used primary and secondary school facilities in many
areas. Officials distributed more than 22 million reading
booklets for beginners and more than 9 million texts for
postliteracy participants. The Ministry of Education also
stocked reading centers with appropriate texts. These books
focused on topics such as agriculture, health, and basic
technology. To consolidate the gains from the literacy
campaign, the government offered follow-up courses for
participants up to grade four, after which they could enroll
in the regular school system. In addition, national
newspapers included regular columns for new readers. The
literacy campaign received international acclaim when the
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) awarded Ethiopia the International
Reading Association Literacy Prize in 1980.
***********
Foreign Educational Assistance
The regime's efforts to resolve the country's educational
problems received considerable support from abroad. The
initial cost of reorienting the education system toward
national development goals through improving opportunities
in remote rural areas had been estimated at US$34.7 million.
Of this amount, US$23 million was received from the
International Development Association (IDA). By late 1978,
the European Economic Community had contributed US$2.6
million to help with the government's education development
plan. The German Democratic Republic (East Germany) sent
teachers, training specialists, and curriculum development
experts. The Soviet Union provided hundreds of scholarships.
In 1978 there were 1,200 Ethiopian children (aged nine to
fifteen years) from poor families who attended two special
schools in Cuba for an undetermined period. Other students
followed this initial group. In 1990 the Swedish
International Development Authority granted US$10.5 million
for elementary education. This aid helped make possible the
construction of about 300 schools. The Swedish agency
already had contributed to the construction of 7,000
elementary schools.
*************
Health and Welfare
The main cause of many of Ethiopia's health problems is the
relative isolation of large segments of the population from
the modern sector. Additionally, widespread illiteracy
prevents the dissemination of information on modern health
practices. A shortage of trained personnel and insufficient
funding also hampers the equitable distribution of health
services. Moreover, most health institutions were
concentrated in urban centers prior to 1974 and were
concerned with curative rather than preventive medicine.
Western medicine came to Ethiopia during the last quarter
of the nineteenth century with the arrival of missionary
doctors, nurses, and midwives. But there was little progress
on measures to cope with the acute and endemic diseases that
debilitated large segments of the population until the
government established its Ministry of Public Health in
1948. The World Health Organization (WHO), the United
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the United States
Agency for International Development (AID) provided
technical and financial assistance to eliminate the sources
of health problems.
In addition to establishing hospitals, health centers, and
outpatient clinics, the government initiated programs to
train Ethiopian health care personnel so that they could
supplement the private institutions that existed in a few
major urban centers. The few government campaigns that
exhorted the people to cooperate in the fight against
disease and unhealthful living conditions were mainly
directed at the urban population.
By the mid-1970s, the number of modern medical facilities
had increased relatively slowly--particularly in rural
areas, where at least 80 percent of the people still did not
have access to techniques or services that would improve
health conditions (see table 8, table 9, Appendix). Forty-
six percent of the hospital beds were concentrated in Addis
Ababa, Asmera, Dire Dawa, and Harer. In the absence of
modern medical services, the rural population continued to
rely on traditional folk medicine. According to official
statistics, in 1983/84 there were 546 physicians in the
country to serve a population of 42 million, a ratio of
roughly one physician per 77,000 people, one of the worst
ratios in the world. Less than 40 percent of the population
was within reach of modern health services.
As in most developing countries in the early 1990s,
Ethiopia's main health problems were communicable diseases
caused by poor sanitation and malnutrition and exacerbated
by the shortage of trained manpower and health facilities.
Mortality and morbidity data were based primarily on health
facility records, which may not reflect the real incidence
of disease in the population. According to such records, the
leading causes of hospital deaths were dysentery and
gastroenteritis (11 percent), tuberculosis (11 percent),
pneumonia (11 percent), malnutrition and anemia (7 percent),
liver diseases including hepatitis (6 percent), tetanus (3
percent), and malaria (3 percent). The leading causes of
outpatient morbidity in children under age five were upper
respiratory illnesses, diarrhea, eye infections including
trachoma, skin infections, malnutrition, and fevers. Nearly
60 percent of childhood morbidity was preventable. The
leading causes of adult morbidity were dysentery and
gastrointestinal infections, malaria, parasitic worms, skin
and eye diseases, venereal diseases, rheumatism,
malnutrition, fevers, upper respiratory tract infections,
and tuberculosis. These diseases were endemic and quite
widespread, reflecting the fact that Ethiopians had no
access to modern health care.
Tuberculosis still affected much of the population despite
efforts to immunize as many people as possible. Venereal
diseases, particularly syphilis and gonorrhea, were
prevalent in towns and cities, where prostitution
contributed to the problem. The high prevalence of worms and
other intestinal parasites indicated poor sanitary
facilities and education and the fact that potable water was
available to less than 14 percent of the population.
Tapeworm infection was common because of the popular
practice of eating raw or partially cooked meat.
Schistosomiasis, leprosy, and yellow fever were serious
health hazards in certain regions of the country.
Schistosomiasis, a disease caused by a parasite transmitted
from snails to humans through the medium of water, occurred
mainly in the northern part of the highlands, in the western
lowlands, and in Eritrea and Harerge. Leprosy was common in
Harerge and Gojam and in areas bordering Sudan and Kenya.
The incidence of typhoid, whooping cough, rabies, cholera,
and other diseases had diminished in the 1970s because of
school immunization programs, but serious outbreaks still
plagued many rural areas. Frequent famine made health
conditions even worse.
Smallpox has been stamped out in Ethiopia, the last
outbreak having occurred among the nomadic population in the
late 1970s. Malaria, which is endemic in 70 percent of the
country, was once a scourge in areas below 1,500 meters
elevation. Its threat had declined considerably as a result
of government efforts supported by WHO and AID, but
occasional seasonal outbreaks were common. The most recent
occurrence was in 1989, and the outbreak was largely the
result of heavy rain, unusually high temperatures, and the
settling of peasants in new locations. There was also a
report of a meningitis epidemic in southern and western
Ethiopia in 1989, even though the government had taken
preventive measures by vaccinating 1.6 million people. The
logistics involved in reaching the 70 percent of Ethiopians
who lived more than three days' walk from a health center
with refrigerated vaccines and penicillin prevented the
medical authorities from arresting the epidemic.
Acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) was a growing
problem in Ethiopia. In 1985 the Ministry of Health reported
the country's first AIDS case. In subsequent years, the
government sponsored numerous AIDS studies and surveys. For
example, in 1988 the country's AIDS Control and Prevention
Office conducted a study in twenty-four towns and discovered
that an average of 17 percent of the people in each town
tested positive for the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV),
the precursor of full-blown AIDS. A similar survey in Addis
Ababa showed that 24 percent tested positive.
In 1990 Mengistu Mihret, head of the Surveillance and
Research Coordination Department of the AIDS Control and
Prevention Office, indicated that AIDS was spreading more
rapidly in heavily traveled areas. According to the Ministry
of Health, there were two AIDS patients in the country in
1986, seventeen in 1987, eighty-five in 1988, 188 in 1989,
and 355 as of mid-1990. Despite this dramatic growth rate,
the number of reported AIDS cases in Ethiopia was lower than
in many other African countries. However, the difference
likely reflected the comparatively small amount of resources
being devoted to the study of AIDS.
Starting in 1975, the regime embarked on the formulation of
a new health policy emphasizing disease prevention and
control, rural health services, and promotion of community
involvement and self-reliance in health activities. The
ground for the new policy was broken during the student
zemecha of 1975/76, which introduced peasants to the need
for improved health standards. In 1983 the government drew
up a ten-year health perspective plan that was incorporated
into the ten-year economic development plan launched in
September 1984. The goal of this plan was the provision of
health services to 80 percent of the population by 1993/94.
To achieve such a goal would have required an increase of
over 10 percent in annual budget allocations, which was
unrealistic in view of fiscal constraints.
The regime decentralized health care administration to the
local level in keeping with its objective of community
involvement in health matters. Regional Ministry of Health
offices gave assistance in technical matters, but peasant
associations and kebeles had considerable autonomy in
educating people on health matters and in constructing
health facilities in outlying areas. Starting in 1981, a
hierarchy of community health services, health stations,
health centers, rural hospitals, regional hospitals, and
central referral hospitals were supposed to provide health
care. By the late 1980s, however, these facilities were
available to only a small fraction of the country's
population.
At the bottom of the health-care pyramid was the community
health service, designed to give every 1,000 people access
to a community health agent, someone with three months of
training in environmental sanitation and the treatment of
simple diseases. In addition to the community health agent,
there was a traditional birth attendant, with one month of
training in prenatal and postnatal care and safe delivery
practices. As of 1988, only about a quarter of the
population was being served by a community health agent or a
traditional birth attendant. Both categories were made up of
volunteers chosen by the community and were supported by
health assistants.
Health assistants were full-time Ministry of Health workers
with eighteen months of training, based at health stations
ultimately to be provided at the rate of one health station
per 10,000 population. Each health station was ultimately to
be staffed by three health assistants. Ten health stations
were supervised by one health center, which was designed to
provide services for a 100,000-person segment of the
population. The Regional Health Department supervised health
centers. Rural hospitals with an average of seventy-five
beds and general regional hospitals with 100 to 250 beds
provided referral services for health centers. The six
central referral hospitals were organized to provide care in
all important specialties, train health professionals, and
conduct research. There were a few specialized hospitals for
leprosy and tuberculosis, but overall the lack of funds
meant emphasis on building health centers and health
stations rather than hospitals.
Trained medical personnel were also in short supply. As
noted previously, the ratio of citizens to physicians was
one of the worst in the world. Of 4,000 positions for
nurses, only half were filled, and half of all health
stations were staffed by only one health assistant instead
of the planned three. There were two medical schools--in
Addis Ababa and Gonder--and one school of pharmacy, all
managed by Addis Ababa University. The Gonder medical school
also trained nurses and sanitation and laboratory
technicians. The Ministry of Health ran three nursing
schools and eleven schools for health assistants.
Missionaries also ran two such schools. The regime increased
the number of nurses to 385 and health assistants to 650
annually, but the health budget could not support this many
new graduates. The quality of graduates had also not kept
pace with the quantity of graduates.
Since 1974 there have been modest improvements in national
expenditures on public health. Between 1970 and 1975, the
government spent about 5 percent of its total budget on
health programs. From 1975 to 1978, annual expenditures
varied between 5.5 and 6.6 percent of outlays, and for the
1982-88 period total expenditures on the Ministry of Health
were about 4 percent of total government expenditures. This
was a low figure but comparable to that for other low-income
African countries. Moreover, much of the real increases of 7
to 8 percent in the health budget went to salaries.
A number of countries were generous in helping Ethiopia
meet its health care needs. Cuba, the Soviet Union, and a
number of East European countries provided medical
assistance. In early 1980, nearly 300 Cuban medical
technicians, including more than 100 physicians, supported
local efforts to resolve public health problems. Western aid
for long-term development of Ethiopia's health sector was
modest, averaging about US$10 million annually, the lowest
per capita assistance in sub-Saharan Africa. The main
Western donors included Italy and Sweden. International
organizations, namely UNICEF, WHO, and the United Nations
Population Fund, also extended assistance.
* * *
Much of the literature on Ethiopian society is based on
research concluded before the 1974 revolution. However, an
increasing number of post-1974 works contain useful
information on both the imperial and the revolutionary
periods.
An excellent linguistic study is Language in Ethiopia,
edited by M. Lional Bender et al. John Markakis's Ethiopia:
Anatomy of a Traditional Polity provides a useful assessment
of Ethiopia's prerevolutionary social order with particular
reference to the political ramifications of social
stratification, interethnic relations, and land control.
Donald N. Levine's Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of a
Multi-Ethnic Society analyzes the main structural features
of the traditional Amhara, Tigrayan, and Oromo sociocultural
systems. Allan Hoben's Land Tenure among the Amhara of
Ethiopia and Ambaye Zekarias's Land Tenure in Eritrea
(Ethiopia) examine the land tenure system in the Amhara
highlands and in Eritrea, respectively. Taddesse Tamrat's
Church and State in Ethiopia, 1270-1527 and John Spencer
Trimingham's Islam in Ethiopia are useful for an
understanding of the role of religion in Ethiopia.
Richard K. Pankhurst's An Introduction to the Medical
History of Ethiopia provides useful insight into the
evolution of health practices in Ethiopia. Implementing
Educational Policies in Ethiopia by Fassil R. Kiros examines
the revolutionary government's attempts to reform Ethiopia's
education system. Desta Asayehegn's Socio-Economic and
Educational Reforms in Ethiopia, 1942-1974 analyzes the
educational changes made during Haile Selassie's last
thirty-two years on the throne. (For further information and
complete citations, see Bibliography.)
*************************
Chapter 3. The Economy
RESTRUCTURING THE ECONOMY along socialist lines and
achieving sustained economic growth were the two major
economic objectives of the Provisional Military
Administrative Council when it assumed power in l974. After
the 1974 revolution, the pace of economic restructuring was
accelerated by a barrage of legislation. A key part of the
effort to reshape the economy was the implementation of
Africa's most ambitious land reform program, which included
nationalization of both rural and urban land. Most of
Ethiopia's industries, large-scale agricultural farms, and
financial institutions were brought under the control of the
government, and both rural and urban communities were
organized into a hierarchy of associations. Pursuit of the
military regime's second objective--sustained economic
growth--was less successful. Drought, regional conflicts,
inflexible government policy, and lack of confidence by the
private sector seriously affected the economy. Falling
productivity, soaring inflation, growing dependence on
foreign aid and loans, high unemployment, and a
deteriorating balance of payments all combined to create a
deepening economic crisis. In 1990 Ethiopia had a gross
national product of US$6 billion and a per capita income of
about US$120, one of the lowest per capita incomes of any
country in the world.
Following the 1974 revolution, the socialist government
developed a series of annual plans and a ten-year
perspective plan to revitalize the war-ravaged economy.
Although the annual plans helped the regime deal with some
urgent economic problems, such as shortages of food and
consumer goods, decline in productivity, lack of foreign
exchange, and rising unemployment, these plans failed to
move the country significantly closer to attaining its long-
term development objectives. In l984/85 (Ethiopian calendar
year--see Glossary) the military government launched a new
ten-year perspective plan, which represented a renewed
commitment to economic growth and structural transformation
of the economy. However, the economy continued to
deteriorate. In response, the regime introduced several
additional reforms. For instance, the l988 Investment Code
allowed unlimited participation of the private sector in
certain areas of the economy. In January l988, under
pressure from aid donor countries, the government agreed to
restructure agricultural and farm price policies. Finally,
in March l990 President Mengistu Haile Mariam announced the
end of the country's Marxist economic system and the
beginning of a mixed economy. Despite these reforms, the
***************
Growth and Structure of the Economy
Developments up to l974
By African standards, Ethiopia is a potentially wealthy
country, with fertile soil and good rainfall over large
regions. Farmers produce a variety of grains, including
wheat, corn, and millet. Coffee also grows well on southern
slopes. Herders can raise cattle, sheep, and goats in nearly
all parts of the country. Additionally, Ethiopia possesses
several valuable minerals, including gold and platinum.
Unlike most sub-Saharan African countries, Ethiopia's
resources have enabled the country to maintain contacts with
the outside world for centuries. Since ancient times,
Ethiopian traders exchanged gold, ivory, musk, and wild
animal skins for salt and luxury goods, such as silk and
velvet. By the late nineteenth century, coffee had become
one of Ethiopia's more important cash crops. At that time,
most trade flowed along two major trade routes, both of
which terminated in the far southwest in the Kefa-Jima
region. From there, one route went north to Mitsiwa via
Gonder and Adwa, the other along the Awash River valley to
Harer and then on to Berbera or Zeila on the Red Sea.
Despite its many riches, Ethiopia never became a great
trading nation. Most Ethiopians despised traders, preferring
instead to emulate the country's warriors and priests. After
establishing a foothold in the country, Greek, Armenian, and
Arab traders became the economic intermediaries between
Ethiopia and the outside world. Arabs also settled in the
interior and eventually dominated all commercial activity
except petty trade.
When their occupation of Ethiopia ended in 1941, the
Italians left behind them a country whose economic structure
was much as it had been for centuries. There had been some
improvements in communications, particularly in the area of
road building, and attempts had been made to establish a few
small industries and to introduce commercial farming,
particularly in Eritrea, which Italy had occupied since
1890. But these changes were limited. With only a small
proportion of the population participating in the money
economy, trade consisted mostly of barter. Wage labor was
limited, economic units were largely self-sufficient,
foreign trade was negligible, and the market for
manufactured goods was extremely small.
During the late l940s and 1950s, much of the economy
remained unchanged. The government focused its development
efforts on expansion of the bureaucratic structure and
ancillary services. Most farmers cultivated small plots of
land or herded cattle. Traditional and primitive farming
methods provided the population with a subsistence standard
of living. In addition, many nomadic peoples raised
livestock and followed a life of seasonal movement in drier
areas. The agricultural sector grew slightly, and the
industrial sector represented a small part of the total
economy.
By the early l950s, Emperor Haile Selassie I (reigned 1930-
74) had renewed calls for a transition from a subsistence
economy to an agro-industrial economy. To accomplish this
task, Ethiopia needed an infrastructure to exploit
resources, a material base to improve living conditions, and
better health, education, communications, and other
services. A key element of the emperor's new economic policy
was the adoption of centrally administered development
plans. Between l945 and l957, several technical missions,
including one each from the United States, the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and
Yugoslavia, prepared a series of development plans. However,
these plans failed to achieve any meaningful results,
largely because basic statistical data were scarce and the
government's administrative and technical capabilities were
minimal.
In 1954/55 the government created the National Economic
Council to coordinate the state's development plans. This
agency, which was a policy-making body chaired by the
emperor, devoted its attention to improving agricultural and
industrial productivity, eradicating illiteracy and
diseases, and improving living standards for all Ethiopians.
The National Economic Council helped to prepare Ethiopia's
first and second five-year plans.
The First Five-Year Plan (1957-61) sought to develop a
strong infrastructure, particularly in transportation,
construction, and communications, to link isolated regions.
Another goal was the establishment of an indigenous cadre of
skilled and semiskilled personnel to work in processing
industries to help reduce Ethiopia's dependence on imports.
Lastly, the plan aimed to accelerate agricultural
development by promoting commercial agricultural ventures.
The Second Five-Year Plan (1962-67) signaled the start of a
twenty-year program to change Ethiopia's predominantly
agricultural economy to an agro-industrial one. The plan's
objectives included diversification of production,
introduction of modern processing methods, and expansion of
the economy's productive capacity to increase the country's
growth rate. The Third Five-Year Plan (1968-73) also sought
to facilitate Ethiopia's economic well-being by raising
manufacturing and agro-industrial performance. However,
unlike its predecessors, the third plan expressed the
government's willingness to expand educational opportunities
and to improve peasant agriculture. Total investment for the
First Five-Year Plan reached 839.6 million birr (for value
of the birr--see Glossary), about 25 percent above the
planned 674 million birr figure; total expenditure for the
Second Five-Year Plan was 13 percent higher than the planned
1,694 million birr figure. The allocation for the Third
Five-Year Plan was 3,115 million birr.
Several factors hindered Ethiopia's development planning.
Apart from the fact that the government lacked the
administrative and technical capabilities to implement a
national development plan, staffing problems plagued the
Planning Commission (which prepared the first and second
plans) and the Ministry of Planning (which prepared the
third). Many project managers failed to achieve plan
objectives because they neglected to identify the resources
(personnel, equipment, and funds) and to establish the
organizational structures necessary to facilitate large-
scale economic development.
During the First Five-Year Plan, the gross national product
(GNP--see Glossary) increased at a 3.2 percent annual rate
as opposed to the projected figure of 3.7 percent, and
growth in economic sectors such as agriculture,
manufacturing, and mining failed to meet the national plan's
targets. Exports increased at a 3.5 percent annual rate
during the first plan, whereas imports grew at a rate of 6.4
percent per annum, thus failing to correct the negative
balance of trade that had existed since l95l.
The Second Five-Year Plan and Third Five-Year Plan
anticipated that the economy would grow at an annual rate of
4.3 percent and 6.0 percent, respectively. Officials also
expected agriculture, manufacturing, and transportation and
communications to grow at respective rates of 2.5, 27.3, and
6.7 percent annually during the Second Five-Year Plan and at
respective rates of 2.9, l4.9, and l0.9 percent during the
Third Five-Year Plan. The Planning Commission never assessed
the performance of these two plans, largely because of a
shortage of qualified personnel.
However, according to data from the Ethiopian government's
Central Statistical Authority, during the 1960/61 to 1973/74
period the economy achieved sustained economic growth.
Between 1960 and 1970, for example, Ethiopia enjoyed an
annual 4.4 percent average growth rate in per capita gross
domestic product (GDP--see Glossary). The manufacturing
sector's growth rate more than doubled (from 1.9 percent in
1960/61 to 4.4 percent in 1973/74), and the growth rate for
the wholesale, retail trade, transportation, and
communications sectors increased from 9.3 percent to 15.6
percent.
Relative to its neighbors, Ethiopia's economic performance
was mixed. Ethiopia's 4.4 percent average per capita GDP
growth rate was higher than Sudan's 1.3 percent rate or
Somalia's 1 percent rate. However, Kenya's GDP grew at an
estimated 6 percent annual rate, and Uganda achieved a 5.6
percent growth rate during the same 1960/61 to 1972/73
period.
By the early l970s, Ethiopia's economy not only had started
to grow but also had begun to diversify into areas such as
manufacturing and services. However, these changes failed to
improve the lives of most Ethiopians. About four-fifths of
the population were subsistence farmers who lived in poverty
because they used most of their meager production to pay
taxes, rents, debt payments, and bribes. On a broader level,
from 1953 to 1974 the balance of trade registered annual
deficits. The only exception was l973, when a combination of
unusually large receipts from the export of oilseeds and
pulses and an unusually small rise in import values resulted
in a favorable balance of payments of 454 million birr. With
the country registering trade deficits, the government
attempted to restrict imports and to substitute locally
produced industrial goods to improve the trade balance.
Despite these efforts, however, the unfavorable trade
balance continued. As a result, foreign grants and loans
financed much of the balance of payments deficit.
*****************
Postrevolution Period
The l974 revolution resulted in the nationalization and
restructuring of the Ethiopian economy. After the
revolution, the country's economy can be viewed as having
gone through four phases (table 10, Appendix).
Internal political upheaval, armed conflict, and radical
institutional reform marked the 1974-78 period of the
revolution. There was little economic growth; instead, the
government's nationalization measures and the highly
unstable political climate caused economic dislocation in
sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing. Additionally,
the military budget consumed a substantial portion of the
nation's resources. As a result of these problems, GDP
increased at an average annual rate of only 0.4 percent.
Moreover, the current account deficit and the overall fiscal
deficit widened, and the retail price index jumped,
experiencing a l6.5 percent average annual increase.
In the second phase (1978-80), the economy began to recover
as the government consolidated power and implemented
institutional reforms. The government's new Development
Through Cooperation Campaign (commonly referred to as
zemecha--see Glossary) also contributed to the economy's
improvement. More important, security conditions improved as
internal and external threats subsided. In the aftermath of
the 1977-78 Ogaden War and the decline in rebel activity in
Eritrea, Addis Ababa set production targets and mobilized
the resources needed to improve economic conditions.
Consequently, GDP grew at an average annual rate of 5.7
percent. Benefiting from good weather, agricultural
production increased at an average annual rate of 3.6
percent, and manufacturing increased at an average annual
rate of l8.9 percent, as many closed plants, particularly in
Eritrea, reopened. The current account deficit and the
overall fiscal deficit remained below 5 percent of GDP
during this period.
In the third phase (1980-85), the economy experienced a
setback. Except for Ethiopian fiscal year (EFY--see
Glossary) 1982/83, the growth of GDP declined. Manufacturing
took a downturn as well, and agriculture reached a crisis
stage. Four factors accounted for these developments. First,
the 1984-85 drought affected almost all regions of the
country. As a result, the government committed scarce
resources to famine relief efforts while tabling long-term
development projects. Consequently, the external accounts
(as shown in the current account deficit and the debt
service ratio) and the overall fiscal deficit worsened,
despite international drought assistance totaling more than
US$450 million. Notwithstanding these efforts, close to 8
million people became famine victims during the drought of
the mid-1980s, and about 1 million died. Second, the
manufacturing sector stagnated as agricultural inputs
declined. Also, many industries exhausted their capacity to
increase output; as a result, they failed to meet the rising
demand for consumer items. Third, the lack of foreign
exchange and declining investment reversed the relatively
high manufacturing growth rates of 1978-80. Finally,
Ethiopia's large military establishment created a major
burden on the economy. Defense expenditures during this time
were absorbing 40 to 50 percent of the government's current
expenditure (see Defense Costs, ch. 5).
In the fourth period (1985-90), the economy continued to
stagnate, despite an improvement in the weather in EFY
l985/86 and EFY l986/87, which helped reverse the
agricultural decline. GDP and the manufacturing sector also
grew during this period, GDP increasing at an average annual
rate of 5 percent. However, the lingering effects of the
1984-85 drought undercut these achievements and contributed
to the economy's overall stagnation. During the 1985-90
period, the current account deficit and the overall fiscal
deficit worsened to annual rates of l0.6 and l3.5 percent,
respectively, and the debt service ratio continued to climb.
*****************
Role of Government
The imperial government presided over what was, even in the
mid-twentieth century, essentially a feudal economy, with
aristocrats and the church owning most arable land and
tenant farmers who paid exorbitant rents making up the
majority of the nation's agriculturalists. Acting primarily
through the Ministry of Finance, the emperor used fiscal and
monetary strategies to direct the local economy. The various
ministries, although not always effective, played a key role
in developing and implementing programs. The government
conducted negotiations with the ministries to allocate
resources for plan priorities.
Officials formulated actual operations, however, without
adhering to plan priorities. This problem developed partly
because the relationship between the Planning Commission,
responsible for formulating national objectives and
priorities, and the Ministry of Finance, responsible for
resource planning and management, was not clearly defined.
The Ministry of Finance often played a pivotal role, whereas
the Planning Commission was relegated to a minor role. Often
the Planning Commission was perceived as merely another
bureaucratic layer. The ultimate power to approve budgets
and programs rested with the emperor, although the Council
of Ministers had the opportunity to review plans.
After the revolution, the government's role in determining
economic policies changed dramatically. In January and
February l975, the government nationalized or took partial
control of more than l00 companies, banks and other
financial institutions, and insurance companies. In March
l975, the regime nationalized rural land and granted
peasants "possessing rights" to parcels of land not to
exceed ten hectares per grantee. In December l975, the
government issued Proclamation No. 76, which established a
500,000 birr ceiling on private investment and urged
Ethiopians to invest in enterprises larger than cottage
industries. This policy changed in mid-1989, when the
government implemented three special decrees to encourage
the development of small-scale industries, the participation
of nongovernmental bodies in the hotel industry, and the
establishment of joint ventures.
Under the Provisional Military Administrative Council
(PMAC; also known as the Derg--see Glossary), Ethiopia's
political system and economic structure changed
dramatically, and the government embraced a Marxist-Leninist
political philosophy. Planning became more ambitious and
more pervasive, penetrating all regions and all sectors of
the society, in contrast to the imperial period. Article ll
of the l987 constitution legitimized these changes by
declaring that "the State shall guide the economic and
social activities of the country through a central plan."
The Office of the National Council for Central Planning
(ONCCP), which replaced the Planning Commission and which
was chaired by Mengistu as head of state, served as the
supreme policy-making body and had the power and
responsibility to prepare the directives, strategies, and
procedures for short- and long-range plans. The ONCCP played
a pivotal role in mediating budget requests between other
ministries and the Ministry of Finance. The government also
sought to improve Ethiopia's economic performance by
expanding the number of state-owned enterprises and
encouraging barter and countertrade practices (see Industry
and Energy; Foreign Trade, this ch.).
On March 5, 1990, President Mengistu delivered a speech to
the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE) Central Committee in
which he declared the failure of the Marxist economic system
imposed by the military regime after the 1974 overthrow of
Emperor Haile Selassie. He also announced the adoption of a
new strategy for the country's future progress and
development. Mengistu's proposals included decentralization
in planning and a free-market, mixed economy in which the
private and public sectors would play complementary roles.
The new strategy would permit Ethiopian and foreign private
individuals to invest in foreign and domestic trade,
industry, construction, mining, and agriculture and in the
country's development in general. Although Mengistu's new
economic policy attracted considerable attention, many
economists were skeptical about Ethiopia's ability to bring
about a quick radical transformation of its economic
policies. In any case, the plan proved irrelevant in view of
the deteriorating political and military situation that led
to the fall of the regime in 1991.
**************
The Budgetary Process
During the imperial period, the government initiated the
budget cycle each year on the first day of Tikimt (October
ll) by issuing a "call for budget proposals." Supposedly,
the various ministries and agencies adhered to deadlines in
completing the budgetary process. These organizations
submitted current and capital budget proposals to the
Ministry of Finance; the Council of Ministers reviewed all
requests. The ultimate power for approval rested with the
emperor.
After the revolution, the government developed new
guidelines on budget preparation and approval. Addis Ababa
issued annual budget "calls" in July or August, with
preliminary information and guidance. The new guidelines
required ministries and agencies to complete their proposals
by January, when budget hearings would begin. The hearings
included discussions with ministries in which requests would
be aligned with allocations, and justifications for requests
would be evaluated. After the ministries submitted their
current budget proposals to the Ministry of Finance for
review, with a copy to the ONCCP, the ONCCP executive
committee would approve, disapprove, or change the requests.
Conversely, ministries would send capital budget proposals
to the ONCCP with a copy to the Ministry of Finance. The
ONCCP would conclude a similar process of budget hearings,
which would include a review of adherence to guidelines,
justifications for requests, and conformity to investment
priorities identified in the national plan. Thus, under the
new system, the Ministry of Finance developed the current
budget, and the ONCCP developed the capital budget. Draft
current and capital budgets prepared by the Ministry of
Finance and the ONCCP, respectively, would then be
reconciled with estimates of revenues, domestic resources,
and other sources of funding such as loans and aid. The
consolidated current and capital budgets then would go to
the Council of Ministers for review and recommendations. The
final approval was the head of state's prerogative (see
Banking and Monetary Policy, this ch.).
**************
Revenue and Expenditures
Resources were allocated among the various sectors of the
economy differently in the imperial and revolutionary
periods. Under the emperor, the government dedicated about
36 percent of the annual budget to national defense and
maintenance of internal order. Toward the end of the
imperial period, the budgets of the various ministries
increased steadily while tax yields stagnated. With a
majority of the population living at a subsistence level,
there was limited opportunity to increase taxes on personal
or agricultural income. Consequently, the imperial
government relied on indirect taxes (customs, excise, and
sales) to generate revenues. For instance, in the early
l970s taxes on foreign trade accounted for close to two-
fifths of the tax revenues and about one-third of all
government revenues, excluding foreign grants. At the same
time, direct taxes accounted for less than one-third of tax
revenues.
The revolutionary government changed the tax structure in
1976, replacing taxes on agricultural income and rural land
with a rural land-use fee and a new tax on income from
agricultural activities. The government partially alleviated
the tax collection problem that existed during the imperial
period by delegating the responsibility for collecting the
fee and tax on agriculture to peasant associations, which
received a small percentage of revenues as payment. Whereas
total revenue increased significantly, to about 24 percent
of GDP in EFY l988/89, tax revenues remained stagnant at
around l5 percent of GDP. In EFY l974/75, total revenue and
tax revenue had been l3 and ll percent of GDP, respectively.
Despite the 1976 changes in the tax structure, the
government believed that the agricultural income tax was
being underpaid, largely because of underassessments by
peasant associations.
The government levied taxes on exports and imports. In 1987
Addis Ababa taxed all exports at 2 percent and levied an
additional export duty and a surtax on coffee. Import taxes
included customs duties and a 19 percent general import
transaction tax. Because of a policy of encouraging new
capital investment, the government exempted capital goods
from all import taxes. Among imports, intermediate goods
were taxed on a scale ranging from 0 to 35 percent, consumer
goods on a scale of 0 to l00 percent, and luxuries at a flat
rate of 200 percent. High taxes on certain consumer goods
and luxury items contributed to a flourishing underground
economy in which the smuggling of some imports, particularly
liquor and electronic goods, played an important part.
Although tax collection procedures proved somewhat
ineffective, the government maintained close control of
current and capital expenditures. The Ministry of Finance
oversaw procurements and audited ministries to ensure that
expenditures conformed to budget authorizations.
Current expenditures as a proportion of GDP grew from l3.2
percent in EFY l974/75 to 26.1 percent in EFY l987/88. This
growth was largely the result of the increase in
expenditures for defense and general services following the
1974 revolution. During the l977-78 Ogaden War, for example,
when the Somali counteroffensive was under way, defense took
close to 60 percent of the budget. That percentage declined
after l979, although it remained relatively higher than the
figure for the prerevolutionary period. Between l974 and
l988, about 40 to 50 percent of the budget was dedicated to
defense and government services.
Economic and social services received less than 30 percent
of government funds until EFY l972/73, when a rise in
educational outlays pushed them to around 40 percent. Under
the Mengistu regime, economic and social service
expenditures remained at prerevolutionary levels:
agriculture's share was 2 percent, while education and
health received an average of l4 and 4 percent,
respectively.
*******************
Banking and Monetary Policy
The 1974 revolution brought major changes to the banking
system. Prior to the emergence of the Marxist government,
Ethiopia had several state-owned banking institutions and
private financial institutions. The National Bank of
Ethiopia (the country's central bank and financial adviser),
the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (which handled commercial
operations), the Agricultural and Industrial Development
Bank (established largely to finance state-owned
enterprises), the Savings and Mortgage Corporation of
Ethiopia, and the Imperial Savings and Home Ownership Public
Association (which provided savings and loan services) were
the major state-owned banks. Major private commercial
institutions, many of which were foreign owned, included the
Addis Ababa Bank, the Banco di Napoli, and the Banco di
Roma. In addition, there were several insurance companies.
In January and February l975, the government nationalized
and subsequently reorganized private banks and insurance
companies. By the early l980s, the country's banking system
included the National Bank of Ethiopia; the Addis Ababa
Bank, which was formed by merging the three commercial banks
that existed prior to the revolution; the Ethiopian
Insurance Corporation, which incorporated all of the
nationalized insurance companies; and the new Housing and
Savings Bank, which was responsible for making loans for new
housing and home improvement. The government placed all
banks and financial institutions under the National Bank of
Ethiopia's control and supervision. The National Bank of
Ethiopia regulated currency, controlled credit and monetary
policy, and administered foreign-currency transactions and
the official foreign-exchange reserves. A majority of the
banking services were concentrated in major urban areas,
although there were efforts to establish more rural bank
branches throughout the country. However, the lending
strategies of the banks showed that the productive sectors
were not given priority. In l988, for example, about 55
percent of all commercial bank credit financed imports and
domestic trade and services. Agriculture and industry
received only 6 and l3 percent of the commercial credit,
respectively.
To combat inflation and reduce the deficit, the government
adopted a conservative fiscal management policy in the
1980s. The government limited the budget deficit to an
average of about l4 percent of GDP in the five years ending
in EFY l988/89 by borrowing from local sources. For
instance, in EFY l987/88 domestic borrowing financed about
38 percent of the deficit. Addis Ababa also imposed measures
to cut back capital expenditures and to lower inflation.
However, price controls, official overvaluing of the birr,
and a freeze on the wages of senior government staff have
failed to control inflation. By 1988 inflation was averaging
7.1 percent annually, but it turned sharply upward during
1990 as war expenditures increased and was estimated at 45
percent by mid-1991. Moreover, money supply, defined as
currency in circulation and demand deposits with banks
(except that of the National Bank of Ethiopia), rose with
the expansion in government budget deficits, which reached
about 1.6 billion birr in EFY 1988/89. To help resolve this
deficit problem and numerous other economic difficulties,
Addis Ababa relied on foreign aid (see Balance of Payments
and Foreign Assistance, this ch).
****************
Labor Force
Ethiopia's first and only national census, conducted in
1984, put the population at 42 million, which made Ethiopia
the third most populous country in Africa, after Egypt and
Nigeria. The census also showed that by l994 Ethiopia's
population would reach 56 million. According to World Bank
(see Glossary) projections, Ethiopia will have a population
of 66 million by the year 2000 (other estimates suggested
that the population would be more than 67 million).
The l984 census indicated that 46.6 percent of the
population consisted of children under fifteen years of age,
which indicated a relatively high rate of dependence on the
working population for education, health, and social
services. Such a high dependency rate often is
characteristic of a country in transition from a subsistence
to a monetized economy. Because of limited investment
resources in the modern sector, not all the working-age
population can be absorbed, with the result that
unemployment can become a growing social and economic
problem for an economy in transition.
The l988/89 economically active labor force was estimated
to be 2l million, of which l9.3 million were in rural areas
and l.7 million in urban areas. Estimates of the labor
force's annual growth ranged from 1.8 to 2.9 percent.
The labor force's occupational distribution showed that in
l990 some 80 percent of the labor force worked in
agriculture, 8 percent in industry, and l2 percent in
services. These figures had changed slightly from the 1965
figures of 86, 5, and 9 percent, respectively. Thus, while
agriculture's proportionate share of the labor force fell,
the other two sectors gained. This trend reflects a
modernizing society that is diversifying its economy by
expanding secondary and tertiary sectors.
****************
Unemployment
Generally, it is difficult to measure unemployment in less
developed countries such as Ethiopia because of the lack of
reliable records and the existence of various informal types
of work. However, based on Ministry of Labor surveys and
numerous other analyses, a general assessment of
unemployment in Ethiopia can be made. According to the
Ministry of Labor, the unemployment rate increased 11.5
percent annually during the 1979-88 period; by l987/88 there
were 715,065 registered unemployed workers in thirty-six
major towns. Of those registered, l34,ll7 ultimately found
jobs, leaving the remaining 580,948 unemployed. The urban
labor force totaled 1.7 million in 1988/89. The Ministry of
Labor indicated that the government employed 523,000 of
these workers. The rest relied on private employment or
self-employment for their livelihood.
According to the government, rural unemployment was
virtually nonexistent. A l981/82 rural labor survey revealed
that 97.5 percent of the rural labor force worked, 2.4
percent did not work because of social reasons, and 0.l
percent had been unemployed during the previous twelve
months. However, it is important to note that unemployment,
as conventionally defined, records only part of the story;
it leaves out disguised unemployment and underemployment,
which were prevalent in both urban and rural areas. For
instance, the same rural labor force survey found that 50
percent of those working were unpaid family workers. What is
important about unemployment in Ethiopia is that with an
expansion of the labor force, the public sector--with an
already swollen payroll and acute budgetary problems--was
unlikely to absorb more than a tiny fraction of those
****************
Labor Unions
The 1955 constitution guaranteed the right to form workers'
associations. However, it was not until 1962 that the
Ethiopian government issued the Labor Relations Decree,
which authorized trade unions. In April 1963, the imperial
authorities recognized the Confederation of Ethiopian Labor
Unions (CELU), which represented twenty-two industrial labor
groups. By 1973 CELU had 167 affiliates with approximately
80,000 members, which represented only about 30 percent of
all eligible workers.
CELU never evolved into a national federation of unions.
Instead, it remained an association of labor groups
organized at the local level. The absence of a national
constituency, coupled with other problems such as
corruption, embezzlement, election fraud, ethnic and
regional discrimination, and inadequate finances, prevented
CELU from challenging the status quo in the industrial
sector. Nevertheless, CELU sponsored several labor protests
and strikes during the first decade of its existence. After
1972 CELU became more militant as drought and famine caused
the death of up to 200,000 people. The government responded
by using force to crush labor protests, strikes, and
demonstrations.
Although many of its members supported the overthrow of
Haile Selassie, CELU was the first labor organization to
reject the military junta and to demand the creation of a
people's government. On May 19, 1975, the Derg temporarily
closed CELU headquarters on the grounds that the union
needed to be reorganized. Furthermore, the military
authorities asserted that workers should elect their future
leaders according to the aims and objectives of Ethiopian
socialism. This order did not rescind traditional workers'
rights, such as the right to organize freely, to strike, and
to bargain collectively over wages and working conditions.
Rather, it sought to control the political activities of the
CELU leadership. As expected, CELU rejected these actions
and continued to demand democratic changes and civilian
rights. In January 1977, the Derg replaced CELU (abolished
December 1975) with the All-Ethiopia Trade Union (AETU). The
AETU had 1,341 local chapters, known as workers'
associations, with a total membership of 287,000. The new
union thus was twice as large as CELU had ever been. The
government maintained that the AETU's purpose was to educate
workers about the need to contribute their share to national
development by increasing productivity and building
socialism.
In l978 the government replaced the AETU executive
committee after charging it with political sabotage, abuse
of authority, and failure to abide by the rules of
democratic centralism. In l982 a further restructuring of
the AETU occurred when Addis Ababa issued the Trade Unions'
Organization Proclamation. An uncompromising Marxist-
Leninist document, this proclamation emphasized the need "to
enable workers to discharge their historical responsibility
in building the national economy by handling with care the
instruments of production as their produce, and by enhancing
the production and proper distribution of goods and
services." A series of meetings and elections culminated in
a national congress in June l982, at which the government
replaced the leadership of the AETU. In l986 the government
relabeled the AETU the Ethiopia Trade Union (ETU).
In l983/84 the AETU claimed a membership of 3l3,434. The
organization included nine industrial groups, the largest of
which was manufacturing, which had accounted for 29.2
percent of the membership in l982/83, followed by
agriculture, forestry, and fishing with 26.6 percent,
services with l5.l percent, transportation with 8.l percent,
construction with 8.0 percent, trade with 6.2 percent,
utilities with 3.7 percent, finance with 2.4 percent, and
mining with 0.7 percent. A total of 35.6 percent of the
members lived in Addis Ababa and another l8.0 percent in
Shewa. Eritrea and Tigray accounted for no more than 7.5
percent of the total membership. By the late 1980s, the AETU
had failed to regain the activist reputation its
predecessors had won in the 1970s. According to one
observer, this political quiescence probably indicated that
the government had successfully co-opted the trade unions.
****************
Wages and Prices
Prior to the revolution, the Central Personnel Agency
formulated and regulated wage policies. At the time of the
military takeover, there was no minimum wage law; wages and
salaries depended much on demand. There was, however, some
legislation that defined pay scales. For instance, Notice 49
of l972 defined pay scales and details regarding incremental
steps for civil servants. Similarly, the Ethiopian Workers
Commission had developed pay-scale guidelines based on
skill, experience, and employment. In l974 CELU asked for a
3 birr daily minimum wage, which the imperial government
eventually granted.
After the revolution, the government's policy was to
control wage growth to reduce pay scales. For parastatal and
public enterprise workers earning 650 birr or less per month
(real income, i.e., income adjusted for inflation) and civil
servants earning 600 birr or less per month, the government
allowed incremental pay increases. But for those above these
cutoff points, there was a general salary freeze. However,
promotions sometimes provided a worker a raise over the
cutoff levels.
Given inflation, the salary freeze affected the real income
of many workers. For instance, the starting salary of a
science graduate in l975 was 600 birr per month. In l984 the
real monthly income of a science graduate had dropped to 239
birr. Similarly, the highest civil servant's maximum salary
in l975 was l,440 birr per month; the real monthly income of
the same civil servant in l984 was 573 birr.
Data on real wages of manufacturing workers and the
behavior of price indexes provide further evidence of
worsening living standards after the revolution. In l985/86
the average real monthly income of an industrial worker was
65.6 percent of the l974/75 level (see table 11, Appendix).
The general trend shows that real income fell as consumer
prices continued to increase. The retail price index for
Addis Ababa rose from 375.2 in l980/8l (l963=100) to 480.0
in l987/88. This rise in the retail price index included
increases in the cost of food (27 percent), household items
(38 percent), and transportation (l7 percent) (see table 12,
Appendix).
Price increases mainly affected urban wage earners on fixed
incomes, as purchases of necessities used larger portions of
their pay. The government's wage freeze and the controls it
placed on job transfers and changes made it difficult for
most urban wage earners to improve their living standards.
The freeze on wages and job changes also reduced
productivity.
****************
Agriculture
Accounting for over 40 percent of GDP, 80 percent of
exports, and 80 percent of the labor force, agriculture
remained in 1991 the economy's most important sector (see
fig. 9). Ethiopia has great agricultural potential because
of its vast areas of fertile land, diverse climate,
generally adequate rainfall, and large labor pool. Despite
this potential, however, Ethiopian agriculture has remained
underdeveloped. Because of drought, which has persistently
affected the country since the early 1970s, a poor economic
base (low productivity, weak infrastructure, and low level
of technology), and the Mengistu government's commitment to
Marxism-Leninism, the agricultural sector has performed
poorly. For instance, according to the World Bank, between
l980 and l987 agricultural production dropped at an annual
rate of 2.l percent, while the population grew at an annual
rate of 2.4 percent. Consequently, the country faced a
tragic famine that resulted in the death of nearly 1 million
people from l984 to 1986.
During the imperial period, the development of the
agricultural sector was retarded by a number of factors,
including tenancy and land reform problems, the government's
neglect of the agricultural sector (agriculture received
less than 2 percent of budget allocations even though the
vast majority of the population depended on agriculture),
low productivity, and lack of technological development.
Moreover, the emperor's inability to implement meaningful
land reform perpetuated a system in which aristocrats and
the church owned most of the farmland and in which most
farmers were tenants who had to provide as much as 50
percent of their crops as rent. To make matters worse,
during the 1972-74 drought and famine the imperial
government refused to assist rural Ethiopians and tried to
cover up the crisis by refusing international aid. As a
result, up to 200,000 Ethiopians perished.
Although the issue of land reform was not addressed until
the l974 revolution, the government had tried to introduce
programs to improve the condition of farmers. In 1971 the
Ministry of Agriculture introduced the Minimum Package
Program (MPP) to bring about economic and social changes.
The MPP included credit for the purchase of items such as
fertilizers, improved seeds, and pesticides; innovative
extension services; the establishment of cooperatives; and
the provision of infrastructure, mainly water supply and
all-weather roads. The program, designed for rural
development, was first introduced in a project called the
Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU). The program
later facilitated the establishment of similar
internationally supported and financed projects at Ada (just
south of Addis Ababa), Welamo, and Humera. By l974 the
Ministry of Agriculture's Extension and Project
Implementation Department (EPID) had more than twenty-eight
areas with more than 200 extension and marketing centers.
Although the MPPs improved the agricultural productivity of
farmers, particularly in the project areas, there were many
problems associated with discrimination against small
farmers (because of a restrictive credit system that favored
big landowners) and tenant eviction.
Imperial government policy permitting investors to import
fertilizers, pesticides, tractors and combines, and (until
1973) fuel free of import duties encouraged the rapid
expansion of large-scale commercial farming. As a result,
agriculture continued to grow, albeit below the population
growth rate. According to the World Bank, agricultural
production increased at an average annual rate of 2.l
percent between l965 and 1973, while population increased at
an average annual rate of 2.6 percent during the same
period.
Agricultural productivity under the Derg continued to
decline. According to the World Bank, agricultural
production increased at an average annual rate of 0.6
percent between 1973 and 1980 but then decreased at an
average annual rate of 2.1 percent between l980 and l987.
During the same period (l973-87), population increased at an
average annual rate of 2.6 percent (2.4 percent for 1980-
87). The poor performance of agriculture was related to
several factors, including drought; a government policy of
controlling prices and the free movement of agricultural
products from surplus to deficit areas; the unstable
political climate; the dislocation of the rural community
caused by resettlement, villagization, and conscription of
young farmers to meet military obligations; land tenure
difficulties and the problem of land fragmentation; the lack
of resources such as farm equipment, better seeds, and
fertilizers; and the overall low level of technology.
President Mengistu's 1990 decision to allow free movement
of goods, to lift price controls, and to provide farmers
with security of tenure was designed to reverse the decline
in Ethiopia's agricultural sector. There was much debate as
to whether or not these reforms were genuine and how
effectively they could be implemented. Nonetheless,
agricultural output rose by an estimated 3 percent in 1990-
91, almost certainly in response to the relaxation of
government regulation. This modest increase, however, was
not enough to offset a general decrease in GDP during the
same period.
*****************
Land Use and Land Reform
Land Use
Of Ethiopia's total land area of l,22l,480 square
kilometers, the government estimated in the late 1980s that
l5 percent was under cultivation and 5l percent was
pastureland. It was also estimated that over 60 percent of
the cultivated area was cropland. Forestland, most of it in
the southwestern part of the country, accounted for 4
percent of the total land area, according to the government.
These figures varied from those provided by the World Bank,
which estimated that cropland, pastureland, and forestland
accounted for l3, 4l, and 25 percent, respectively, of the
total land area in l987.
Inaccessibility, water shortages, and infestations of
disease-causing insects, mainly mosquitoes, prevented the
use of large parcels of potentially productive land. In
Ethiopia's lowlands, for example, the presence of malaria
kept farmers from settling in many areas.
Most agricultural producers were subsistence farmers with
small holdings, often broken into several plots. Most of
these farmers lived on the highlands, mainly at elevations
of 1,500 to 3,000 meters. The population in the lowland
peripheries (below l,500 meters) was nomadic, engaged mainly
in livestock raising.
There are two predominant soil types in the highlands. The
first, found in areas with relatively good drainage,
consists of red-to-reddish-brown clayey loams that hold
moisture and are well endowed with needed minerals, with the
exception of phosphorus. These types of soils are found in
much of Ilubabor, Kefa, and Gamo Gofa. The second type
consists of brownish-to-gray and black soils with a high
clay content. These soils are found in both the northern and
the southern highlands in areas with poor drainage. They are
sticky when wet, hard when dry, and difficult to work. But
with proper drainage and conditioning, these soils have
excellent agricultural potential.
Sandy desert soils cover much of the arid lowlands in the
northeast and in the Ogaden area of southeastern Ethiopia.
Because of low rainfall, these soils have limited
agricultural potential, except in some areas where rainfall
is sufficient for the growth of natural forage at certain
times of the year. These areas are used by pastoralists who
move back and forth in the area following the availability
of pasture for their animals.
The plains and low foothills west of the highlands have
sandy and gray-to-black clay soils. Where the topography
permits, they are suitable for farming. The soils of the
Great Rift Valley often are conducive to agriculture if
water is available for irrigation. The Awash River basin
supports many large-scale commercial farms and several
irrigated small farms.
Soil erosion has been one of the country's major problems.
Over the centuries, deforestation, overgrazing, and
practices such as cultivation of slopes not suited to
agriculture have eroded the soil, a situation that worsened
considerably during the 1970s and 1980s, especially in
Eritrea, Tigray, and parts of Gonder and Welo. In addition,
the rugged topography of the highlands, the brief but
extremely heavy rainfalls that characterize many areas, and
centuries-old farming practices that do not include
conservation measures have accelerated soil erosion in much
of Ethiopia's highland areas. In the dry lowlands,
persistent winds also contribute to soil erosion.
During the imperial era, the government failed to implement
widespread conservation measures, largely because the
country's complex land tenure system stymied attempts to
halt soil erosion and improve the land. After 1975 the
revolutionary government used peasant associations to
accelerate conservation work throughout rural areas. The
1977 famine also provided an impetus to promote
conservation. The government mobilized farmers and organized
"food for work" projects to build terraces and plant trees.
During 1983-84 the Ministry of Agriculture used "food for
work" projects to raise 65 million tree seedlings, plant
18,000 hectares of land, and terrace 9,500 hectares of land.
Peasant associations used 361 nurseries to plant 11,000
hectares of land in community forest. Between 1976 and 1985,
the government constructed 600,000 kilometers of
agricultural embankments on cultivated land and 470,000
kilometers of hillside terraces, and it closed 80,000
hectares of steep slopes for regeneration. However, the
removal of arable land for conservation projects has
threatened the welfare of increasing numbers of rural poor.
For this reason, some environmental experts maintain that
large-scale conservation work in Ethiopia has been
ineffective.
*************
Land Reform
Until the l974 revolution, Ethiopia had a complex land
tenure system. In Welo Province, for example, there were an
estimated 111 types of land tenure. The existence of so many
land tenure systems, coupled with the lack of reliable data,
has made it difficult to give a comprehensive assessment of
landownership in Ethiopia. However, the tenure system can be
understood in a rudimentary way if one examines it in the
context of the basic distinction between landownership
patterns in the north and those in the south.
Historically, Ethiopia was divided into the northern
highlands, which constituted the core of the old Christian
kingdom, and the southern highlands, most of which were
brought under imperial rule by conquest. This north-south
distinction was reflected in land tenure differences. In the
northern provinces--particularly Gojam, Begemdir and Simen
(called Gonder after 1974), Tigray, highland Eritrea, parts
of Welo, and northern Shewa--the major form of ownership was
a type of communal system known as rist (see Glossary).
According to this system, all descendants (both male and
female) of an individual founder were entitled to a share,
and individuals had the right to use (a usufruct right) a
plot of family land. Rist was hereditary, inalienable, and
inviolable. No user of any piece of land could sell his or
her share outside the family or mortgage or bequeath his or
her share as a gift, as the land belonged not to the
individual but to the descent group (see Glossary). Most
peasants in the northern highlands held at least some rist
land, but there were some members belonging to minority
ethnic groups who were tenant farmers.
The other major form of tenure was gult (see Glossary), an
ownership right acquired from the monarch or from provincial
rulers who were empowered to make land grants. Gult owners
collected tribute from the peasantry and, until l966 (when
gult rights were abolished in principle), exacted labor
service as payment in kind from the peasants. Until the
government instituted salaries in the twentieth century,
gult rights were the typical form of compensation for an
official.
Other forms of tenure included samon, mengist, and maderia
land. Samon was land the government had granted to the
Ethiopian Orthodox Church in perpetuity. Traditionally, the
church had claimed about one-third of Ethiopia's land;
however, actual ownership probably never reached this
figure. Estimates of church holdings range from l0 to 20
percent of the country's cultivated land. Peasants who
worked on church land paid tribute to the church (or
monastery) rather than to the emperor. The church lost all
its land after the 1974 revolution. The state owned large
tracts of agricultural land known as mengist and maderia.
Mengist was land registered as government property, and
maderia was land granted mainly to government officials, war
veterans, and other patriots in lieu of a pension or salary.
Although it granted maderia land for life, the state
possessed a reversionary right over all land grants.
Government land comprised about 12 percent of the country's
agricultural land.
In general, absentee landlordism in the north was rare, and
landless tenants were few. For instance, tenancy in Begemdir
and Simen and in Gojam was estimated at about 2 percent of
holdings. In the southern provinces, however, few farmers
owned the land on which they worked. Southern landownership
patterns developed as a result of land measurement and land
grants following the Ethiopian conquest of the region in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. After
conquest, officials divided southern land equally among the
state, the church, and the indigenous population. Warlords
who administered the occupied regions received the state's
share. They, in turn, redistributed part of their share to
their officers and soldiers. The government distributed the
church's share among the church hierarchy in the same
manner. Officials divided the rest between the traditional
leaders (balabats--see Glossary) and the indigenous people.
Thus, the loss of two-thirds of the land to the new
landlords and the church made many local people tenants
(gebbars). Tenancy in the southern provinces ranged between
65 and 80 percent of the holdings, and tenant payments to
landowners averaged as high as 50 percent of the produce.
In the lowland periphery and the Great Rift Valley, the
traditional practice of transhumance and the allocation of
pastoral land according to tribal custom remained
undisturbed until after World War II. These two areas are
inhabited by pastoralists, including the Afar and Isa in
eastern Eritrea, Welo, and Harerge; the Somali in the
Ogaden; the Borana in Sidamo and Bale; and the Kereyu in the
Great Rift Valley area of Shewa. The pastoral social
structure is based on a kinship system with strong interclan
connections; grazing and water rights are regulated by
custom. Until the l950s, this pastoral life remained largely
undisturbed by the highlanders, who intensely disliked the
hot and humid lowland climate and feared malaria. Beginning
in the l950s, however, the malaria eradication programs made
irrigation agriculture in these areas possible. The
government's desire to promote such agriculture, combined
with its policy of creating new tax revenues, created
pressure on many pastoralists, especially the Afar and the
Arsi (a division of the Oromo). Major concessionaires, such
as the Tendaho Cotton Plantation (managed until the 1974
revolution by the British firm Mitchell Cotts) and the Wonji
Sugar Plantation (managed by HVA, a Dutch company), acquired
large tracts of traditional Afar and Arsi grazing land and
converted it into large-scale commercial farms. The loss of
grazing land to these concessions significantly affected
traditional migration patterns for grazing and water.
In the northern and southern parts of Ethiopia, peasant
farmers lacked the means to improve production because of
the fragmentation of holdings, a lack of credit, and the
absence of modern facilities. Particularly in the south, the
insecurity of tenure and high rents killed the peasants'
incentive to improve production.
By the mid-l960s, many sectors of Ethiopian society favored
land reform. University students led the land reform
movement and campaigned against the government's reluctance
to introduce land reform programs and the lack of commitment
to integrated rural development. By l974 it was clear that
the archaic land tenure system was one of the major factors
responsible for the backward condition of Ethiopia's
agriculture and the onset of the revolution. On March 4,
l975, the Derg announced its land reform program. The
government nationalized rural land without compensation,
abolished tenancy, forbade the hiring of wage labor on
private farms, ordered all commercial farms to remain under
state control, and granted each peasant family so-called
"possessing rights" to a plot of land not to exceed ten
hectares.
Tenant farmers in southern Ethiopia, where the average
tenancy was as high as 55 percent and rural elites exploited
farmers, welcomed the land reform. But in the northern
highlands, where communal ownership (rist) dominated and
large holdings and tenancy were exceptions, many people
resisted land reform. Despite the special provision for
communal areas (Article l9 of the proclamation gave peasants
in the communal areas "possessing rights" to the land they
were tilling at the time of the proclamation) and the PMAC's
efforts to reassure farmers that land reform would not
affect them negatively, northerners remained suspicious of
the new government's intentions. The reform held no promise
of gain for most northerners; rather, many northern farmers
perceived land reform as an attack on their rights to rist
land. Resistance intensified when zemecha (see Glossary)
members campaigned for collectivization of land and oxen.
Land reform had the least impact on the lowland
peripheries, where nomads traditionally maintained their
claims over grazing lands. The new proclamation gave them
rights of possession to land they used for grazing.
Therefore, the nomads did not perceive the new program as a
threat. However, in the Afar area of the lower Awash Valley,
where large-scale commercial estates had thrived, there was
opposition to land reform, led mainly by tribal leaders (and
large landowners), such as Ali Mirah, the sultan of Aussa.
The land reform destroyed the feudal order; changed
landowning patterns, particularly in the south, in favor of
peasants and small landowners; and provided the opportunity
for peasants to participate in local matters by permitting
them to form associations. However, problems associated with
declining agricultural productivity and poor farming
techniques still were prevalent.
Government attempts to implement land reform also created
problems related to land fragmentation, insecurity of
tenure, and shortages of farm inputs and tools. Peasant
associations often were periodically compelled to
redistribute land to accommodate young families or new
households moving into their area. The process meant not
only smaller farms but also the fragmentation of holdings,
which were often scattered into small plots to give families
land of comparable quality. Consequently, individual
holdings were frequently far smaller than the permitted
maximum allotment of ten hectares. A l979 study showed that
around Addis Ababa individual holdings ranged from l.0 to
l.6 hectares and that about 48 percent of the parcels were
less than one-fourth of a hectare in size. Another study, of
Dejen awraja (subregion) in Gojam, found that land
fragmentation had been exacerbated since the revolution. For
example, during the pre-reform period, sixty-one out of 200
farmer respondents owned three or four parcels of land;
after the reform, the corresponding number was 135 farmers.
The second problem related to security of tenure, which was
threatened by increasing pressure to redistribute land and
to collectivize farms. Many peasants were reluctant to
improve their land because they were afraid that they would
not receive adequate compensation for upgrades. The third
problem developed as a result of the military government's
failure to provide farmers with basic items like seeds,
oxen, and fertilizer. For instance, one study of four
communities in different parts of Ethiopia found that up to
50 percent of the peasants in some areas lacked oxen and
about 40 percent did not have plows.
************
Government Rural Programs
In l984 the founding congress of the Workers' Party of
Ethiopia (WPE) emphasized the need for a coordinated
strategy based on socialist principles to accelerate
agricultural development. To implement this strategy, the
government relied on peasant associations and rural
development, cooperatives and state farms, resettlement and
villagization, increased food production, and a new
marketing policy.
*********
Peasant Associations and Rural Development
Articles 8 and l0 of the l975 Land Reform Proclamation
required that peasants be organized into a hierarchy of
associations that would facilitate the implementation of
rural development programs and policies. Accordingly, after
the land reform announcement, the government mobilized more
than 60,000 students to organize peasants into associations.
By the end of l987, there were 20,367 peasant associations
with a membership of 5.7 million farmers. Each association
covered an area of 800 hectares, and members included
tenants, landless laborers, and landowners holding fewer
than ten hectares. Former landowners who had held more than
ten hectares of land could join an association only after
the completion of land redistribution. An umbrella
organization known as the All-Ethiopia Peasants' Association
(AEPA) represented local associations. Peasant associations
assumed a wide range of responsibilities, including
implementation of government land use directives;
adjudication of land disputes; encouragement of development
programs, such as water and land conservation; construction
of schools, clinics, and cooperatives; organization of
defense squads; and tax collection. Peasant associations
also became involved in organizing forestry programs, local
service and production cooperatives, road construction, and
data collection projects, such as the l984 census.
*************
Cooperatives and State Farms
Starting in l976, the government encouraged farmers to form
cooperatives. Between l978 and l98l, the PMAC issued a
series of proclamations and directives outlining procedures
for the formation of service cooperatives and producers'
cooperatives. Service cooperatives provided basic services,
such as the sale of farm inputs and consumer items that were
often rationed, the provision of loans, the education of
peasant association members in socialist philosophy, and the
promotion of cottage industries.
The producers' cooperatives alleviated shortages of inputs
(because farmers could pool resources) and problems
associated with the fragmentation of landholdings. The
government ordered the creation of these cooperatives
because of its belief that small farmers were inefficient
and were unable to take advantage of economies of scale.
The producers' cooperatives developed in three stages. The
first stage was the melba, an elementary type of cooperative
that required members to pool land (with the exception of
plots of up to 2,000 square meters, which could be set aside
for private use) and to share oxen and farm implements. The
second stage, welba, required members to transfer their
resources to the cooperative and reduce private plots to
l,000 square meters. The third stage, the weland, abolished
private land use and established advanced forms of
cooperatives, whose goal was to use mechanized farming with
members organized into production brigades. Under this
system, income would be distributed based on labor
contributions.
The government provided a number of inducements to
producers' cooperatives, including priority for credits,
fertilizers, improved seed, and access to consumer items and
building materials. According to the ten-year plan, more
than half of the country's cultivated land would be
organized into producers' cooperatives by l994.
Despite the incentives, farmers responded less than
enthusiastically. Farmers saw the move to form cooperatives
as a prelude to the destruction of their "family farms." By
l985/86 there were only 2,323 producers' cooperatives, of
which only 255 were registered. Some critics argued that the
resistance of farmers caused the government to formulate its
resettlement and villagization programs.
A major component of the government's agricultural policy
since the l974 revolution has been the development of large-
scale state farms. After the l975 land reform, the Derg
converted a majority of the estimated 75,000 hectares of
large, commercial farms owned by individuals and
cooperatives into state farms. Since then, the government
has expanded the size of state farms. In l987/88 there were
about 2l6,000 hectares of state farmland, accounting for 3.3
percent of the total cultivated area. The ten-year plan
indicated that state farms would be expanded to 468,000
hectares by l994, accounting for 6.4 percent of the
cultivated land.
The primary motive for the expansion of state farms was the
desire to reverse the drop in food production that has
continued since the revolution. After the l975 land reform,
peasants began withholding grain from the market to drive up
prices because government price-control measures had created
shortages of consumer items such as coffee, cooking oil,
salt, and sugar. Additionally, increased peasant consumption
caused shortages of food items such as teff (see Glossary),
wheat, corn, and other grains in urban areas. The problem
became so serious that Mengistu lashed out against the
individual and petit burgeois tendencies of the peasantry
and their capitalist mentality on the occasion of the fourth
anniversary of military rule in September l978. Mengistu and
his advisers believed that state farms would produce grain
for urban areas and raw materials for domestic industry and
would also increase production of cash crops such as coffee
to generate badly needed foreign exchange. Accordingly,
state farms received a large share of the country's
resources for agriculture; from 1982 to 1990, this totaled
about 43 percent of the government's agricultural
investment. In l983 state farms received 76 percent of the
total allocation of chemical fertilizers, 95 percent of the
improved seeds, and 8l percent of agricultural credit. In
terms of subsidies, between l982/83 and l985/86 the various
state farm corporations received more than 90 million birr
in direct subsidies. Despite the emphasis on state farms,
state farm production accounted for only 6 percent of total
agricultural output in l987 (although meeting 65 percent of
urban needs), leaving peasant farmers responsible for over
90 percent of production.
The stress on large-scale state farms was under attack by
Western donors, who channeled their agricultural aid to the
peasant sector. These donors maintained that experiences
elsewhere in Africa and in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union had shown that state farms were inefficient and a
drain on scare resources.
**************
Resettlement and Villagization
The policy of encouraging voluntary resettlement went back
to 1958, when the government established the first known
planned resettlement in Sidamo. Shortly after the 1974
revolution, it became Derg policy to accelerate
resettlement. Article l8 of the l975 Land Reform
Proclamation stated that "the government shall have the
responsibility to settle peasants or to establish cottage
industries to accommodate those who, as a result of
distribution of land . . . remain with little or no land."
Accordingly, in l975/76 there were eighty-eight settlement
centers accommodating 38,8l8 households. The government
conducted most of these resettlement programs under the
auspices of the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC)
and the Ministry of Agriculture. By l982 there were ll2
planned settlements populated by more than l20,000 people.
The settlements were concentrated mainly in the south and
southwest. In l984 Addis Ababa announced its intention to
resettle l.5 million people from the drought-affected
northern regions to the south and southwest, where arable
land was plentiful. By l986 the government had resettled
more than 600,000 people to three settlement areas. More
than 250,000 went to Welega; about l50,000 settled in the
Gambela area of Ilubabor; and just over l00,000 went to
Pawe, the largest planned resettlement in Gojam and largely
sustained by Italian financial support. In addition, another
78,000 went to Kefa, Shewa, and western Gonder.
In mid-l986 the government halted the resettlement program,
largely to fend off the negative reaction from the
international community. But in November l987 the program
resumed, and in March l988 Mengistu spoke of the need to
move at least 7 million people. He claimed resettlement
would resolve the country's recurring drought problem and
would ease population pressure from northern areas where the
land had been badly overused. Western donors and
governments, whom Addis Ababa expected to help with the
program, remained apprehensive of the government's
intentions, however. Some believed that the plan to resettle
l.5 million people by l994 was unrealistic, given the
country's strained finances. Others argued that resettlement
was a ploy to depopulate areas of resistance, weaken the
guerrillas' support base, and deny them access to recruits,
particularly in Eritrea and Tigray. Additional arguments
against resettlement included charges of human rights
violations, forced separations of families, and lack of
medical attention in resettlement centers, which resulted in
thousands of deaths from malaria and sleeping sickness.
Although many of these charges were valid, some criticisms
may have been unfounded. For instance, the claim that the
resettlement was a ploy to depopulate the rebel areas may
not have been valid, given that by 1986 only l5 percent of
the 600,000 resettled peasants were from Tigray and none
were from Eritrea. More than 80 percent of those resettled
were from Welo and Shewa.
In l985 the government initiated a new relocation program
known as villagization. The objectives of the program, which
grouped scattered farming communities throughout the country
into small village clusters, were to promote rational land
use; conserve resources; provide access to clean water and
to health and education services; and strengthen security.
Government guidelines stipulated that villages were to house
200 to 300 households, with l00-square-meter compounds for
each family.
In 1985 Addis Ababa established a national coordinating
committee to oversee the villagization plan's
implementation. By March l986, about 4.6 million people in
Shewa, Arsi, and Harerge had been relocated into more than
4,500 villages. Although the government had villagized about
l3 million people by l989, international criticism,
deteriorating security conditions, and lack of resources
doomed the plan to failure. Nevertheless, Mengistu remained
committed to the villagization concept.
Opponents of villagization argued that the scheme was
disruptive to agricultural production because the government
moved many farmers during the planting and harvesting
seasons. There also was concern that villagization could
have a negative impact on fragile local resources,
particularly on water and grazing land; accelerate the
spread of communicable diseases; and increase problems with
plant pests and diseases. In early 1990, the government
essentially abandoned villagization when it announced new
economic policies that called f |
